Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 1-06-FL133012
Mihara, J.
Appellant Kristen McMullen (Mother) appeals from the Family Court’s denial of her motion to change her minor daughter’s surname from “Sugrue” to “McMullen-Sugrue” or, alternatively, “Sugrue-McMullen.” She contends that the court “failed to consider the requisite factors” in reaching its decision and that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
I. Background
Mother married John Sugrue, Jr. (Father) on September 11, 2004, and their daughter Claire Kristine Sugrue was born in December 2005. The Sugrues separated in April 2006 and later divorced. The judgment of dissolution restored Mother’s former name. The parents share joint legal and physical custody, but Claire’s primary residence is with Mother.
In August 2008, Mother sought to have Claire’s surname changed from “Sugrue” to “McMullen-Sugrue” or “Sugrue-McMullen.” In her motion, Mother said she wanted Claire “to feel as if she BELONGS in the McMullen family just as much as she belongs in the Sugrue family.” “When I remarry and have more children, I will hyphenate my name as well. I want Claire to feel part of MY new family and connected to ME and not feel like she is an ‘outsider in her family.’ ” Mother argued that teachers find it “a lot easier to know ‘who belongs to whom’ when parents share the same last name [as their children].” Hyphenated names, she added, are “very common.” “If presented to [Claire] in the right manner, a hyphenated name could make her feel special.”
Father opposed the proposed name change. In his declaration and in testimony presented at the contested hearing on the motion, he noted that since Claire resides with Mother for more than half of each year she “will have no issues identifying with her mother.” Father emphasized the importance of his surname in maintaining the father-daughter bond, especially in light of Mother’s efforts “to alienate, or distance, [him] from his daughter.” “I do not believe Mother will use the hyphenated version of Claire’s name if the Court grants Mother’s request. I firmly believe that Mother will drop the Sugrue from the hyphenation at every opportunity. McMullen-Sugrue is an extremely long last name for a young child and it is likely that Mother will allow teachers and daycare providers to refer to Claire and teach her to write her name as Claire McMullen. Since the separation, and prior to filing her motion to change Claire’s name, Mother repeatedly gave Claire’s name to third-parties [sic] as Claire McMullen.” Demonstrative evidence supporting Father’s position included a photocopy of Claire’s sandal, which was marked with the initials “CMC, ” and a photograph of an “Our Families” display at Claire’s preschool, which made no mention of him.
Father also argued that it would be in Claire’s best interest to have the same surname as her future Sugrue siblings “to help create unity and a cohesive bond.” Noting that he was engaged to be married and intended to have more children with his second wife, Father pointed out that if Claire’s surname were changed to “McMullen-Sugrue” or “Sugrue-McMullen, ” she would share that name with no one. As a compromise, Father said he would not oppose changing Claire’s middle name from “Kristine” to “McMullen.”
Mother acknowledged that Claire was “thriving” in preschool with her current name. Mother admitted using a variety of surnames for Claire, explaining that “I believe her legal name could be McMullen or Sugrue or McMullen-Sugrue.” She conceded, “I have called her Claire McMullen at times.” Mother acknowledged that a photograph Claire took to preschool for a classroom “Our Families” display did not include her father and that a poster she and Claire made for another classroom display omitted any reference to Father.
The court denied the motion. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
In In re Marriage of Schiffman (1980) 28 Cal.3d 640 (Schiffman), the California Supreme Court listed a number of factors to be considered by a court determining whether a surname change is in a child’s best interest. (Schiffman, at p. 647.) Mother claims “[t]here is no evidence the court considered any of those factors in articulating its decision, ” and therefore, reversal is required. We disagree.
