Patrick's testimony squarely placed him within the category of "voluntarily unemployed," and it was proper to impute income to him. ¶ 53 Although not directly on point, In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858 (1979), provides support for our conclusion. In Smith, the husband, who was 54 years old and in good health, retired during the dissolution proceedings from his position earning $50,000 per year. Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 860.

The court then addressed case law regarding imputing income to a party. The court referred to the Smith case ( In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858 (1979)), which discussed the ability of the maintenance-paying spouse to contribute to the other spouse's support. The court held that the Smith case distinguished the current level of income from the ability a spouse has to earn income.

" ¶ 22 Lorand also cites In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858 (1979). In Smith, a husband voluntarily retired during the divorce proceedings.

In re Marriage of Lichtenauer, 408 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1089 (2011). Courts pay special attention where there is a difference between the paying spouse's actual and potential income that is a result of a totally voluntary retirement or change in employment status. In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858, 862 (1979). When deciding whether it was appropriate for the supporting spouse to voluntarily retire or cut back on his or her income, the court may consider: "the age, health of the party, his motives in retiring, the timing of the retirement, his ability to pay maintenance even after retirement and the ability of the other spouse to provide for himself or herself."

" Thus, the court perceived that there was some degree of bad faith on the part of the husband. This court stated in In re Marriage of Smith (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 858, that the amount of maintenance must be calculated on the basis of the supporting spouse's ability to pay, which is linked to the amount of income he would have realized had he chosen not to voluntarily leave his job. ( Smith, 77 Ill. App.3d at 864.) In Smith, wife appealed an award of maintenance, arguing it was inadequate to support her. Before husband instigated the dissolution of the marriage, he was a successful engineer and president of his own company making $50,000 per year. He voluntarily resigned from his position during the marriage dissolution proceedings on the ground that he did not want to work long hours anymore.

[¶ 12] The parties and the trial court mainly relied upon the case law cited in Sommer, 2001 ND 191, ¶ 20, 636 N.W.2d 423, in assessing whether Donald's voluntary retirement justified a modification of spousal support. See Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So.2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1992); In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill.App.3d 858, 33 Ill.Dec. 332, 396 N.E.2d 859, 863-64 (1979); Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1980); Silvan v. Sylvan, 267 N.J.Super. 578, 632 A.2d 528, 530 (App.Div. 1993); Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J.Super. 350, 603 A.2d 542, 545-46 (App.Div. 1992). These courts have adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and have set forth similar non-exclusive factors for consideration:

(4) The evidence showed Douglas's retirement was in bad faith; his retirement was not long after the maintenance award, and his motivation was his enjoyment of life, not his health or necessity. (5) Under cases such as In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill.App.3d 858, 396 N.E.2d 859 (1979), the court should base maintenance on the payor's ability to pay, not his or her willingness to work.

Id. at 1091, 945 N.E.2d at 132; see also In re Marriage of Morse, 240 Ill. App. 3d 296, 310, 607 N.E.2d 632, 642 (1993) (the trial court awarded maintenance based upon past earnings when the husband liquidated his company in orderto be unemployed); In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858, 863-64, 396 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1979) (during dissolution, husband voluntarily left his job and started a consulting firm earning less than he did at his former job; appellate court linked maintenance award to the amount he would have made had he not left his job).¶ 25 In the oldest of these cases, In re Marriage of Smith, the court explained the Act's mandate that the court consider the spouse's "ability" to contribute to the other's support:

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858 (1979) (held because the change in circumstances was brought about by husband's own actions, it could not be the basis of a modification of maintenance). The trial court's consideration of this factor is required by statute and thus is not error. ¶ 139 Feng further argues that combining the issue of child support with the issue of maintenance constitutes an abuse of discretion. Janet argues in response that the court heard her petition for indirect civil contempt concerning payment of child support and Feng's petition to modify maintenance at the same time, by agreement.

Id.; In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill.App.3d 858, 33 Ill.Dec. 332, 396 N.E.2d 859 (1979). The trial judge should decide one pivotal issue: whether the advantage to the retiring spouse substantially outweighs the disadvantage to the payee spouse.