Opinion
B320856
07-24-2023
Cristian I. Palafox for Appellant. Law Offices of Eric A. Jimenez and Eric A. Jimenez for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 20WHFL00065, Maria Puente-Porras, Judge. Affirmed.
Cristian I. Palafox for Appellant.
Law Offices of Eric A. Jimenez and Eric A. Jimenez for Respondent.
ADAMS, J.
In this dissolution of marriage action, Lissette Ramos (Lissette) appeals from an order requiring her to pay Caleb Ramos (Caleb) temporary spousal support. Lissette argues the trial court abused its discretion by making a temporary spousal support order without considering her expenses or Caleb's needs. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lissette filed for divorce in January 2020. Caleb filed a petition for spousal support, child support, and related relief in December 2021. The trial court held a hearing on Caleb's petition in April 2022.
At the beginning of the hearing, Caleb's counsel presented a proposed DissoMaster calculation for spousal support. The court then asked the parties questions about their children, income, and expenses.
The DissoMaster is "a computer software program used by courts to calculate support." (In re Marriage of Pletcher (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 906, 911, fn. 2 (Pletcher).)
Lissette and Caleb have two children. At the time of the spousal support hearing, their son was in second grade, and their daughter was a senior in high school. Lissette and Caleb equally divided their time with their son, but their daughter lived with Caleb 95 percent of the time.
The court reviewed Caleb's paycheck and asked Lissette about her monthly income. The court inquired about Caleb's salary and why he was earning only $1,300 a month, an amount less than minimum wage. Caleb explained he ran his own business, and the court informed Caleb he needed to get a fulltime job, known as a "Gavron Warning," and imputed to him a minimum monthly income of $2,600 to comport with minimum wage.
The court computed Lissette's monthly income at $11,102, and also took into account her "health insurance premium and the mortgage interest and the property tax deduction," to calculate child support and spousal support using the DissoMaster. In making its determination, the court clarified that Lissette was not paying any union dues or mandatory retirement. It also requested information about loans Lissette was paying on her 401(k), and totaled the amounts she paid for the family's medical, dental, and vision insurance. The court concluded Lissette owed Caleb $1,291 a month in temporary spousal support using the DissoMaster.
Lissette does not challenge the trial court's calculation of child support in her appeal.
The court then heard from Lissette and her counsel regarding her other expenses. Counsel told the court Lissette paid additional amounts for healthcare not covered by insurance, childcare and distance learning for her son, groceries, eating out, therapists to address her son's A.D.H.D., car insurance, gas, car repairs, utilities, phone bills, laundry, and clothing for her son. In addition, Lissette and Caleb's daughter recently had a baby, and Lissette assisted the daughter with the financial costs of pregnancy and provided supplies for the newborn. Lissette also paid the mortgage on the family home and $3,000 in rent for her own home since she had moved out. The court informed the parties that Caleb would need to start paying the mortgage.
In calculating spousal support, which the court based on the DissoMaster 2022 guideline computations, the court declined to give Lissette "special consideration" based on her expenses, explaining, "there is nothing that I can do to make somebody earn the money to keep the household in the way that they were accustomed to when you now have split the obligation from one unit to two separate units. So [Lissette's] expenditures for keeping herself afloat while I respect that they are a challenge is not a basis for me to determine and find that she needs to be given special consideration.... I need to look at the household, and I need to make certain that the household isn't impacted in such a way that the child is then deprived of their basic necessities." The court concluded it would not "change any of these numbers" from the DissoMaster.
Lissette timely appealed the trial court's award of $1,291 in temporary spousal support.
DISCUSSION
Lissette argues the trial court erred by considering only her income and not the evidence of her expenses; the court erred in awarding spousal support despite a lack of evidence of Caleb's needs; and the court's factual findings regarding her ability to pay were not supported by the evidence. We find no error.
I. Legal Principles
The trial court has statutory authority to order temporary spousal support while an action for dissolution of marriage is pending. (Fam. Code, § 3600.) The court may order "either spouse to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the other spouse." (Ibid.)"' "The court is not restricted by any set of statutory guidelines in fixing a temporary spousal support amount." '" (Pletcher, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 912, citing In re Marriage of Samson (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 23, 29 (Samson).)"The trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of temporary spousal support, considering both the supported spouse's need for support and the supporting spouse's ability to pay." (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442 (Blazer); Pletcher, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 913.) In "exercising its broad discretion, the court may properly consider the 'big picture' concerning the parties' assets and income available for support in light of the marriage standard of living." (In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1327 (Wittgrove).)
