Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD419167, Robert Alan Schnider, Judge.
Jeeraphan Miyaguchi, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Brian D. McMahon and Brian D. McMahon for Appellant.
Darryl Miyaguchi, in pro. per., for Respondent.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Jeeraphan Miyaguchi (Jeeraphan) appeals from the order denying her request for child custody and awarding her former spouse, Darryl Miyaguchi (Darryl), physical and legal custody of the parties’ children. We affirm.
As is customary in family law matters, we refer to the parties by their first names for purposes of clarity.
We elect to augment the record on appeal with the superior court file pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).
The parties were married on February 19, 1994 and are the parents of three children: Anthony, born 1994; Andrew, born 1997; and Ann-Marina, born 2002. On December 13, 2004, the parties separated following Jeeraphan’s arrest for domestic violence after she threw hot soup on Darryl. She pled no contest to domestic violence as a misdemeanor on January 20, 2005, and she was placed on summary probation for three years under certain terms and conditions. She successfully completed a domestic violence program.
At a hearing on April 18, 2005, the trial court ordered equal time with the children for both parties. On September 30, 2005, a suspected child abuse report was filed naming Darryl as a suspect. On November 29, 2005, the children were removed from Darryl’s home and placed in protective custody. The dependency court placed the children with the paternal aunt. On July 11, 2006, the dependency court ordered the minor children placed with Darryl and awarded Jeeraphan monitored visitation. On September 18, 2007, the dependency court terminated jurisdiction and awarded the parties joint legal custody and Darryl physical custody, subject to specific visitation for Jeeraphan.
On April 8, 2008, Jeeraphan filed an order to show cause seeking to modify the exisiting custody and visitation order. She sought sole legal and physical custody, with no visitation for Darryl. The matter was ultimately heard on July 17, 2008. At that hearing, the trial court awarded sole physical and legal custody of the minor children to Darryl, subject to specific visitation for Jeeraphan.
DISCUSSION
In addressing an appeal, we begin with the presumption that the trial court’s ruling is correct. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Fleishman v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 350, 357.) “It is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 318.)
Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court requires that a party’s briefs “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the... record.” (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115.) To the extent the parties have made references to factual or procedural matters without record references, we will disregard such matters. (Yeboah v. Progeny Ventures, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 443, 451; Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 481, fn. 1.) Neither will we consider any claim of error based on statements unsupported by record references. (Cf. Weller v. Chavarria (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 234, 246.)
We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding of the rules on appeal is, as a practical matter, more limited than an experienced appellate attorney’s. Whenever possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a manner that deprives litigants of a hearing.
While Jeeraphan is complaining about the trial court’s ruling on July 17, 2008, awarding Darryl physical and legal custody of the children, and while we are mindful that she is a self-represented litigant, there is nothing in her sparse citations to the record that would support her contention that the trial court erred in awarding Darryl sole legal and physical custody, subject to her right to visitation.
A court has broad discretion in making a child custody determination and may award custody to either parent based on “the best interest of the child.” (Fam. Code, § 3040, subd. (b).) Under the statutory scheme governing child custody and visitation determinations, the overarching concern is the best interest of the child. (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 256.)
After an initial child custody determination, a change of custody requires a persuasive showing of changed circumstances. (In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725, 730.) The changed circumstances must be substantial and affect the child to such a degree that modification is essential to the child’s welfare. (Ibid.) Material facts and circumstances must show why a change in custody is necessary. (Id. at pp. 730-731) This rule preserves continuity and stability in custody arrangements unless a change in circumstances dictates a different arrangement in the best interest of the child. (Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 535.) The burden of showing changed circumstances is on the party seeking to modify the order. (In re Marriage of Carney, supra, at p. 731.)
On June 25, 2008, the trial court heard from the children’s counsel after counsel interviewed Darryl in his office, had a telephone conference with Jeeraphan, interviewed all three children and twice spoke to the children’s therapist. Counsel also listened to an approximately 35-minute recording that Andrew had secretly made of a conversation primarily between Anthony and Jeeraphan. Counsel indicated that the children did not report any of the abuse alleged by Jeeraphan in her pleadings. He expressed a concern about her behavior, her inability to refrain from talking about the custody situation around the children and her efforts to influence the children.
On July 17, 2008, the trial court heard from Dr. Joseph Kenan, a psychiatric evaluator appointed by the court. The evaluator met with both parents and the three children. He also spoke to the paternal grandfather and the children’s counsel. He believed that Jeeraphan suffered from an Axis 1 disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar mania. He also opined that Jeeraphan would probably always say inappropriate things about her former spouse to the children. His recommendation was that Jeeraphan have unmonitored visitation.
The trial court in its ruling, while finding evidence of a strong positive relationship between the children and their mother, found strong evidence of emotional abuse on the part of Jeeraphan. Despite Jeeraphan’s accusations to the contrary, the trial court found “zero evidence of any inappropriate, incorrect, or unethical behavior on the part of minor’s counsel, or the court-appointed expert witness.” The tape recording indicated that Jeeraphan was not being truthful. The trial court determined that the children were warmly, emotionally connected to the father and his family. There was no evidence of inadequate or inappropriate physical or emotional care, only unfounded allegations by the mother.
Jeeraphan has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding there was no change of circumstances requiring modification of the child custody and visitation award. Neither do we find anything in the record that would support her claim.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., ZELON, J.