Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RF04140737
Ruvolo, P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Alai Kimberly Toure, who is proceeding in propria persona, appeals from numerous orders entered in her marital dissolution action. The orders on appeal relate to attorney fees, child visitation and custody, and page limits on trial court documents. After requesting and receiving supplemental briefing, we conclude there is no final appealable judgment or order in this case. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal is just one of a series of appellant’s filings in this court challenging orders made in her marital dissolution proceeding. Appellant is an attorney duly licensed to practice in California, but she is appearing in propria persona in this case. The orders challenged in this appeal were made by the Honorable Wynne Carvill in the period between February 2007 and May 2007.
Our review of facts and procedural history of this case is severely impeded by multiple deficiencies in appellant’s brief. Appellant has failed to “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)); and, for the most part, she has failed to support her factual assertions by appropriate reference to the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856; Millan v. Restaurant Enterprises Group, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 477, 485.)
Appellant also violates another mandatory rule of appellate procedure––the requirement that the appellant set forth a coherent argument with citation to law and evidence for reversing the order appealed from. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellant must “support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”]; accord, Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc./Obayashi Corp. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [appellant must provide “meaningful argument with citation to law or the evidentiary record].)
In short, appellant’s brief is largely a subjective explication of egregious misconduct committed by respondent designed to convince us that he is violent and mentally unstable and that respondent’s bad conduct has inflicted untoward emotional and financial stress on appellant and her children. This one-sided presentation of the evidence violates another established rule of appellate practice. An appellant must fairly set forth all the significant facts, not just those beneficial to the appellant. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) Given these deficiencies, we summarize the facts and procedural history of this litigation as best we can.
Throughout these proceedings, appellant has been the sole caregiver for the couple’s three minor children––one of whom has a very serious medical condition. It appears that respondent has had limited contact with the children, and he has failed to contribute toward their support. At one point, the court observed that respondent’s position appeared to be “as long as [appellant] is ‘keeping his children from him,’ he will not pay support.”
In February 2004, immediately after the parties separated, their three-year-old child was diagnosed with brain cancer and had to undergo emergency brain surgery to save his life. Since that time, he has required an extraordinary amount of care, which appellant has given exclusively. He has undergone chemotherapy, a stem-cell transplant, brain radiation, numerous surgeries, and was under strict quarantine for approximately one year because his immune system had been completely destroyed by the treatment. Appellant’s ability to sustain employment has been severely compromised by her need to attend to the child’s special needs.
The primary issues in this case have all been litigated in an extremely contentious fashion. These issues involve the support and custody of the parties’ three minor children. Other issues involve the characterization, valuation and division of the marital estate, including the family residence in Oakland.
A great deal of the record before us involves the court’s many attempts to determine respondent’s income for purposes of awarding child support, spousal support, and attorney fees. Appellant claims that “Mr. Toure has held numerous jobs, yet he refused to provide financial support to the three Toure children even while his then three-year-old son was in the hospital receiving surgery, chemotherapy and radiation for brain cancer and while Mr. Toure was aware that [appellant] was unable to work full-time while she cared for the sick child and the other two Toure children. Instead Mr. Toure has attempted to hide his income.”
In an order regarding child support, the court noted, that “[r]espondent is a well-educated and articulate individual, and yet his declarations and discovery responses related to income have been terse and incomplete, and he has chosen not to keep, maintain and produce underlying documentation . . . .”
There has also been a history of domestic violence during the pendency of these proceedings. According to appellant, respondent has been convicted in a criminal proceeding of violating a restraining order issued for domestic violence against appellant and thereafter was found to have violated the terms of his probation by again violating the restraining order. Respondent has also engaged in criminal conduct involving the marital estate. In June 2007, respondent was charged with three felonies for identity theft, fraud and forgery, including attempting to take out a $525,000 loan in appellant’s name. Respondent was incarcerated as a result of these charges.
For his part, in papers filed below, respondent claimed that appellant is “both mental[ly] and physically unsound.” He has accused appellant of “paper[ing] us to death” and using “every possible manipulative trick at her disposal to continually bring up issues from the past to discredit” respondent.
There is no question but that an unhealthy level of conflict has existed in this case from the beginning, which still exists up to this day. The judge who issued the orders challenged in this appeal characterized this case as “one of the highest conflict cases in a busy Family Law department.” He assigned blame for this state of affairs on both parties, opining that “both parents have serious psychological issues.” (Original italics.) Respondent’s attorney made a similar observation when she withdrew from this case: “I believe each side is equally at fault for the state of affairs here . . . .” “This case is one of the highest acrimony between the parties and I no longer wish to be a part of it; so many things have been twisted and manipulated I can no longer judge what information is accurate and reliable.”
