Opinion
B327366
02-14-2024
In re the Marriage of ARTHUR and POLINA TSATRYAN. v. POLINA TSATRYAN et al., Respondents. ARTHUR TSATRYAN, Appellant,
Arthur Tsatryan, in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent Polina Tsatryan.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Order Filed Date 3/12/24
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD512645 Patricia A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Tsatryan, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent Polina Tsatryan.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
THE COURT:
The above-entitled opinion filed on February 14, 2024 is modified as follows:
At the end of footnote 15 on page 12 in section D of the Factual and Procedural Background, add the following two sentences:
In his February 28, 2024 petition for rehearing, Arthur includes a purported transcription of an audio recording Arthur made during the November 29, 2022 hearing on the RFO. The official record in a family law matter is the record taken in shorthand by an official reporter or official reporter pro tempore of the superior court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 269, subd. (a).) Arthur's audio recording is therefore inadmissible. Arthur had the option to use a settled statement "as the record of the oral proceedings in the superior court" under California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1), but he failed to do so.
On page 19 in section B of the Discussion, delete the word "in person" and replace the word "Pellman" with the word "Young."
Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied. There is no change in the appellate judgment.
FEUER, J.
On September 7, 2018 the family court in this marital dissolution proceeding entered an order (the 2018 order) denying a postdissolution motion filed by the Los Angeles County Child Support Services Department (Department) to modify Arthur Tsatryan's child support obligation because he received a needs-based cash grant. Arthur had argued his support obligation should be reduced to zero. Athur appealed from the 2018 order, and we affirmed. (In re Tsatryan (Aug. 14, 2020, B293433) [nonpub. opn.] (Tsatryan I).)
We refer to Arthur and Polina Tsatryan by their first names to avoid confusion.
Although this is Arthur's 14th appeal in this case, we refer to the 2020 opinion as Tsatryan I for ease of reference.
In this appeal, Arthur challenges the family court's denial of Arthur's July 2022 request for order (RFO) seeking to vacate the 2018 order as void. Arthur contends the 2018 order was void on multiple grounds, including that the court committed misconduct and was biased in favor of Polina, the attorney for the Department lied, there was no support for Polina's statements at the hearing, and the evidence showed Arthur suffered a disability that prevented him from working. Arthur also contends the court abused its discretion by denying him an evidentiary hearing on the July 2022 RFO. Arthur has failed to show the 2018 order is void or that the family court erred or abused its discretion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Our discussion of the factual and procedural background leading up to the 2018 order is taken from our opinion in Tsatryan I, supra, B293433.
A. The Petition and Dissolution Judgment
Arthur and Polina were married on August 5, 1987. Their son Alexander was born in January 2001. They separated on August 3, 2009, and Arthur filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on September 23, 2009.
After a five-day trial, on May 21, 2015 the family courtentered a judgment of dissolution awarding Polina sole legal and physical custody of Alexander with Arthur to have visitation two weekends per month, plus an equal division of vacation days. The court ordered Arthur to pay $507 per month in child support based on findings Polina had an annual income of $75,000 and Arthur had a monthly income of $4,500 ($54,000 annually). Arthur appealed the judgment, and we affirmed in Tsatryan v. Tsatryan (Feb. 13, 2018, B265467) (nonpub. opn.).
Judge Mark A. Juhas signed the dissolution judgment.
On June 20, 2017 the superior court (Commissioner Armando Duron) entered an order increasing Arthur's child support obligation from $507 to $636 per month. The court found Arthur's income of $4,500 per month had not changed and Polina's income had increased to $118,896 annually, but Arthur's custodial timeshare had decreased to 1 percent.
B. The Department's 2018 Motion To Modify Child Support
On May 31, 2018 the Department filed a motion to modify Arthur's child support obligation because Arthur had received a needs-based cash grant. The Department did not request a specific reduction, instead stating "the amount the court will order will be based upon information presented at the hearing." The Department served Arthur with a notice to produce pay stubs for the last 12 months, the last two years of federal and state income tax returns, an income and expense declaration, and "documentation of any hardship or other deductions being requested by [Arthur]."
