Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. VFL226730 Melinda M. Reed, Judge.
Ronald E. Pierce, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
OPINION
Kane, J.
In this family law case, Ronald E. Pierce appeals from the trial court’s order of June 25, 2010, which increased his visitation time with his children but denied some of the relief that Pierce had sought. The present appeal fails to demonstrate, through cogent legal argument and citation to an adequate record, that the trial court abused its discretion. Because Pierce did not meet his burden as the appealing party, we affirm the order of the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Background
The record on appeal herein included only documents filed in the trial court after May 24, 2010. We note that Pierce filed two prior appeals in the same case, both of which were decided by us in opinions issued on February 17, 2011 (Pierce v. Arreola (Feb. 17, 2011, F060078) [nonpub. opn.]; Pierce v. Arreola (Feb. 17, 2011, F059887) [nonpub. opn.]). We affirmed the orders of the trial court in both of these prior appeals.
In the interest of providing a general background to the matter before us, we take judicial notice of, and reiterate below, our synopsis of the factual and procedural history of this case that we set forth in our recent nonpublished opinions in Pierce v. Arreola, supra, F060078, and Pierce v. Arreola, supra, F059887.
What follows in the remainder of this “Background” section, part A., is summarized from the “FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY” sections of our nonpublished opinions in the two prior appeals in this case.
Pierce and Arreola were married in 1992 and, during their 15-year marriage, they had three children. On January 30, 2008, Pierce filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Arreola filed a response to the petition on February 28, 2008, agreeing that the marriage should be dissolved. A status-only judgment of dissolution was entered by the trial court on September 4, 2008, with all other issues reserved.
Temporary Restraining Order
On February 29, 2008, Arreola filed a motion for temporary protective orders against Pierce to prevent domestic violence, including a request for a stay away order and an order to prevent acts of harassment and other personal contact. Arreola’s motion included a request that she receive sole physical custody of the children and that Pierce be allowed reasonable visitation. In support of her request for such orders, Arreola’s declaration stated that Pierce is “violent and … unable to control his temper.” She asserted that “[h]is violent outbursts occurred at least two times each week during [their] marriage.” Further, according to her declaration, Pierce’s outbursts were directed sometimes at Arreola, sometimes at the children, and sometimes at both Arreola and the children, and allegedly included verbal abuse, yelling, intimidation, kicking in doors, throwing furniture, dishes and heavy objects, and punching holes in cabinets and walls. Allegedly, his verbal abuse toward the children included angry tirades against their autistic child, calling the child “‘an asshole’” and “‘a little shit.’” The autistic child allegedly reacted to Pierce’s tirades by trying to run away from Pierce and begging to be left alone. Another child, “ha[d] cowered, cried, and [lost bladder control] during [Pierce’s] outbursts.” Arreola further stated in her declaration that Pierce had recently shown up at the house, demanded to be let in, and screamed in anger at her and the children. Other times, he had parked his car out front and waited, and, in light of “what [she knew] about Pierce’s inability to control his anger, ” this caused Arreola to be “scared” for her safety. On March 3, 2008, the requested relief was issued by the trial court as a temporary restraining order, effective pending the outcome of a contested hearing or trial of custody issues.
We generally refer to the protective orders as restraining order(s) herein. For convenience, we use the singular “restraining order.”
Thereafter, as more fully outlined below, the hearing on custody issues was continued a number of times, during which period the temporary restraining order remained in effect, subject only to Pierce’s specific rights under the trial court’s provisional custody and visitation orders.
On March 28, 2008, the trial court ordered that “[p]ending trial or until further order of the court, ” Arreola would have physical custody of the children, while Pierce would have supervised visits with the children each Sunday and telephonic contact on Thursday evenings. Further, at Pierce’s own request, a “Domestic Violence Assessment” was to be performed to evaluate both parties. The restraining order was to remain in effect pending the next contested hearing.
The domestic violence assessments were filed with the trial court on June 6, 2008. The assessments, prepared by a licensed mental health professional affiliated with Family Services of Tulare County (the assessor) who had interviewed both Pierce and Arreola, reflected the assessor’s evaluation that Arreola’s accounts of Pierce’s angry and abusive behavior were accurate. The assessor concluded that Arreola “ha[d] been a victim of domestic violence.” The assessor recommended that future visitation of the children by Pierce should be pursuant to a supervised program at “CHAT House” for the next four to six months. In response to the assessment, the parties appear to have stipulated to participation in additional counseling services and the trial court ordered “reunification therapy.” Meanwhile, the contested hearing regarding child custody was continued from June 27, 2008, to October 28, 2008.
