To support an unequal distribution of the marital estate pursuant to this provision, a court need not find that a spouse acted with wrongful intent, as the marriage was ending. See In the Matter of Martel &Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 58 (2008) (distinguishing "dissipation" of assets from "diminution" of assets, and declining to read an intent or timing element into RSA 458:16-a, 11(f)).
Plaintiff objects, and asks the court to apply New Hampshire law, which: (1) permits the recovery of hedonic damages in wrongful death cases, see Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. Dist., 143 N.H. 331, 336-345 (1999); (2) allows for an award of double or treble damages in private actions brought under the Consumer Protection Act, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ("RSA") § 358-A:10, I; (3) permits spouses and minor children to recover in wrongful-death cases, see RSA 556:12, II III; and (4) follows the American rule, under which "each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees" unless there is "statutory authorization [to the contrary], a court rule, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception [to the general rule]." In re Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63 (2008) (citing In re Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 289 (2006)). The choice-of-law question presented here is somewhat complicated.
Given our conclusion that the record supports the trial court's ruling that Wife intentionally dissipated the Panama property, we need not consider the court's alternative ruling that the transfer of the property warrants an unequal distribution of the estate under RSA 458:16-a, II(f) and In the Matter of Martel &Martel, 157 N.H. 53 (2008). See Loeffler v. Bernier, 173 N.H. 180, 189 (2020).
We will affirm the trial court's factual findings unless the evidence does not support them or they are legally erroneous. In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 62 (2008). The trial court found that the Wife was the source of the "Fini" email that allegedly released the son from his obligations under the loan agreement.
"An award of attorney's fees must be grounded upon statutory authorization, a court rule, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception to the rule that each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees." In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63, 944 A.2d 575 (2008) (quotation omitted). We review the trial court's denial of attorney's fees under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.
We review the trial court's decision to grant relief under RSA 173-B:5 under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 63, 944 A.2d 575 (2008). This standard of review means that we review only whether the record establishes an objective basis for the trial court's discretionary judgments.
Id. If the court's findings can reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand. In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 56, 944 A.2d 575 (2008). A. Valuation of real estate
The court, she contends, similarly "failed to consider [her] motives behind [the] embezzlement" and the petitioner's "post-divorce stature" as well as the fact that the respondent must pay restitution and income taxes associated with the embezzlement. By failing to consider these alleged facts, she contends, the trial court acted contrary to In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 59, 944 A.2d 575 (2008), in which we held: [I]n applying RSA 458:16–a, II(f) to support an unequal distribution of assets due to a spouse's conduct which resulted in a diminution in value of property, a trial court must consider factors such as: conduct which contributed to the growth in value of property; the nature of the conduct; the other spouse's knowledge of the conduct; whether the conduct diminished the total marital assets to such an extent that the other spouse is unable to maintain a similar lifestyle
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's decision is unsustainable. We, therefore, vacate the trial court's ruling on the Keers' motion for contempt and remand for consideration in light of our ruling. Cf. In the Matter of Martel & Martel , 157 N.H. 53, 61, 944 A.2d 575 (2008) (vacating trial court's denial of a motion for contempt where trial court erred in a factual finding that formed the basis of contempt motion). Finally, we note that, on appeal, the parties disagree as to the meaning and ramifications of the trial court's grant of the condominium association's motion to substitute parties. Given that we are remanding, we leave it to the trial court to determine, in the first instance, the effect of its own order.
See id. at 1274;Lewis v. I.R.S., 823 F.2d 375, 378–79 (9th Cir.1987). The petitioner's remaining arguments that enforcement proceedings cannot be “reasonably anticipated” are either inadequately developed, see In the Matter of Martel & Martel, 157 N.H. 53, 64, 944 A.2d 575 (2008), or based upon a mischaracterization of the affidavit. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the affidavit “avers to the potential of an investigation as opposed to the required potential of a proceeding.”