On June 19, 2018 Arthur filed an application to continue the hearing on the child support motion in which he stated he suffered from generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder "d[u]e to [the] ordeal he is going through in the divorce with Polina . . ., child alienation and not be[ing] able to see his child for more than 3 years." Arthur attached medical records showing he visited his physician on May 10 and June 13, 2018 concerning a 2014 diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder and recurrent major depressive disorder. The family court continued the hearing on the motion to August 23, 2018.
On July 2, 2018 Arthur filed an income and expense declaration stating he had monthly income of zero. Arthur did not produce pay stubs, recent tax returns, or documentation describing his medical condition or asserted disability.
C. The Hearing on the Department's Motion and the 2018 Order
Arthur and Polina were self-represented at the August 23, 2018 hearing on the Department's motion to modify child support. At the outset, counsel for the Department advised the family court Arthur "is [a] recipient of general relief since November of 2017, and [Polina] is opposed to a zero child support order as she feels he should be working and contributing for the welfare of the child."
When the family court inquired whether Arthur's income had changed since the 2017 finding his monthly income was $4,500, Arthur responded he was "now not making money at all" because he "lost [his] business and [he] cannot work." Arthur explained that prior to his separation from Polina, he owned a construction business but his health deteriorated, he was unable to continue working, and his contractor's license lapsed due to nonpayment. Arthur relied on support from his siblings, mother, and other family members to pay for necessities. Arthur stated he had not filed an income tax return "because I didn't make money."
Commissioner Stephen Lowry presided over the August 23, 2018 hearing.
Polina testified Arthur had seen Alexander only once since 2015, despite the visitation order providing Arthur with weekend visitation. Polina believed Arthur was still working in construction based on the fact his company, Art's Flooring Incorporated, was still registered, and Arthur's nephew recently worked with Arthur. However, Polina admitted she did not personally know what work Arthur had been doing since 2015. Polina expressed skepticism about Arthur's claimed disability: "He says that he doesn't have money to work. Whatever happened? I see he has legs. He has arms. He has head. He goes to court every week, family court and civil court .... I don't know how he is driving there." She added that Arthur's family "feed[s] him, whatever, give[s] money for everything."
After the parties testified, the Department's attorney suggested that because the Department had filed the motion, the family court "[p]erhaps" should deny the motion or take it off calendar; the court stated it was inclined to agree. However, the court allowed Arthur to provide additional testimony about his asserted disability. Arthur testified, "My doctor made [a] statement and I share[d] [it] with [the Department] attorney, I cannot work." The court inquired as to the nature of his disability, to which Arthur responded, "You have to ask my doctor. My family sent me to Russia because here I am very depressed and mourning my son which I cannot see, and this son was raised by me." In response to further questioning from the court, Arthur stated, "I can show you the paper from my doctor....They say disability. I don't know why. You have to ask [my] doctor. I am not an expert in medical [matters]." Arthur added that he suffered from depression and was "depressed because of your procedure." The court stated, "Well, that makes you like everybody else in the United States. Everybody in the United States is depressed." Arthur responded, "But not everyone get[s] disability." When the court inquired if Arthur was receiving disability payments, Arthur initially responded yes but then clarified, "I am not getting money for disability. I am on disability. That is what I stated, and I show[ed] the paper to the attorney."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court denied the motion (without further explanation), stating, "The child support order will remain in place." On September 7, 2018, the court filed the 2018 order.
