Opinion
No. 4-883 / 04-1254
Filed February 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, Mary Ann Brown, Judge.
The petitioner appeals, challenging a dissolution of marriage decree provision which places physical care of the parties' child with the respondent. AFFIRMED.
James Miller of Cray, Goddard, Miller Taylor, L.L.P., Burlington, for appellant.
Marlis Roberts of Beckman Hirsch, Burlington, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan, Miller, and Vaitheswaran, JJ., and Nelson, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
Nicole Rice appeals from that provision of the decree dissolving her marriage to B.J. Rice which awarded B.J. physical care of the parties' child. We affirm the district court.
Nicole and B.J. were married on August 5, 2000. Their son, Cameron, was born October 7, 2001. Nicole left the marital home in September 2003, and in October 2003 filed a petition to dissolve the parties' marriage. At the time of the April 2004 trial Nicole and B.J. agreed that they should be awarded joint legal custody of Cameron, but each sought the child's physical care. In its July 2004 decree the district court awarded physical care to B.J. Nicole appeals, asserting the court incorrectly applied the factors of Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2003), and gave inadequate consideration to the fact that she had been Cameron's primary caregiver during the marriage.
Our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We give weight to the fact findings of the district court, especially in determining witness credibility, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g). Our overriding consideration is the child's best interests. Iowa R. App. P. 14(6)( o); In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997).
In assessing which physical care arrangement is in Cameron's best interests, we consider the factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2003), as well as the factors identified in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Iowa 1974). In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992). While we give careful consideration to allowing a child to remain with the primary caregiver, it is not the singular factor in determining which placement would best serve the child's interests. See In re Marriage of Wilson, 532 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). The critical issue is which parent will do better in raising the child. In re Marriage of Courtade, 560 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Having reviewed the record in light of the foregoing principles, we find no reason to disagree with the district court's physical care award.
Either parent would be a suitable caretaker. Although Nicole was the primary caregiver during the marriage, B.J. did participate in child rearing tasks. Each party can provide an adequate home for Cameron, and meet his basic needs. The parties earn comparable salaries. While Nicole has the more flexible work schedule, Nicole's and B.J.'s work schedules are both amenable to an award of physical care. Although each party can cite additional factors weighing in his or her favor, for the most part those factors counterbalance each other. For example, while Nicole lives closer to a daycare for Cameron, B.J. remains in the marital home, which provides Cameron with more familiar surroundings.
Nicole asserts her role as primary caregiver should tip the scales in her favor. However, as we have previously noted this is an important, but not an overriding, consideration. Wilson, 532 N.W.2d at 495. Because our objective is to place the child in the environment most likely to bring him to healthy physical, mental and social maturity, In re Marriage of Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1999), we must give strong consideration to all the relevant factors, not the least of which is each parent's ability to effectively communicate with the other about the child, and his or her ability to foster the relationship between the child and the other party. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(c), (e). In weighing these factors, we find the district court's evaluation of the parties particularly helpful. See In re Marriage of Engler, 503 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (noting that because the trial court had the parties before it and was able to observe their demeanor it was in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate them as custodians).
Here, the district court made implicit credibility findings against Nicole. Although Nicole attempted to cast B.J. as "irrational, immature, argumentative and erratic," as well as physically abusive, the court concluded Nicole's claims were exaggerated. We must agree. The record falls short of demonstrating physical abuse by B.J., and in fact casts Nicole in a less than flattering light. The evidence indicates that Nicole behaved in a demanding and controlling manner, and allowed the acrimony between the parties to take precedence over Cameron's need for interaction with his father. This behavior raises legitimate concerns about Nicole's ability to foster B.J. and Cameron's relationship.
As noted by the district court:
[D]uring the parties' separation, B.J. has evolved in his attitude to be the parent more willing to work with the other in trying to provide for Cameron's best interests. B.J. has demonstrated a willingness to work with Nicole. Nicole, instead, particularly on the telephone tapes, demonstrates a total disregard for B.J.'s point of view.
During the parties' separation, Nicole made audio tapes of the parties' conversations. B.J. was not aware that the conversations were being tape recorded.
It is also important to note that B.J. has strong family support to assist him in providing for Cameron. It is not Nicole's fault, but she simply does not have the same support structure that B.J. has.
The court concluded that "B.J. will be more concerned and committed to insuring Nicole has substantial time with Cameron and a strong relationship with him than Nicole would," and that "B.J. has demonstrated better judgment in areas of his life which directly affect Cameron than Nicole has." We must agree with the district court in this regard, as well as with its conclusions that B.J. can more effectively minister to Cameron's long-range best interests, and put the child in the environment most likely to bring him to healthy physical, mental, and social maturity.
In short, we conclude the district court's findings of fact are accurate, its reasoning sound, its credibility assessments rational, and its application of the law correct. Accordingly, we affirm the court's decision to place Cameron's physical care with B.J.