Opinion
F086115
03-20-2024
In re the Marriage of MARLIES and RICHARD WILLIAM RIPLEY. v. RICHARD WILLIAM RIPLEY, Respondent. MARLIES RIPLEY, Appellant,
Marlies Ripley, in pro. per., for Appellant. Richard William Ripley, in pro. per., for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County No. S3373. Brian Austin, Judge.
Marlies Ripley, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Richard William Ripley, in pro. per., for Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Marlies Ripley appeals a decision pursuant to Family Code section 3651terminating the spousal support payments she received from her ex-husband, respondent Richard Ripley. The trial court found good cause to change the terms of the previously ordered spousal support payment based on changed circumstances, namely, that respondent had been paying alimony for more than 20 years and was now approaching retirement. Appellant claims she needs the alimony payments to continue so as to obtain a line of credit, which she hopes to use for repairs to one of her two properties. Appellant concedes these repairs have nothing to do with respondent; rather, her rental property was damaged by some tenants. Because appellant identifies no error in the trial court's discretion, its decision is affirmed.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
BACKGROUND
The relevant background facts of this case are largely undisputed. The parties were married for 20 years. They divorced approximately 20 years ago, and an original order for spousal support of $1,250 per month was entered in August 2003. Both parties are now in their late 60s, and of normal retirement age. Appellant has begun drawing Social Security and pension payments of between approximately $1,750 and $1,900 per month.
Respondent testified his circumstances had changed because he was caring for his adult daughter, his wife had increasing medical bills in recent years, and he was assisting his ailing sister. Respondent also noted appellant owned two separate properties with which she could support herself, which appellant confirmed. Appellant testified she needed the alimony payments to continue because her debt-to-income ratio was insufficient without alimony to qualify for a loan from the bank, which she hoped to use for repairs to one of her properties, and for other expenses.
The trial court issued a statement of decision on April 13, 2023, finding that the parties had a long-term marriage, and spousal support payments began in June 2003. It found appellant had started drawing Social Security and retirement payments, which constituted changed circumstances. It also found respondent's circumstances had changed, as he was caring for an elderly sister and an ailing wife, and was anticipating retiring, as he was now 66 years old. The court also found appellant had failed to heed the warning administered by the court previously pursuant to In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705, cautioning that after an appropriate period of time, the supported spouse was expected to become self-sufficient. The court also found that, because appellant was now receiving retirement income, she would be living at the same standard she was with the alimony payments. Ultimately, the court terminated the support payments due to the change of circumstances for both parties.
Appellant states the order was signed by the trial court on April 3, 2023, two days prior to the hearing, leading her to "speculate[] that the Judge might have already written the verdict prior to the court trial." It appears from the record that a document captioned as a "Statement of Decision and Order After Hearing on Spousal Support" was filed on April 3, 2023, and then an "Amended Statement of Decision" was signed on April 13, 2023. The hearing in this matter was held on April 5, 2023. We interpret the April 3, 2023 document to be akin to a tentative ruling. Madera County Superior Court's Local Rules permit a court to issue a tentative ruling, although it is not common practice and no party is required to give notice of intent to appear. (Super. Ct. Madera County, Local Rules, rule 3.3.6.) Moreover, the tentative does not automatically become the ruling of the court if no intent to appear is filed, and the tentative "shall not become final until the hearing." (Ibid.) In other words, a tentative ruling in that court is simply a guide for argument because it has no force or effect until after the hearing, and will not automatically become the court's decision in any event. The issuance of the April 3, 2023 "Statement of Decision" here was no more than a tentative ruling setting forth how the court anticipated it would rule on the issue. (See Lief v. Superior Court (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 868, 870-871 [concluding tentative decision" 'does not constitute a judgment and is not binding on the court' "]; Khan v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1173, fn. 4.) Indeed, the court told the parties at the end of the hearing that it would issue a final written ruling within 30 days after the hearing: "[W]hat I have to do is balance this. The things I've said, I'm going to take those into consideration. I will do a written statement and then that will be my decision." Although perhaps inaccurately captioned, we perceive no error in the trial court's issuance of a tentative ruling on April 3, 2023, here.
A "long-term marriage" presumptively exists where the parties were married more than 10 years. (§ 4336, subd. (b).) This permits the trial court to retain indefinite jurisdiction over the matter, including the authority to modify or terminate support orders upon a showing of "changed circumstances." (§ 4336, subd. (c); In re Marriage of Christie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 849, 858.)