Arthur appealed, and in August 2020 we affirmed the 2018 order, reasoning Arthur failed to present evidence of a material decrease in his income. We explained, "Arthur did not present any evidence other than his very general testimony. He testified he lost his construction business and was unable to work because he suffered from a disability, but when the trial court examined Arthur about the disability and how it prevented him from working, Arthur provided only vague answers. Arthur testified he suffered from depression, but when the court inquired as to the nature of his disability, Arthur responded, 'You have to ask [the] doctor.'" (Tsatryan I, supra, B293433, footnote omitted.) Further, "Arthur never submitted documentation showing his current disability or inability to work. Arthur submitted a medical record showing he was diagnosed in October 2014 with generalized anxiety disorder and recurrent major depression and placed off work from October 22 to November 12, 2014. Arthur submitted another record showing he visited his doctor for the same conditions in March 2017, but he presented no evidence he was placed off work due to his disability for any time period other than in 2014. The medical records Arthur submitted to support his ex parte application to continue the hearing showed only that Arthur consulted with his doctor on May 10 and June 13, 2018 about generalized anxiety disorder and recurrent major depressive disorder, but likewise did not refer to a disability or Arthur's inability to work." (Id.) We also held the family court did not deny Arthur a fair hearing, rejecting his argument the court deprived him of an opportunity to receive copies of Polina's most recent tax returns.
D. Arthur's 2022 RFO To Vacate the 2018 Order
On July 14, 2022 Arthur, representing himself, filed an RFO "to vacate order after hearing filed on 09/7/2018 [and] set child support to zero." (Capitalization omitted.) Arthur's 10-page declaration challenged the fairness of the August 23, 2018 hearing, raising many of the arguments he asserted in his appeal from the 2018 order. Among other things, Arthur argued the Department's lawyer violated her duty of candor and "expressed her partiality and favoritism [for Polina] and was biased [against Arthur]" by giving credence to Polina's opinion that Arthur was lying about his inability to work despite Arthur's documentation of his disability. Further, Polina testified falsely about her income and Arthur's ability to engage in remunerative work. Arthur also declared that in 2017 Polina, who is a government employee, was paid $99,269, or $8,272 per month, excluding benefits, based on figures published on the website TransparentCalifornia.com.
Arthur made the same assertion in his appeal from the 2018 order based on the Transparent California website. We observed that Arthur did not present this information to the family court in connection with the 2018 modification motion.
Arthur argued in his declaration, "Under the circumstances of Arthur receiving General Relief of $221 and Polina's monthly pay of $8,272.42 not including benefits, the [c]ourt had no authority to rule the child support order of $636 to remain in place ....The [c]ourt lacked jurisdiction. [¶]. . .[¶] [The] [c]ourt's ruling is to that extent void on its face." Arthur also argued that Commissioner Lowry's conduct and questions from the bench during the August 23, 2018 hearing "would make an objective observer question [the] state of the Court's mental capacity and constitute willful misconduct" and that Commissioner Lowry, who retired shortly after the hearing, should have disqualified himself based on the possibility of a physical impairment, bias toward Polina, and discrimination against Arthur on the basis of gender and disability.
Arthur argued further that "[o]n September 17, 2020 Federal Administrative Law Judge Ken H. Chau confirmed that I have been disabled and not working since March 15, 2017." Arthur attached as an exhibit a "Notice of Decision" from the Office of Hearing Operations for the Social Security Administration dated September 17, 2020. The notice included a two-page statement of decision signed by administrative law judge (ALJ) Ken H. Chau. The ALJ made findings that "[t]here is no affirmative evidence that [Arthur] has worked since the alleged onset date [March 15, 2017]. He denies working during the period in question. The earnings record is consistent with his account." The ALJ concluded, "[Arthur] has not engaged in disqualifying substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date," and "[b]ased on the application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits filed on June 13, 2017, the claimant has been disabled under section 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act since March 15, 2017." Arthur also filed a request to provide oral testimony at the hearing on his RFO pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(b) (Rule 3.1306(b)), seeking to cross-examine Polina for 90 minutes "to develop evidence on perjury." (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) In addition, Arthur filed a statement of opposition to remote appearance, arguing a remote appearance would interfere with his right to cross-examine Polina.
Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act, as amended and codified at 42 U.S.C. section 423(d)(1)(A), defines a "'disability'" in pertinent part as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
In its responsive declaration the Department argued there is no child support obligation to modify because Alexander turned 18 in June 2019. Further, to the extent Arthur was seeking to modify the earlier award of child support, "the issue is now res judicata and cannot be relitigated," and retroactive modifications of child support orders are prohibited under section 3653. In addition, any request to reconsider the 2018 order "is untimely and is not based upon any new or different facts, circumstances, or law, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a)." Moreover, "[t]his case is being enforced for arrears only," and as of August 16, 2022 Arthur owed arrears of $26,575 to Polina.
Family Code section 3653, subdivision (a), provides, "An order modifying or terminating a support order may be made retroactive to the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate, or to any subsequent date ...." Family Code section 3653 thus "permits the trial court to make its ruling retroactive to the filing date of the motion, but no earlier." (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 300 [italics added]; accord, Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 ["A court order modifying support retroactive to any time period before the filing date of a modification motion would thus violate the governing statutory scheme."]; see In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620, 625-626 ["The Legislature has established a bright-line rule that accrued child support vests and may not be adjusted up or down. [Citations.] If a parent feels the amount ordered is too high-or too low-he or she must seek prospective modification....[A] trial court has no discretion to absolve an obligor of support arrearages, or interest thereon."].) Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
In her responsive declaration Polina, also self-represented, asked the family court to dismiss Arthur's RFO and to increase child support "based on [Arthur's] performance in paralegal and construction businesses." (Boldface omitted.) Polina disputed Arthur's claimed inability to work based on his aggressive litigation conduct, a statement on Arthur's social media that he was a certified paralegal, and his co-authorship of a book about manufacturing published in 2019.
Arthur filed a reply to Polina's responsive declaration denying he is a certified paralegal or advertised paralegal services. Arthur also accused Polina of lying and argued she had no basis for stating he was not disabled.
At the August 29, 2022 hearing on the RFO, Arthur objected to a family court commissioner deciding the matter as a temporary judge. The commissioner conducted a hearing, at which Arthur and Polina testified (with Polina appearing telephonically), and the commissioner issued a statement of findings and recommendation that Arthur's RFO be denied in its entirety. Arthur filed a notice of objection to findings and recommendation, and on September 28, 2022 the family court set the RFO for a hearing de novo. On November 14, 2022 Arthur filed a Rule 3.1306(b) request for oral testimony as well as a statement of opposition to remote appearance.
Section 4251, subdivision (c), provides, "If a party objects to the commissioner acting as a temporary judge, the commissioner may hear the matter and make findings of fact and a recommended order. Within 10 court days, a judge shall ratify the recommended order unless either party objects to the recommended order, or where a recommended order is in error. In both cases, the judge shall issue a temporary order and schedule a hearing de novo within 10 court days. A party may waive the right to the review hearing at any time."
Commissioner Jeffrey W. Korn. The minute order of the August 29, 2022 hearing indicates there was a court reporter present; however, there is no reporter's transcript in the appellate record.
Judge Amy M. Pellman.
On November 29, 2022 the family court held a hearing on the RFO, at which Arthur and Polina were sworn and testified. The minute order reflects that there was no court reporter present for the hearing. After hearing testimony, the court held, "The Court having reviewed the moving documents and court file, and having heard argument this date, hereby denies [Arthur's] request to vacate the child support order in 2018. It is a ruling that has been denied and appealed."
On the day of the RFO hearing, Judge Pellman transferred the case to Judge Patricia A. Young, who heard and ruled on the RFO.
In his opening brief on appeal Arthur states, "No [c]ourt [r]eporter was available, and there was no time given to request one, [and] the [c]ourt denied Petitioner's request to [c]ontinue the hearing." The minute order does not reflect why there was no court reporter present nor does it state Arthur requested a continuance.
