Opinion
No. 50962-4-I.
Filed: March 15, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No. 01-3-03829-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 07/29/2002. Judge signing: Hon. Terry Lukens.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Deborah Anne Bianco, Campiche Hepburn McCarty Bianco, Elliott Bay Office Park, 300 Elliott Ave W Ste 550, Seattle, WA 98119-4145.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Melissa Mager, Attorney at Law, 900 4th Ave Ste 3250, Seattle, WA 98164-1072.
Catherine Wright Smith, Edwards Sieh Smith Goodfriend PS, 1109 1st Ave Ste 500, Seattle, WA 98101-2988.
Cynthia B Whitaker, Attorney at Law, 900 4th Ave Ste 3250, Seattle, WA 98164-1072.
Steve Webert challenges the permanent parenting plan, child support order, findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of dissolution entered by the trial court. Webert contends the court abused its discretion when it (1) failed to consider the factors required for a permanent parenting plan; (2) determined the amount of child support; (3) unfairly divided property; and (4) required recalculation of the parties' tax liability. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion; substantial evidence supports the permanent parenting plan, child support order, findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of dissolution, and affirm.
FACTS
Steve Webert and Carlyn Liebert were married for 20 years and have two children: Patrick, age 17 and Janelle, age 14. In the beginning of the marriage, Webert worked for the University of Washington as a scientific computer programmer. He then obtained a Master's degree in Computer Science and a Master's in Business Administration and worked as an engineer and product developer for several companies including Nyplan, SpaceLab, U.S. One Communications and Oracle before starting his own consulting business in 1987.
Liebert is a registered nurse practitioner who worked part-time throughout the marriage and is the trustee of a generation skipping trust that owns stocks and real estate in California. Throughout the marriage, Liebert received significant interest and rental income from the trust. After years of marital conflict and unsuccessful counseling, the parties separated in April 2001 and filed for dissolution. By agreement, Dr. Marsha Hedrick, a clinical psychologist, was appointed to conduct a parenting assessment and parenting plan evaluation. When the parties separated in April, they agreed to follow a joint residential parenting plan schedule. In August, the trial court appointed Margo Waldroup as the guardian ad litem for the children and ordered her to file a report and make recommendations for a temporary parenting plan pending completion of Dr. Hedrick's report. The trial court specifically required the guardian ad litem to ascertain and include the children's preferences for the residential schedule.
Waldroup recommended Liebert be the primary residential parent and that the children spend alternate weekends and Thursday nights with Webert. Waldroup also recommended that Janelle obtain counseling to help with age-appropriate issues in the context of the divorce. In September, the trial court entered an agreed amended temporary parenting plan that adopted Waldroup's recommendations.
Dr. Hedrick in her parenting assessment and parenting plan evaluation recommended that Liebert be the primary residential parent and that Webert have the children on alternate weekends and Thursdays overnight, but suggested the parents jointly make major decisions for the children. Dr. Hendrick testified that she made the recommendation regarding the residential schedule because the parents have a high-conflict relationship and because of Patrick's needs. Dr. Hedrick recommended they jointly make major decisions because the parties did not have conflict about the education, medical care and activities for the children, and joint decision making would help maintain a balance of power between the parents. Webert and Liebert disagreed with Dr. Hendrick's recommendations and could not agree on the amount of child support, or the division of property and liabilities. Trial began on April 2 and concluded on April 12, 2002. During the eight-day trial, the parties, Dr. Hedrick, Waldroup and many other witnesses testified, and over 200 exhibits were admitted into evidence.
The only exception was to allow Liebert alone to make decisions about Patrick's counseling and drug treatment. CP 171.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued a carefully considered and crafted written decision. The court followed and adopted Dr. Hedrick's recommendations for the permanent parenting plan, imputed income to Webert, and divided the community property while providing for shared payment of certain expenses. The court also ordered Liebert's accountant to recalculate the parties' current tax liability. The court entered a permanent parenting plan, child support order, findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of dissolution consistent with its written decision. Webert appeals and challenges the trial court's decisions.
