Opinion
1-17-3174
09-30-2021
In re MARRIAGE OF DEBBIE PITTMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, and RONNIE PITTMAN, Respondent-Appellee.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 12 D 10425 Honorable Naomi H. Schuster and Marita C. Sullivan, Judges Presiding.
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
McBRIDE JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The trial court retained jurisdiction while petitioner's interlocutory appeal was pending and the court's order of indirect civil contempt against petitioner is affirmed.
¶ 2 This is the second appeal by petitioner Debbie Pittman, appearing pro se, arising from her divorce proceedings from respondent Ronnie Pittman. The marriage between petitioner and respondent was dissolved in a judgment for dissolution of marriage in August 2015. In her first appeal, petitioner raised numerous issues related to the trial court's orders in the dissolution proceedings and this court held that the trial court's orders were not final and appealable except for a finding of indirect civil contempt against petitioner. See In re Marriage of Pittman, 2019 IL App (1st) 161316-U, ¶¶ 50-57. We affirmed the finding of indirect civil contempt against petitioner and dismissed all of petitioner's remaining claims for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 73
¶ 3 On appeal, petitioner argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter any orders, including a second finding of indirect civil contempt against petitioner, because the case had been "stricken from the call" when her trial counsel filed a motion to vacate all orders entered after she filed her initial notice of appeal in May 2016.
¶ 4 Given the extensive record related to the parties' dissolution proceedings, we recount the facts as necessary to address petitioner's issues raised on appeal. No report of proceedings was filed with the record on appeal.
¶ 5 In the trial court's dissolution order, petitioner was awarded the marital home, subject to all liens and encumbrances. In a motion to reconsider the dissolution judgment, respondent alleged that petitioner had fraudulently concealed considerable assets from a personal settlement with Allstate Insurance, totaling $416,210, of which a lump sum of $351,545 was disbursed to petitioner during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) against petitioner to restrain her from accessing these monies. Respondent later filed a rule to show cause to hold petitioner in contempt for violating the TRO. Following a hearing in April 2016, the trial court found petitioner to be in indirect civil contempt for her willful violation of the court's orders. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal on May 10, 2016.
¶ 6 On May 18, 2016, the trial court granted respondent's motion for reconsideration and continued the matter until June 10, 2016, for the court's entry of an amended judgment for dissolution of marriage. Petitioner filed an amended notice of appeal on May 19, 2016.
¶ 7 On June 10, 2016, the trial court made its findings on the record and amended the judgment for dissolution of marriage. Regarding the marital home, the court awarded the house to petitioner, but she was responsible for any liability on the property, and she was required to refinance the property within 120 days. If she failed to refinance the property within that timeframe, then the property would be transferred to respondent and was to be sold with the use of a real estate broker of respondent's choosing and respondent could then have exclusive rights to live in the home or to refinance it if he so chose prior to the sale. Petitioner was also ordered to pay rent in an amount sufficient to cover payments on the outstanding loans and other obligations on the property. If petitioner failed to pay those amounts, respondent was permitted to initiate actions to lock petitioner out, with a minimum of five days' notice.
¶ 8 While petitioner's initial appeal was pending before this court, the trial court continued to preside over matters related to the dissolution judgment. In February 2017, respondent filed a petition for rule to show cause against petitioner and alleged that petitioner had failed to comply with the June 10, 2016 order. Petitioner continued to live in the marital residence, but had failed to pay monthly rent to respondent. Respondent asked the court to hold petitioner in contempt for her failure to comply with the court order, enter a money judgment for the unpaid rent, evict petitioner from the residence, and award respondent sole possession of the marital residence.
¶ 9 On March 24, 2017, petitioner, through her trial counsel, filed a motion to vacate, requesting that all of the trial court's orders entered after petitioner filed her initial notice of appeal on May 10, 2016 be vacated and all pleadings filed and litigation of any pleadings that occurred after petitioner's appeal was filed be stricken or stayed. Petitioner's notice of motion filed with the motion to vacate indicated that petitioner's counsel would present the motion before the trial court on March 29, 2017. There is no trial court status or order for March 29, 2017. However, the electronic docket for the circuit court contains an entry for March 29, 2017, stating, "STRIKE FROM THE CALL - ALLOWED".
¶ 10 On April 12, 2017, the trial court entered an agreed order on the "presentment of petitioner's motion vacate" as well as a motion by respondent to change the date on the rule to show cause petition with counsel for both parties present. The court (1) granted respondent's motion and set the hearing on the rule to show cause, and (2) gave respondent 28 days to respond to petitioner's motion to vacate and petitioner 14 days to reply.
¶ 11 On June 19, 2017, the trial court entered the following order: "that Debbie Pittman's Motion to Vacate allegedly filed on March 24, 2017, but not shown on Clerk's webpage is hereby stricken at 10:15 a.m. with both Debbie Pittman and her counsel failing to appear for the second straight court date." The court also continued respondent's petition for rule to show cause against petitioner to July 19, 2017, and granted petitioner 21 days to file a response.
¶ 12 On July 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order of adjudication of indirect civil contempt against petitioner for failure to pay rent and fees. The order noted that petitioner did not appear. The order of commitment to the Cook County Jail was stayed until August 23, 2017, and petitioner could purge the contempt finding by posting $9,240.
