Opinion
B322040
05-30-2023
In re the Marriage of DAMIKA N. and SEAN O. WILLIAMS. v. SEAN O. WILLIAMS, Appellant. DAMIKA N. WILLIAMS, Respondent,
Law Office of Randolph J. Brandelli and Randolph J. Brandelli for Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 21CMFL00071, Emily T. Spear, Judge.
Law Office of Randolph J. Brandelli and Randolph J. Brandelli for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
LAVIN, J.
INTRODUCTION
Sean and Damika Williams separated in 2021 after 20 years of marriage. The court entered judgment of dissolution pursuant to the parties' stipulated agreement. Months later, Sean moved to set aside the judgment, arguing that the parties had not complied with the disclosure requirements of Family Code sections 2104 and 2105. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.
We refer to the parties by their first names because they have the same last name. No disrespect is intended.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2021, Damika filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Sean. Damika and Sean were married for 20 years and have two minor children.
All dates are in 2021 unless otherwise indicated.
On May 21, Damika and Sean filed a stipulation stating that the parties agreed: (1) that the matter could be decided as an uncontested matter; (2) that they waived their rights to notice of trial, a statement of decision, a motion for new trial, and the right to appeal; (3) that the matter could be decided by a commissioner sitting as a judge; and (4) none of these agreements or waivers would apply unless the court approves the stipulation for judgment or incorporates the written settlement agreement into the judgment.
On June 22, Damika filed a declaration for default or uncontested dissolution, which stated that the matter was proceeding as an uncontested action and that the parties had mutually waived service of final declarations of disclosure. The parties also filed declarations regarding service of their preliminary declarations of disclosure, which stated that they had served one another on February 5, and filed a stipulation and waiver of final declaration of disclosure, which they had signed on May 14. In that waiver, which was made on Judicial Council of California form FL-144, Damika and Sean agreed that both had "complied with Family Code section 2104, and the preliminary declarations of disclosure have been completed and exchanged"; that they "fully complied with Family Law section 2102 and have fully augmented the preliminary declarations of disclosure"; that each entered into the waiver "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily"; and that "[e]ach party understands that this waiver does not limit the legal disclosure obligations of the parties but rather is a statement under penalty of perjury that those obligations have been fulfilled."
Damika also filed a proof of service of summons of the petition for dissolution of marriage, which stated that Sean had been served with the petition on June 15. Sean filed an acknowledgment of receipt of service of the petition, which he had signed June 18.
On July 12, the court entered judgment of dissolution, which ordered child custody, visitation, child support, and division of property pursuant to the parties' stipulated judgment, which was signed by the parties and notarized on March 20.
In January 2022, Sean filed a motion to set aside the judgment. In his memorandum of points and authorities, he argued that the judgment should be set aside because Damika served her preliminary declaration of disclosure before she filed the petition and that he had signed the stipulated judgment before he was served.
Damika filed a responsive declaration opposing the motion. She argued that the Family Code requires a finding by the court that "the facts alleged as the grounds for relief materially affected the original outcome and that the moving party would materially benefit from the granting of the relief" (§ 2121, subd. (b)), and that Sean had failed to address either of those elements or to state any grounds for his motion. Damika further contended that Sean failed to allege any prejudice and that none existed because the parties had exchanged preliminary declarations prior to signing the stipulated judgment, and the parties also signed a waiver of the final declaration under penalty of perjury.
Sean filed a further memorandum in support of his motion, in which he contended that Damika had told Sean, who was then unrepresented by counsel, that "the Stipulated Judgment was just some papers intended to get the divorce 'started'" and thus fraudulently induced him to sign the papers. He did not submit any evidence in support of these claims. Sean argued that the court should set aside the judgment because the stipulated judgment was signed prior to service of the petition and because of Damika's purported fraud in inducing Sean to sign the agreement.
On May 2, 2022, the court heard argument on the motion. The court denied the motion and concluded that "the apparent stipulation and waivers are sufficient to get over the declaration of disclosure issue."
Sean timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sean's motion to set aside the judgment.
