Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. D489631, Lisa Foster, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
Katherine L. Marsh (Katherine) appeals a judgment entered after trial of Stephen L. Marsh's (Stephen) petition for dissolution of their marriage. On appeal, she contends the trial court erred by: (1) not awarding her $21,600 for the aggregate amount of temporary spousal support previously awarded her that she asserts was deficient; (2) awarding her only $5,500 per month in permanent spousal support; and (3) awarding Stephen reimbursement for postseparation debts he incurred or amounts he paid for the college expenses of their adult daughter.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1978, Stephen and Katherine were married. When they separated on March 1, 2005, they had three adult children.
On April 6, 2005, Stephen filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage. On April 8, he filed an order to show cause regarding temporary spousal support. On September 7, after consideration of the parties' papers and a hearing, the trial court (San Diego County Superior Court Judge Thomas C. Hendrix) awarded Katherine temporary spousal support as discussed in detail below.
A trial on the petition for dissolution of marriage was conducted on May 31 and November 2, 2007. On or about March 24, 2008, after considering the testimony and other evidence submitted by both parties and arguments of counsel, the trial court (San Diego County Superior Court Judge Lisa Foster) issued a statement of decision (Statement of Decision). The court found that Stephen was a partner in the law firm of Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLC and his annual income was $328,000 for purposes of spousal support. Katherine was not employed and not been employed since 1989. Considering her personal circumstances, the court declined to impute any income to her. At the time of separation, the parties were heavily in debt. The court found the parties' standard of living was middle class to upper middle class. The parties lived modestly so that they could pay for the private education of their three children. The court awarded Stephen reimbursement for his postseparation payment of community debts. It further ordered that the parties' community home be sold and the sale proceeds be used to retire the remaining community debt. The court awarded Stephen reimbursement for postseparation debts incurred or payments made for the undergraduate college expenses of their youngest adult child. Finally, the court awarded Katherine permanent spousal support in the amount of $5,500 per month.
On August 18, the trial court entered a judgment consistent with the Statement of Decision. Katherine timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Temporary Spousal Support
Katherine contends the trial court erred by denying her an award of $21,600 for the aggregate amount of temporary spousal support previously awarded her that she asserts was deficient.
A
Family Code section 3600 provides: "During the pendency of any proceeding for dissolution of marriage..., the court may order (a) the husband or wife to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the wife or husband...." "Awards of temporary spousal support rest within the broad discretion of the trial court and may be ordered in 'any amount' (§ 3600) subject only to the moving party's needs and the other party's ability to pay. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 594 (Murray).) Although permanent spousal support awards are constrained by the factors set forth in section 4320, "there are no explicit statutory standards governing temporary [spousal] support. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 312 (Cheriton).) Accordingly, "[s]ubject only to the general 'need' and 'the ability to pay,' the amount of a temporary spousal support award lies within the court's sound discretion, which will only be reversed on appeal on a showing of clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1327.)
All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
A temporary spousal support order "may be modified... at any time except as to an amount that accrued before the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify...." (§ 3603.) Section 3603 " 'has been construed to prohibit retroactive modifications of temporary [spousal] support....' [Citation.]" (Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 596, quoting In re Marriage of Garcia (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 885, 895-896.)
B
On April 8, 2005, Stephen filed an order to show cause regarding temporary spousal support. On September 7, after consideration of the parties' papers and a hearing, the trial court issued an order stating:
" SPOUSAL SUPPORT:
"2. The Court makes a temporary spousal support order based upon the needs of the parties and [Stephen's] ability to pay.
"3. [Stephen] shall pay to [Katherine] the sum of $3,700 per month, as and for spousal support.
"4. [Katherine] is ordered to pay the first and second mortgage on the community residence, as well as all of the utilities on the residence, which shall include water, gas and electric, cable, trash service, internet and telephone.
"5. [Stephen] shall make all minimum payments due on the parties' credit cards and credit lines.
"6. [Stephen] shall make the payments on the automobile loans for himself, [Katherine], and the parties' children. [Stephen] shall also pay for automobile insurance for himself, [Katherine], and the parties' children.
"7. This order is predicated on [Stephen's] draw of $16,434 per month, his health insurance premiums of $1,219 per month and his mandatory retirement contribution of $2,334 per month. [Katherine's] income is zero."
Katherine apparently did not file an appeal (or writ petition) challenging that order and did not file a motion to modify the amount of temporary spousal support awarded by the court.
