Opinion
H025042.
11-25-2003
In re Marriage of SHARNA and HOYT D. RITCHIE, JR. SHARNA B. JORDAN-RITCHIE, Respondent, v. HOYT D. RITCHIE, JR., Appellant.
Respondent Sharna B. Jordan-Ritchie (Sharna) obtained a dissolution of marriage from appellant Hoyt D. Ritchie, Jr., (Hoyt) on June 2, 1999. Three years of harassment, threats, and verbal abuse followed. Sharna then obtained restraining orders and a child support order which Hoyt now appeals on the ground that the court committed prejudicial error.
FACTS
Both parties are in propria persona in this court. The following facts were gleaned from the record. Sharna and her two-and-a-half-year-old son Micah started living with Hoyt in January 1991. Sharna and Hoyt married on August 3, 1995, and their son Wyatt, was born on August 19, 1997. Sharnas and Hoyts relationship was "emotionally/sexually strained"; "the couple had issues about their sexual intimacy," and Hoyt used prostitutes and exhibited sexually addictive behavior during the marriage. Both parties were angry and verbally abusive, and despite counseling, the parties finally sought a dissolution. Hoyt was very angry during the process of dissolution and threatened Sharna. However, he finally received inpatient treatment for an addiction of compulsive use of pornography and prostitutes starting in December 1998.
Sharna and her sons moved to Southern California to live with her mother. Hoyt was granted visitation with Wyatt every other weekend in Southern California and three times a year in Monterey, but he found it possible to visit only 10 days in three years. Shortly after Sharna moved to Southern California, Hoyt sent her an e-mail stating "I was going to kill you," and he made other threats against her. Sharna allowed then four-year-old Wyatt to visit Hoyt in Monterey County one summer, and Wyatt came home and "reverted back to going potty in his pants and in his bed at night," and he attempted to French kiss Sharna. He said he saw his dad and his dads new wife Karen do this.
In October 2001, Hoyt filed a motion for modification of visitation requesting additional visitation in Northern California. On December 11, 2001, Sharna filed a motion for modification of child support, payment of uninsured health care costs, and other relief. At the hearing on February 8, 2002, Hoyt revealed that he moved his new wife and stepdaughter to Southern California also. Sharna filed an application for a temporary restraining order. At the hearing on February 22, 2002, Sharna presented evidence that Hoyt continued to threaten her and her boyfriend (and eventually husband), William Montgomery. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order at the hearing while Hoyt was in court. There were some errors in the order, and an amended restraining order was issued on March 4, 2002. Sharna was to attend Wyatts school events "when they start and [Hoyt] may go 20 minutes before it ends. Communication is to be by e-mail. Visitation remains as is. The matter is continued to 5-9-02 . . . for [the psychological evaluations]." The court ordered Hoyt to stay at least 200 yards away from "(1) person seeking the order; [¶] . . . [¶] (3) residence of person seeking the order; [¶] (4) place of work of person seeking the order; [¶] (5) the childrens school or place of child care; and [¶] (6) protected persons vehicle."
Another order based on the February 8 hearing was issued on July 19, 2002. This order ordered guideline child support of $790 per month, allowed Sharna a hardship deduction for Micah, her child from a prior marriage and required Hoyt to maintain medical insurance on Wyatt. After another hearing, the court awarded the dependent tax deduction for Wyatt for 2001 to Hoyt and ordered Sharna to file an amended tax return for that year removing Wyatt as a dependent.
The court received the psychological evaluations on March 4, 2002. Dr. Eddy recommended sole legal and primary physical custody of Wyatt to Sharna with visitation to Hoyt. Dr. Eddy stated, "[i]t is essential that [Hoyts] history of adult sexual obsessive-compulsiveness never become something that his son is aware of. If this boy is inappropriately exposed to some type of adult sexuality (e.g., waking up to find his father viewing X-rated videos), then the current custody/visitation system should be immediately re-assessed by the Court."