Under section 2122, there are six exclusive grounds to set aside a judgment, including actual fraud and failure to comply with the disclosure requirements. (§ 2122, subds. (a), (f).) Before granting relief from judgment, the trial court "shall find the facts alleged as the grounds for relief materially affected the original outcome and that the moving party would materially benefit from the granting of the relief." (§ 2121, subd. (b).) We review an order granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment under section 2122 for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Binette (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1125 (Binette).)
Sean argues that the stipulated judgment is invalid because, contrary to the relevant provisions of the Family Code, the preliminary declarations of disclosure were exchanged before the petition for dissolution was served on him, and because the stipulated judgment was signed by the parties before they exchanged final declarations of disclosure or signed their waiver of those disclosures. Although Sean raised the argument concerning the preliminary disclosures below, he did not argue that the judgment must be overturned based on the timing of the waiver of the final declaration of disclosure." 'It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.'" (Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 651, 670.) Even if we assume that this argument is not waived, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sean's motion.
Sean states in the introduction of his brief that the stipulated judgment was "obtained . . . through fraud and misrepresentation," but his brief contains no arguments concerning Damika's purported fraud. Thus, we deem this argument abandoned.
1.1. Sean fails to make any showing that he was prejudiced by the exchange of preliminary disclosures before the time required by statute.
Sean does not and cannot argue that the stipulated judgment was inequitable because he did not have access to Damika's financial information. He also does not contend that Damika's preliminary disclosure was substantively deficient. Rather, Sean appears to argue that the judgment should have been set aside because the timing of the disclosure was not consistent with the statute, which provides that "[t]he petitioner shall serve the other party with the preliminary declaration of disclosure either concurrently with the petition for dissolution or legal separation, or within 60 days of filing the petition." (§ 2104, subd. (f).) Sean fails to identify how he was harmed by being served with Damika's preliminary disclosure five days before she filed the petition and several months before she served it.
The Family Code provides: "It is the policy of the State of California (1) to marshal, preserve, and protect community and quasi-community assets and liabilities that exist at the date of separation so as to avoid dissipation of the community estate before distribution, (2) to ensure fair and sufficient child and spousal support awards, and (3) to achieve a division of community and quasi-community assets and liabilities on the dissolution or nullity of marriage or legal separation of the parties as provided under California law." (§ 2100, subd. (a).) "In order to promote this public policy, a full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage ...." (Id., subd. (c).)
Section 2120, subdivision (a), reiterates the State of California's "strong policy of ensuring the division of community and quasicommunity property in the dissolution of a marriage" and that "[t]hese policy goals can only be implemented with full disclosure of community, quasi-community, and separate assets, liabilities, income, and expenses, as provided in Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 2100) ...."
Considering the relevant public policies, we fail to see how Sean could have been prejudiced by having access to Damika's preliminary disclosures at an earlier point than is required by statute. In the cases Sean relies upon in asserting error, the parties either did not exchange preliminary disclosures or their disclosures were deficient. (In re Marriage of Fell (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1060 (Fell); Binette, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1133.) In Fell, the court concluded that the parties could not contravene the policies expressed in sections 2100 and 2120 through a private agreement stating that the parties need not exchange any disclosures. (Fell, at pp. 1063-1064.) That was plainly not the case here.
Sean argues that any noncompliance with the nondisclosure statutes requires reversal, relying on section 2107, subdivision (d), which states in relevant part: "The failure to comply with the disclosure requirements does not constitute harmless error." We conclude that nondisclosure is a legitimate basis for vacating a judgment only if the moving party shows that he or she was prejudiced by the nondisclosure. In In re Marriage of Steiner &Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 519, 526 (Steiner), the court observed that it "appears that th[is] sentence was added precisely to undo the rule articulated by" earlier cases that had squarely held that a showing of prejudice resulting from a nondisclosure must be shown to compel a reversal of the judgment. (Ibid.) However, these prior decisions "were not . . . based purely on statutory construction," but "relied on the constitutional mandate embodied in article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution that no judgment may be set aside or new trial granted unless there has been a miscarriage of justice." (Ibid.) The Steiner court concluded that "[t]he California Constitution trumps any conflicting provision of the Family Code." (Id. at pp. 675-676; accord, In re Marriage of Kieturakis (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 56, 92 ["showing of prejudice is still required despite th[e] statutory language" of section 2107, subdivision (d)].) We agree. Further, section 2107, subdivision (d), is inconsistent with section 2121, subdivision (b), which, as discussed above, requires a court to find that the grounds advanced for relief from judgment "materially affected the original outcome."