At the 2007 trial on the petition for dissolution of marriage, Katherine noted the 2005 order awarded her temporary spousal support requiring Stephen to pay her $3,700 per month based on his law firm draw and to pay automobile and other expenses in lieu of additional spousal support. In the Statement of Decision, the trial court addressed Stephen's reimbursement claim for postseparation credit card and other payments he had made and, in so doing, noted the ambiguities contained in the spousal support section of the 2005 order, stating:
"The [September 7] Order is, frankly, ambiguous. While the Order explicitly characterizes only the $3,700 monthly cash payment 'as and for spousal support', all of the other payments are listed under the heading of 'Spousal Support.' Moreover, Stephen concedes that the payments for automobile loans and insurance should be considered spousal support, and there appears to be no reason on the face of the order to treat those payments as support and the credit card payments ordered as something different. However, the [September 7] Order makes no mention of how the credit card or automobile-related payments ultimately will be treated. There is no explicit reservation of jurisdiction to reallocate those payments or determine [In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76] credits, nor is there an explicit waiver of Stephen's right to seek reimbursement.
"In determining how to resolve this issue, the Court makes several observations. First, 'guideline' spousal support was based solely on Stephen's draw. Using the findings upon which the [September 7] Order was predicated would result in a guideline support order of $3500 per month. Stephen was ordered to pay $3700 per month and make the other payments listed. If one used Stephen's average monthly income of $27,333, the monthly amount Mr. Pearson opines is available for support, guideline support would have been $6000 per month. The monthly automobile-related expenses total approximately $1700. Thus, the cash support and the automobile-related payments together total a support award [i.e., $5,400 per month] that is slightly less than what support would have been had the Court utilized the full amount of Stephen's income, rather than just his monthly draw."
The court ultimately awarded Stephen reimbursement credit for most of his credit card and other postseparation community payments, but not for the automobile-related payments he made that were considered temporary spousal support.
C
On appeal, Katherine argues, apparently for the first time, the trial court erred in its September 7, 2005, order by awarding her temporary spousal support of only $5,400 per month (i.e., Stephen's direct payment of $3,700 per month plus his payment of $1,700 per month for automobile-related expenses), instead of $6,000 per month had the court followed the temporary support guidelines and used Stephen's total annual income of $328,000. Although she apparently did not seek a credit during the 2007 trial on the petition, Katherine now seeks a credit for an aggregate amount of $21,600, an amount she argues reflects the deficient amount of temporary monthly spousal support (i.e., $600 per month) awarded by the court on September 7, 2005.
Although neither party addressed the question, Katherine cannot now, on appeal from the 2008 judgment, challenge the amount of temporary spousal support awarded her in the earlier September 7, 2005, order. Appeals from orders granting temporary spousal support "have long been authorized." (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 367.) "When a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 368.) Accordingly, the California Supreme Court "has held temporary [spousal] support orders directly appealable. [Citations.]" (Ibid.; cf. Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 561, 564.) Alternatively stated, "an order for temporary spousal support is in the nature of a final judgment and so is directly appealable. [Citation.]" (Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.) Because Katherine did not timely file a notice of appeal challenging the amount of temporary spousal support awarded her in the September 7, 2005, order, she cannot now indirectly or collaterally challenge that order by arguing in this appeal that the trial court erred in its 2008 judgment by not awarding her credit for the purported deficient amount of temporary spousal support awarded her in the 2005 order. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata applies to bar Katherine from challenging the court's order granting her temporary spousal support. (Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 599.)
We further note that the record does not reflect any attempt by Katherine to obtain modification of the temporary spousal support order. Because she did not file any order to show cause to modify the temporary spousal support order, no retroactive modification of or other change to the amount of that temporary spousal support is possible. (§ 3603; Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 596; In re Marriage of Garcia, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 895-896.)
However, because the parties did not address in their briefs and have not been given the opportunity to file supplemental briefs on this appealability issue, we nevertheless proceed to address the merits of Katherine's contention. The crux of her argument is that the trial court in awarding her temporary spousal support in 2005 should have followed the support guidelines and used Stephen's total annual income, which presumably would have resulted in an award of $6,000 per month rather than $5,400 per month. However, spousal support guidelines are not binding on trial courts. (In re Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 65, 70; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 5:163, p. 5-69 ["Although concededly a 'valuable tool,' standardized temporary spousal support schedules are only guidelines and, therefore, are not binding on the court."].) In exercising its broad discretion in awarding temporary spousal support, a trial court must consider the moving party's needs and the other party's ability to pay. (Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 594.) There are no express statutory standards governing awards of temporary spousal support. (Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.)
