When a party seeks to vacate or modify a property settlement incorporated in a divorce decree, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the settlement. ( In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 313, 474 N.E.2d 28, 30.) A court should not set aside a settlement agreement merely because one party has second thoughts. In re Marriage of Steichen (1987), 163 Ill. App.3d 1074, 1079, 517 N.E.2d 645, 648.
Indeed, section 502 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 502) is intended to encourage parties to reach an amenable settlement of their rights. In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 313, 474 N.E.2d 28, 30. • 1 When a party seeks to vacate or modify a property settlement incorporated into a dissolution judgment, the settlement is presumed valid.
Lorenzi is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 474 N.E.2d 28, also cited by respondent, can offer little support since there was no issue in that case of failure to hold an evidentiary hearing. While the court in Dendrinos v. Dendrinos (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 639, 374 N.E.2d 1016, did remand the case for a hearing even though one had never been requested, the plaintiff there, unlike Arnold, was a foreign national who testified at the prove-up through an interpreter.
( Guyton v. Guyton (1959), 17 Ill.2d 439, 444, 161 N.E.2d 832; In re Marriage of Chapman (1987), 162 Ill. App.3d 308, 515 N.E.2d 424; In re Marriage of Maher (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 1039, 420 N.E.2d 1144.) Whether a divorce decree should be modified rests within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's findings will be disturbed on appeal only when the evidence clearly so requires. In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 474 N.E.2d 28. Irene argues that the agreement should be properly characterized as one made pursuant to section 502 of the Act, which purports to promote amicable settlement of disputes by allowing the parties to enter into an agreement to dispose of their property attendant upon the dissolution of their marriage.
When one party to the dissolution action seeks to vacate a property settlement incorporated into the dissolution judgment, all presumptions favor the validity of the settlement. ( In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 313.) While such settlements are favored, a court will not effectuate the terms of an agreement if it is procured by fraud or coercion, or is otherwise contrary to the law, public policy, or morals.
As noted above, however, the standard which this court must apply is not whether the agreement is merely unfair, but whether it is unconscionable. ( In re Marriage of Kloster (1984), 127 Ill. App.3d 583, 469 N.E.2d 381.) An agreement is unconscionable when it is improvident, totally one-sided or oppressive. In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 474 N.E.2d 28. • 4 After reviewing the provisions of the settlement agreement, we find that Beverly in fact received an extremely generous settlement.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 502(a).) The agreement is binding upon the court, except as it pertains to minor children, unless the agreement is found to be unconscionable. ( In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 313, 474 N.E.2d 28, 30; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 502(b).) Additionally, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the agreement.
• 2 An agreement is unconscionable if it is "improvident, totally one-sided or oppressive." ( In re Marriage of Morris, 147 Ill. App.3d 380, 390, 497 N.E.2d 1173, 1178; In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 317, 474 N.E.2d 28, 33.) In order to be fraudulent, a misrepresentation must consist of: (1) a false statement of material fact, (2) known by the party making the statement to be false, (3) made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, and (4) in fact relied upon by the other party. Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
When a party seeks to vacate a property settlement incorporated into a judgment of dissolution, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the settlement. ( In re Marriage of Riedy (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 311, 313.) Although the law looks with favor upon such settlements, the terms of an agreement will not be given effect if procured by fraud or coercion or if contrary to any rule of law, public policy or morals.
"A contract is unconscionable when it is improvident, totally one-sided or oppressive." In re Marriage of Riedy, 130 Ill. App. 3d 311, 317 (1985). However, "[a] property settlement should not be set aside merely because one party has second thoughts."