Parenting Plan
Webert contends the trial court's findings on the required statutory factors for the permanent parenting plan were inadequate, his residential time is inappropriately limited, he should not be excluded from decision making about Patrick's drug treatment, the preferences of the children were not considered and the trial court erred when it did not hear testimony from Patrick's drug counselor.
Webert does not assign error to any of the trial court's findings; therefore, they are verities on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994); Gotcher v. Rowell, 2 Wn. App. 615, 468 P.2d 1004 (1970).
This court reviews a trial court's decision regarding a parenting plan for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). We give the trial court's findings great weight because it is in a unique position to observe the parties and their demeanor during the trial. A trial court must make findings of fact in all final decisions in dissolutions. The findings must be sufficient to suggest the factual basis for its conclusions.
A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). A decision is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the record, it is based on untenable reasons, it is based on an incorrect standard of law or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard of law. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47.
Fernando v. Nieswandt, 87 Wn. App. 103, 108, 940 P.2d 1380 (1997).
Groff v. Dept. of Labor Ind., 65 Wn.2d 35, 40, 395 P.2d 633 (1964).
The trial court agreed with Dr. Hedrick's recommendations and adopted a parenting plan that provided stability for the children and minimized the conflict between the parents. In its findings of fact, the trial court stated:
It is the court's conclusion that both Patrick and Janelle need regularity and stability in their lives which is made all the more important by the struggles that all teenagers go through. I concur with Dr. Hedrick that it is important to create an inflexible, rigid parenting plan to minimize the continuing conflict between the parents. While the parties (and the children, for that matter) can always informally agree to modify the plan, and recognizing that Patrick will be governed by the plan for only a short period of time, nonetheless a rigid, baseline plan is most appropriate.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 2.18. CP 201.
In its written decision, the trial court further explained that after hearing the testimony, receiving Waldroup's and Hedrick's reports and observing the parties during trial: I concur with the conclusion of Dr. Hedrick that Mr. Webert's '. . . ability to interact appropriately with others is compromised by an intensity and self focus that often leaves the other persons (sic) needs out of the equation.' It is easy to see how Patrick and others could feel overwhelmed by Mr. Webert's approach to life that some might describe as compulsive. For those reasons, it is my conclusion that the provisions of the parenting plan proposed by the Petitioner with respect to the school schedule are not appropriate and not in the best interest of the children.
It is also my conclusion that both Patrick and Janelle need regularity and stability in their lives which is made all the more important by the struggles that all teenagers go through. I concur with Dr. Hedrick that it is important to create an inflexible, rigid parenting plan to minimize the continuing conflict between the parents.
Decision Following Trial. CP 137.
The trial court ordered the parents to jointly make major decisions for each child, with the exception that '[a]ll decisions regarding Patrick's counseling and substance abuse treatment shall be made by the mother alone.' The court described the reasons for this decision:
Parenting Plan 4.2. CP 171.
I fear that Patrick will be caught in the middle in a most critical time of his life. The decisions regarding treatment by Mr. Galloway appears to be a particular area of continuing conflict as highlighted by the recent Motion for Clarification and Petitioner's lengthy response wherein he, in essence, litigates this case all over again. Accordingly, rather than allow this continued conflict to negatively impact Patrick, all decisions regarding Patrick's counseling and substance abuse treatment shall be made by [Liebert] alone since I do not believe that cooperation will occur and to wait to allow the arbitration process to produce a resolution could be too late.
Decision Following Trial. CP 139.
Webert contends the trial court abused its discretion because it did not make findings regarding each of the factors in RCW 26.09.187(3)(a). When the court adopts a permanent parenting plan, RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) requires the court to consider:
(i) The relative strength, nature, and stability of the child's relationship with each parent, including whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for performing parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the child;
(ii) The agreements of the parties, provided they were entered into knowingly and voluntarily;
(iii) Each parent's past and potential for future performance of parenting functions;
(iv) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;
(v) The child's relationship with siblings and with other significant adults, as well as the child's involvement with his or her physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities;
(vi) The wishes of the parents and the wishes of a child who is sufficiently mature to express reasoned and independent preferences as to his or her residential schedule; and
(vii) Each parent's employment schedule, and shall make accommodations consistent with those schedules.