Hoyt responded with a request that custody be changed to him because Sharna did not reveal to him that she had recently married. Hoyt stated, "[d]ue to all the lies, deceit and deception that has currently come to light the Notice of Motion for Modification of Child Support dated December 4, 2001; Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order filed on February 15, 2002; Restraining Order After Hearing filed on February 15, 2002; Retraining Order After Hearing filed on March 4, 2002 and the Evaluation of Dr. [James] Eddy dated March 4, 2002 should all be stricken and we should proceed to the OSC filed on April 15, 2002." The court found there was no change of circumstance and denied the motion. This appeal ensued.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Hoyt contends that "[t]he court committed prejudicial error in admitting the findings and order after hearing filed on" (1) July 19, 2002, (2) February 22, 2002, and (3) March 4, 2002. In addition, (4) "[t]he court erroneously refused to accept declarations filed by [Hoyts] sixteen year old daughter and accepted a declaration filed by [Sharnas] thirteen year old son." (5) "The court committed prejudicial error in dismissing [Hoyts] order to show cause filed on April 16, 2002, after substantial evidence was presented regarding [Sharnas] lies in open court."
DISCUSSION
Hoyt asserts that "[t]he court committed prejudicial error in admitting the findings and order after hearing filed on July 19, 2002." He then lists four categories of error: hardship, child support and mandatory additional child support, wage and earning assignment, and dependent tax deductions and three "[o]ther issues." "[Sharna] lying in open Court on February 8, 2002"; "Preparation of Findings and Order After Hearing for February 8, 2002"; and "Proof of Service on [Hoyt]." Each listed "error" is followed by a factual assertion, for example, Sharna was not entitled to an $892 hardship deduction because "[t]his hardship should have been stricken as it was never addressed in Court," and "Mandatory additional child support. [Sharna] has that the amount of mandatory additional child support of $528.28 which [Hoyts] one-half is $274.13 be backdated to December 11, 2001. This amount of $548.28 did not go into effect until February 12, 2002."
Although Hoyt "state[s] each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point," (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(B)), he does not "support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(B).) Instead of describing errors of law the court committed, Hoyt reargues the facts that were presented to the trial court for resolution.
The "errors" Hoyt complains of are so de minimus as to be absurd. For example, according to Hoyt, the correct amount of child support is $772 per month rather than $790, a difference of $ 18 a month. The difference between the mandatory additional child care ordered by the court (50 percent of $548.25 paid by each) and the amount Hoyt says the court should have calculated ($ 274.13 for each) is two cents, a penny for each parent. Hoyts additional complaints-that Sharna never sent him a copy of the July 19, 2002, order that the restraining order after hearing filed on February 22, 2002, contained items which were omitted from the order and was never served on Hoyt, and that the amended restraining order after hearing filed on March 4, 2002, contained items which were never agreed to in court and were never served on Hoyt-these complaints are inconsequential. The headings in a brief on appeal should not only show the points involved but should be stated to compel reversal if the points are well taken. (Richard v. Richard (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 900, 902.)
Equally inconsequential are the additional points that Hoyt never agreed to two restrictions in the amended restraining order, that the court should have accepted a declaration by Hoyts 16-year-old step-daughter and his mother-in-law, and that the court should not have dismissed Hoyts application for an order to show cause filed on April 16, 2002 in which he sought to have Sharna punished for lying about her remarriage by having all previous orders of the court stricken.
Sharnas respondents brief noted that Hoyt added the claim that she was a vexatious litigant. She suggests that "[i]t is apparent by review of the documents filed in the trial court and now in the appellate court that [Hoyt] is attempting to accomplish his task which is[,] as he stated in his own words: `I will personally destroy you in any way possible. I will make your life a living hell until the day I die. " After wading through a record full of disparaging declarations, accusations of wrongdoing, nitpicking discrepancies, and hurtful interparental communications, we are inclined to agree.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
WE CONCUR: Elia, J., Bamattre-Manoukian, J. --------------- Notes: The original briefs were ordered corrected by the parties since they did not conform to the California Rules of Court. In the new appellants brief, Hoyt added a "vexatious litigant" claim which is not developed in the body of the brief. This claim is deemed abandoned.