Appellant now appeals from the court’s ruling on April 20, 2007, allowing respondent to withdraw $10,000 from a line of credit that the court ordered be placed on the family residence for the purpose of funding respondent’s attorney fees for trial of the unresolved community property issues. She also challenges a provision of the above-dated order, where the court indicated that because appellant’s filings “have been far too voluminous, repetitive and, at times, vituperative,” that “no party may file a legal memorandum or declaration in excess of five (5) pages without leave of court.” An order made on May 18, 2007, resolving issues arising from the child custody evaluation, has also been challenged. Appellant claims the court’s rulings “prevented [her] from exercising her right to challenge the recommendations of the evaluator and seek another remedy.” We proceed to determine whether any of these orders are properly before us.
III. DISCUSSION
The “one final judgment rule” provides that an appeal may be taken from a final judgment, but not an interlocutory judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) By definition, a judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.) Thus, “an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may be characterized as ‘separate and independent’ from those remaining.” (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743.) A judgment is final when it decides the rights and duties of the parties, terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits, and leaves no issue for future judicial determination except compliance with the judgment’s terms. (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 304; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 399.)
In appellant’s statement of appealability, she claims that there has been a final judgment entered in the case because on September 11, 2007, “the family court ordered that [a]ppellant would receive full permanent custody of the minor children.” In this same order, the court reserved jurisdiction on the issue of child visitation, leaving this issue for future judicial determination. However, appellant acknowledges that the order of September 11, 2007, was in her favor and “is not being appealed but it is a final order in this case.” (Italics added.) The fact that appellant has not appealed this custody order establishes its finality and bars us from allowing appellant to continue litigating the issues regarding custody and visitation of her children in this appeal. Therefore, the issues regarding custody and visitation of the parties’ children are not properly before us. It is also clear that the court’s April 20, 2007 order setting some guidelines on the parties’ filings in this case is an interlocutory, nonappealable order rendered during trial. (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 2:253, p. 2-119 (rev. #1 2007).)
Appellant’s real bone of contention is the order entered by Judge Carvill on April 20, 2007, granting respondent $10,000 to be used as attorney fees to litigate the unresolved community property issues. The order states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f on or before May 30, 2007, the community property issues are not settled and reduced to a writing executed by the parties,” appellant and respondent “shall take out a credit line on the [family residence] sufficient to allow payment of $10,000 to [r]espondent as a one-time payment towards his attorney[] fees.” In her statement of appealability, appellant claims that this order is ripe for review because “attorney[] fees are appealable without a final order.”
In marital dissolution cases, “[w]hen a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 (Skelley).) Where the collateral order doctrine applies, a family law attorney fee order will be subject to direct appeal. (Id. at pp. 368-369; In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 118-119; Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 964, fn. 37.)
Skelley directs us to look to the substance of the interlocutory order to determine whether it is directly appealable. (Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 368.) Where nothing remains for judicial determination except enforcement or compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the interlocutory order, a direct appeal will lie. (Ibid.; In re Marriage of Weiss, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.) Skelley involved an appeal from an interlocutory order denying attorney fees; consequently, the court held that the order was appealable because it had all the elements of a final judgment. (Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 368.)
Here, we asked the parties to each file a supplemental brief on the question of whether the court’s April 20, 2007 attorney fee order is directly appealable. In our letter, we noted that “in our review of the appellate record, we have come across several orders––issued while this appeal was pending––which lead us to question whether Judge Carvill’s April 20, 2007 order is a final, appealable determination of the parties’ rights.” We noted that on July 5, 2007, Judge Carvill issued an order explaining that respondent was incarcerated and awaiting trial on felony charges stemming from his criminal conduct. The order notes that “[t]he court previously ruled that [r]espondent could withdraw $10,000 from a line of credit the court was ordering be placed on the family residence for purposes of funding his attorney[] fees in the trial on the community property issues. This order is STAYED until the community property issues are re-set for trial.” The July 5th order goes on to indicate that the community property issues are “hereby DROPPED, subject to being re-set when both parties may be available to proceed.” The next day, on July 6, 2007, Judge Carvill recused himself from the case in the hopes that “a different judicial officer . . . may proceed with the stress levels reduced.”
Although, as appellant emphasizes, she is currently subject to an order awarding attorney fees to respondent, the order is not final and enforceable because its continued viability undoubtedly turns on contingencies which this court is ill-equipped to predict. A claim premised on “ ‘ “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,” ’ ” is not ripe for adjudication. (Texas v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 296, 300.) The ripeness problem is evident and fatal to this appeal. “ ‘[W]here anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory’ ” and nonappealable. (Olson v. Cory, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 399.) In this particular case, the challenged attorney fees order calls out for further judicial action to determine the parties’ rights. Accordingly, we conclude that the order is interim in nature, and therefore, not appealable.
IV. DISPOSITION
Since none of the orders that are the subject of this appeal are appealable, the appeal is dismissed.
We concur: Reardon, J., Sepulveda, J.