Arthur timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Family Court Properly Denied Arthur's RFO 1. Applicable law and standard of review
"'A judgment or order is void when there is an absence of fundamental jurisdiction.... "Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of . . . authority over the subject matter or the parties."'" (Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 126, 138-139; accord, People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660 (American Contractors); In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56 (Marriage of Goddard) ["[a] court can lack fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party, making its judgment void"].) A void order is subject to collateral attack at any time. (American Contractors, at p. 660; Schrage, at p. 138; see Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d) ["[t]he court . . . may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order"].)
In contrast, a judgment or order may be voidable but not void "'"where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no 'jurisdiction' (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites."'" (Schrage, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 139; accord, American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661 ["'"[w]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction"'" and "its act or judgment is merely voidable."]; Marriage of Goddard, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 56 [when a court "merely act[s] in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power" it renders the judgment "voidable"].) A voidable order or judgment is "'valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by "principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata.'" (Schrage, at p. 138; accord, American Contractors, at p. 661.)
"[M]ost procedural errors are not jurisdictional. [Citations.] Once a court has established its power to hear a case, it may make errors with respect to areas of procedure, pleading, evidence, and substantive law." (Marriage of Goddard, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 56; accord, Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950 ["a failure to state a cause of action [citation], insufficiency of evidence [citation], abuse of discretion [citation], and mistake of law [citations] have been held nonjurisdictional errors for which a collateral attack will not lie"]; see Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 752, 767 ["Errors of substantive law are within the jurisdiction of a court and are not typically acts beyond the court's fundamental authority to act."].)
Whether an order is void and thus subject to collateral attack is a question of law we review de novo. (Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282, 295; Schrage, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.)
2. The family court had fundamental jurisdiction to enter the 2018 order, and the order is not subject to collateral attack
Arthur's primary contention on appeal is that the 2018 order was "void on its face" because the family court was incompetent and biased in favor of Polina at the August 23, 2018 hearing; the Department's attorney was also biased in favor of Polina and lied about the parties' incomes; Polina lied about her income and Arthur's disability; the court disregarded Arthur's evidence of disability; and the court had "no authority to rule" that the existing support order should remain in place in light of Polina's monthly income of $8,272 and Arthur's receipt of $221 in monthly general relief. As discussed, Arthur appealed directly from the 2018 order, asserting many of the same arguments, and we affirmed the 2018 order in Tsatryan I, supra, B293433. The 2018 order is now a final order, and after four years it was not subject to collateral attack in the family court, except to the extent the family court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to enter the 2018 order. (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; Schrage, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138-139.) It did not.
Despite Arthur's repeated and emphatic use of the term "void judgment," he has not identified any defect in the family court's "fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party, making its judgment void." (Marriage of Goddard, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 56.) Arthur has been a party in the dissolution proceeding for nearly 15 years, and he remained subject to a child support order. Arthur does not challenge the family court's jurisdiction over the parties or its statutory authority to modify his child support obligation under section 3650 et seq. based on a material change of circumstances relating to his ability to pay support. Rather, Arthur is in the paradoxical position of arguing the court "lacked jurisdiction" to decide not to reduce his support obligation.
Moreover, the asserted misconduct that Arthur labels as void does not reach the power of the court to act, instead raising a nonjurisdictional procedural or substantive error that cannot be collaterally attacked. (See Armstrong v. Armstrong, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 950.) For example, Arthur's arguments that Polina and the Department misrepresented Polina's income, Arthur's financial condition, and his ability to work, and the family court improperly ignored Arthur's testimony and evidence to the contrary, go to the weight and credibility of evidence that are committed to the discretion of the family court. (See In re Marriage of Brewster &Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481, 500 ["the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence"].) Likewise, arguments that a ruling is based on insufficient evidence or was an abuse of discretion do not go to the court's jurisdiction. (Marriage of Goddard, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 56; Armstrong, at p. 950.)
