Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SFS0018719
RAYE, Acting P. J.Appellant Lorain Rice and respondent Thomas Eaton entered into an agreed order in the State of Illinois for the support and custody of their daughter Mia. A year and a half later, after relocating to California, Rice petitioned a California trial court for a modification of support according to California guidelines and requested that Eaton obtain health insurance for Mia. Following a two-day trial, the trial court entered a new order for child support, child care expenses, and medical insurance. The order was subsequently modified. Proceeding in propria persona, Rice appeals, arguing the trial court’s modified order includes clerical errors, fails to conform to the statement of decision, and runs afoul of the Family Code. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties entered into an agreed order in Illinois on September 23, 2002 (Illinois order). The Illinois order was registered in California on November 18, 2003. The Illinois order included provisions for child support; child custody; and medical, dental, and related expenses.
In January 2004 a petition for modification of support according to California guidelines was filed in Yuba County by the Yuba County Department of Child Support Services on behalf of Rice. The department withdrew and Rice continued the case in pro. per. On Rice’s motion, the case was transferred to Placer County Superior Court.
Following a two-day trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision and order for modification of support (statement of decision), filed on November 30, 2005. Eaton filed a motion to reopen the case, which Rice opposed. The court, following a hearing, issued an order on motion to reopen case or amend statement of decision and final statement of decision (final statement of decision), filed January 31, 2006. Rice subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the final statement of decision, which the court denied.
The court adopted a “Findings and Order Modification of Child Support” (modification order), filed on May 15, 2006. Rice filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Rice questions various aspects of the interplay between the statement of decision, the final statement of decision, and the modification order. We shall address each of Rice’s objections in turn.
I
Rice argues the effective date of the modification order is incorrect. According to Rice, the statement of decision found “[t]he effective date of the new order shall be as of the filing of the motion for modification on January 5, 2004.” However, the modification order states: “The effective date of this order is January 5, 2005.”
The modification order states: “The court orders Respondent to pay Petitioner for the support, care, maintenance, and education of the minor child . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The effective date of this order is January 5, 2005. [¶] . . . [¶] Support arrearages for the period through November 2005 are $774 for a period of 22 months and 25 days, a total of $17,465.” (Italics added.)
The court’s starting date of January 5, 2005, appears to be in error. It obviously used January 5, 2004, as the starting date in computing the arrearages; otherwise, the court’s computation makes no sense. In addition, the court explicitly ordered the arrearages computed up to November 2005, for a total of 22 months 25 days. The trial court’s statement of decision was entered on November 30, 2005.
No evidence supports Rice’s assertion that the ending date is incorrect. Rice argues, without providing any accurate citation to the record, that the ending date for arrearages should be the date of the new order on May 5, 2006. Nothing in the trial court’s statement of decision or modification order states the arrearages will continue until the entry of the modification order. Instead, the modification order, filed May 15, 2006, explicitly states the arrearages extend through “November 2005.”
This date appears to be in error, since the modification order was filed on May 15, 2006.
Given the fact that the error in the starting date in no way affects the calculation of arrearages, we find the error harmless.
II
Rice also argues the calculations and dates to determine retroactive support in the modification order are not supported by the evidence. Rice claims the modification order “used $774 per month instead of 1,324. By using the incorrect figures the back child support only amounted to $17,465 instead of $38,396.”
Rice’s argument is not a model of clarity. She repeatedly asserts the Illinois order “specifically finds that child support is $1,200.” Rice then subtracts the $1,200 prior support from the $2,524 new support for $1,324 in monthly arrearages.
However, we find the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion. The Illinois order states, under the heading “Settlement of Arrearage”: “The $1750.00 per month to be paid for the support of Mia by Thomas shall include his obligation for support.” The uniform order for support notes the “$1750.00/mo represents $1200/mo for child support and $350/mo for daycare expenses for which Petitioner is pro se and $200.00 per mo for Respondent’s portion of medical and dental insurance premiums.”