On October 17, 2008, Arreola filed an ex parte request for an order to show cause hearing to modify the child visitation arrangement. Arreola sought to curtail Pierce’s visitation because of alleged concerns that he was mentally unstable and suicidal. In her supporting declaration, Arreola referred to an online Web site posting in which Pierce allegedly admitted to being depressed, suicidal, and struggling with misuse of alcohol. The trial court granted her request for modification, and “[e]ffective immediately, ” Pierce’s visitation was to be “supervised through the CHAT House.”
On October 28, 2008, the trial date of remaining contested issues was set for January 29, 2009. On the date of trial, although some issues were resolved, a further trial date was scheduled for June 9, 2009, and then continued again to July 16, 2009, to address the matters of custody and visitation. Prior to that continued hearing, each party filed declarations accusing the other of improper conduct. For example, Pierce accused Arreola of “[c]yber [s]talking” him, and of allowing the children to be exposed to inappropriate movies and engaging in discussion of sexual matters that were not age-appropriate. Arreola’s declaration referred to additional online Web site postings written by Pierce as evidence of his alleged mental instability, including a statement by Pierce that if he had the power to do so, he would go on a “killing spree of … global proportions.” Pierce did not deny making the statement, but explained he was merely expressing his thoughts in the context of a vampire game where he “waxed artistic about [his] despair.”
On July 16, 2009, following the contested hearing, the trial court ordered that a full “custody evaluation” shall be performed “which shall include a psychological evaluation” of the parties. The hearing date on the issue of custody was continued once again to allow sufficient time for the evaluation to be conducted. The process of selecting a qualified evaluator was to begin with Pierce selecting three qualified private custody evaluators and notifying Arreola’s attorney of his selections, and then Arreola was to choose one of the three. Thereafter, Ronald Gandolfo, Ph.D., was selected to act as custody evaluator. The date of the contested hearing on child custody was continued to December 8, 2009.
Contested Hearing on Child Custody and Vistitation
The contested hearing on the issue of child custody was finally held on December 8, 2009. Dr. Gandolfo’s custody evaluation was on file with the trial court, and the parties were given an opportunity to read the report prior to commencement of the hearing. The custody evaluation recommended a resumption and gradual expansion of Pierce’s visitation with his children under controlled conditions. The trial court ordered that, pending further hearing, Arreola would have sole legal and physical custody of the minor children. The trial court expressly stated it was following the recommendations of the custody evaluation. Pierce was granted visitation every Saturday at the home of the paternal grandmother from 12:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. A further review hearing would occur on April 9, 2010, at which time an expanded parenting plan would be considered. In regard to the factor of alleged domestic violence, the trial court held that Arreola’s allegations “do not rise to the level of domestic violence pursuant to Family Code section 3044.” Further, the trial court also held that “[t]he restraining order against [Pierce] that is currently in effect shall expire on April 9, 2010, unless there are ongoing issues that warrant an extension of the orders.” (Italics added.)
On January 13, 2010, Pierce filed a notice of motion seeking to strike the custody evaluation upon which the trial court had relied in its December 8, 2009, order. The motion was made on the ground that the person appointed to act as evaluator (Dr. Gandolfo) was not qualified. Pierce’s motion sought not only to strike the custody evaluation, but also to set aside the visitation order that was apparently based on the custody evaluation. Additionally, Pierce filed papers seeking an order to show cause to modify the December 8, 2009, custody order so as to require his prior consent before one of the children could receive any psychotropic medications for anxiety or depression. Pierce believed such medications were unnecessary and/or harmful, but Arreola had a different opinion and had allowed them to be administered at the recommendation of the child’s doctor.
On February 19, 2010, a hearing was held regarding Pierce’s requested relief from certain aspects of the existing custody order. At that time, Pierce’s motion to strike the custody evaluation was denied. Pierce’s request to modify the prior child custody or visitation order was denied, including with respect to one of the children’s medications. Pierce appealed from the trial court’s February 19, 2010, order, which was the first of his two prior appeals. We affirmed the order of the trial court in our opinion in Pierce v. Arreola, supra, F059887.
