In re Marriage of Stich

1 Citing case

  1. In re Marriage of Gray

    204 Cal.App.3d 1239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 16 times
    Noting that when two courts from two jurisdictions have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to an in rem proceeding, the rule giving priority is generally stated in terms of comity, and thus is a rule of discretionary policy, and further noting that because husband's request for divorce in the District of Columbia was "floating in a kind of legal limbo," under principles of comity California had jurisdiction to act on his petition for dissolution, even though he consented to the reservation of all property issues to the District of Columbia court

    Thus, Wife's D.C. action for separate maintenance does not operate as a bar to Husband's attempt to obtain a dissolution of marital status in this state. Wife cites numerous cases in support of her argument that Husband is making an impermissible collateral attack on the decree and jurisdiction of the D.C. court. ( Sherrer v. Sherrer (1948) 334 U.S. 343 [92 L.Ed. 1429, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1 A.L.R.2d 1355]; Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber (5th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 1015; Peery v. Superior Court (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1085 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 882]; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 919]; and Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 692].) To the extent they do not actually support Husband's petition for dissolution of marriage, the cases cited by Wife are all concerned with the res judicata effect of a jurisdictional finding of domicile in a divorce action.