In this case, the trial court expressly stated in its September 7, 2005, order that it "makes a temporary spousal support order based upon the needs of the parties and [Stephen's] ability to pay." Furthermore, the record shows the trial court expressly stated its support order was based on Stephen's income (albeit his $16,434 per month draw), his health insurance premiums of $1,219 per month, and his mandatory retirement contribution of $2,334 per month. In expressly (or implicitly) awarding Katherine a total of $5,400 per month in temporary spousal support (by requiring Stephen to pay her $3,700 per month and to pay automobile-related expenses of $1,700 per month), we cannot conclude the trial court acted unreasonably in determining that amount and/or by not following the guidelines and using Stephen's total annual income. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not crediting Katherine with $21,600 for the amount by which the court's temporary spousal support award was purportedly deficient. Katherine has not carried her burden on appeal to show otherwise.
II
Permanent Spousal Support
Katherine contends the trial court erred by awarding her only $5,500 per month in permanent spousal support. She argues the trial court did not consider, or properly consider, certain section 4320 factors in determining the amount of permanent spousal support.
A
Section 4320 provides:
"In ordering [permanent] spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances:
"(a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following: [¶] (1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment. [¶] (2) The extent to which the supported party's present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.
"(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.
"(c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party's earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living.
"(d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage.
"(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party.
"(f) The duration of the marriage.
"(g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the party.
"(h) The age and health of the parties.
"(i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence....
"(j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
"(k) The balance of the hardships to each party.
"(l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time....
"(m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4325.
"(n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable."
"In ordering [permanent] spousal support, the trial court must consider and weigh all of the circumstances enumerated in the statute, to the extent they are relevant to the case before it. [Citations.]" (Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 302-303, fns. omitted.) "The first of the enumerated circumstances [in section 4320], the marital standard of living, is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 303.) "In making its spousal support order, the trial court possesses broad discretion so as to fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by section 4320, with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice for the parties in the case before it." (In re Marriage of Kerr (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 87, 93.) However, "the court does not have discretion to ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in the statute. To the contrary, the trial judge must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support. [Citations.] Failure to do so is reversible error. [Citations.]" (Cheriton, at p. 304.) If a trial court recognizes and applies the section 4320 factors in awarding permanent spousal support, "the ultimate decision as to amount and duration of spousal support rests within its broad discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Kerr, at p. 93, fn. omitted.)
B
Katherine argues the trial court did not consider the parties' ability to maintain the marital standard of living (§ 4320, subd. (a)) and the tax consequences to each party (§ 4320, subd. (j)), and did not properly consider and weigh her reasonable needs (§ 4320, subd. (d)) and Stephen's ability to pay (§ 4320, subd. (c)).
To the extent Katherine argues the trial court's Statement of Decision was deficient because it omitted any discussion, or a sufficient discussion, of the parties' ability to maintain the marital standard of living, we conclude, as Stephen asserts, she has waived that deficiency by not timely objecting to that omission or deficiency below. (§ 4332; Code Civ. Proc., § 634; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133-1134 (Arceneaux); In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 49 (Schmir); In re Marriage of Cohn (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 923, 928 (Cohn).) "[If] a party does not bring such deficiencies to the trial court's attention, that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement [of decision] was deficient in these regards, and hence the appellate court will imply findings to support the judgment." (Arceneaux, at pp. 1133-1134.) In Cohn, the court stated: "Howard requested a statement of decision but failed to bring the court's attention to the fact that it did not make findings with respect to his opportunity to work. Thus, insofar as Howard's challenge to the judgment is based on this deficiency, it is waived." (Cohn, at p. 928.)
Because the record does not reflect any objection by Katherine to the omission of any discussion, or sufficient discussion, of the parties' ability to maintain the marital standard of living, she has waived that purported error for purposes of appeal. In any event, the trial court expressly stated it considered all of the section 4320 factors, even though it did not recite or discuss each of the 14 factors listed in section 4320. In the Statement of Decision, the court stated: "The Court determines whether to award spousal support and the amount of any support order based on the factors adumbrated [sic] in Family Code § 4320." It further stated: "Considering all of the Family Code § 4320 factors, as well as the parties' living expenses, and Stephen's income, the Court orders spousal support in the amount of $5,500 per month." (Italics added.) Accordingly, making all implied findings in favor of the judgment to the extent the Statement of Decision does not make express findings, we conclude the trial court considered the parties' ability to maintain the marital standard of living.
Likewise, we conclude Katherine waived her contention that the trial court erred by not expressly stating in the Statement of Decision that it had considered the tax consequences to the parties of the spousal support award. (§ 4332; Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133-1134; Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 49; Cohn, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) Because the record does not reflect her objection to omission of that factor from the Statement of Decision, that purported error was waived for purposes of this appeal. In any event, as discussed above, the trial court expressly stated it considered all of the section 4320 factors, even though it did not recite or discuss each of the 14 factors listed in section 4320. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court considered the tax consequences to the parties of the spousal support award.
