Ability to pay encompasses far more than the income of the spouse from whom temporary support is sought; investments and other assets may be used for both temporary spousal support and attorney fees pendente lite. ( Rosenthal v. Rosenthal (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 289, 299 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 186]; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 74 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 919].) (10a) In the instant case, the trial court made the specific and unequivocal finding that husband "has the ability to pay" based on the "extensive assets and nonsalary income at his disposal" which "have been placed by him in the control of others acting for his benefit [and] have a value in excess of $20,000,000."
Generally, the amount should reflect what is necessary to redress the ‘undue burden’ a frivolous appeal imposes on the legal system and respondent and to deter the same type of conduct in the future.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs, supra, ¶ 11:135, p. 11-55, citing Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 33; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 78; Hersch v. Citizens Savings & Loan Assn, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1013.) The factors that may be considered in setting the amount of sanctions include the appellant’s net worth (Bank of California v. Varakin, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1640; In re Marriage of Stich, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 78) the need for “discourage[ment of] like conduct in the future” (Pierotti v. Torian, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 34-35), and the lack of any discernible deterrent effect of any previous sanction order (Papadakis v. Zelis, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150).
Thus, Wife's D.C. action for separate maintenance does not operate as a bar to Husband's attempt to obtain a dissolution of marital status in this state. Wife cites numerous cases in support of her argument that Husband is making an impermissible collateral attack on the decree and jurisdiction of the D.C. court. ( Sherrer v. Sherrer (1948) 334 U.S. 343 [92 L.Ed. 1429, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1 A.L.R.2d 1355]; Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber (5th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 1015; Peery v. Superior Court (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1085 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 882]; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 919]; and Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 692].) To the extent they do not actually support Husband's petition for dissolution of marriage, the cases cited by Wife are all concerned with the res judicata effect of a jurisdictional finding of domicile in a divorce action.
(Cf. Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1558-1559; Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 310-313; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75-78.) There is no indication in the record that either Hedman has any legal background or that they do not in good faith believe the merits of their case.
(Cf. Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1559; Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 310-313; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75-78.)
See McCarthy v. Warden, 213 Conn. 289, 293, 567 A.2d 1187 (1989) (judicial notice taken of file in federal court); see also Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So.2d 529, 548 (Miss. 1992); Matter of Vineland Chemical Co., 243 N.J. Super. 285, 579 A.2d 343, 360 n. 5 (App.Div. 1990), cert. denied, 127 N.J. 323, 604 A.2d 598 (1990); In re Marriage of Stich, 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 75, 214 Cal.Rptr. 919, 929 (1985), review denied, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, Stich v. Stich, 479 U.S. 946, 107 S.Ct. 428, 93 L.Ed.2d 379 (1986), reh. den. 479 U.S. 1047, 107 S.Ct. 913, 93 L.Ed.2d 862 (1987); Matter of Ronwin, 139 Ariz. 576, 680 P.2d 107, 111 n. 4 (1989), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 413, 78 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983); Sapp v. Wong, 654 P.2d 883, 885 n. 3 (1982). Of course, since court ordinarily adjourns at 5:00 P.M., these two matters are not necessarily inconsistent.