Opinion
No. 5-251 / 04-0805
Filed April 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.
Petitioner-appellant appeals, challenging certain of the economic provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to respondent-appellee. AFFIRMED.
Michael Brice, Oskaloosa, for appellant.
Michael Mahaffey, Montezuma, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Petitioner-appellant Carl Schuring appeals, challenging certain of the economic provisions of the decree dissolving his less than ten-year marriage to respondent-appellee Paula Schuring. Carl contends (1) the division of assets and liabilities made by the district court was not equitable, (2) the district court failed to correctly consider the terms of the antenuptial agreement of the parties, (3) the district court erred in holding him solely responsible for a debt owed to his mother Maxine Verros, (4) the district court should not have set aside to Paula, as property brought into the marriage, a portion of the value of a horse named Shirley Cool, and (5) the district court should not have awarded Paula the horse named Perpetually Charmed. We affirm.
We review economic challenges to a dissolution decree de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984). We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the issues properly presented. In re Marriage of Bonnette, 492 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). We give weight to the fact-findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g).
Iowa is an equitable distribution state, which means the partners in a marriage that is to be dissolved are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Havran, 406 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987).
The distribution of the property of the parties should be that which is equitable under the circumstances after consideration of the criteria codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (2003). In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983).
Assets and liabilities are valued as of the date of dissolution. See In re Marriage of McLaughlin, 526 N.W.2d at 342, 344 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994); see also Locke v. Locke, 246 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Iowa 1976); Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968). We value property for division purposes at its value at the time of the dissolution. See Locke, 246 N.W.2d at 252. It is the net worth of the parties at the time of trial that is relevant in adjusting property rights. In re Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Iowa 1989); In re Marriage of Moffatt, 279 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 1979).
We look to the economic provisions of the decree as a whole in assessing the equity of the property division. See In re Marriage of Robison, 542 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Carl and Paula signed an antenuptial agreement in April of 1996 and married in May of that year. Apparently, one of the two items of contention that relate to the agreement is the real estate in Carl's name at the time of marriage. Carl's asset list attached to the agreement shows the item "Real property $18,000 (mortgage $40,000)." It is not clear whether the equity in the property was $18,000 or whether the property was mortgaged for more than its value. The second item in contention related to the agreement is a horse named Sonny C Skip listed as an asset of Paula's with $10,000 beside it.
The antenuptial agreement provided that each party owned certain property that would remain their separate estates. It further provided real estate in Carl's name would remain his separate property but if the parties' marriage was dissolved Carl agreed to pay Paula one-third of the net value of the real estate and that there would be an appraisal and Carl would then give Paula an amount equal to one third of the equity in the property.
The district court divided the property and assets it was asked to divide leaving each party with $53,963.38 in value.
Certain assets, including the parties' separate 401(k) accounts, were not valued but were set aside to the party who had contributed to the account.
We first address Carl's contention the district court did not properly consider the antenuptial agreement in arriving at the property division, in that the court said the agreement was of little effect and found that Carl should give Paula one-half the equity in the real estate. Paula contends the evidence supports the district court's finding, for in January of 2002 she and Carl deeded the real estate to themselves as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common. She contends this was done because she had contributed financially to the real estate both by investing proceeds of more than $15,000 from the sale of a previous home and also by making mortgage payments on the property from her wages. Paula also contends that the buildings on the property were put there after the marriage and her father helped pay for a lean-to that is part of a building on the property. Paula argues the deed showed that the agreement was no longer in effect as it related to the real estate.
Antenuptial contracts are looked upon with favor by the law and are to be liberally construed to carry out the intentions of the parties. In re Parish's Estate, 236 Iowa 822, 830, 20 N.W.2d 32, 36 (1945), In re Marriage of Pillard, 448 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). The purpose of such contracts is to fix the interests of the respective parties in the property of the other. Parish, 20 N.W.2d at 36, Pillard 448 N.W. 2d at 715. Iowa Code section 598.21(1)(l) provides that in equitably dividing property between the parties to a dissolution, one of the many factors the court is to consider is "[t]he provisions of an antenuptial agreement."
We cannot say that after the contributions Paula made to the property and the fact that the parties put the property in their names a joint tenants, the district court did not do equity in considering each to have a half interest in the property. We affirm on this issue.
Carl next contends he should not have been solely responsible for a note to his mother Maxine Verros.
Paula contends the note was dated July 7, 2003 but was not signed by Carl until a few days before trial in February. Paula said Carl admitted she knew nothing about the note and the only testimony about the note came from Carl and his mother. Paula said $4,000 of the amount went for legal fees and the money from Carl's mother was used to replace the income she had been providing. Paula also points out that other than the promissory note there was no other evidence of the claimed debt.
Carl admits money from the loan went to his legal fees. He contends that money from the loans also went to debts the parties had accumulated and to feed the horses which they owned.
The district court found Carl was not required to reimburse Paula nearly $6,000 for money her father allegedly spent to improve the property and that Carl was responsible for the debt to his mother. While the district court made no specific findings as to why the debt was not divided, from our review of the evidence we find the existence of the debt is in some question. Giving deference to the district court in addressing the credibility of witnesses we affirm on this issue.
Carl also argues that the district court did not do equity in its treatment of the horse Shirley Cool. Paula owned the horse at the time of the marriage and it was given to her in the decree. Shirley Cool was appraised at $20,000 and the district court considered $7,300 of that amount as property Paula brought to the marriage and set that amount aside to her. Under Iowa Code section 598.21(1)(c) one of the factors the district court is to consider in dividing property in a dissolution is "[t]he property brought to the marriage by each party." We cannot say the district court did not do equity in considering a portion of the value of Shirley Cool as set aside to Paula as property brought in to the marriage. We affirm on this issue.
Carl also contends the district court should not have awarded the horse Perpetually Charmed valued at $4,500 to Paula, but should have awarded the horse to him. He says both he and Paula agreed at trial that it should go to him and it was inequitable for the trial court not to honor that agreement.
Paula disagrees there was an agreement that Carl receive Perpetually Charmed and argues that the division made was equitable.
Our review of Paula's testimony convinces us that Paula said she wanted Perpetually Charmed, but that if Carl wanted her then her value should go to his side. The division made by the district court was equitable. We affirm on this issue.