Opinion
C097375
04-30-2024
In re the Marriage of LENNART and SARA THORNROS. LENNART THORNROS, Appellant, v. SARA THORNROS, Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SDR0056387
ROBIE, J.
Following a court trial in this dissolution of marriage case, the court granted Lennart and Sara Thornros's request for a dissolution of marriage and divided property they acquired during marriage and after separation. At issue in this appeal is the trial court's finding that certain property, acquired by the parties in joint tenancy after separation, was the sole property of Sara. Lennart, in propria persona, contends this finding was in excess of the court's jurisdiction and made in error. Lennart also challenges the court's failure to order a continuance and grant his new trial motion. We affirm.
Given the parties' shared surname, we will refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended. (See Kuehn v. Kuehn (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 824, 828, fn. 2 ["As is customary in family law cases, we refer to the parties by their first names for purposes of clarity and not out of disrespect"].)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, Sara and Lennart purchased the family home in Roseville. They purchased the home as Sara's sole and separate property because Lennart had bad credit due to a failed business. In 2012, the couple lost the Roseville home to foreclosure. The foreclosure caused Sara's credit to decline. On February 6, 2012, the couple moved to a home in Lincoln purchased by the Vart Has Trust. "The [g]rant [d]eed clearly reflect[ed] that the Lincoln property was specifically held by the Vart Has Irrevocable Trust." Sara testified that the Vart Has Trust was created to protect the family home from creditors in the event of a bankruptcy. The trust agreement provided the couple were each entitled to half the benefit of the trust. When the couple's Lincoln home was subsequently sold, $345,000 from the sale was placed in the trust.
The parties separated in April 2016 pursuant to a separation agreement, wherein Sara would not receive any spousal or child support. The agreement included the parties' division of property. As relevant here, Sara and Lennart retained their half interests in the Vart Has Trust. The parties further agreed community property laws no longer applied to their property. The parties later entered a supplement to the separation agreement dividing the proceeds in excess of $345,000 from the sale of the Lincoln home and amending the ownership shares of their jointly owned company.
Also in 2016, half the money from the trust was dispersed to Sara, with Lennart's permission, to purchase a house in Roseville on Lyndhurst Avenue (Lyndhurst property); the purchase of which was finalized in November of 2016. Lennart was given $117,443.87 from the trust to purchase a boat. At trial, Sara testified the 2012 foreclosure adversely affected her ability to finance the purchase of the Lyndhurst property. Lennart agreed to cosign the loan for the Lyndhurst property, in exchange for a letter of guarantee to ensure he was not responsible for any mortgage payments or any consequences of Sara's default. Sara agreed to the terms of the letter of guarantee because it was the only way she could purchase a home.
The letter of guarantee specified that it "pertain[ed] only to the co-signing of a mortgage loan by Lennart Thornros for[ the Lyndhurst property]. [¶] Sara Thornros is solely responsible for the repayment of the mortgage for the aforementioned property. [¶] . . . [¶] Lennart Thornros will be reimbursed should he incur any costs directly associated to any delinquency to this mortgage loan. Either [b]ankruptcy or [f]oreclosure negates this obligation. If Sara Thornros ends up in [b]ankruptcy she is solely responsible for such a situation, and Lennart Thornros will not be held responsible in any way[.] [¶] . . . [¶] If for any reason Sara Thornros defaults on the mortgage loan, Lennart Thornros has the right to sell the property."
Title to the Lyndhurst property was held in the name of Sara and Lennart as joint tenants. Despite the joint tenancy, and for the duration of Sara's ownership of the home, Sara exclusively paid for the mortgage, taxes, repairs, and improvements. Lennart did not contribute any money to the maintenance or improvement of the Lyndhurst property.
The parties went to trial to determine, among other things, the ownership of the Lyndhurst property. On July 26, 2021, Sara requested a continuance, which was granted. Lennart informed the trial court that he lived outside of the country and may need to appear remotely. The next day, Lennart filed a request for a remote appearance, indicating Sara's attorney was sick on the initial trial date and he lived approximately 3,500 miles away.
In a minute order dated October 1, 2021, Lennart was "having connection issues." Later that day, but in a different court department, trial was set for October 14, 2021, and October 21, 2021. The trial court advised Lennart he was obligated to ensure sufficient connectivity to appear via video.
On October 14, 2021, trial commenced with Lennart representing himself. The clerk's trial minutes reflect that at 9:11 a.m., Sara was present and Lennart was not. One-half hour later, the trial court was able to make contact with Lennart via telephone. Lennart said he was in Grenada and unable to locate a hotel with sufficient technology to appear by video. The trial proceeded with Lennart appearing via telephone. "[T]he telephone connection was completely unsatisfactory and the court reporter, after a diligent effort, informed the parties that she was simply unable to make a record of these proceedings that she could certif[y]." The parties agreed to proceed without a court reporter.