Arthur also argues-based on the family court's questioning during the hearing, its adverse rulings, and Commissioner Lowry's retirement-that the court was biased in favor of Polina and mentally incompetent and Commissioner Lowry should therefore have been disqualified. Although there is a split of authority as to whether a judge's disqualification renders an order issued prior to disqualification void or merely voidable (see Conservatorship of Tedesco (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 285, 305; Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 542-543, fn 22 [observing that "[m]ore recent decisions have characterized the acts of a judge subject to disqualification as voidable rather than void"]), we do not reach the issue here because Arthur did not move for disqualification, and even if he did, "[t]he determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate ...." (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d); see People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 444-445 [review of trial court order striking disqualification motion "not cognizable on appeal"].)
B. Arthur Has Not Presented an Adequate Record To Show the Family Court Improperly Denied Him an Evidentiary Hearing
Arthur also contends the family court abused its discretion by denying him an evidentiary hearing on his 2022 RFO so that he could cross-examine Polina "to uncover her lack of credibility and pattern of forging and falsifying documents and records of the court." Arthur has failed to provide us with an adequate record to review this contention.
"[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] 'This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' [Citations.] 'In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court's action will be made by the appellate court. "[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented."' [Citation.] '"A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed."' [Citation.] 'Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].'" (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; accord, Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296 [to overcome presumption on appeal that an appealed judgment or order is presumed correct, appellant must provide an adequate record demonstrating reversible error]; Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 ["[i]t is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of proving reversible error by an adequate record"].)
The August 29, 2022 minute order reflects that at the initial hearing before Commissioner Korn, Polina appeared (albeit telephonically), was sworn, and testified. Nothing in the minute order or any other entry in the register of actions in the clerk's transcript reflects that the family court denied Arthur's Rule 3.1306(b) request for a hearing to testify and cross-examine Polina. Moreover, although the minute order shows there was a court reporter present, Arthur did not designate the reporter's transcript in his designation of the record on appeal. Without a transcript of the hearing, Arthur has failed to meet his burden to show he was not allowed to fully cross-examine Polina at the hearing. Moreover, Polina was sworn and testified in person at the November 29, 2022 de novo hearing on the RFO before Judge Pellman, so any error in limiting Polina's cross-examination at the August 29 hearing was not prejudicial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 475 [“No judgment . . . shall be reversed or affected by reason of any error . . . unless it shall appear from the record that such error . . . was prejudicial”]; Linton v. DeSoto Cab Co., Inc. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1224 [“Plaintiff has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudice, that is, that the errors have resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; see Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801 [judgment cannot be reversed “unless the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].)
Without a transcript of the hearing, we also cannot determine whether Commissioner Korn addressed Arthur's objection to Polina appearing telephonically. Further, Arthur contends the family court abused its discretion in ignoring his August 22, 2022 request to strike the Department's responsive declaration, which was filed and served at least one day late. However, in failing to designate the transcript of the August 29 hearing, and absent any other evidence in the record concerning the disposition of his request, Arthur cannot meet his burden to show an abuse of discretion or prejudice.
Finally, Arthur contends the doctrines of disentitlement and unclean hands bar Polina from seeking relief from the court because of her "contempt for legal orders and the process of the courts." Arthur argues Polina recorded a reconveyance of a deed of trust for the marital home that Arthur had granted to Vyacheslav Shirinyan (which the family court subsequently determined was a fraudulent transfer), even though we reversed on procedural grounds the default judgment that voided Shirinyan's interest. The parties' disputes over the marital home-and ancillary litigation with third parties relating to Arthur's fraudulent transfer of community property-are the subject of multiple appeals but are not at issue in this appeal from the order denying the July 2022 RFO.
DISPOSITION
The November 29, 2022 order denying Arthur's RFO is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: SEGAL, Acting P. J., MARTINEZ, J.