Opinion
A163765
12-22-2022
In re the Marriage of PAMELA Z. SCHLOSS and BEN V. SCHLOSS. v. BEN V. SCHLOSS, Appellant. PAMELA Z. SCHLOSS, Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. FAM0122478)
Richman, J.
This appeal arises from a dispute between Ben V. Schloss and Pamela Z. Schloss regarding the characterization of a commercial warehouse that Ben purchased in his name only while married to Pamela. After holding a trial on that issue, the trial court issued a statement of decision and a series of orders, including that the warehouse was community property and that Ben had a right to reimbursement of his separate property contribution to the purchase of the warehouse. Ben appeals, contending the warehouse was his separate property because he acquired it with separate property funds.
As is customary in family law proceedings, we refer to the parties by their first names for clarity and convenience.
We conclude the court erred in (1) characterizing the warehouse as entirely community property because the source of payments to acquire the warehouse is traced to both separate and community contributions, and (2) limiting Ben to only reimbursement of his separate property contribution to the purchase of the warehouse, rather than an ownership interest in the warehouse proportionate to the separate property funds that he contributed. Accordingly, we reverse the orders characterizing the warehouse as community property and awarding reimbursement, and we affirm the remaining orders.
BACKGROUND
Ben and Pamela married in March 2000. In August 2013, they separated, and Pamela petitioned to dissolve the marriage. In November 2017, the trial court terminated marital status.
On October 19, 2020, after bifurcating the issue of the characterization of the warehouse, the court held a trial on that issue, where it heard testimony from both Ben and Pamela. The facts elicited at trial are these.
Ben runs a design manufacturing business that he had started in approximately 1993. Pamela is a hairstylist who owns and runs a beauty salon.
In late 2010, Ben began looking for a warehouse that he could purchase and operate his business from, since the rent on the facility he was renting had increased. He chose a warehouse located at 707 Warrington Avenue in Redwood City ("the warehouse").
Ben testified that before the warehouse was purchased, the parties were discussing separation and agreed they should keep their businesses separate. To that end, he testified the parties understood Ben would purchase the warehouse in his name only and keep it as a separate asset. Ben also testified Pamela did not want "to be involved" in the purchase and did not attend any meetings with the real estate agent he consulted. Pamela, on the other hand, testified the parties discussed that the warehouse would be rented out in the future and that the rent collected would serve as their retirement income.
Ben arranged for a notary to go to the family residence on the night of May 9, 2011, when Pamela was presented with a document entitled "Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed." That document stated, "Pamela Zink Schloss, wife of the herein grantee[,] [¶] hereby GRANTS to Ben V. Schloss, a married man as his sole and separate property the [warehouse]." Pamela testified Ben had told her she "needed to sign the interspousal grant deed because if [she] didn't, [her] income would need to be included in his [loan] application, and the income would be too high and therefore he wouldn't qualify." Pamela further testified that although she did not have full knowledge of the facts surrounding the deed or a complete understanding of the effect of the transfer, she trusted Ben and "[had] confidence in him doing what was best for the family." Pamela thus signed the deed that night.
The purchase price of the warehouse was approximately $445,000. Ben testified he made a down payment of $45,000 with money that his mother had gifted him. Pamela, however, testified the down payment came from money they received from Ben's sale of their gold coins to his mother.
To finance the rest of the purchase price, Ben applied for a loan through the Small Business Administration. He provided "proof of income, business income, a lot of the business records around PNA and things like that and proof of down payment." Ben eventually secured the loan.
On May 12, 2011, a deed was recorded granting the warehouse from the sellers to "Ben V. Schloss, a married man as his sole and separate property."
Ben testified that the property value of the warehouse was estimated to be approximately $1.5 million.
Following the testimony of Ben and Pamela, the parties rested. The court then received the parties' written closing arguments, after which it issued a proposed statement of decision and order. Ben requested clarifications of, and objected to, some of the proposed findings. Pamela responded, and Ben replied to that response.