According to RCW 26.09.002, 'the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties' parental responsibilities.' While the statute requires the trial court to consider certain factors, it does not require the court to expressly list and address each factor in its findings.
Here, although the trial court did not make a separate finding with regard to each factor, it explicitly and implicitly considered the factors in RCW 26.09.187(3)(a). The court recognized the undisputed high level of conflict between the parents and stated there was 'continuous conflict between these parties' and that 'the parents do not have a history of cooperation.' The court also addressed the children's emotional needs when it stated that they 'need regularity and stability' and are subject to 'the struggles that all teenagers go through':
Decision Following Trial. CP 139.
Decision Following Trial. CP 139.
Decision Following Trial. CP 137.
Decision Following Trial. CP 137.
It is also my conclusion that both Patrick and Janelle need regularity and stability in their lives which is made all the more important by the struggles that all teenagers go through. I concur with Dr. Hedrick that it is important to create an inflexible, rigid parenting plan to minimize the continuing conflict between the parents.
Decision Following Trial. CP 137.
The trial court's decision to reject Webert's proposed joint residential parenting plan and adopt a parenting plan that made Liebert the primary residential parent is supported by substantial evidence. Waldroup and Dr. Hedrick each independently identified the high level of conflict between the parents, the potential harm to the children, and the need to designate a primary residential parent as critical to the children's best interests. Hedrick testified that psychological testing for both parents yielded results that were of marginal validity because of extreme defensiveness. She stated that the parents' inability to see their own flaws is part of their problem, and they disagreed about virtually everything. According to Hedrick, Webert has a problem with empathy and focus and is intolerant, arrogant, and thinks in black and white, while Leibert is very intense and works things to death and does not validate Webert's contributions and relationship with the children. She also noted that the parents' conflicts were longstanding.
Hedrick concluded that there was no clear evidence that one parent was better than the other, but that Liebert was more involved with the children historically, had a somewhat better relationship with them, and was better able to organize their daily schedules. Hedrick also stated that Webert's 'ability to interact appropriately with others is compromised by an intensity and self focus that often leaves the other persons (sic) needs out of the equation.' Hedrick said that neither child wanted a shared residential situation or a return to the original parenting plan that provided for mid-week overnight visits with Webert.
Decision Following Trial. CP 137.
Webert also claims the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the children's involvement with other significant adults, their surroundings, school, or other activities and their wishes, and the trial court's decision that Patrick but not Janelle would spend Easter with him was an abuse of discretion.
Dr. Hedrick interviewed Patrick and concluded that having one primary residence was important for Patrick because of his ADHD. Dr. Hedrick also stated that although Patrick feels closer to his father, he gets along better with his mother. Based on her interview with Janelle, Dr. Hedrick concluded Janelle is more attached to her mother.
Waldroup testified that while both Patrick and Janelle expressed a desire to remain close to both parents, Patrick expressed a desire to have a primary residence in part to help him organize school and extracurricular activities. Patrick also told Waldroup he preferred to stay in the home he was most familiar with. The record establishes the court considered the children's preferences for a residential plan.
Webert fails to cite any authority for his argument that the trial court erred when it excluded the drug counselor's testimony.
According to Webert, Patrick was more involved in church than Janelle, attending with greater regularity, and the Easter service was an important part of their shared faith.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting a rigid parenting plan that makes Liebert the primary residential parent, allows Liebert to make decisions about Patrick's drug counseling, and provides that only Patrick attend Easter services with Webert.
Child Support
Webert contends the trial court abused its discretion in deciding the amount of child support. He argues that the court improperly (1) imputed income to him; (2) considered tax returns for the previous three years instead of the previous two years; (3) did not find Liebert voluntarily underemployed; (4) used an extrapolated amount for the child support obligation; and (5) failed to give him credit for five percent of health care expenses.
