(Cf. Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1558-1559; Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 310-313; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75-78.) There is no indication in the record that Schine has any legal background or that he does not in good faith believe the merits of his case.
(Cf. Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1558-1559; Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 310-313; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75-78.) There is no indication in the record that either Hedman has any legal background or that they do not in good faith believe the merits of their case.
But this was not a trial in which factual findings were made. (In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 76 [a request for a statement of decision is appropriate only after the determination of a factual issue].) Instead, it was a motion for joinder.
(Cf. Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1559; Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 310-313; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75-78.)
(Cf. Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1559; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75-78; Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 310-313.)
Although in propria persona litigants generally are not entitled to any greater consideration and are held to the same standard as an attorney (Kobayashi, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 543), courts are reluctant to impose sanctions against in propria persona litigants for filing frivolous appeals (Kabbe v. Miller (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 93, 98). Generally, courts have imposed sanctions against in propria persona litigants only in cases where in addition to lack of merit, the record also revealed some additional improper motive (see, e.g., Leslie v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 117, 121; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 78.) Moreover, sanctions on appeal “should be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct.”
Generally, the amount should reflect what is necessary to redress the ‘undue burden’ a frivolous appeal imposes on the legal system and respondent and to deter the same type of conduct in the future.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs, supra, ¶ 11:135, p. 11-55, citing Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 33; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 78; Hersch v. Citizens Savings & Loan Assn, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1013.) The factors that may be considered in setting the amount of sanctions include the appellant’s net worth (Bank of California v. Varakin, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1640; In re Marriage of Stich, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 78) the need for “discourage[ment of] like conduct in the future” (Pierotti v. Torian, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 34-35), and the lack of any discernible deterrent effect of any previous sanction order (Papadakis v. Zelis, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150).
“[A]n award of temporary spousal support is within the sole discretion of the trial court” and will not be reversed unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 71.) “Temporary spousal support may be ordered in ‘any amount that is necessary for … support and maintenance.’ [Citations.] Whereas permanent spousal support ‘provide[s] financial assistance, if appropriate, as determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution and the division of their community property,’ temporary spousal support ‘is utilized to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties in as close to the status quo position as possible pending trial and the division of their assets and obligations.’
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that under either an objective standard (see, e.g., Maple Properties v. Harris (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 997, 1008-1009 [205 Cal.Rptr. 532] [sanctions imposed because appeal indisputably lacked merit]), a subjective standard (see, e.g., In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 77 [169 Cal.Rptr. 919] [sanctions imposed because appeal was pursued solely for purpose of delay]), or a combination of the two standards (see, e.g., Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 32, fn. 9 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 553] [frivolous nature of appeal provided evidence it was prosecuted solely for purpose of delay]), this appeal is frivolous. In compliance with Flaherty’s procedural requirements, we advised the parties we were considering the imposition of sanctions and pursuant to said
See McCarthy v. Warden, 213 Conn. 289, 293, 567 A.2d 1187 (1989) (judicial notice taken of file in federal court); see also Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So.2d 529, 548 (Miss. 1992); Matter of Vineland Chemical Co., 243 N.J. Super. 285, 579 A.2d 343, 360 n. 5 (App.Div. 1990), cert. denied, 127 N.J. 323, 604 A.2d 598 (1990); In re Marriage of Stich, 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75, 214 Cal.Rptr. 919, 929 (1985), review denied, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, Stich v. Stich, 479 U.S. 946, 107 S.Ct. 428, 93 L.Ed.2d 379 (1986), reh. den. 479 U.S. 1047, 107 S.Ct. 913, 93 L.Ed.2d 862 (1987); Matter of Ronwin, 139 Ariz. 576, 680 P.2d 107, 111 n. 4 (1989), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 413, 78 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983); Sapp v. Wong, 654 P.2d 883, 885 n. 3 (1982). Of course, since court ordinarily adjourns at 5:00 P.M., these two matters are not necessarily inconsistent.