As the court in Steiner observed, and as will be relevant below, section 2107, subdivision (d), is also directly inconsistent with section 2105, which concerns final declarations of disclosure. (Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) Section 2105, subdivision (c) provides: "In making an order setting aside a judgment for failure to comply with this section, the court may limit the set aside to those portions of the judgment materially affected by the nondisclosure." "The idea of material effect by reason of nondisclosure cannot be squared with the proposition that a judgment not materially affected at all by nondisclosure must be set aside." (Steiner, at p. 527.)
In sum, the California Constitution and Family Code require that Sean demonstrate prejudice. He has failed to do so. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that any noncompliance with respect to the preliminary disclosures was harmless.
1.2. Sean fails to establish that he was prejudiced by the parties' waiver of final disclosures after they entered into the stipulated judgment.
Sean also argues that the court was required to set aside the judgment because the parties did not exchange their final disclosure declarations or execute a waiver of those disclosures prior to signing the stipulated judgment, contrary to the requirements of the Family Code.
Section 2105, subdivision (a) provides: "Except by court order for good cause, before or at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of property or support issues other than pendente lite support . . . each party, or the attorney for the party in this matter, shall serve on the other party a final declaration of disclosure and a current income and expense declaration, executed under penalty of perjury on a form prescribed by the Judicial Council, unless the parties mutually waive the final declaration of disclosure." (Italics added.)
Here, the parties mutually waived the final declaration of disclosure. Sean does not contend that the waiver, which was made on a court form, was not compliant with section 2105, subdivision (d).
Section 2105, subdivision (d) provides that a waiver must contain the following representations: (1) that the parties "have complied with Section 2104 and the preliminary declarations of disclosure have been completed and exchanged"; (2) that they "have completed and exchanged a current income and expense declaration, that includes all material facts and information regarding that party's earnings, accumulations, and expenses"; (3) that they have "fully complied with Section 2102 and have fully augmented the preliminary declarations of disclosure"; (4) that "[t]he waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into by each of the parties"; and (5) and that "[e]ach party understands that this waiver does not limit the legal disclosure obligations of the parties, but rather is a statement under penalty of perjury that those obligations have been fulfilled" and "that noncompliance with those obligations will result in the court setting aside the judgment."
In the cases on which Sean relies, the courts found that the judgments had been properly set aside where the parties' attempted waivers of the final disclosures did not comply with the statutory requirements, not because the waivers were executed after a stipulated judgment or settlement agreement. In Fell, "[t]he parties neither obtained a court order on good cause shown permitting them to dispense with the final declaration of disclosure nor did they make the representations required by subdivision (c). The instant waiver agreement did not state that the parties complied with section 2104, that the preliminary declarations have been completed and exchanged and that both parties have completed and exchanged a current income and expense declaration." (Fell, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10641065.) Indeed, the parties could not represent that they had complied with section 2104, as "[t]he parties did not comply with the statutes setting forth the mandatory requirements for exchange of preliminary and final declarations of disclosure and of current income and expenses under penalty of perjury." (Id. at p. 1063.) The court therefore affirmed the judgment setting aside the original judgment of dissolution and marital settlement agreement. (Id. at p. 1066.) Thus, contrary to Sean's assertion, the court in Fell did not hold that the failure to comply "with the timing required in the declaration disclosure statutes . . . was grounds to set aside the dissolution judgment."
The requirements now in section 2105, subdivision (d) were previously found in subdivision (c). The statute was amended in 2001 to add a new subdivision (c), which states: "In making an order setting aside a judgment for failure to comply with this section, the court may limit the set aside to those portions of the judgment materially affected by the nondisclosure." (Stats. 2001, ch. 703, § 4.)