¶ 13 On August 21, 2017, petitioner filed an amended motion to set aside and vacate all court orders entering after May 10, 2016, including the July 19, 2017 order finding petitioner in indirect contempt of court, and in the alternative to stay enforcement of all judgments until the resolution of petitioner's appeal. The order to purge contempt was continued. In an October 25, 2017 order, the trial court stated that petitioner was present and aware of all pending matters. The court also noted that it was shown appellate court orders from July 2016 denying a stay of proceedings in the trial court.
¶ 14 On November 15, 2017, the trial court entered an agreed order. Respondent was awarded proceeds of approximately $10,000 from a State Farm Mutual Insurance Company policy as a set off from the purge amount set in the contempt order. Petitioner was then purged of the contempt finding. Petitioner was also ordered to pay rent to respondent for the marital residence and was to immediately refinance the residence. All pending matters, including attorney fees on the contempt order were entered and continued. The order was signed by both parties as well as the trial court judge.
¶ 15 Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on December 18, 2017, seeking "reversal of orders in their entirety," and listed several orders, including the finding of contempt.
¶ 16 On appeal, petitioner raises four arguments related to the trial court's entry of the indirect civil contempt order against her. She contends that the court erred because: (1) the case had been stricken from the call due to her motion to vacate; (2) respondent misrepresented to the court that petitioner's motion to vacate had not been filed; (3) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case had been stricken from the call; and (4) respondent had not filed a motion to vacate the order striking the case from the call. All of these arguments concern petitioner's contention that her March 2017 motion to vacate had been granted and the case had been stricken from the court's call, and thereafter, trial court lost jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioner does not argue the merits of the trial court's order finding her in indirect civil contempt.
¶ 17 Respondent has not filed a brief in response, and we will consider this appeal pursuant to the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 131-33 (1976). We observe that pro se litigants, such as petitioner, are not entitled to more lenient treatment than attorneys. "In Illinois, parties choosing to represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the same rules and are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys." Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. "Pro se litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures." Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill.2d 514, 528 (2001). These rules include the appellant's duty to supply the reviewing court with a sufficient record of the trial proceedings to support her claims of error. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill.2d 389, 391-92 (1984). If a complete record is unavailable, the reviewing court must presume "that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis." Id. at 392. Any doubts arising "from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant." Id.
¶ 18 The crux of this appeal is petitioner's misunderstanding of the record and the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court for the following reasons.
¶ 19 The supreme court defines subject matter jurisdiction as "a court's power' "to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs." '" In re Luis R., 239 Ill.2d 295, 300 (2010) (quoting In re M. W., 232 Ill.2d 408, 415 (2009), quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill.2d 325, 334 (2002)). "With the exception of the circuit court's power to review administrative action, which is conferred by statute, a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution." McCormick v. Robertson, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 19. "Under section 9 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution, the jurisdiction of circuit courts extends to all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office.'" Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9).
¶ 20 "So long as a matter brought before the circuit court is justiciable and does not fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of our court, the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider it." Id. " [A] matter is considered justiciable when it presents 'a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'" Id. ¶ 21 (quoting Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill.2d at 335).
¶ 21 It is clear that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings between petitioner and respondent. Further, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the proceedings after petitioner filed her notice of appeal in May 2016. As noted above, this court dismissed all but one of petitioner's claims in that appeal because no final order had been entered. See Pittman, 2019 IL App (1st) 161316-U, ¶ 57.
¶ 22 The only issue this court had jurisdiction to consider was her interlocutory appeal of a finding of indirect civil contempt. Id. ¶ 58. "The appeal of an interlocutory order does not divest the trial court of all jurisdiction in a case." Witters v. Hicks, 338 Ill.App.3d 751, 755 (2003). "Rather, it restrains the trial court from entering any order which would change or modify the order on appeal or which would have the effect of interfering with the review of that order." Id." Orders entered after the filing of a notice of appeal are valid if the substantive issues in the interlocutory appeal are not altered so that they present a new case to the reviewing court." Id. Thus, the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction by petitioner's interlocutory appeal.
¶ 23 Moreover, the record on appeal belies petitioner's arguments that her March 2017 motion to vacate was granted on March 29, 2017, and the case was stricken from the call. The notice of motion filed with the motion to vacate indicated that petitioner's counsel was to present the motion to the trial court on March 29, 2017. The electronic docket entry from March 29, 2017, states "STRIKE FROM THE CALL - ALLOWED." No written order is in the record for that date, nor do we have a report of proceedings. See Foutch, 99 Ill.2d at 392 (Any doubts arising "from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant").
¶ 24 Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the record shows that her motion to vacate remained pending. The April 12, 2017 agreed order stated that the case was coming to be heard for "presentment of Petitioner's motion to vacate," and respondent was granted 28 days to respond to this motion. The record clearly establishes that the trial court did not rule on petitioner's motion on March 29, 2017. Since the presentment of the motion took place on April 12, 2017, as shown in the trial court's order, the motion was stricken from the call on March 29, 2017, and the presentment did not occur. The trial court struck petitioner's motion to vacate on June 19, 2017, when both petitioner and her trial counsel had failed to appear "for the second straight court date." Since the trial court did not grant petitioner's motion to vacate and the trial court retained jurisdiction over the pending divorce proceedings, petitioner's claims lack merit, and the indirect civil contempt finding was properly entered.
¶ 25 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 26 Affirmed.