On April 15, 2021, the court issued its final statement of decision. The court presumed Pamela had a community property interest in the warehouse. Regarding the interspousal transfer grant deed, the court assumed without deciding that it met the technical form requirements of a valid transmutation under Family Code section 852, subdivision (a). Even if the deed complied with section 852, the court noted, it was still subject to examination for undue influence under section 721, subdivision (b). And so analyzed, the court found a presumption of undue influence arose. It determined Ben had gained an unfair advantage over Pamela when she signed the interspousal transfer grant deed because it gave Ben full ownership of the warehouse. The court next observed that Pamela's testimony supported the finding that she did not sign the interspousal transfer grant deed freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the facts and understanding of the effect of the transaction. As such, the court concluded Ben failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
The statement of decision ended with a section entitled "Orders," which included the following: (1) the warehouse "should be characterized as [c]ommunity [p]roperty"; (2) Ben "is entitled to down payment reimbursement for the amount he used to purchase the property"; (3) "[p]ursuant to [section] 2550 [et seq.], all community property shall be divided equally"; and (4) "[e]ach party is to bear his or her own fees and costs."
On April 23, Ben filed a motion requesting the court to certify there was probable cause for immediate appellate review of the orders contained in the statement of decision. Because the court did not rule on the motion within 40 days of service of the orders, the motion was deemed granted by operation of law pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.392(b)(3).
Ben then filed in this court a motion to appeal and a request for a stay of the orders. On November 19, we granted both the motion and stay request. We also granted Ben's unopposed motion to augment the record to include the exhibits attached to his motion to appeal, as well as two other documents that were omitted from the motion.
DISCUSSION
Ben contends the trial court erred in characterizing the warehouse as community property because he acquired it with separate property funds. If Pamela had no property interest in the warehouse, Ben asserts, then "she gave up nothing by executing the deed." In turn, Ben argues the validity of the interspousal transfer grant deed was irrelevant, and the court erred in analyzing that question to conclude the warehouse was community property. Alternatively, Ben maintains that because the interspousal transaction was free from undue influence, it validly transmuted the warehouse from community property to his separate property.
As now explained, we conclude the trial court's finding that the warehouse is entirely community property is not supported by substantial evidence. First, the evidence shows the warehouse's purchase price is traced to both Ben's separate property (down payment) and community property (the loan proceeds). Second, the record does not establish there was a transmutation of either the separate or community property interest, and therefore those property interests retained their character. Ben did not sign any express written declaration transmuting his separate property to community property. Although Pamela did sign an interspousal transfer grant deed purporting to transmute her community property interest in the warehouse to Ben's separate property, the record discloses the transaction was a product of undue influence.
For these reasons, the court should have characterized the warehouse as a mixed asset consisting of both Ben's separate property and a community property interest. Furthermore, because Ben retained a separate property interest in the warehouse, he was entitled to a pro rata ownership interest, not a right of reimbursement as the court ordered.
The Standard of Review
Generally, we review the factual findings that underpin a trial court's characterization of property for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.) When, however, the determination" 'requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values,' the determination in question amounts to the resolution of a mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law. [Citation.] As such, it is examined de novo. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Lehman (1998) 18 Cal.4th 169, 184.)
Also, whether the interspousal transaction gives rise to a presumption of undue influence and whether the burden of rebutting that presumption has been satisfied are questions for the trier of fact, whose decision will not be reversed if supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 730, 734 &fn. 11 (Burkle); In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624, 632 (Mathews).)
Ben contends our review in this case should be purely de novo because there are no factual disputes. We disagree. The facts underlying the court's characterization and undue influence determinations are disputed. Thus, in reviewing the court's factual findings, we resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party and indulge all reasonable inferences in order to uphold the finding. (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 31 (Bonds), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945, 958.)
Additionally, where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal," 'a reviewing court starts with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.' [Citations.]" (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman).) The appellant therefore must" 'demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings'" and, accordingly, must" 'set forth all the material evidence on the point and not merely [its] own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.; accord, In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1531 (Davenport) [an appellant's factual presentation stating only evidence favorable to it" 'is but an attempt to reargue on appeal those factual issues decided adversely to it at the trial level, contrary to established precepts of appellate review. As such, it is doomed to fail' "], quoting Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 398-399.)
The Community Property Presumption
"The character of property as separate or community is determined at the time of its acquisition. [Citations.]" (See v. See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 783, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Perkal (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1198, 1201-1202.) Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be community property under section 760, while property acquired before marriage or after separation or at any time by gift, bequest, or devise is separate property. (§§ 770, subd. (a), 771, subd. (a).)
The presumption that property acquired during the marriage is community property is rebuttable. (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 91.) It" 'may be overcome simply by tracing the source of the funds used to acquire the property to separate property. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1423 (Bonvino).)
"Property that a spouse purchases with separate property funds continues to be separate property. [Citation.] . . . Property that is separate at the time of acquisition remains separate, except for any increase in value due to community efforts or contributions. [Citation.]" (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423.)