Hearing and Order of April 9, 2010 Regarding Restraining Order
As noted above, the trial court’s December 8, 2009, order provided that the restraining order would “expire” on April 9, 2010, unless it was shown there were “ongoing” issues that warranted an extension thereof.
On April 1, 2010, Arreola filed a declaration requesting that the trial court extend the duration of the restraining order. Arreola’s declaration began by reiterating past matters of which the trial court was previously informed, including Pierce’s alleged out-of-control anger that led Arreola to originally seek the restraining order, the subsequent domestic violence assessment, and Pierce’s online Internet postings in which he admitted to being suicidal, severely depressed and also stated (apparently in a game setting) that he would like to go on a “killing spree of … global proportions.” As new and further information in support of her request to extend the restraining order, Arreola’s declaration asserted that Pierce was continuing to engage in acts of emotional intimidation and harassment against her, as demonstrated in certain online Internet postings and frivolous legal filings.
Pierce’s opening brief admits he has since been diagnosed with “Severe Depressive Disorder.”
With regard to Internet postings, Arreola’s declaration and exhibits attached thereto showed that Pierce made an Internet blog entry in December 2009 stating that he would like to see “‘the death chamber’” for those involved in the judicial proceedings or “‘court-run corruption scheme’” that had brought him such misery. Arreola asserted that she continued to live in fear of Pierce, based in part on this “ongoing pattern of threatening statements on the [I]nternet.…” Arreola’s declaration also presented evidence that, in 2009, Pierce posted on You Tube an interview he conducted with the parties’ autistic child, about why the child purportedly wanted to stay with Pierce and did not want to live with Arreola. The public posting of such a sensitive matter was presented to the trial court as further evidence of Pierce’s emotional intimidation and harassment.
Regarding Arreola’s allegation that Pierce sought to intimidate her through frivolous court filings, Arreola claimed in her declaration that there was a past pattern of such litigious conduct that had recently been continued by Pierce. As to the past, Arreola’s declaration stated that in 2008, Pierce filed a meritless lawsuit against Family Services of Tulare County, Family Services therapists, and against the therapist of one of the children at that time, Dr. Jackie Harris-Groeber. We do not have that lawsuit before us in the record on appeal, and about all we do know is that Pierce has conceded it was summarily dismissed by the superior court based on Civil Code section 47. As to more recent conduct, Arreola claimed that subsequent to the December 8, 2009, order, Pierce filed a baseless petition for a “[c]ivil [h]arassment” restraining order against Arreola’s boyfriend merely because some of the boyfriend’s junk mail was inadvertently forwarded to Pierce’s post office box. That fact and the fact that Pierce had recently threatened to sue the current doctor or therapist of one of the children, Dr. Sanjay Masson, for prescribing medications that Arreola herself expressly consented to, and approved of, were submitted by Arreola to the trial court as further evidence of Pierce’s harassment and intimidation.
On April 6, 2010, Pierce filed a declaration in opposition to the requested extension of the restraining order. Pierce decried the fact that Arreola was again “vomiting forth the same tired and perjurious allegations, ” and, consequently, it was with “a sigh of weariness over [Arreola’s] continued maliciousness” that he presented his response. He asserted that he was no longer suicidal, not a threat to anyone’s safety, and never committed or threatened domestic violence or abuse of any kind whatsoever. He claimed that, contrary to Arreola’s “‘scary’” portrayal of him, he was in reality a most “benevolent” family man. As to the Internet postings, Pierce pointed out that he had a right to state his own opinions and political views, including the opinion that Tulare County Superior Court’s “sneeringly aloof family law judges, ” the “greedy” Tulare County Family Services mental health professionals, and the “twisted” lawyers involved in such proceedings, had been extremely corrupt and evil in how they treated him. He stated he had learned firsthand how “lives have been uprooted and destroyed by malicious spouses, judicial retaliation, and court racketeering that has nothing to do with the best interests of children.…” He stated that if he was persuaded that some of those “monsters” should “suffer the death sentence, ” and if he presented that viewpoint on the Internet, he was simply exercising his right to free speech. He did not deny that he filed the several lawsuits and threatened another, as referred to by Arreola, but contended such measures were legally justified in light of all the circumstances and the way he had been treated.