In Binette, "the parties filed a stipulation and waiver of final declaration of disclosure (stipulation). According to the stipulation, the parties agreed that they had complied with [Family Code] sections 2102 and 2104; that they completed and exchanged a current income and expense declaration; that they entered into the stipulation knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and that if they failed to comply with the legal disclosure obligations, 'the court will set aside the judgment.'" (Binette, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123.) However, the court granted the wife's motion to set aside the judgment on grounds of mistake of fact, as the parties had not actually complied with the requirements of section 2104. (Id. at pp. 1124, 1133.) The Court of Appeal concluded that, "[g]iven the lack of compliance with the statutory requirements, the stipulation was insufficient to act as a waiver of the final disclosure," and affirmed. (Id. at pp. 11331134.) Again, the issue in Binette was not the timing of the waiver of the final disclosures, but the fact that the waiver contained inaccurate representations. Sean has made no showing that the representations made in the parties' waiver were in any way false.
Here, the court concluded that the parties' waiver of the final declarations of disclosure after the stipulated judgment was executed rendered any error in not exchanging final disclosures prior to signing the stipulated judgment harmless. Sean argues that, to the extent a showing of prejudice is required (and we have held that it is), "the plain terms of the one-sided stipulated judgment in favor of Damika, giving her all of the community property and essentially full custody of the children, with no visitation rights for Sean, easily meets any required showing of a miscarriage of justice, or prejudice, or a loss to Sean upon upholding the agreement and refusing to set aside the dissolution judgment." However, he makes no attempt to tie the timing of the waiver of the final disclosures to the purported inequity of the parties' stipulated judgment. Sean does not argue that, had the parties exchanged final disclosures or signed a waiver thereof at the time the stipulated judgment was entered into, he would have read its terms (which he admits he did not do) and refrained from signing it. Thus, he has failed to adequately address the court's conclusion, much less demonstrate that it was beyond the bounds of reason.
Sean relies on In re Marriage of Dellaria &Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196 to support that the uneven terms of the stipulated judgment requires reversal. In that case, the parties' purported oral agreement regarding the lopsided division of community property was not evidenced by any written agreement of the parties or by an oral stipulation in court, as required by section 2550. (Dellaria, at p. 201.) The husband in the case disputed that any oral agreement existed (id. at pp. 199200), and" 'vehemently disagree[d] that the alleged oral agreement constituted a favorable division of the community estate'; and . . . explained in great detail how he was prejudiced by the court's enforcement of the parties' agreement." (Id. at p. 205.) The Court of Appeal found the circumstances distinguishable from those present in Steiner, where "the appellant had not shown how she was prejudiced by the failure to exchange final disclosure statements." (Id. at p. 205, citing Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 527-528.) The court concluded that the husband "fulfilled his duty to tender a proper prejudice argument" and that "the error here is not cured by the 'miscarriage of justice' standard in article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution." (Dellaria, at p. 205.)
Unlike in Dellaria, the agreement here was signed by both Sean and Damika and notarized. In Dellaria, the statutory noncompliance and the prejudice to the husband were directly related: but for the court overlooking the requirements of section 2550, the husband would not be subject to the unfavorable division of community property. In contrast, Sean has failed to offer any explanation as to how the parties' failure to exchange final disclosures prior to their execution of the stipulated judgment impacted the distribution of property, or of how he was harmed notwithstanding his subsequent waiver of the final disclosure. Thus, his reliance on Dellaria is unavailing.
Having failed to tie the purported inequity of the stipulated judgment to noncompliance with the disclosure requirements, Sean cannot argue that the judgment must be overturned simply because it is inequitable. "Section 2123 is plain that where the only reason to set aside a judgment is that it was 'inequitable when made,' the trial court is affirmatively commanded not to set the judgment aside under 'any' law." (In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 33.) "[Section 2123] leaves a trial court with no discretion to grant a motion based solely on an imbalance or 'windfall' theory." (Id. at p. 34.) "[T]he naked lopsidedness of the deal in hindsight" is not enough under section 2123 to warrant setting aside the judgment. (Id. at p. 36.)
We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Sean was not prejudiced by the parties' failure to exchange final disclosures prior to entering into the stipulated judgment.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Sean's motion to set aside the judgment is affirmed. No costs are awarded because Damika did not participate in the appeal.
WE CONCUR: EDMON, P. J., EGERTON, J.