Ben argues the trial court erred in not characterizing the warehouse as his separate property because the down payment came from a separate property source: funds that his mother gave him as a gift. (§ 770, subd. (a)(2).) Pamela counters that the down payment was made with community funds in the form of money they received from Ben selling their gold coins to his mother. The court resolved this conflict in the evidence in favor of Ben, and its finding is entitled to deference. (See Bonds, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 31.) Thus, the record supports the court's finding that Ben used separate property funds for the down payment. This finding, however, does not compel Ben's conclusion that the warehouse was wholly his separate property.
As Ben acknowledges, the remainder of the purchase price of the warehouse was financed from a loan. "Loans . . . acquired during marriage are presumptively community property ...." (In re Marriage of Grinius (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1179, 1187 (Grinius); see Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 210 (Gudelj) ["There is a rebuttable presumption that property acquired on credit during marriage is community property"], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Steinberger (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1466.) This presumption can be rebutted by showing that the lender intended to rely on the spouse's separate property. (Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 210; Grinius, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1187.) "Without satisfactory evidence of the lender's intent, the general presumption prevails." (Grinius, at p. 1187.)
Grinius stated the standard for overcoming the presumption that loan proceeds are community property in stricter terms than were used in Gudelj. Whereas Gudelj stated the test was whether the evidence showed the lender "primarily" relied on separate property (Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 1187, Grinius expressed it as whether "the lender intended to rely solely upon a spouse's separate property." (Grinius, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 210, italics added.) For the reasons stated in the text, Ben has not rebutted the general presumption under either standard.
Ben did not request a finding, or object to the statement of decision for lack of a finding, on the lender's intent to rely on community property or the character of the loan. "If a party fails to raise omissions or ambiguities in the trial court, the appellate court will infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the [order]." (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424; see In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 11331134.) We therefore imply the trial court found the lender intended to rely on community property and the loan proceeds were community property.
Substantial evidence supports this implied finding. Both parties testified that Ben's earnings would be the source of income listed on the loan application. Income earned from a spouse's time, labor, and skill during a marriage is community property. (In re Marriage of Harrison (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1216, 1226; State Board of Equalization v. Woo (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 481, 483.) The parties do not dispute this, and Ben in fact testified his belief that Pamela had a community property interest in his business. It was Ben's burden at trial to rebut the presumption that the loan proceeds belonged to the community, and he failed to establish the lender intended to rely primarily on his separate property in making the loan. (See Grinius, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1186-1189.) Indeed, Ben does not offer any argument concerning the character of the loan in his appellate briefs.
Based on the above, the warehouse was neither entirely community property, as Pamela claims and the trial court found, nor entirely Ben's separate property, as Ben claims. Instead, the record supports that the warehouse was a mixed asset consisting of both Ben's separate property and a community property interest.
As will be shown, in the absence of a valid transmutation, the separate and community contributions to the purchase of the warehouse maintained their character. (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424.)
Transmutation
"A married person may transmute the character of property from separate to community or from community to separate by agreement or transfer, with or without consideration, but the transmutation must meet the statutory requirements to be valid." (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.) A valid transmutation of property requires an express declaration in writing that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected. (§ 852, subd. (a).)
Any interspousal transmutation of property, even one that complies with section 852, is still subject to examination of the transaction for undue influence under section 721, subdivision (b). (See In re Marriage of Barneson (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 583, 588 ["[T]he broad question whether a valid transmutation of property has taken place depends not only on compliance with the provisions of section 852 but also upon compliance with rules governing fiduciary relationships"].) In property transactions between spouses, the spouses owe one another a fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing. (§ 721, subd. (b).) Thus, where a transaction advantages one spouse over the other, a presumption of undue influence arises. (In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 344.) "The presumption of undue influence is regularly applied in marital transactions in which one spouse has deeded property to the other ....In such cases, it is evident one spouse has obtained an advantage-the deeded property-from the other." (Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 730.) The advantaged party bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of undue influence, if applicable, by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 736.)
With respect to Ben's separate property interest in the warehouse, there is no evidence he signed an express written declaration transmuting his separate property to community property under section 852. As such, his contribution to the purchase of the warehouse maintained its separate property character. (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.)