October 21, 2021, was the second day of trial. The clerk's trial minutes reflect that at the start of the day's proceedings, the trial court attempted to telephone Lennart for seven minutes without success. Lennart eventually appeared via telephone at 9:12 a.m. Two minutes later, the court reporter declared it would be impossible to certify the record due to the quality of Lennart's remote appearance.
The trial court issued a written ruling, disagreeing with Lennart's argument that the Lyndhurst property was an asset of the Vart Has Trust. The court then agreed with Sara's contention that she owned the Lyndhurst property as her sole property. The court found the letter of guarantee "certainly d[id] not reflect a joint tenancy intent in that it states that Sara . . . is [']solely responsible for the repayment of the mortgage for the aforementioned property' and any 'bankruptcy is the sole responsib[ility] of Sara.' Clearly, if the parties were actually holding the [Lyndhurst] property in joint tenancy, [Lennart] would be responsible for half the mortgage, taxes and insurance and other expenses of ownership, such as repairs and improvements, and would also be just as adversely affected by a bankruptcy as [Sara]." Moreover, the court reasoned, Lennart had not contributed any funds to the maintenance and improvement of the Lyndhurst property. Further, the amount of money dispersed from the Vart Has Trust to Sara was exactly half the corpus of the trust, which was the amount she was entitled to as her sole property pursuant to the trust agreement. Taken together, the trial court found the letter of guarantee demonstrated the parties' intent that the Lyndhurst property was Sara's sole property.
Following the trial court's ruling, Lennart brought a new trial motion. At the hearing on the motion, Lennart was represented by counsel and argued he was entitled to a new trial based on an irregularity in the proceedings. He contended he was unable to connect to the court's remote platform because it blocked his foreign Internet address. He assured the court that he had ensured his Internet provided sufficient connectivity pursuant to the remote appearance agreement, and it was the court's block of foreign Internet addresses that led to his inability to appear by video. Lennart argued he could not test for this issue because the link for virtual appearances was not active until the time of trial. He argued this prejudiced him because he was unable to coherently present his case at trial.
The trial court denied Lennart's motion for a new trial because Lennart could have chosen to appear in person. The court also did not recall Lennart ever requesting a continuance based on the quality of the remote connection despite substantial efforts to ensure his ability to present his case.
Lennart appeals.
DISCUSSION
It is a "well-established rule of appellate review that a judgment or order is presumed correct." (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) "Statements of fact that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by the reviewing court." (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 947; Fierro v. Landry's Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5.) This principle extends to any portion of an appellate brief, including argument. (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8.)
There is a disagreement between the parties as to the contents of the record. The disagreement stems from a reading of the clerk's minute order regarding the hearing on Lennart's motion to adopt a settled statement. There is no reporter's transcript of the hearing. As background, Lennart sought for the trial court to adopt a settled statement with his own recounting of the circumstances leading to the timing of trial and the difficulties regarding his ability to communicate during trial. Sara responded with suggested edits to Lennart's proposed settled statement, a narrative of her own, and a copy of the clerk's minutes, including the clerk's trial minutes. The minute order from the hearing on the motion provides that Sara "request[ed] the proposed settled statement submitted to be adopted" and that the court ordered, "[T]he clerk's [trial] minutes . . . is the record. The settle[d] statement is the record." The court later "reiterate[d] that the clerk's [trial] minutes for 10/14/2021 and 10/21/2021 is the record. [The] [c]ourt order[ed] the proposed settled statement submitted by respondent's counsel to be adopted."
Lennart argues the record includes all of Sara's responses because those responses constitute her proposed settled statement adopted by the court. Sara contends the settled statement is the clerk's trial minutes. We read the trial court's notations to mean that the clerk's trial minutes are the settled statement, and that neither of the parties' narratives were adopted. While the court ordered Sara's settled statement adopted, it did so when "reiterat[ing]" its prior ruling that the clerk's trial minutes constituted the record. Thus, we will not consider facts obtained from outside the clerk's trial minutes or arguments that rely on those facts.
We grant Sara's motion to strike portions of Lennart's opening brief to the extent it seeks to strike portions that run afoul of our conclusion regarding the contents of the settled record.