Although Katherine apparently concedes the trial court considered her reasonable needs based on the marital standard of living (§ 4320, subd. (d)), she nevertheless argues the court did not specifically discuss her reasonable or financial needs or properly discuss the marital standard of living. However, by not objecting to the Statement of Decision and its omission of a specific discussion of her reasonable or financial needs, she has waived that purported error. (§ 4332; Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133-1134; Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 49; Cohn, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) In any event, the trial court expressly stated it considered all of the section 4320 factors. Although the court did not specifically discuss her reasonable or financial needs, we nevertheless conclude the court considered that factor.
To the extent Katherine argues the trial court did not sufficiently or properly discuss the marital standard of living, she again has waived that deficiency by not objecting below. In any event, the court adequately addressed the martial standard of living. The court stated:
"The Court finds that the standard of living during the marriage was middle class to upper middle class. The testimony of both parties was that the Marshes lived modestly so that they could pay for the education of their three children. The family home is in a neighborhood both describe as 'blue collar.' The home itself could be so characterized. It is modest in size and needs some repairs. The parties drive modest cars, but also have been able to provide modest cars for their children. The parties were able to eat out regularly, although typically at modestly priced restaurants."
Accordingly, the trial court specifically addressed the parties' marital standard of living and sufficiently described it as "middle class to upper middle class." In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469 stated: "It appears to us that the Legislature intended 'marital standard of living' to be a general description of the station in life the parties had achieved by the date of separation and this is satisfied by the everyday understanding of the term in its ordinary sense, i.e., upper, middle or lower income." (Id. at p. 491.) Although greater specificity regarding the finding of marital standard of living may have been preferable (e.g., monetary value or other quantification), it was not required. (Ibid.; In re Marriage of Kerr, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 94, fn. 7; cf. In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, 825 [trial court found " '[t]he [parties'] life style at the time of separation was "upper-middle class"....' "].) The trial court made adequate findings regarding the parties' marital standard of living on consideration of Katherine's reasonable needs under section 4320, subdivision (d). We further infer the court properly related that standard of living to her reasonable needs in making its spousal support award.
Finally, Katherine argues the trial court did not properly consider or weigh Stephen's ability to pay spousal support (§ 4320, subd. (c)). To the extent she challenges the court's findings in the Statement of Decision, we again conclude she has waived that purported error by not objecting below. (§ 4332; Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133-1134; Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 49; Cohn, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) In any event, we conclude the trial court properly considered and weighed Stephen's ability to pay permanent spousal support. The court expressly found Stephen has highly marketable skills as an attorney specializing in environmental law. It noted he is a partner at a prestigious law firm. The court stated: "Stephen is capable of paying spousal support. His 2006 taxes reflect taxable income of $347,675.... Once the community debt is paid, Stephen's expenses in particular should be reduced significantly.... Neither [party] will have significant assets once the home is sold and the debt retired." It further stated: "[Stephen's] testimony at trial was that his monthly draw had been reduced and that he expected to earn approximately $25,000 less in 2008 than he did in 2007. For purposes of calculating support, the Court will utilize $328,000 as [Stephen's] annual income." Considering Stephen's ability to pay permanent spousal support together with all of the other section 4320 factors, the trial court then ordered Stephen to pay Katherine permanent spousal support of $5,500 per month. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering and weighing Stephen's ability to pay and in ultimately awarding Katherine $5,500 per month in permanent spousal support.
III
Reimbursement for College Expenses
Katherine contends the trial court erred by awarding Stephen reimbursement for postseparation debts he incurred or amounts he paid for the college expenses of Theresa, their youngest adult child. Although Katherine concedes the parties had a long-standing prior agreement to pay for all of their children's undergraduate college expenses, she argues the court erred by finding that agreement continued after their separation.
A
At trial, Stephen testified that he and Katherine had agreed they "were going to put our daughter through college and get her to complete it." He testified that "[w]e always agreed that we would pay for all three children to go through college." Although they had originally agreed before their separation to pay for their daughter's college education, he testified they "continued to agree on that" after their separation. Before their separation, Stephen and Katherine had paid for the first two years of Theresa's college expenses. Prior to Theresa's junior year of college, Katherine had applied for and obtained approval for an educational loan to pay for Theresa's third year of college. However, immediately prior to the start of school, Katherine refused to sign the loan documents, explaining to Stephen that she did not want to jeopardize her credit rating and ability to qualify for her own loan for law school expenses. Katherine told Stephen to sign the loan for Theresa's college expenses so that it would not show up on her credit ratings. Stephen believed there was an agreement between Katherine and him that they would be jointly responsible for that loan. Stephen testified Katherine never told him that she preferred Theresa not receive a loan or that she preferred Theresa drop out of school. He further testified Katherine never told him she was not going to pay for any of Theresa's schooling.
