Opinion
No. 5-163 / 04-0704
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady, Judge.
Barbara Teahen appeals various economic provisions of the decree dissolving her marriage to Peter Teahen. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Allison Heffern of Simmons, Perrine, Albright Elwood, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Karen Volz of Ackley, Kopecky Kingery, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Barbara Teahen appeals various economic provisions of the decree dissolving her marriage to Peter Teahen. We affirm as modified.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Barbara, who was born in 1948, and Peter, who was born in 1953, married on July 14, 1990. It was the second marriage for both. The parties met in 1985 after which Peter, president of the Teahen Funeral Home Corporation, hired Barbara as an intern. Approximately one year later, Barbara passed her boards and became a licensed funeral director. Barbara then became employed as a funeral director at Teahen Funeral Home, earning between $60,000 and $70,000 per year. Peter's mother gifted him all of the shares in the corporation between 1985 and 1991 as an advance on his inheritance. Both parties continued to be employed by the funeral home throughout the marriage.
Both Peter and Barbara became interested in disaster relief, and Peter eventually became recognized as an expert in the handling of mass fatalities. He spent a significant amount of time working on disaster-related activities. Barbara, however, continued working full-time at the funeral home and handled much of the day-to-day responsibilities until she was terminated by Peter in 2003.
On January 16, 2002, Barbara filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Peter. Following a trial, the district court granted the petition. Among other things, the court set aside to Peter premarital property with a value of $140,755 and set aside to Barbara premarital property with a value of $32,467. The court also determined that the funeral business had appreciated $611,572 during the marriage and awarded Barbara ten percent of that appreciation. The court denied Barbara's request for alimony, but ordered Peter to pay $5000 of Barbara's attorney fees. Barbara appeals.
Scope and Standards of Review.
The court's standard of review in dissolution-of-marriage proceedings is de novo. In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998). The court is obliged to examine the entire record and adjudicate rights anew on the issues properly presented. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1993)).
The partners to a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Dean, 642 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Iowa Ct.App. 2002). Iowa courts do not require an equal division or percentage distribution. In re Marriage of Bonnette, 584 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each circumstance. In re Marriage of Campbell, 623 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).
Premarital Assets.
As noted, the court set aside to Peter premarital property with a value of $140,755 and set aside to Barbara premarital property with a value of $32,467. On appeal, Barbara first argues the relevant date for valuing their premarital assets should have been May of 1989, the date on which they began cohabiting and commingling assets, rather than July of 1990, the date of the marriage. We reject this notion. See Iowa Code § 598.21(1)(b) (2001) (directing courts to divide property after considering "the property brought into the marriage by each party.") (emphasis added).
Barbara further claims (1) she should have received full credit for the appreciation which occurred to the home she brought into the marriage, and (2) she should be credited for a car, an IRA, and an insurance policy. We conclude the district court properly allocated the parties' premarital assets. First, the home was clearly converted to a joint investment. Peter contributed personal income to make substantial improvements to the home, and its mortgage was paid off using joint bonuses from the funeral home. Thus, it is not inequitable to set off to Barbara only that value as of the date of the marriage and allow the parties to share the appreciation from their joint efforts. As far as the other assets, we believe Barbara has simply failed in her duty to adequately document her assets' claimed values at the time of the parties' marriage, given the controverted testimony.
Appreciated Value of Funeral Home.
The court found the value of Teahen Funeral Home, Inc., had appreciated from $417,777 to $1,029,349 during the marriage. These figures are not disputed on appeal. However, Barbara does maintain she is entitled to more than ten percent of that appreciation as granted by the district court. She claims her unique contributions to the business and the substantial degree of responsibilities she held entitles her to a larger share.
On our de novo review of the record, we agree with Barbara. Barbara introduced compelling evidence that her responsibilities were above and beyond that of a mere employee and that her substantial contributions to the funeral home entitle her to a larger percentage of its appreciation. Barbara was elected to the position of corporate secretary in 1991 and performed all the expected tasks of a funeral home director. Her average work week ran from fifty to fifty-five hours, and she was on call twenty-four hours per day, seven days a week. Although Peter retained his authority as sole shareholder, he was absent frequently and thus delegated many of the day-to-day decisions critical to the success of the funeral home to Barbara. She participated in hiring and firing decisions and provided training for employees. Barbara clearly played an integral role in the success and appreciation of the funeral home beyond that of a mere employee. We believe an award to Barbara of thirty percent of the appreciated value of the company, or $183,471.60, does equity between the parties. We therefore amend the decree to order Peter to pay Barbara an additional $122,314.40, representing the difference between the ten and thirty percent awards.
Value of Condominium.
In February of 2003, during the pendency of the dissolution and after the parties separated, Barbara purchased a condominium in Cedar Rapids to serve as her new residence. The district court assigned this condominium a net value of $69,308 and awarded it to Barbara. On appeal, Barbara asserts the net value of this condominium should be reduced to $25,000, reflecting the portion of equity obtained with the use of marital funds. We believe the record and equity supports Barbara's position. We thus use this figure in the calculation of the equalization payment from Peter to Barbara, as laid out in the decree. Accordingly, rather than an equalization payment of $14,064 for real estate as ordered by the district court, Peter should pay to Barbara $36,218, or an additional $22,154.
Teahen Land, L.L.C., and Iron Bird, Inc.
Barbara contests the value placed on certain real estate located in Walford, Iowa, that Peter had purchased as a location for a second funeral home. She maintains the court should have determined Peter held equity in the land of $91,250. Peter testified that the property was appraised by the bank at $290,000 and that he had taken three loans on the property totaling $290,000; thus there was no equity in the property. The district court valued the Walford real estate at $0. The record supports this finding, and we therefore affirm it.
In January of 1990, six months before the parties' marriage, Peter purchased a half interest in a corporation called Iron Bird, Inc., which owns and operates an airplane. Peter testified at trial that the airplane has a value of $108,000 and the district court valued Iron Bird, Inc. at that amount. However, on appeal, Barbara maintains the court erred in failing to include the corporation's checking account in its valuation. We agree. As of July 16, 2003, the corporation had $14,700 in this account. We modify the decree to reflect this and order that Peter pay, as part of his equalization payment, half of this amount or an additional $7,350 to Barbara.
Appellate Attorney Fees.
Barbara seeks attorney fees for this appeal. An award of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right, but rests within the court's discretion. In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the district court's decision on appeal. In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Iowa 1999). We determine each party should pay his or her own appellate attorney fees.
Conclusion.
We affirm the district court's division of the parties' premarital assets. However, we believe that equity requires Barbara to receive thirty percent of the appreciation of the funeral home. We therefore amend the decree to order Peter to pay Barbara an additional $122,314.40. Next, in recognition of our reduction of the value of Barbara's condominium from marital assets, Peter should pay an additional $22,154 to Barbara. Finally, we modify the decree to order that Peter pay, as part of his equalization payment, half of the amount from the Ironbird checking account, $7,350 to Barbara. Accordingly, Peter's total payment to Barbara under this modified decree of dissolution should be increased by $151,818.40. No attorney fees are awarded on appeal and costs are assessed equally.