See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carpenter, 286 Ill. App. 3d 969, 976 (1997); In re Marriage of Radae, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1023 (1991); In re Marriage of Vest, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 332. Whether to award attorney fees and the amount of the fees to award are decisions entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.
General and vague statements about such funds are insufficient to defeat a charge of dissipation. In re Marriage of Radae (1991), 208 Ill. App.3d 1027, 1031. Here, neither party accused the other of dissipation.
A trial court's rulings on the allocation of parental decision-making and parenting time are afforded great deference because the trial court is in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the children. In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill.2d 489, 516 (2004); In re Marriage of Radae, 208 Ill.App.3d 1027, 1029 (1991). We will not disturb the trial court's rulings on the allocation of decision-making responsibilities or parenting time unless those rulings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
A trial court's parenting time and decision-making determination is afforded great deference because the trial court is in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 516 (2004); In re Marriage of Radae, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1029 (1991).
A trial court's parenting time and decision-making determination is afforded great deference because the trial court is in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 516 (2004); In re Marriage of Radae, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1029 (1991). Thus, the trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 54 Here, Bruce indicated that he and Michele's father had never discussed the loans listed on Exhibit 8 and that the loans had stemmed from talks that Michele had had with her father before she stopped working. Cf. In re Marriage of Radae, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1032 (1991) (upholding the circuit court's determination that a $5000 payment that the parties received from the petitioner's parents during the marriage was a loan where the petitioner's unrefuted testimony established that she, her husband, and her parents all had an understanding that the money was to be paid back). Bruce indicated that Michele had told him that her father had agreed to make up the difference between her salary and disability payments and that she had agreed to repay the transfers with back-pay that she would "hopefully receive in the future."
Intermediate appellate courts in several other states have done the same. (Lawrence v. Lawrence (Tenn. App. 2010) 360 S.W.3d 416, 418–420 ; Alameda v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 235 S.W.3d 218, 221–223 ; Smith v. Smith (La. App. 2005) 923 So.2d 732, 740 ; State v. Morrison (Ariz. App. 2002) 203 Ariz. 489, 56 P.3d 63, 65 ; In re Marriage of Radae (1991) 208 Ill.App.3d 1027, 153 Ill.Dec. 802, 567 N.E.2d 760, 763–764 ; State v. Diaz (N.J. App. 1998) 308 N.J. Super. 504, 706 A.2d 264, 269–270 ; Silas v. Silas (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) 680 So.2d 368, 370–372.)Id. at 498, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 871.
¶ 33 A trial court's determination regarding parental decision-making responsibilities, like its determination of custody under the previous version of the Act, is given great deference because the trial court is in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the children. In re Marriage of Radae, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1029 (1991). We will not reverse that determination on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is manifestly unjust, or it results from an abuse of discretion.
Intermediate appellate courts in several other states have done the same. ( Lawrence v. Lawrence (Tenn. App. 2010) 360 S.W.3d 416, 418-420 ; Alameda v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 235 S.W.3d 218, 221-223 ; Smith v. Smith (La. App. 2005) 923 So.2d 732, 740 ; State v. Morrison (Ariz. App. 2002) 203 Ariz. 489, 56 P.3d 63, 65 ; In reMarriage ofRadae (1991) 208 Ill.App.3d 1027, 153 Ill.Dec. 802, 567 N.E.2d 760, 763-764 ; State v. Diaz (N.J. App. 1998) 308 N.J.Super. 504, 706 A.2d 264, 269-270 ; Silas v. Silas (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) 680 So.2d 368, 370-372.) The most recent of these state cases, the New York high court's decision in Badalamenti , contains a thorough discussion.
¶ 32 A trial court's determination regarding parental decision-making responsibilities, like its determination of custody under the previous version of the Act, is given great deference because the trial court is in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Radae, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1029 (1991). We will not reverse that determination on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is manifestly unjust, or it results from an abuse of discretion.