Katherine testified she was concerned with the education of all of their children. She and Stephen agreed early in their marriage how important they considered education. They borrowed money to finance Theresa's first two years of college at the University of San Francisco. Katherine admitted they had the same agreement to pay for Theresa's college education as they had for their two older children. She testified: "We would pay for their undergraduate degree[s], and they would pay for their graduate degrees." She testified Stephen borrowed money for Theresa's junior year of college just as he had for Theresa's first two years.
In the Statement of Decision, the trial court found that although Katherine had not signed the postseparation loan for Theresa's undergraduate college education, Katherine "testified that the agreement the parties made with all three of their children was that Stephen and Katherine would pay for each child's undergraduate education. She testified further that early on in their marriage, she and Stephen agreed that the education of their children was very important. The Court finds that given their agreement with the children and their history of paying for both of their older children's education, the debt incurred with the Department of Education is community debt. One[-]half of the debt is, accordingly, assigned to each party." In its subsequent judgment, the court stated: "With regard to the loan payments made by [Stephen] to the U.S. Department of Education, the Court finds that those payments are community debt and orders that [Stephen] is entitled to reimbursement for one[-]half of the payments made to the U.S. Department of Education. The amount that shall be reimbursed by [Katherine] to [Stephen] is $10,503.67. [Katherine] shall also reimburse one-half of all payments that [Stephen] makes until that debt is paid."
B
Katherine argues the trial court abused its discretion by concluding the postseparation loan for Theresa's undergraduate college expenses was a community debt. Although the parties had no statutory duty to pay for those expenses, they nevertheless had the ability to agree to pay for those expenses of their adult child. (§ 3901, subd. (b); Kamper v. Waldon (1941) 17 Cal.2d 718, 720-721.) Considering the evidence in this case, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Stephen and Katherine had an agreement to pay for Theresa's undergraduate college expenses, which agreement continued in effect after the parties' separation. As discussed above, Stephen testified that he and Katherine had agreed they "were going to put our daughter through college and get her to complete it." He testified that "[w]e always agreed that we would pay for all three children to go through college." Although they had originally agreed before their separation to pay for their daughter's college education, he testified they "continued to agree on that" after their separation. Before their separation, Stephen and Katherine had paid for the first two years of Theresa's college expenses. Although Katherine refused to sign loan documents for Theresa's junior year college expenses, she told Stephen to sign the loan for those expenses so that it would not show up on her credit ratings. Stephen believed there was an agreement between Katherine and him that they would be jointly responsible for that loan. Katherine never told him she did not want to pay for Theresa's college expenses.
Katherine's testimony did not substantially contradict and, for the most part, was consistent with Stephen's testimony. Importantly, Katherine testified she and Stephen had the same agreement to pay for Theresa's college education as they had for their two older children. The record is devoid of any testimony that after the marital separation she had informed either Stephen or Theresa that she no longer agreed to pay for Theresa's undergraduate college expenses. Although Katherine refused to sign the loan documents for the expenses of Theresa's junior year of college, that refusal did not show she no longer agreed with Stephen to pay for those expenses. Rather, the court could, and presumably did, find Katherine's refusal to sign those loan documents was intended to merely protect her own credit rating and not to revoke her agreement with Stephen to pay for Theresa's college expenses. There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that there was an agreement between Stephen and Katherine to pay for Theresa's undergraduate college expenses, which agreement continued after the parties' separation.
Katherine argues the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion by concluding the postseparation education debt incurred for Theresa's college expenses was a community debt because her (Katherine's) financial situation drastically changed after separation. She argues: "Although there is no dispute that Katherine and Stephen had a long-standing prior agreement to finance their children's education, the court should not have inferred, based on the parties' past agreement and conduct, that Katherine would continue to do so given her drastically changed circumstances after the disintegration of her [27-]year marriage." Although we presume the trial court could have rationally made a contrary inference, we cannot conclude it acted irrationally or otherwise abused its discretion by inferring, based on the record in this case, that Stephen's and Katherine's agreement to pay for Theresa's college expenses continued after their separation despite the respective changes in the parties' financial circumstances. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Stephen reimbursement for postseparation debts he incurred or amounts he paid for Theresa's college expenses.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Stephen is entitled to his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR, NARES, Acting P. J., McINTYRE, J.