Opinion
43676-1-II
02-21-2013
In the Matter of the Marriage of: LANNY G. ROSS, Appellant, and NADEZHDA L. ROSS, Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HUNT, J.
Lanny G. Ross appeals from the division of property contained in the decree dissolving his marriage with Nadezhda L. Ross. We affirm.
The notice of appeal states that it is from the dissolution decree. But the assignment of error and arguments on appeal address only the property distribution. Accordingly, we address only the property distribution issues in this appeal.
FACTS
Lanny and Nadezhda Ross were married in 1999. In 2011, the parties separated, and Lanny petitioned to dissolve the marriage. At the time of trial, Lanny was 70 years old, was receiving $1,834 per month in Social Security, and had little other retirement income, having cashed in a retirement account during the marriage. Nadezhda was 54 and was earning $6,570 per month as a registered nurse. After characterizing their assets and liabilities as separate or community, the trial court distributed the community assets and liabilities as follows:
We use the parties' first names for clarity. We intend no disrespect.
Lanny
Nadezhda
Assets
Equity in House
$43,000
Savings
$55,155
Personal Property
19,165
401K
36,735
WIMOS Ownership
1,005
Personal Property
18,107
Scotttrade
200
Checking
15,904
Equalization
12,725
Retirement
12,050
Accrued Vacation
6,124
Subtotals
$76,095
$144,074
Liabilities
Credit Card
$(11,000)
Equalization
$(12,725)
Totals
$65,095 33.14%
$131,349 66.86%
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2-6, 13-15. Lanny appeals.
A commissioner of this court initially considered Lanny's appeal as a motion on the merits under RAP 18.14 and then transferred it to a panel of judges.
ANALYSIS
Lanny argues that the trial court (1) violated RCW 26.09.080's requirement to make a "just and equitable" division of the community assets and liabilities and (2) manifestly abused its discretion in awarding Nadezhda a disproportionate amount of the community assets and failing to take into account that his future earning capacity is far less than Nadezhda's. We disagree.
In distributing a dissolving marriage's assets, the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse or domestic partner at the time the division of property is to become effective.RCW 26.09.080. We review the trial court's division of property for a manifest abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn.App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996).
Lanny elected not to provide a verbatim report of proceedings of the dissolution trial. As a result, we do not have before us any oral findings or reasoning by the trial court; thus, our review is limited to the trial court's written findings, which Lanny has designated as part of the record on appeal. Lanny does not assign error to any of the trial court's findings; thus, we treat them as verities on appeal. RAP 10.3(g); In re Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 8, 93 P.3d 147 (2004).
These unchallenged findings show no manifest abuse of discretion. On the contrary, the following portion of Finding of Fact 2.5.c reasonably explains, in part, the trial court's division of property:
Lanny Ross spent much of the last two years visiting and helping his sons in California on a temporary basis until late in 2010 when he became afraid of his son, Fred Ross. Lanny Ross became involved in his son's marijuana growing operation in California. He acted either as a banker receiving money, paying his son's bills, and paying money to his son or engaged in money laundering. There was no accounting for the money received by Mr. Ross nor was there evidence that the money received was his son's or owned jointly with his son. Much of the money received passed through the community bank account and has been unaccounted for.CP at 2. We affirm the trial court's property division set forth in the decree of dissolution.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
We concur: Worswick, C.J. Quinn-Brintnall, J.