The hearing was held on April 9, 2010. At that time, the trial court issued the following order: “The court grants [Arreola’s] request for continuance of the current restraining order against [Pierce]. The court finds good cause for the issuance based upon the evidence presented. The restraining order issued March 28, 2008, shall expire on March 28, 2013. The restraining order shall be subject to existing custody orders and to future orders the court may make regarding custodial or visitation plan.” In addition, the trial court also directed that reports should be submitted by Dr. Sanjay Masson and Dr. Margarita Prado-Borrego, as the court desired further information relevant to other issues before it. Pierce appealed from the April 9, 2010 order, which was the second of his two prior appeals. We affirmed that order of the trial court in Pierce v. Arreola, supra, F060078.
B. The Order From Which Pierce Now Appeals
This brings us to the June 25, 2010, order from which Pierce presently appeals. The record provided by Pierce in the instant appeal included the minute order and the trial court’s written order of June 25, 2010, but did not include a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. According to the minute order of June 25, 2010, the hearing was to consider, among other things, the following matters: “Review Hearing re: Visitation/Dr. Reports/[Pierce’s] OSC [re] Contempt/[Pierce’s] request to have order 4/9/10 stricken.” The minute order noted that the “[o]rder denying [Pierce’s] peremptory challenge dated February 22, 2010 shall stand.” The minute order further reported that the trial court’s tentative ruling became the order of the court for the reasons stated in the record.
The trial court’s June 25, 2010, written order after hearing made numerous findings and determinations, including: (1) Pierce’s objection to the trial court’s April 9, 2010, order was overruled; (2) Pierce’s peremptory challenge was denied; (3) Pierce’s “allegation regarding cyber-stalking” was denied without prejudice because it “lack[ed] specificity, lack[ed]proof of illegal acts, and fail[ed] to state a prima facie case”; (4) Pierce’s request to change one of the children’s mental health treatment and prescribed medications was denied, and Pierce was required to administer prescribed medications to the child during visitation; (5) Pierce’s claim of “[c]ontempt” was set for hearing on September 3, 2010; (6) Pierce’s visitation was expanded (see below); and (7) All previous orders made in the case, not in conflict or modified by the June 25, 2010 order, remained in effect.
With respect to visitation, the trial court ruled in relevant part as follows: “[Pierce’s] visitation is immediately modified as follows: [¶] a. [Pierce] shall have visitation with the children on the 1st, 3rd, and 5th weekends of every month, from Saturday at 9:00 a.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. … [¶] b. Visitation exchanges shall continue to take place at the Dinuba Police Department. [¶] c. [Pierce’s] visits are no longer confined to the residence of [Pierce’s mother]. [¶] d. [Pierce] is ordered to administer … medication … as directed by [the child’s] prescription(s) during his visitation and [Pierce’s mother] shall ensure that the medications are properly administered. [¶] e. [Pierce’s] weekly telephone calls to the children are no longer ordered. The children are to be allowed to call and speak with [Pierce] by telephone whenever they would like to do so. [¶] f. [Pierce’s mother] continues to submit herself to the jurisdiction of the court. [She] is ordered not to permit [Pierce’s father] to make any negative remarks to the children regarding [Arreola], their ethnicity, or anything else that will negatively impact the children’s mental health. If [Pierce’s mother] allows such comments to be made, the matter may be placed on the ex parte calendar for further orders.”
Pierce filed a timely notice of appeal from the June 25, 2010 order. Arreola did not file a respondent’s brief in this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The trial court has wide discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child. (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255.) Once there has been a final custody determination, the parent “seeking to alter the order for legal and physical custody can do so only on a showing that there has been a substantial change of circumstances so affecting the minor child that modification is essential to the child’s welfare.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 37.) However, if the requested modification would only alter the details of the parenting schedule or visitation arrangements, and would leave the existing custody order otherwise the same, the trial court applies the best interest of the child standard. (In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077-1080.)
“The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child. We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.) “The test is not whether this court would have made the same order or whether the trial court could have reasonably made some other order, but ‘whether the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the order in question advanced the “best interest” of the child.’ [Citation.]” (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 595.) “‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of review. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505.)
II. Pierce’s Fundamental Burden As Appellant
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) As a consequence, an appellant has the burden of demonstrating reversible error based on adequate legal argument and citation to the record. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 556-557.) When points are perfunctorily raised, without adequate analysis and authority, and without citation to an adequate record, we pass them over and treat them as abandoned. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.)
“‘A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) The inadequate record and lack of cogent argument in this case is, in effect, a default by Pierce, requiring that we affirm the order or judgment below.