As for Pamela's community property interest in the warehouse, the parties dispute whether the interspousal transfer grant deed validly transmuted it to Ben's separate property. The court resolved this issue in favor of Pamela. It found that even if the deed met the express writing requirements for a valid transmutation under section 852, a presumption of undue influence arose under section 721, subdivision (b). The court explained that Ben secured the unfair advantage of receiving Pamela's interest in the warehouse by means of persuading her to sign an interspousal transfer grant deed, resulting in Ben obtaining sole, separate ownership. As a result, the court held Ben had the burden to show he did not use undue influence in the interspousal transaction.
Ben argues the presumption of undue influence did not apply in this this case and therefore the burden did not shift to him to refute the presumption. He asserts "[t]he interspousal grant deed imposed no disadvantage on Pamela-she had no property interest in the acquisition of [the warehouse] and suffered no disadvantage by executing a deed confirming that." This argument is unavailing because it rests on the premise that the warehouse was his sole and separate property, a premise we rejected above.
The court next determined Ben failed to defeat the presumption of undue influence. To rebut that presumption, the court explained, Ben had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "the transaction was 1) Freely and voluntarily made, 2) With full knowledge of . . . all the facts and 3) With a complete understanding of the effect of the transfer." (Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) The court determined these factors were not present in this case. The court cited evidence that Pamela was excluded from meetings concerning the purchase of the warehouse. It also relied upon Pamela's testimony that she signed the interspousal transfer grant deed with the understanding that the purchase of the warehouse would be an investment for the benefit of the community. Although Ben testified the parties understood the interspousal transaction was a means to keep the warehouse his separate asset, the court did not find his testimony credible. The court thus concluded Ben failed to negate the presumption of undue influence.
Ben disputes the trial court's finding, arguing there was no evidence he imposed no "pressure or coercion" on Pamela to sign the interspousal transfer grant deed. In so arguing, Ben focuses on evidence only favorable to him, while ignoring all of the other material evidence on the undue influence issue, including the evidence the trial court relied upon to make its finding. Ben's failure to set forth all material evidence waives the claim that the court's order is not supported by substantial evidence. (Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881; Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1530-1531.) His failure to affirmatively show the evidence was insufficient also allows us to presume the court's findings are correct and, on that basis, affirm. (See Foreman, at p. 881.)
In any event, Ben's contention is not persuasive. It is true that Pamela testified she did not receive pressure or coercion from Ben to sign the interspousal transfer grant deed, in the sense that Ben did not threaten or force her to sign it. However, as noted, undue influence may be shown with other indicia of unfair dealing, such as that the disadvantaged spouse entered into the interspousal transaction without full knowledge of all the facts and a complete understanding of the effect of the transaction. (Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) There was such evidence in this case. As the court found, the record demonstrates that Pamela did not know all the facts that she should have known for her benefit and protection concerning the nature and effect of the transaction. The evidence shows she instead always believed the warehouse was a community asset and trusted Ben to handle the transaction for the community's benefit. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Ben failed to defeat the presumption of undue influence.
We are not convinced by Ben's assertion that Pamela's "unexpressed subjective understanding" he "would transfer the property into both names at a later time . . . cannot form the basis of an undue influence claim." Ben relies on Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 624 and In re Marriage of Holtemann (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1166 (Holtemann), but these cases are distinguishable.
In Mathews, the wife quitclaimed to her husband her interest in their residence in order to obtain a more favorable interest rate on their mortgage. Title to the house was taken in the husband's name alone. (Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 627.) The wife knew title was taken in that manner, but believed she would be added to the title later on. (Ibid.) Later, the couple separated and their home was sold. (Id. at pp. 627-628.) The wife contested the validity of the quitclaim deed, primarily on the ground that she was a native of Japan and did not speak English well enough to fully understand what she was doing. (Id. at p. 627.) The Mathews court held that the husband rebutted the presumption of undue influence by showing the wife entered into the interspousal transaction freely, voluntarily, and with a full understanding of the quitclaim deed. (Id. at pp. 631-632.)
The factual setting in Mathews seems similar to this case at first glance. In Mathews, the wife said she merely assumed she would be added onto the title after escrow closed. (Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 627.) Similarly, here, Ben and Pamela "never discussed [the] situation" of whether Pamela's name would be added onto the title at a later time. Nonetheless, there remain material distinctions from Mathews. Here, unlike in Mathews, there was testimony that Pamela did not merely assume, but actually discussed with Ben, that the warehouse property would be used to provide retirement income for the community. From this testimony, the trial court could reasonably infer, as it did, Pamela had been misinformed or misled about the effect of the transaction. Additionally, there is no evidence that Pamela, like the wife in Mathews, managed the marital household finances. (Id. at p. 627.)
