In re Marriage of Wilson

17 Citing cases

  1. In re Marriage of Perlmutter

    225 Ill. App. 3d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 21 times
    Concluding that salary alone was in fact reasonable compensation for his efforts; as such, the marital estate had already been compensated; and holding the trial court's finding that the marital estate is entitled to additional reimbursement was against the manifest weight of the evidence"

    The cases cited by Norman in support of his argument that the trial court erred in analyzing assets of the partnership separately are inapposite. In both In re Marriage of Weiss (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 166, and In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, the reviewing courts were addressing the proper method of valuing a partnership. Those cases were not concerned with the classification of a partnership or its assets as marital or nonmarital property.

  2. In re Marriage of Malters

    133 Ill. App. 3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 41 times

    • 4 First, as Edwards contends, in valuing the pension plans the court does not appear to have taken into consideration Edward's unrebutted testimony that the title to the Montana property had been placed in his pension plans. Thus, in assigning a value of $240,000 to $300,000 to the Montana property and a value of $877,346 to the pension plans, Edward argues that the trial court apparently duplicated the value of the Montana property, thereby overstating the parties' assets by as much as $300,000. Clearly, this would be error ( In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 443 N.E.2d 31), and a redetermination of value with regard to the pension plans and the Montana property is necessary. • 5 Second, the trial court valued the Brinker Road property at $425,000.

  3. In re Marriage of Weiss

    129 Ill. App. 3d 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 8 times

    I • 1 Evelyn's first contention on appeal is that she was awarded an inequitable amount of the parties' marital property because the trial court failed to correctly evaluate Frederick's interests in Weiss, Ltd., Lincoln Medical Park Development and the 17 tax shelter partnerships. For a trial court to apportion marital assets under section 503 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 503), the proper value of such assets must be established. ( In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 443 N.E.2d 31; In re Marriage of Donley (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 367, 403 N.E.2d 1337.) Where the record lacks proper evidence of value, there is no basis upon which the appellate court can review the propriety of the trial court's apportionment of marital property. In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 443 N.E.2d 31; In re Marriage of Kundit (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 310, 437 N.E.2d 777.

  4. In re Marriage of Suarez

    148 Ill. App. 3d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 20 times

    Because the trial court's reconsideration of the evidence of valuation may affect its ultimate division of marital property between the parties, other portions of the judgment awarding maintenance and child support will also be vacated for redetermination after division of the marital property is effected. In re Marriage of Rubinstein (1986), 145 Ill. App.3d 31, 38; In re Marriage of Rapacz (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 1045, 1051; In re Marriage of Malters (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 168, 183; In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 815-16. • 6 Because the cause is being remanded, we find it necessary to address several errors raised by Humberto with regard to the alleged overvaluation of Diesel Radiator. He argues that Dutcher's formula method — net tangible assets ($515,479) plus goodwill ($1,726,600) equals value ($2,242,079) — erroneously included the parties' personally owned real estate (the Melrose Park building valued at $185,000) as a corporate asset.

  5. In re Marriage of Davis

    476 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 10 times

    [Citation.]" In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 813, 443 N.E.2d 31. While we recognize that the valuation of a closely held corporation "is not an exact science" ( In re Marriage of Mullins (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 86, 89, 458 N.E.2d 1360), this does not mean that such entities are incapable of being appropriately evaluated. For example, in In re Marriage of Weiss (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 166, 172, 472 N.E.2d 128, the court states:

  6. Hamilton Airport Advertising v. Hamilton

    462 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    "Due to the nature of a partnership, a partner not only has rights in partnership assets and profits . . . but also has the right to be repaid the amount of his contributions to the capital of the partnership."In re Marriage of Wilson, (1982) 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 814, 66 Ill.Dec. 508, 511-512, 443 N.E.2d 31, 34-35. And from a purely practical standpoint, a partner could be repaid his capital contribution in full, but his partnership interest would remain.

  7. In re Marriage of Shafer

    462 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 12 times

    Petitioner contends that the trial court's valuation of the business at $55,000 is arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence presented. • 4 In order to apportion marital assets under section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the proper value of such assets must be established. ( In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 813, 443 N.E.2d 31, 34.) The trial court need not make specific findings of fact as to the value of the marital assets, so long as the evidence of value in the record is sufficient to enable a court of review to analyze the propriety of the trial court's disposition. In re Marriage of Voight (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 623, 628, 444 N.E.2d 694, 697.

  8. In re Marriage of Schneider

    343 Ill. App. 3d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 8 times

            (d) Liabilities of the practitioner related to his business." Stone, 155 Ill.App.3d at 72, 107 Ill.Dec. 747, 507 N.E.2d 900; Rubinstein, 145 Ill.App.3d at 35-36, 99 Ill.Dec. 212, 495 N.E.2d 659 (valuation of medical corporation); In reMarriage of Davis, 131 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1069, 87 Ill.Dec. 145, 476 N.E.2d 1137 (1985) (valuation of corporate law firm); In re Marriage of Wilson, 110 Ill.App.3d 809, 813-14, 66 Ill.Dec. 508, 443 N.E.2d 31 (1982) (valuation of timber business partnership).         As such, accounts receivable are business assets and must be included in the valuation of Earl's dental practice.

  9. In re Marriage of Tietz

    238 Ill. App. 3d 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 84 times
    Holding that the husband's summary of his major expenses during the relevant period was sufficient to establish that the money withdrawn was used for appropriate purposes

    " Stone, 155 Ill. App.3d at 72, 507 N.E.2d at 906-07. See also In re Marriage of Leon (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 383, 386-87, 399 N.E.2d 1006, 1009, citing In re Marriage of Lopez (1974), 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 110, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58, 69; In re Marriage of Rubinstein (1986), 145 Ill. App.3d 31, 35-36, 495 N.E.2d 659, 662 (valuation of medical corporation); In re Marriage of Davis (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 1065, 1069, 476 N.E.2d 1137, 1140 (valuation of corporate law firm); In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 813-14, 443 N.E.2d 31, 34-35 (valuation of timber business partnership); In re Marriage of Feldman (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1002, 1005, 557 N.E.2d 1004, 1006 (accounts receivable are business assets and must be included in the practice's valuation); Davis, Valuation of Professional Practices in Dissolution Cases, 74 Ill. B.J. 14 (1985). While the supreme court in Zells held neither contingent-fee contracts nor professional goodwill was a marital asset subject to valuation, division or distribution, it did not state accounts receivable could not be considered in valuing a partnership.

  10. In re Marriage of Stone

    155 Ill. App. 3d 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 32 times

    (d) Liabilities of the practitioner related to his business.In re Marriage of Leon (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 383, 386, 399 N.E.2d 1006, 1009, citing In re Marriage of Lopez (1974), 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 110, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58, 69. See also In re Marriage of Rubinstein (1986), 145 Ill. App.3d 31, 495 N.E.2d 659 (valuation of medical corporation); In re Marriage of Davis (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 1065, 476 N.E.2d 1137 (valuation of corporate law firm); In re Marriage of Wilson (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 809, 443 N.E.2d 31 (valuation of timber business partnership); In re Marriage of White (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (valuation of professional dental practice). • 8 The wife's expert valued the interest in the partnership using the method of valuation adopted in Leon.