I
The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction
Lennart contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his ownership interest in the Lyndhurst property because he and Sara acquired it after they separated. (Citing In re Marriage of Buford (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 74.) Lennart impliedly acknowledges he never objected to the trial court deciding the issue of ownership of the Lyndhurst property, and, as Sara points out, Lennart affirmatively requested the trial court to make such a determination. Still, Lennart argues subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited and he can assert this argument for the first time on appeal. He is wrong.
Lennart argues in his reply that he objected at trial but the objection was not acknowledged because of the poor connection. Because Lennart's objection is not noted in the clerk's trial minutes, Lennart has failed to demonstrate he made such an objection.
Family Code section 2010, subdivision (e) grants the court jurisdiction in a dissolution of marriage action to settle the property rights of the parties. Section 2650 grants the court "jurisdiction, at the request of either party, to divide the separate property interests of the parties in real and personal property, wherever situated and whenever acquired, held by the parties as joint tenants or tenants in common." Section 2650 "was intended to close a historical loophole, pursuant to which separate property interests- even those held in joint title between spouses-could only be partitioned in a separate civil action." (In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797, 810 (Braud).)
Undesignated section references are to the Family Code.
Lennart asserts there are limits to this jurisdiction, as acknowledged by the Law Revision Commission comments to section 2650, which provide, "Property subject to division [under section 2650] includes property acquired by the parties either before or during marriage." According to Lennart, because he and Sara acquired their separate property interests in the Lyndhurst property after marriage, the trial court was without power to adjudicate its ownership. Not so.
The language of section 2650, by its plain terms, does not contain the limitation Lennart advances. (In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 347-348 [statutory interpretation begins with" 'the words of the statute,'" and if those words are clear and unambiguous, it ends there].) Further, the trial court was not without general jurisdiction to hear the parties' dispute over the Lyndhurst property. While, "it is well settled in California that the court's jurisdiction over the parties' separate property is quite limited," that is only true absent agreement of the parties. (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 810.) Indeed, the Law Revision Commission comments to section 2650 further provide that the provision "is consistent with the general rule that the court has jurisdiction to settle the property rights of the parties and with the principle that the court has jurisdiction to settle matters submitted to it by the parties." Accordingly, "as a general rule the superior court in a divorce proceeding has no jurisdiction to deal with the separate property of the spouses, but the superior court in which the action for divorce must be brought is also invested with general jurisdiction to determine title to real property and, thus, if the parties in a divorce proceeding see fit to make the character of property held by them an issue in the proceeding, the same effect must be given to its judgment as if a direct superior court action had in fact been brought." (Braud, at p. 810, citing Porter v. Superior Court (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 793, 805.)
Thus, the trial court had fundamental general jurisdiction to settle the rights of the parties in jointly owned property acquired after marriage. Given the court's fundamental ability to resolve the claim before it, Lennart was required to object if he wanted to shield the issue from the court. (See Greenville Rancheria v. Martin (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 466, 476-477 [when a court is empowered to answer the underlying question that gives rise to the dispute, it does not lack fundamental subject matter jurisdiction and a party must object to the state court's exercise of authority].) Lennart's failure to object results in forfeiture.
II
The Trial Court Did Not Err Regarding The Lyndhurst Property Lennart argues the trial court erred by finding the parties intended for the Lyndhurst property to be Sara's sole property. We disagree.
A
Pertinent Standard Of Review
Lennart argues for a de novo standard of review considering the legal standard the trial court utilized required it to merely interpret a written instrument to determine whether Lennart intended to sever his joint tenancy interest. The standard Lennart refers to is encompassed in Civil Code section 683.2, subdivision (a), which provides for the circumstances when a joint tenant may sever a joint tenancy interest without the consent of the other tenant. Civil Code section 683.2, subdivision (a) exists "in addition to any other means by which a joint tenancy may be severed." Case law interpreting this standard requires the written instrument, here the letter of guarantee, to unambiguously and irrevocably demonstrate a joint tenant's intent to sever the joint tenancy. (Pearce v. Briggs (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 466, 477-481.) This may be done by eroding a key component of joint tenancy, like the right to survivorship. (Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 208, 210.)
While the trial court cited to Civil Code section 683.2 for the basis of its decision, its analysis was more akin to the analysis required for the standard utilized in Milian v. De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185 (Milian), a case upon which Lennart relies. In Milian, the trial court considered whether the unmarried parties in that action, who purchased a property in joint tenancy outside of marriage, intended to enter a true joint tenancy such that they intended an equal division of property. (Id. at p. 1189.) Unlike severance cases analyzing only the contents of a writing, the law articulated in Milian is applicable to joint tenants who contend the character of the property was established through an express or implied agreement and is different than the character reflected in the deed. (Id. at pp. 1194-1198.) The relevant inquiry in Milian, and cases like it, is the general understanding and agreement of the parties inferred from their conduct. (Ibid.; see Machado v. Machado (1962) 58 Cal.2d 501, 506 ["evidence tending to prove a common understanding or an agreement that the character of the property was to be other than joint tenancy" can override the character provided in the deed].)