For similar reasons, Holtemann is also inapposite. There, the court concluded the husband validly transmuted his assets from separate to community property by signing a "Transmutation Agreement." (Holtemann, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) The court rejected the husband's argument he was unduly influenced in signing the agreement, concluding he "was fully informed of the legal consequences of his actions. Nothing in the record indicates that he was misinformed or misled. On the contrary, counsel sent [husband] a letter 'reminding' him that 'this "transmutation" of separate into community property ha[d] clear and potentially irreversible consequences ....'" (Id. at p. 1173, fn. omitted.) By contrast, here, the trial court had evidence from which to infer Pamela was "misinformed or misled" about the consequences of signing the interspousal transfer grant deed.
In light of the above, substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the interspousal transfer grant deed did not validly transmute Pamela's community property interest in the warehouse to Ben's separate property.
Although we uphold that particular finding, however, we disagree with the court's ultimate ruling that the warehouse was community property. We circle back to our conclusion above that both separate and community property interests in the warehouse were established. In the absence of a transmutation of either of those interests, the court should have characterized the warehouse as partially separate property and partially community property. We will therefore reverse and remand the matter to the trial court to properly characterize the warehouse.
Reimbursement
After characterizing the warehouse as community property, the trial court limited Ben to reimbursement of his separate property contribution. The court did not state the statutory basis for the award, but presumably it was made under section 2640, as Ben notes. Section 2640 provides that a spouse is entitled to reimbursement for separate property contributions to the acquisition of community property.
Section 2640, subdivision (b) provides: "In the division of the community estate under this division, unless a party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement or has signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for the party's contributions to the acquisition of property of the community property estate to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source." Contributions expressly include down payments. (§ 2640, subd. (a).)
But section 2640 applies only where the court has first determined the asset in question is community property. As the court in Bonvino states, "Section 2640 does not purport to apply to separate property used during marriage to acquire an asset that retains its character as separate property. In order for section 2640 to apply, the asset purchased during marriage must be characterized as community property ...." (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.)
Here, the court should not have applied section 2640 because, as explained above, the warehouse is not community property. Where, as here, an asset is solely titled, tracing permits the contributing party (Ben) to establish separate property ownership. Ben's separate property contribution gives him an ownership interest in the warehouse proportionate to the separate property funds he contributed, not merely a right to reimbursement. (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434.)
The facts here are much like those in Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th 1411. There, the husband purchased a home during the marriage with a deed held in his name alone. (Id. at p. 1419.) The purchase was funded with a down payment of the husband's separate property and a loan that the husband had applied for, listing his income as the primary source of payment. (Id. at pp. 1418-1420, 1423-1424.) The wife signed a quitclaim deed of the property to the husband; however, the court set that deed aside because the husband had not rebutted the presumption the wife executed that deed as the result of his undue influence. (Id. at pp. 1419, 1420-1421.) The trial court held the property was a community asset even though the husband used separate property to make the down payment and took title in his name alone. It further concluded the husband was only entitled to reimbursement. (Id. at pp. 1420-1421.)
The appellate court reversed, concluding the home was both separate and community property. (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1422, 1424.) The court then pointed out that when a spouse uses both separate property and community property to purchase real property during marriage but held in separate title, the statutory requirements of section 852 for transmutations must be satisfied before the reimbursement provisions of section 2640 apply. (Bonvino, at p. 1432.) And because there was no evidence of an express transmutation of the husband's separate property, his separate property contributions remained his separate property. He thereby retained a separate property pro rata interest in the property, not a right of reimbursement. (Id. at pp. 1432, 1434.) The trial court on remand was directed to "calculate the separate and community interests in the Westlake Village property." (Id. at pp. 1434-1435.)
As for the wife's quitclaim deed of the home, the unpublished portion of the Bonvino opinion addressed the husband's challenge to the trial court's finding he did not rebut the presumption he used undue influence in that transaction. (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416.)
Likewise, here, Ben traced his use of separate property funds to acquire the warehouse during marriage, and he held the property in separate title. There is no evidence he purported to transmute his separate property interest into community property. As such, his separate property contribution remained his separate property, and he retained a separate property pro rata interest in the warehouse. We thus reverse the order of reimbursement.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's orders concerning the characterization of the warehouse and reimbursement award are reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The remaining orders are affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: Stewart, P.J., Miller J.