III. No Abuse of Discretion Shown
The present appeal is taken from the trial court’s order of June 25, 2010, that we have outlined above. In applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we must affirm if the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the best interest of the children. (In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.) We now turn to the particular determinations made in said June 25, 2010, order that are the focus of Pierce’s appeal.
Pierce’s notice of appeal specifies that the instant appeal is taken from the June 25, 2010, order of the trial court. A notice of appeal “defines the scope of the appeal by identifying the particular judgment or order being appealed” (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967); therefore, we limit our consideration to the issues Pierce has raised with respect to that order.
A. Expansion of Visitation
Pierce makes general claims that although the trial court’s order increased his visitation rights, it continued to unfairly favor Arreola, violated equal protection and due process protections, and infringed on his right to raise his children. In so doing, Pierce is repeating the same conclusory remarks that he made in his prior two appeals, which we resolved against him. As before, Pierce’s broad statements are entirely unsupported by cogent legal argument and citation to an adequate record; therefore, he failed to meet his burden as appellant. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575 [an appellant’s burden is to demonstrate the existence of reversible error by reference to an adequate record]; Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556-557 [an appellant must present an adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the record].) “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Error must be affirmatively demonstrated. (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Here, the record on appeal does not affirmatively show any error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in regard to the June 25, 2010 order or any aspect thereof.
In addition, although the record and briefing before us are entirely inadequate to support Pierce’s vague and general claims regarding the June 25, 2010 order, it is nevertheless clear that the trial court could have reasonably concluded the order in question served the best interests of the children. For example, the somewhat cautious approach by the trial court in gradually increasing Pierce’s visitation rights is reasonably supported by the evidence of the (apparently) highly threatening words made by Pierce, which were discussed in Pierce v. Arreola, supra, F060078. In short, no abuse of discretion is shown.
B. “Objections” to Order of April 9, 2010
Pierce apparently filed objections in the trial court to the order of April 9, 2010. He now appeals “the trial court’s overruling of his objections, ” which was one of the matters decided in the trial court’s June 25, 2010, order. Pierce’s appeal provided no argument and did not identify any error in regard to any particular objection. Pierce did not furnish, in connection with the present appeal, a record of the objections or the trial court’s basis for rejecting them. He did not provide a transcript of the hearing and he did not request a statement of decision. We therefore pass over this issue as unsubstantiated and abandoned. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 699-700; People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.) Additionally, the April 9, 2010, order was directly appealed from by Pierce in Pierce v. Arreola, supra, F060078, and our opinion in that appeal affirmed the trial court’s April 9, 2010, order in its entirety. We will not consider it further now.
C. Denial of Peremptory Challenge
Pierce’s appeal challenges the trial court’s decision, set forth in the June 25, 2010, order, to decline Pierce’s request that the trial court address and/or reconsider a prior motion for a peremptory challenge. No record is provided in the instant appeal of the original peremptory challenge, its grounds, or the trial court’s presumed denial thereof. Pierce has not articulated any coherent legal argument in support of his present appeal of this matter, nor has he provided a transcript of the hearing below. This portion of his appeal is unsupported, and we accordingly disregard it. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 699-700; People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.) Furthermore, an order on a motion for disqualification of a judge is not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).)
D. Denial of Request for Protection Against “Cyber-Stalking”
Pierce’s appeal attacks the trial court’s denial of his request for “protection” against alleged “cyber-stalking.” The instant appeal did not provide a record of his moving papers, any opposing papers, or a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. His brief on appeal failed to present any legal authority for the relief he sought in the trial court, and we are not even informed in a perfunctory manner of the statutory or other legal basis for his request for a protective order. Likewise, the record in the instant appeal does not include a declaration or other evidence, if any, that was presented to the trial court in support of the motion regarding cyber-stalking. Again, it is obvious that Pierce has failed to meet his burden as appellant of demonstrating error based on sufficient legal argument and an adequate record. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556-557.) Pierce’s appeal did correctly point out that Arreola found and presented to the trial court several statements published by Pierce on Internet sites. However, Pierce failed to explain how, under any statute or law, the mere retrieval by Arreola of statements or articles that he had posted on a public website or blog amounted to illegally “stalking” him or why such activity entitled him to a protective order.
