In re Marriage of Pitulla

46 Citing cases

  1. In re Application of the County Treasurer

    351 Ill. App. 3d 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    Instead, respondent chose to receive petitioner's tender of the redemption money and, by so doing, released its claim and divested this court of jurisdiction over its appeal. Respondent cites to Meyer v. First American Title Insurance Agency of Mohave, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 330, 335-37 (1996), Herron v. Anderson, 254 Ill. App. 3d 365, 371-72 (1993), and In re Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 109-10 (1990), all for the proposition that, "[w]here a statute compels payment as a condition of relief, a tender and acceptance of payment pursuant to the statute does not waive or bar the right to appeal of either party." The cases cited by respondent do not quite stand for the proposition it asserts.

  2. Bricks, Inc. v. C F Developers, Inc.

    361 Ill. App. 3d 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 14 times

    We have found, however, that section 12-183 does not preclude the judgment creditor's right to an appeal. See Meyer v. First American Title Insurance Agency of Mohave, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 330, 335-37 (1996); Herron v. Anderson, 254 Ill. App. 3d 365, 371-72 (1993); In re Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 109-10 (1990). The purpose of section 12-183 is to serve as proof of the payment of the judgment, barring any further attempts by the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment, and to stop the accrual of postjudgment interest.

  3. Meyer v. First Amer. Title Ins. Agency

    285 Ill. App. 3d 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Noting lack of due process may constitute a valid ground for the vacation of a foreign judgment

    The Appellate Court, First District, has held that this section does not bar the judgment creditor's right to appeal following payment of that judgment. Herron v. Anderson, 254 Ill. App.3d 365, 371-72 (1993); see also In re Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App.3d 103, 110 (1990). While the instant case differs slightly in that the petitioners, the alleged judgment creditors, were not the recipients of the payment allegedly made by First American, we see no reason to deny the petitioners the right to appeal the trial court's granting of the respondent's section 12-183 motion ( 735 ILCS 5/12-183 (West 1994)).

  4. Berman v. Dempsey

    257 Ill. App. 3d 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 6 times

    (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 13, Historical Practice Notes, at 32 (Smith-Hurd 1985).) This rule patterns Circuit Court Rule 1.4. ( In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 103, 120, 559 N.E.2d 819.) "The purpose of Rule 1.4 * * * is to inform the court and the parties of who is properly representing each party and where that person may be served with notice. Neither rule specifies any sanctions for noncompliance.

  5. In re Marriage of Pitulla

    256 Ill. App. 3d 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 11 times

    Like Sisyphus, this court is asked once again to roll the bulky boulder of this ceaseless litigation uphill towards resolution in the hapless hope that it will not crash back down into our chambers yet again. Appellants, Richard A. Rinella and Rinella Rinella, Ltd. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Rinella), appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County, entered November 1, 1991, pursuant to the opinion and mandate issued in In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 103, 559 N.E.2d 819 ( Pitulla II), the sequel to this court's decision in In re Marriage of Pitulla (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 956, 491 N.E.2d 90 ( Pitulla I). Petitioner, Joanne Pitulla (hereinafter Pitulla), cross-appeals from the same order as Rinella and also from an order entered by the trial court on April 26, 1991. Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (134 Ill.2d R. 301). For the following reasons, we affirm.

  6. Herron v. Anderson

    254 Ill. App. 3d 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 18 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Masonic now asserts that the $450,000 payment constituted satisfaction thus rendering this appeal moot. However, section 12-183 does not preclude the judgment creditor's right to an appeal. ( In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 103, 110, 559 N.E.2d 819.) The purpose of section 12-183 is to serve as proof of payment of the judgment, barring any further attempts by the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment, and to stop the accrual of post-judgment interest.

  7. In re Marriage of Winton

    576 N.E.2d 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 26 times

    However, the amount awarded should be fair compensation only for those services which were reasonable and necessary to the action. In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 103, 111. • 7 The criteria for determining whether fees are reasonable include: the number of hours expended; the skill and standing of the attorneys; the difficulty of the questions at issue; the importance of the subject matter, especially from a family law standpoint; the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the case; the usual and customary charge in the community; and the benefit resulting to the client.

  8. Ghantous v. Ghantous

    20 N.E.3d 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 33 According to the doctrine of release of errors, a litigant is barred or estopped on appeal from attacking a decree or judgment if the same litigant has enjoyed the benefits of that judgment and the opposing party would be placed at a distinct disadvantage upon reversal. Mitchell v. Atwood Enterprises, Inc., 253 Ill.App.3d 475, 479, 191 Ill.Dec. 690, 624 N.E.2d 878 (1993) (citing In re Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill.App.3d 103, 110–11, 147 Ill.Dec. 479, 559 N.E.2d 819 (1990) ); Adams v. Adams, 44 Ill.App.3d 656, 657, 3 Ill.Dec. 336, 358 N.E.2d 734 (1976). Hence, the test for dismissal of an appeal under the doctrine of release of errors involves two issues: “(1) [whether] the appellant has accepted benefits from the decree and, (2) [whether] the appellee would be at a distinct disadvantage upon reversal.”

  9. In re Marriage of Tantiwongse

    371 Ill. App. 3d 1161 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that attorneys do not incur fees when they represent themselves

    Thus, attorneys who represent themselves in an action are not entitled to recover their own attorney fees. See Kehoe v. Saltarelli, 337 Ill. App. 3d 669, 786 N.E.2d 605 (2003); In re Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 559 N.E.2d 819 (1990); Stein v. Kaun, 244 Ill. 32, 91 N.E.2d 77 (1910). The retainer agreement entered into between Martha and Jaquays provided that Martha would pay all costs and attorney fees Jaquays incurred to collect the legal fees Martha owed.

  10. In re Denby

    653 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 6 times

    Due to William's vigorous cross-examination of Peters, the State asserts William entered his appearance on behalf of respondent and thus served as respondent's attorney. However, the case the State cites for this proposition, In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 103, 559 N.E.2d 819, contravenes the State's assertion. Pitulla noted that an attorney's written appearance on behalf of a client before any court in Illinois binds the attorney to continue to represent that client until the court grants leave for the attorney to withdraw. ( Pitulla, 202 Ill. App.3d at 120, 559 N.E.2d at 832.)