Notice of appeal was timely filed on April 17, 2023. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Spousal support orders, and by extension the modification or termination thereof, are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1150; In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47; In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283; In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.) "Appellate courts must act with 'cautious judicial restraint' in reviewing spousal support orders." (Left, at p. 1150.) "In exercising its discretion the trial court must follow established legal principles and base its findings on substantial evidence. If the trial court conforms to these requirements its order will be upheld whether or not the appellate court agrees with it or would make the same order if it were a trial court." (Schmir, at p. 47, fn. omitted.)
In exercising its broad discretion to modify or terminate spousal support, the trial court considers the same criteria it considered when making its initial order, which are set forth under section 4320. (In re Marriage of Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) These include, as relevant to this case, the earning capacities of the parties, the ability of the supporting party to pay support, the needs of each party "based on the standard of living established during the marriage," the assets of the parties, and the goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a "reasonable period of time." (§ 4320, subds. (a), (c), (d), (e), (l).) Per statute, a "reasonable period of time" in which to become self-supporting is generally "one-half the length of the marriage." (§ 4320, subd. (l).)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Terminating Spousal Support
The trial court concluded it was appropriate to terminate spousal support in this case. In its order, the court went through each of the 14 statutory criteria set forth in section 4320, and analyzed them. Based on the relevant factors, it concluded appellant had failed to become self-sustaining despite the two decades since the parties' divorce. This is twice as long as the presumptive "reasonable period of time" set forth in the statute, which would have been 10 years. It further found appellant's Social Security income permitted her to continue to live in a similar fashion as she had been while receiving alimony, and that respondent was not responsible for appellant's debt, her inability to obtain a new line of credit, or any damage to her property caused by renters. The facts on which the court found changed circumstances-the amount of appellant's retirement payments, the age of the parties and anticipated retirement, and the length of time since the divorce during which support had been paid-were all undisputed.
Appellant fails to identify for us any legal error in the court's analysis. In her argument on appeal, she primarily focuses on factual issues which are simply irrelevant to the questions before either this court or the trial court. We must defer to the trial court's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Here, the court's critical findings are undisputed: both parties are at retirement age; appellant has begun drawing Social Security and other retirement income; appellant owns two properties, one of which she lives in and one of which she rents; and appellant's retirement income maintains appellant at approximately the same level-and in fact even slightly above-the level of income previously provided by respondent's support. The court's observation that appellant should be self-sufficient at this point, 20 years after the dissolution of the marriage, is not unreasonable.
Appellant claims she felt "intimidated" by "courtroom misconduct," which she implies was due to the trial judge's actions during the hearing on this matter, and suggests the court reporter failed to record all critical parts of the hearing. We have reviewed the transcript in detail, and there is no indication of misconduct; rather, the trial judge simply attempted to refocus the argument and testimony on facts relevant to his considerations under the statute. Even if we credit appellant's recounting of what was not captured on the reporter's transcript, we would not find misconduct.
Ultimately, appellant's concern is that the trial judge failed to understand she "only needed alimony until she could establish a new line of credit." (Italics omitted.) This is because she had lost the income from her renters, who had "stopped payments" and "trashed [her] house." However, alimony cannot and should not be continued merely because it would be financially beneficial for the supported spouse to continue receiving extra income or have a better debt-to-income ratio. If that were the sole or primary concern, support would never terminate, since it will always be better for the supported spouse if their income is higher. Rather, what is required is that the court review a set of enumerated statutory factors, weigh these factors together, and exercise its best discretion. (§ 4320.) The trial court did so here. Its decision was primarily based on the length of time the parties had been divorced and over which support had been paid to appellant, the fact appellant was now receiving Social Security and pension payments roughly approximate to the alimony payments, and that appellant owned two properties, thus ensuring she had both a place to live and an additional property to generate income.
According to appellant, the trial court accepted certain evidence presented by respondent, but did not credit certain statements she made in relation to her health. However, it is generally up to the finder of fact to determine issues of credibility. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 [" 'A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility.' "]; People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 856.) Moreover, appellant has not pointed us to substantial evidence in the record that contradicts the findings of the trial court. Even if appellant is in poor health, she receives more income now than she received with respondent's support. There is substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion that changed circumstances justify terminating support in this case.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons given above, the trial court's order terminating support is affirmed. Respondent is awarded the costs of the appeal.
[*] Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.