It is with this highly factual standard the trial court here appeared to have engaged when it considered, not only the letter of guarantee, but also the conduct of the parties as it related to their expectations regarding the Lyndhurst property. Thus, we will review the court's order in light of the standard utilized in Milian. (See Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 568 ["If correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment will be sustained regardless of the considerations that moved the lower court to its conclusion"].)
Consequently, we will review the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. (See People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955 ["It is not our function to reweigh the evidence, reappraise the credibility of witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact"].) Under this standard, we must accept as true the evidence most favorable to the order and assume that the trier of fact did not accept the contradictory evidence. (In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1140.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is "reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.)
Lennart argues Evidence Code section 662 required the trial court to make its findings pursuant to a clear and convincing evidence standard. We agree. "The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." (Evid. Code, § 662.) Here, the court did not state the burden of proof utilized but did find that there was no doubt the parties intended to treat the Lyndhurst property as Sara's sole property. Because we must presume the trial court followed the law absent indications to the contrary (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 638), we will presume it did so here and review its decision in light of the appropriate burden of proof (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995 ["appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding requiring clear and convincing proof must account for the level of confidence this standard demands"]).
B
The Trial Court's Finding That Sara Held The Lyndhurst Property As Her Sole Property Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
A joint tenancy is a joint interest owned by two or more persons, who have equal interests among themselves. (Civ. Code, § 683.) "The joint tenants must share unity of time, title, interest and possession. A distinctive feature of joint tenancy . . . is the right of survivorship," which means that "when one joint tenant dies, the entire estate belongs automatically to the surviving joint tenant(s)." (Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1317.)
As parties who bought the Lyndhurst property outside of marriage, Lennart and Sara are the equivalent of two unmarried persons competent to contract respecting their property rights. (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1193.) As discussed, Evidence Code section 662 provides that "[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." Thus, a deed conveying title to property as joint tenants creates a rebuttable presumption the property is held in joint tenancy. (Machado v. Machado, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 506.) This presumption, however, "may not be rebutted solely by evidence as to the source of the funds used to purchase the property," "[n]or can the presumption be overcome by testimony of a hidden intention not disclosed to the other grantee at the time of the execution of the conveyance." (Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 212.) Rather, it may be overcome "only by evidence tending to prove a common understanding or an agreement that the character of the property was to be other than joint tenancy." (Machado, at p. 506.)
In Milian, a couple who were romantically involved purchased a home as joint tenants. (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1189.) Milian contributed more to the down payment than his girlfriend and he paid the mortgage in exchange for her agreement to make payments on his car. He also paid the majority of property tax and insurance payments on the property. She paid for improvements to the property. (Id. at p. 1190.) When they stopped dating, a partition action was commenced. The trial court found the parties had a true joint tenancy and ordered the proceeds of the sale be divided equally between the parties without any accounting or reimbursement. (Id. at pp. 11911192.) The court found the parties had "an implied contract . . . to treat their property equally and to divide the same equally." (Id. at p. 1192.) The court ordered the property sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. (Id. at pp. 1192-1193.)
The appellate court affirmed the ruling. (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1200.) In doing so, the appellate court held that the trial court may consider the fact the parties have contributed different amounts to the purchase price and maintenance of the property when determining whether a true joint tenancy was intended, contrary to Lennart's argument. But if a true joint tenancy was intended, then ownership of the property is equal and the amount contributed toward the property by either party is irrelevant. (Id. at pp. 1195-1196.)
Here, by finding the parties intended for the Lyndhurst property to be Sara's sole property, the trial court found Lennart and Sara agreed the Lyndhurst property was not a true joint tenancy. There is substantial evidence in the record to support this finding by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, as the trial court found, Sara purchased the Lyndhurst property after marriage and with her sole property dispersed to her from the Vart Has Trust. The parties then entered an agreement at the same time the property was purchased placing sole responsibility for the mortgage and maintenance of the property on Sara. In the event Lennart was called on to shoulder any burden in paying for the Lyndhurst property, Lennart declared he would sell it and be reimbursed for any expenses he incurred related to Sara's default. This clearly manifests an intent by Lennart not to share equally in the responsibilities of home ownership as a typical joint tenant would.
