Following a hearing, the petition was denied on August 31, 1979. It is from the judgment of the circuit court that petitioner appeals. • 1 In In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576, this court stated the applicable standard of review with regard to modification of child custody judgments: "It has long been an established general rule that custody matters are within the discretion of the trial court because it is in the best position to hear and evaluate the evidence.

Since we cannot say the trial court's sentence was based upon a misapprehension of the law or a mistaken belief that periodic-imprisonment facilities were totally absent in Du Page County, the sentence will only be disturbed if the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing sentence ( People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill.2d 482, 492) or if the sentence "constitutes a clear departure from fundamental law or is not proportioned to the nature of the offense" ( People v. Gold (1967), 38 Ill.2d 510, 518, cert. denied (1968), 392 U.S. 940, 20 L.Ed.2d 1400, 88 S.Ct. 2317). An abuse of discretion will be found only if the judgment of the trial court is manifestly unjust or palpably erroneous. In re Marriage of Batchelor (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 781, 783; In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689. As we noted, this sentencing decision was arrived at after balancing several factors.

The courts of Illinois have repeatedly held that a permanent custody order is a "final judgment" as to circumstances existing at the time it was rendered. Hofmann v. Poston, 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576 (1979); Herron v. Herron, 74 Ill. App.3d 748, 393 N.E.2d 1153 (1979); Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App.3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978); Dunning v. Dunning, 14 Ill. App.2d 242, 144 N.E.2d 535 (1957); Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952). Whether a custody order is temporary or permanent and final must be determined according to the substance, not the form, of the order.

However, it then stated that because the evidence was that defendant put his hands around A.F.'s neck and lifted him off the ground, no rational trier of fact could say that it believed that it occurred but that it was justified as reasonable force administered in the course of reasonable discipline. ¶ 34 While there was evidence that defendant held A.F. by the neck to the top of his door frame for 15 seconds, such that he could not breathe or talk, A.F. also testified that it hurt his head and neck only "a little bit." Thus, a rational jury could have determined that the incident did not occur exactly as A.F. had described it. Moreover, in Hofmann v. Poston, 77 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693-94 (1979), the appellate court stated that spanking using a stick or a belt for failure to do chores, where there was no resulting injury, was not outside the bounds of normal parental discipline. Thus, reasonable parental discipline can encompass even a significant level of physicality.

( Sousanes, 66 Ill. App.3d at 396.) Accordingly, a reviewing court may intervene only where the trial court acted arbitrarily or, in light of all the circumstances presented, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial injustice resulted ( In re Marriage of Silber (1988), 176 Ill. App.3d 853, 856); or where the judgment of the trial court is found to be palpably erroneous, contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or manifestly unjust ( In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 692); or where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Petrovich (1987), 154 Ill. App.3d 881, 887, appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill.2d 556.

) The trial court is vested with broad discretion in custody matters and absent a palpably erroneous judgment, contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court's judgment should not be reversed. ( E.g., In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576.) We find no abuse of discretion in this case.

A judge has not abused his discretion unless his judgment is `palpably erroneous, contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or manifestly unjust.' ( In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576, 579.)" Here there was no abuse of discretion.

The statute has limited the previous broad discretion given the trial court in matters of child custody. [ Hoffmann v. Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576; In re Custody of Harne (1979), 77 Ill.2d 414, 396 N.E.2d 499.] Therefore, we emphasize that Respondent's burden of proof in this action is extremely high. * * *" We find no merit to Diane's contention that this statement by the court indicated it was imposing an improperly high burden of proof on her. The court was merely indicating its awareness of the presumption in favor of the custodial parent created by this section.

• 3 Under section 610, the broad discretion afforded the trial court in matters of custody modification has been tempered by the desire for finality in child custody judgments and a presumption in favor of the current custodian. ( In re Marriage of Batchelor; see In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576.) Since the shifting of custody from one parent to the other may cause emotional damage to a child by creating a feeling of insecurity and lack of self-worth, a court should not order a further change in the child's custodial arrangement unless the reasons are compelling and relate directly to the child's best interests. In re Marriage of Rizzo (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 636, 420 N.E.2d 555.

) The judge's discretion is limited by the Act, which requires that the evidence fit the higher standard of endangerment prior to visitation restriction and that such a finding be explicitly set out before proceeding to modify in the best interests. In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576. The trial judge here repeatedly stated that he was applying a best interests standard, and although he did mention considerations of possible detriment to the child caused by the existing visitation arrangements, he did not make the explicit threshold finding of serious endangerment which would allow restriction of respondent's visitation rights.