The amount of child support rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 560, 918 P.2d 954 (1996); In re Marriage of Stern, 57 Wn. App. 707, 717, 789 P.2d 807 (1990). In Washington, child support obligations are calculated according to the statutory support schedule. See RCW 26.19.020. The schedule was enacted in order 'to insure that child support orders are adequate to meet a child's basic needs and to provide additional child support commensurate with the parents' income, resources, and standard of living.' RCW 26.19.001. In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796, 803, 954 P.2d 330 (1998). In enacting the schedule, the legislature also 'intended to equitably apportion the child support obligation between both parents.' In re Marriage of Ayyad, 110 Wn. App. 462, 467, 38 P.3d 1033, rev. denied, 147 Wn.2d 1016 (2002). The schedule sets forth support obligations for each child based on the combined monthly net income of both parents, the number of children in the family, and the age of each child. See RCW 26.19.001. The trial court concluded Webert was 'capable of earning significant amounts' based on his earning history and successful consulting business. The court imputed earned net pre-tax income of $114,390 per year based on a weighted average of Webert's past business income for three years. In the child support order, the imputed amount for Webert's gross monthly income is $9533 and net monthly income is $6,723.94.
CP 185.
The court did not consider the inheritance received by Webert upon his mother's death. CP 201.
Below, Webert argued that his 2000 income should be used while Liebert argued the court should use Webert's maximum earning potential of $3000 per day. According to tax returns, Webert's gross income was $146,000 in 1998; $193,000 in 1999; and $233,000 in 2000. The court stated in its written decision that:
I have looked at his Schedule C for the last three years (1998, 1999 and 2000) and have determined his net income. . . . I then added back the depreciation deduction since it is not a cash expense, as well as the Lexus lease payments, which are personal. This results in a restated net income as follows: 1998: — $103,751[;] 1999 — $128,695[;] 2000 — $108,404.
The weighted average of this net, pretax income (with 2000 weighted at 3, 1999 at 2, and 1998 at 1) is $114,390 per year, which I find is a reasonable income for the Petitioner to use for calculating child support.
Decision Following Trial. CP 140-141.
Webert testified that he had no significant periods of unemployment during the marriage but when the parties separated in 2001, Webert's business income for that year was only $18,175. Webert testified that in 2001 both his parents were terminally ill, he worked on a project he later abandoned, and spent time with church and his children's activities. While Webert had no clients at the time of trial, he testified that he charged $2,000 per day for his consulting services in the past and had recently raised his rate to $3,000 per day. Although he stated that he could perhaps find employment as an engineer for $50,000 to 100,000 a year he had recently borrowed additional money to invest in his consulting business. And in his July 2001 loan application, Webert projected his consulting business income at $18,500 per month.
Webert argues the trial court should have only relied on the tax returns for the two previous years, 1999 and 2000. While the statute provides that tax returns for the preceding two years should be used to determine income, it does not preclude use of returns for more than two years. And in this case, use of the three years' tax returns lowered Webert's average net income because his income in 1998 ($146,000) was lower than in 1999 ($193,000) and 2000 ($233,000). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in using three years' of returns and imputing income to Webert.
Tax returns for the preceding two years and current pay stubs shall be provided to verify income and deductions. RCW 26.19.071(2).
The record shows that Liebert has always been employed part-time as a registered nurse practitioner. In Webert's proposed worksheets, he listed Liebert's gross income from wages and salary as $1,330.33 and did not ask the court to find her underemployed.
The court on appeal may refuse to consider any claim of error not raised in the trial court. RAP 2.5(a); Harris v. Dept. of Labor Industries, 120 Wn.2d 461, 468, 843 P.2d 1056 (1993).
Liebert's total gross monthly income on the worksheets adopted by the trial court is $11,985. This gross monthly income includes her wages of ($1,330) interest ($2800), and other income ($7,885), from her separate property in the generation skipping trust. The trial court determined Liebert's net monthly income is $9025. The parties' combined monthly net income is $15,298.94.