Both parties inaccurately cite to Family Code section 4320, which only applies to permanent, not temporary, spousal support. (Samson, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 30 ["The factors listed in section 4320 apply to permanent support orders"].)
Temporary support is designed to" 'maintain the status quo prior to the divorce.'" (Blazer, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442, italics omitted.) The goal is to" 'maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties as closely as possible to the status quo, pending trial and the division of the assets and obligations of the parties.'" (In re Marriage of Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201, 208.)
We review temporary spousal support orders for an abuse of discretion. (Wittgrove, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1327; accord Blazer, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443.)" 'As long as the court exercised its discretion along legal lines, its decision will be affirmed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it.' [Citations.] 'To the extent that a trial court's exercise of discretion is based on the facts of the case, it will be upheld "as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence presented."' [Citation.]." (Blazer, at p. 1443.)" 'An abuse of discretion occurs" 'when it can be said that no judge reasonably could have made the same order.'" '" (In re Marriage of Maher &Strawn (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 356, 363 (Marriage of Maher &Strawn).)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining the Temporary Spousal Support Award
Lissette claims the trial court failed to consider her expenses and thus her ability to pay spousal support. We disagree. The record reflects that the trial court considered not only Lissette's income, but also her expenses for medical, dental and vision insurance for her family, the mortgage interest and property tax deduction, loans owed on Lissette's 401(k), and mandatory deductions from her paycheck.
The trial court also explicitly reviewed Lissette's other expenses and questioned some of them, such as $1,800 Lissette was paying for her son's online learning, and payments to her mother for childcare when the son was eligible for in-person school. While Lissette argues the trial court did not consider her need to maintain the expense of a residence separate from Caleb, we note the court ordered Caleb to start paying the mortgage payment on the family home. Lissette therefore would no longer have the expense of both the mortgage and her rent at the time of the order for spousal support, and the trial court did not err in failing to consider it. The court further acknowledged that Lissette was supporting some of her daughter's and grandchild's needs, despite the daughter living with Caleb the majority of the time.
Courts generally "perceive no problem with the trial court's use of standard guidelines, based solely on income, for temporary support," and also look to what claimed monthly expenses are "reasonable." (In re Marriage of Winter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1926, 1931, 1933 [upholding order based on standard guidelines from computer program where "Wife declared that her total monthly expenses were $4,370, but the court found her reasonable monthly living expenses to be only $2,600"].) The record demonstrates that the court did, in fact, consider Lissette's expenses.
We also disagree that the court failed to consider the extent of Caleb's need for spousal support when determining the amount of the award. The record reflects that the court considered Caleb's limited income relative to Lissette's; that their daughter, who had a baby, lived with Caleb 95 percent of the time; and that the son lived with Caleb approximately half of the time. The court heard argument regarding Caleb's self-employed status and ordered him to obtain a full-time job. The court recognized, as it was required to, that it needed to consider the parties' marital standard of living in setting the amount of any temporary support order. (In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637 [purpose of temporary support is to maintain the living conditions of the parties" 'as closely as possible' "].)
The trial court's decision not to deviate from the DissoMaster guideline calculation based on the amount Lissette spends on childcare, food, car expenses, online learning, and other expenses was not an abuse of its discretion. As noted above, the trial court has "broad discretion" to consider the" 'big picture'" of the parties' available income. (Wittgrove, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1327.) Given the wide disparity in the parties' respective incomes, it is reasonable that Lissette would need to pay temporary spousal support to maintain Caleb's status quo. "Trial courts may properly look to the parties' accustomed marital lifestyle as the main basis for a temporary support order." (Ibid.) Further, Lissette has neither identified any evidence in the record, nor made any specific argument, to establish that she cannot afford to pay $1,291 a month in spousal support based on her income and reasonable expenses.
In sum, the trial court properly considered evidence of Lissette's ability to pay and the general needs of Caleb. (Wittgrove, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1327 ["Subject only to the general 'need' and 'the ability to pay,' the amount of a temporary spousal support award lies within the court's sound discretion, which will only be reversed on appeal on a showing of clear abuse of discretion"].) Substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings. On the record before us, we cannot conclude that no judge reasonably could have made the same order as to temporary spousal support. (Marriage of Maher &Strawn, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering temporary spousal support in the amount of $1,291.
DISPOSITION
The trial court order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: EDMON, P. J., LAVIN, J.