The modification order subtracts the $1,750 from the $2,524 in new support for $774 in monthly arrearages. The record supports the calculations. Eaton provided evidence to the trial court that Rice incurred neither daycare nor health insurance expenses during the period the order was in effect. The court determined the entire amount was effectively child support. Rice’s challenge to the evidence is not persuasive.
III
Rice also contends education expenses were included in the basic support figure but should have been an add-on. However, the citation Rice supplies to the record does not support her argument. The modification order states the amount of monthly support shall be $2,524. It does not state this figure includes any educational expenses.
IV
Rice claims the trial court incorrectly allowed Eaton an offset of $6,400 for health insurance reimbursements. According to Rice: “The Court did not have any evidence to conclude Lorain made these payments, what, if any, portion was used, or if insurance coverage was obtained, and for which months.” Rice is mistaken.
In its statement of decision, the trial court found: “Respondent also requests an offset for overpayment of $200 per month for health insurance. Petitioner acknowledged she only paid for health insurance for about six months. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to an offset of $6,400, which is the unused health insurance payment for 32 of the last 38 months.” The record supports the trial court’s finding.
Rice asserts the trial court agreed there was insufficient evidence on the question of health insurance. However, during closing argument the court briefly stated: “I feel there has been a lack of evidence from both sides regarding this true status of the health situation.” The court made its statement after requesting Rice and Eaton’s counsel to stop “sniping” at one another. The court’s comments reflect impatience with the parties’ conduct during argument. The court did not state insufficient evidence existed on the health insurance issue.
V
Rice disputes the trial court’s allocation calculations of uninsured health care costs. The court ordered Eaton to pay 74 percent of the uninsured health care. Rice argues Eaton should pay 93 percent of the uninsured health care.
The trial court allocated the cost based on the net income of the parties. Under Family Code section 4061, subdivision (b)(2), any additional child support required for expenses is to be paid by the parents in proportion to their net disposable incomes.
In computing the allocation between Eaton and Rice, the trial court found “respondent has $14,749 in disposable income per month, adjusted to $12,225 after deduction for the payment of child support. Accordingly, respondent has 74% of the total adjusted income of the parties. Respondent shall pay 74% of the uninsured medical costs; petitioner shall pay 26% of such costs.”
The court previously found the combined net spendable income of Eaton and Rice to be $16,641 per month. Rice had $7,775 per month, after receiving support, and Eaton had $8,866, after paying support. Eaton’s total monthly income, after taxes, was $14,749. The court reduced this by the child support order of $2,524 for a total monthly income of $12,225. The court then divided Eaton’s $12,225 monthly income by the total net income of both Eaton and Rice of $16,641, which yielded 74 percent. The court correctly ordered Eaton to pay 74 percent of the uninsured medical expenses.
Rice bases her argument on her income of $888 per month. However, the court in computing the allocation properly incorporated the support payments made to Rice by Eaton.
VI
Finally, Rice argues the modification order failed to provide for dental insurance for Mia, although the final statement of decision mandated its inclusion. Rice misreads the modification order.
In its final statement of decision, the trial court responded to several of Eaton’s concerns about the statement of decision. Eaton claimed the trial court required him to pay for dental insurance without any supporting evidence. The court found sufficient evidence regarding dental insurance: “Considerable testimony was offered by respondent regarding his efforts to obtain health insurance through his business. Indeed, in his concluding arguments, respondent acknowledged the need to provide insurance coverage, but simply wanted the opportunity to do so through his business. . . . Under these circumstances, no further evidence need be offered to justify the court’s order requiring that he obtain dental coverage as part of his duty to provide health insurance.” The court also noted that “for the purposes of additional support, . . . health and dental coverage is synonymous.” (Fam. Code, § 3750.)
The modification order states, under “Health Insurance,” that “Respondent shall secure and maintain in full force and effect health insurance for the benefit of the minor child. The cost of this insurance shall be paid by Respondent. Respondent may secure the insurance through his office.” Under Family Code section 3750, medical and dental expenses are covered within the definition of health care expenses. The modification order comports with the final statement of decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Eaton shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: ROBIE, J., BUTZ, J.