Webert's and Liebert's combined monthly net income is more than double the maximum amount ($7,000) listed on the economic table. When the combined net income exceeds $7,000, the amounts listed on the schedule are advisory. The statute provides:
The economic table is presumptive for combined monthly net incomes up to and including five thousand dollars. When combined monthly net income exceeds five thousand dollars, support shall not be set at an amount lower than the presumptive amount of support set for combined monthly net incomes of five thousand dollars unless the court finds a reason to deviate below that amount. The economic table is advisory but not presumptive for combined monthly net incomes that exceed five thousand dollars. When combined monthly net income exceeds seven thousand dollars, the court may set support at an advisory amount of support set for combined monthly net incomes between five thousand and seven thousand dollars or the court may exceed the advisory amount of support set for combined monthly net incomes of seven thousand dollars upon written findings of fact.
RCW 26.19.020 (emphasis added).
Where the combined monthly net income exceeds $7,000, the court has two options under the child support schedule: (1) it may set support at the advisory amount for incomes between $5,000 and $7,000; or (2) it may exceed the advisory amount for combined incomes of $7,000. If a court exceeds the amount of support provided by the child support schedule, the amount should be ''commensurate with the parents' income, resources, and standard of living,' in light of the totality of the financial circumstances.' In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. at 804. In such cases, the court must provide written findings of fact. RCW 26.19.020.
Webert argues the trial court erred in extrapolating from the child support schedule and failing to enter findings regarding extrapolation. The combined net income of the parties was $15,298.94. In such circumstances, the 'statute expressly invites the court to extrapolate from the existing schedule when the parent's income exceeds the amounts calculated in the schedule.' Clarke v. Clarke, 112 Wn. App. 370, 379, 48 P.3d 1032 (2002). The court in Clarke defined extrapolation as a 'process of estimating the unknown number outside the range of known numbers.' Clarke v. Clarke, 112 Wn. App. at 379.
The Order of Child Support incorporates the findings of fact and conclusions of law, where the court found that:
'. . . the presumptive amount is $1416 per month and the advisory amount is $1892 per month, of which Petitioner's transfer payment will be approximately 41%. While the court used a weighted average of Petitioner's past business income, it is also clear that he is capable of earning significant amounts while Respondent's earned income is nominal. In light of these considerations, and pursuant to Marriage of Leslie, . . . payment of child support by the Petitioner in the extrapolated amount of $1500 per month is appropriate.
Order of Child Support. CP 185.
Clarke permits the trial court to exceed the economic table by extrapolation and thereby exceed the highest advisory amount listed on the schedule. Combined income that exceeds the schedule is not a 'deviation' as contemplated by RCW 26.19.035(4). In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. at 804.
There was a substantial amount of documentary and testimonial evidence before the trial court regarding the parties' economic circumstances including income, assets, liabilities, standard of living, expenses and expenditures. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to Webert. Neither did it abuse its discretion in exceeding the economic table by setting the amount of Webert's obligation.
Webert also argues the trial court erred in not giving him credit for five percent of health care expenses. RCW 26.19.080(2) provides that '[o]rdinary health care expenses are included in the economic table' and that such expenses 'that exceed five percent of the basic support obligation shall be considered extraordinary health care expenses' and 'shall be shared by the parents in the same proportion as the basic child support obligation.' The statute does not provide for any credit to the obligor, and there is no evidence that these expenses were not properly allocated.
Property
Webert contends that the trial court abused its discretion in unfairly dividing property, leaving him with a negative net worth, and failing to consider the parties' post-dissolution economic circumstances. Webert also argues that because the parties' obligations for the 2001 tax return had been decided in a previous agreed order, the trial court's order requiring Liebert's accountant to recalculate the 2001 tax liability was error.
'The trial court has broad discretion in awarding property in a dissolution action, and will be reversed only upon a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.' In re Marriage of Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. 657, 667-68, 50 P.3d 298 (2002). In allocating property in a dissolution action, the trial court must make a fair and equitable division of property. It is guided by the following statutory factors: (1) the nature and extent of the community property; (2) the nature and extent of the separate property; (3) the duration of the marriage; and (4) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective.
The parties' community property consists of an interest in two houses, bank, retirement, and IRA accounts, automobiles and personal property. The trial court identified and characterized the property as community or separate and divided the community property 50/50, awarding each party community property with a net value of $193,624, together with personal property. To accomplish the even division of community property, the court ordered Liebert to pay Webert $24,193. The court stated that:
See Exhibit 1, Decision Following Trial. CP 149, 150.