Further, in the years that followed the purchase of the Lyndhurst property, Lennart contributed nothing to the Lyndhurst property in any form and Sara shouldered the entire burden of paying the mortgage and taxes, as well as paying for improvements and repairs. Lennart did not live at the Lyndhurst property or exercise any right bestowed upon him as a joint tenant. Sara testified that Lennart's presence on the mortgage was necessary for her to gain financing, and that was the sole reason for Lennart appearing as a joint tenant on the deed. The trial court credited this testimony as truthful and evidence of the parties' intent. These facts stand in stark contrast to the facts of Milian, where the court found a true joint tenancy because the parties bought the property in anticipation of marriage, both parties paid various expenses of the household, and both parties expended sums of money toward maintenance and improvement of the property. (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1191-1193.)
Still, Lennart argues he and Sara had a true joint tenancy as reflected in the deed, which he contends is a written instrument that prohibited the severance of his joint interest. As an initial matter, we note the record shows the deed merely granted a joint tenancy interest to Lennart and did not specifically prohibit severance of his interest. Lennart has not pointed to any agreement between himself and Sara prohibiting severance of his interest, and he points to no case prohibiting severance when a deed merely grants a joint tenancy. Thus, Lennart's joint tenancy interest is not solidified by the deed.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that the parties did not intend to form a true joint tenancy and that Sara owned the Lyndhurst property as her sole property.
III
The Trial Court Did Not Err By Failing To Order A Continuance
Lennart contends the trial court erred by failing to continue trial once it became clear he could not participate via remote connection. We disagree.
Courts do not have a sua sponte obligation to continue the trial date. (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 739 [not error to fail to continue trial sua sponte].) Further, as a general rule, we do not consider claims made for the first time on appeal. (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 972.) "Appellate courts are loathe to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider." (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178.)" 'We will therefore "ignore arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the trial court." [Citation.] Such arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited.'" (Lauron, at p. 972.)
The record does not reflect that Lennart ever objected to the court progressing with trial once it was discovered that he would not be able to participate via video. He also did not object after the court reporter declared she would not be able to certify the record and agreed trial should continue with the testimony of witnesses. The trial court noted at Lennart's hearing on his new trial motion that no one ever asked for a continuance. Given that Lennart never requested a trial continuance with the court, his argument the court should have continued trial is forfeited.
IV
The Trial Court Did Not Err By Denying Lennart's Motion For A New Trial Lennart contends the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial based on an irregularity in the proceedings because of his inability to meaningfully participate via remote connection. We disagree.
Lennart's request for judicial notice is granted. This ruling makes Lennart's motion to strike Sara's opposition to his request for judicial notice moot.
"Section 657, subdivision (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial may be granted for an '[irregularity] in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party . . . by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.'" (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d 860, 870.) Courts have recognized "[n]o accurate classification of such irregularities can be made," other than it must involve "an overt act of the trial court, jury, or adverse party, violative of the right to a fair and impartial trial, amounting to misconduct." (Gray v. Robinson (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 177, 182.)
" '[A]n overt act of the judge [that] prevents the complaining party from having a fair and impartial trial'" is an irregularity in the proceedings. (Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 638.) The party requesting a new trial, however, must show the misconduct was prejudicial to his or her substantial rights and ability to have a fair trial. (Gray v. Robinson, supra, 33 Cal.App.2d at p. 182.) "[W]hether, under all the circumstances, an irregularity has materially affected substantial rights and prevented a fair trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court[,] which, having heard and seen the witness[es] and having knowledge of circumstances [that] may not be produced in the record, is in better position than the appellate court to determine the effect." (Id. at p. 182.)
Lennart argues it was the trial court's fault he could not connect to the virtual platform because the court blocked foreign Internet addresses. He contends he did everything he could to ensure sufficient Internet connectivity and there was no way he could have foreseen the court would block his Internet address because the link was not live until the day of trial. We disagree. The blame for Lennart's inability to utilize the court's virtual platform was with Lennart. Lennart was advised before trial that he was responsible for ensuring he could connect with the court's virtual platform. Lennart's ability to appear virtually failed on October 1, 2021, weeks before trial. Yet, the record does not reflect he reached out to court staff until after trial for guidance about why he could not sufficiently connect to the court's virtual platform. Lennart was required to show this diligence before trial per the court's instruction, and his failure to do so cannot be declared the fault of the court.
Because Lennart has not shown the court was responsible for his failure to connect to the trial court's virtual platform, Lennart has not demonstrated an irregularity in the proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lennart's motion for a new trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Lennart shall pay costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)
We concur: HULL, Acting P. J. MAURO, J.