In our independent research, we note that under Civil Code section 1708.7, a party may obtain injunctive relief against stalking, but an essential element of such a tort is that the plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety or the safety of an immediate family member. (Civ. Code, § 1708.7, subd. (a)(2).) Similarly, under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivisions (a) and (b), an injunction to prevent harassment may be obtained if a course of conduct was directed at a particular person, caused serious harassment, served no legitimate purpose, and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. The record on appeal does not reflect Pierce made a showing in the trial court that could possibly satisfy either of these statutes.
Moreover, even if we assumed for the sake of argument that a statutory basis for such a protective order existed, and even if hypothetically some evidence was in the record that would potentially support the discretionary issuance of a protective order, that would still not show an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs if, in light of the applicable law and considering all of the relevant circumstances, the court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422.) “‘[T]he showing on appeal is wholly insufficient if it presents a state of facts … which … merely affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’” (In re Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 128, 138.) “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.) Plainly, on the record before us, the trial court’s order, which found, in substance, that Pierce had not made an adequate or sufficiently showing to convince the court that protective relief was necessary or proper, was well within the bounds of reason, and Pierce has not shown otherwise.
E. Child’s Mental Health Treatment
Pierce takes issue with the trial court’s factual finding as to one of the children’s mental or emotional condition; namely, that the child was “in a delicate and sensitive state.” That finding was apparently a factor in the trial court’s disposition of Pierce’s objection to the child’s use of psychotropic medications, even though they were consented to by Arreola and prescribed by Dr. Masson in connection with the child’s mental health treatment. Since we do not have an adequate record of the evidentiary bases for the trial court’s finding, or of the factual and other matters presented and argued at the hearing, we disregard Pierce’s challenge as unsupported and forfeited.
Pierce also challenges the trial court’s ruling that he must give the child prescribed medications when the child is with him on visitation. He is personally opposed to the use of psychotropic drugs and states that, as his child’s father, he does not want to be forced to give the child such medication. We take judicial notice that in the trial court’s December 8, 2009, order, sole legal and physical custody of the children was granted to Arreola. We are not aware of any change in that custodial arrangement and Pierce’s appeal has not informed us of any modification thereof. When one parent has sole legal custody, “that one parent shall have the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.” (Fam. Code, § 3006.) Arreola, as the parent with sole legal custody, had the right to make the decision regarding the health and medical care of the children, and it appears that her decision was to follow Dr. Masson’s advised course of treatment, including prescribed medications. We conclude the trial court had a reasonable basis to uphold that decision by Arreola regarding the child’s health care, by requiring Pierce to provide the prescribed medications to the child during visitation.
Even if this were a situation of joint legal custody, and the trial court was simply resolving a dispute between the parents over appropriate medical care, Pierce has failed to establish that the trial court’s decision that, in effect, upheld Arreola’s position regarding the child’s health care (thereby denying Pierce the freedom to withhold the prescribed medications), was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. He has merely shown that he has a difference of opinion to that of Arreola and Dr. Masson.
F. Directions to Pierce’s Mother
Finally, Pierce objects that the June 25, 2010, order effectively “deputiz[ed]” his mother to monitor aspects of visitation. The June 25, 2010, order stated that Pierce’s visits with the children “are no longer confined to the residence of [Pierce’s mother], ” although she would “ensure that the medications are properly administered” and also keep Pierce’s father from making “negative remarks to the children regarding [Arreola], their ethnicity, or anything else that will negatively impact the children’s mental health.” Further, if “[Pierce’s mother] allows such comments to be made, the matter may be placed on the ex parte calendar for further orders.”
Clearly, there is a history behind this aspect of the order, none of which has been provided to us by Pierce in connection with the instant appeal. We presume that at some point, the trial court found it necessary under the facts before it to include a degree of supervision or monitoring of Pierce’s visitation. Pierce has failed to explain why the order is unreasonable, arbitrary, or otherwise an abuse of discretion under all the circumstances. In any event, there is no actual deputization of his mother, if that is the thrust of Pierce’s concern. Rather, in the entire context, it appears the trial court has accepted the involvement of a person willing to assist the parties and the court voluntarily. That is, if a monitor is needed, Pierce’s mother is willing to follow the trial court’s instructions and perform that task. Presumably, she has agreed to abide by the court’s directives so that Pierce will be able to carry out and maximize his available visitation opportunities, within the framework of the trial court’s custody and visitation orders. Pierce has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Dawson, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J.