There shall be a net transfer payment from Respondent to Petitioner of $24,193 to accomplish a 50/50 split of community property and including the reimbursement due Respondent of $12,833. See Exhibit 1. To accomplish an equal division of personal property, as reflected in Exhibit 2, an equalizing payment of $2,987 shall be made by Petitioner to Respondent thus decreasing the transfer payment to $21,206. Payment to Petitioner by Respondent shall be reduced by $350 for the attorney fee award to Respondent on November 11, 2001 and $500 for the attorney fee award on June 26, 2002. The net transfer payment to Petitioner by Respondent is $20,356.
Finding of Fact 2.20. CP 201.
Although Liebert owns substantial separate property, the trial court awards separate property of one party to the other only in exceptional circumstances. In re Marriage of Konzen, 103 Wn.2d 470, 477-78, 693 P.2d 97 (1985). And the court found that Webert 'is capable of earning significant amounts while respondent's earned income is nominal.' The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the property of the parties.
Decision Following Trial. CP 141.
Webert claims the trial court did not consider the parties' post-dissolution economic circumstances. This claim is not supported by the record. The trial court states in findings of fact and conclusions of law 2.8 that:
This is a relatively long term marriage of 20 years. The court considered the economic circumstances of the parties following the dissolution, the education and employment history of the parties, the future earning prospects of the parties, and the kinds of property left to be divided at the dissolution in determining that the community assets are to be divided on a 50/50 basis.
Finding of Fact 2.8, 3. CP 198.
Finally, Webert argues that because a previous agreed order directed him to provide copies of tax returns for 1998, 1999 and 2000, the trial court was prohibited from addressing the parties' tax liability for 2001. Karol King, Liebert's accountant for her separate trusts, testified that for 1998 and 1999, Webert and Liebert paid part of the tax from their joint account to cover their tax liability, and part from Liebert's separate accounts. In 2000, Liebert paid taxes from her separate funds. King calculated that Webert owed Liebert $35,747 for his share of their tax liability.
At the time of trial, the parties' 2001 tax return had not been filed and Leibert argued that Webert failed to comply with the court's earlier order to provide income tax information. The trial court ordered King to calculate the taxes for 2001 and allocate the tax liability between the parties. Webert argues that the prior temporary order was an agreed order, the 2001 tax return was not an issue at trial, and the trial court had no authority to order King to calculate the parties' tax obligation for 2001. The previous order was a temporary order entered under RCW 26.09.060(b)(c). The statute provides that '[a] temporary order . . . (b) may be revoked or modified; and (c) terminates when the final decree is entered. . . .' The temporary order did not prevent the trial court from ordering calculation of the parties' tax obligations to insure that the community had not overpaid its share.
Webert also objected to using King's services because King was not the parties' accountant but only Leibert's. The court reiterated that Webert was required by the order to provide the information to King.
Attorneys' Fees
Without citation to authority or argument, Webert asks this court to award him attorneys' fees and costs in this appeal. We deny Webert's request based on RAP 18.1(b).
Liebert asks for an award of her attorneys' fees on appeal under RAP 18.9(a) because of Webert's intransigence or for filing a frivolous appeal. Under RAP 18.9 '?[a]n appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there [is] no reasonable possibility of reversal.'' State v. Chapman, 140 Wn.2d 436, 454 998 P.2d 282, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 984, 121 S.Ct. 438, 148 L.Ed.2d 444 (2000) (quoting State ex rel Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wn.2d 888, 906, 969 P.2d 64 (1998)). In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and there was substantial evidence to support each of its decisions. We grant Liebert's request for reasonable attorney's fees on appeal for a frivolous appeal. Reasonable attorney's fees shall be determined by a commissioner of this court upon further compliance with the provisions of RAP 18.1 and 18.9. In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. at 807.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's decisions and the permanent parenting plan, child support order, findings of fact and conclusions and decree of dissolution.
Liebert's request for reasonable attorney's fees is granted under RAP 18.1 and 18.9.
GROSSE and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.