“[A]s in custody disputes, quarrels concerning a child’s surname should be decided according to the best interests of the child.” (Schiffman, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 642; Code Civ. Proc., § 1278.5 [codifying Schiffman].) “[T]he question of what is in the ‘child’s best interests’ is one of fact.” (In re Marriage of Douglass (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1054 (Douglass).) Factors to be considered include the length of time that the child has used a surname, the effect of a name change on preservation of the father-child relationship, and identification of the child as part of a family unit. (Schiffman, at p. 647.) “ ‘[The] embarrassment or discomfort that a child may experience when he bears a surname different from the rest of his family’ should be evaluated. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘[T]he maternal surname might play a significant role in supporting the mother-child relationship... in the cases where the father is the custodial parent or where the custodial mother goes by her birth-given surname.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
At the beginning of the contested hearing on Mother’s motion, the trial judge stated that he had “reviewed the written submissions... and I did a little bit of research on my own.... [T]he standard for the Court is whether or not it’s in the best interest of the child for the name to be changed. [¶] Have I got that right?” Both parties agreed, and the record reflects that the arguments and testimony that followed focused on the Schiffman factors.
Before announcing his ruling, the judge observed in passing that his first exposure to a hyphenated last name occurred sometime after 1973. Mother claims that this anecdote, rather than a balanced application of the Schiffman factors, was the basis for the court’s decision. There is no merit to Mother’s contention, which appears to be based on an assumption, unsupported by any citation to authority, that the court was required to detail its reasoning in a written statement of decision. The assumption is incorrect. Factual findings are not required absent a request for a statement of decision (Code Civ. Proc., § 632). Having made no such request, Mother cannot now complain that the court failed to make the requisite findings. (In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643, 648-649.) Nor can she avoid the well-settled rule that “[a] judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. [Citations.]” (In reMarriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 [“Sections 632 and 634... set forth the means by which to avoid application of these inferences in favor of the judgment”].)
Code of Civil Procedure section 632 provides in relevant part that “[i]n superior courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required. The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632, italics added.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 634 provides in relevant part that “[w]hen a statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue, or if the statement is ambiguous and the record shows that the omission or ambiguity was brought to the attention of the trial court either prior to entry of judgment or in conjunction with a motion under Section 657 [motion for new trial] or 663 [motion to set aside judgment], it shall not be inferred on appeal or upon a motion under Section 657 or 663 that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing part as to those facts or on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 634, italics added.)
Mother next contends the trial court’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Again, we disagree.
A trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion to change a child’s surname will be sustained so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of McManamy & Templeton (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 607, 610 (McManamy).) Under the substantial evidence standard, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged to uphold the lower court’s decision. (Douglass, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1055.) “ ‘When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. [Citations.]’ ” (Douglass, at p. 1055; McManamy, at p. 610.) The burden is on the party challenging the trial court’s order to establish that the order is not supported by substantial evidence. (Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.)
Here, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that it would not be in Claire’s best interest to change her surname. The trial court could reasonably have balanced the first factor against the proposed change. (Schiffman, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 647.) The child was almost four at the time of the hearing. While she had not yet started kindergarten, she was in her second year of preschool and, as Mother acknowledged, doing well there with her current name. In our view, the trial court could also have interpreted Mother’s statement that “[i]f presented to [Claire] in the right manner, a hyphenated name could make her feel special” as an implied admission that the child would not necessarily embrace a name change. (Italics added.)
The trial court could reasonably have balanced the familial bond factors against the proposed name change as well. (Schiffman, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 647.) There was no evidence, beyond Mother’s preference, that a hyphenated surname was needed to strengthen the mother-daughter bond. On the other hand, there was considerable evidence supporting Father’s concern that Mother may have been subtly trying “to alienate, or distance, [him] from his daughter, ” and that, if Claire’s surname were changed to a hyphenated one, Mother would continue to “drop the Sugrue from the hyphenation at every opportunity.” Mother freely conceded that she had “at times” called her daughter “Claire McMullen, ” and she did not dispute that materials Claire contributed to various classroom displays did not depict or refer to Father. Additionally, Father presented evidence that although he lives only five miles away from Claire’s preschool, Mother did not list him as an emergency contact but instead listed relatives who reside in El Dorado Hills, 150 miles away. The trial court could reasonably have concluded from this evidence that the importance of preserving the father-daughter bond mitigated against the proposed name change. We conclude that since substantial evidence supported the trial court’s implied finding that it was not in Claire’s best interest to change her surname, the trial court did not err when it denied Mother’s motion.
III. Disposition
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J., McAdams, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.