Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. 00D003855 Barry S. Michaelson, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Barbakow & Ribet and Claudia Ribet for Appellant.
Barry E. Cohen for Respondent.
OPINION
O’LEARY, ACTING P. J.
This appeal concerns Hassan Malaklou’s child support obligation to his three children. Hassan and his ex-wife Nahid have been in and out of court since 1986. Nahid appeals from a 2009 trial court order concluding she waived the children’s claim to child support arrears. The order was based on the trial court’s interpretation of a 2003 marital settlement agreement and stipulated judgment containing a broadly worded general release and waiver of all claims between the parties. Nahid asserts the 2003 waiver could not have related to support arrears because Nahid turned over her child support enforcement rights to the Orange County District Attorney’s Family Support Division (now the Orange County Department of Child Support Services) (DCSS). Alternatively, Nahid claims when she signed the stipulated judgment there was no bona fide dispute regarding the calculation of arrears that could have been compromised by a general waiver. The trial court agreed with Hassan’s argument there was substantial evidence the stipulated judgment was a valid waiver of support arrears. We conclude parents cannot simply waive all child support arrears and, in this case, there was no evidence of an accord and satisfaction (a compromise) regarding arrears. Accordingly, the trial court’s order reaching a contrary result is reversed and remanded. For reasons we will explain, we direct the family law court to consider Nahid’s claim to collect any child support owed from July 1999 and thereafter.
We refer to the parties by their first names for ease of reading and to avoid confusion, and not out of disrespect. (In re Marriage of James & Christine C. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1264, fn. 1.)
I
Nahid and Hassan married in December 1984 and had their first child in July 1985. They separated in 1986 and Hassan filed an action for marital dissolution (case no. D258200). In September 1986, the court executed a child and spousal support order. The order contained a visitation schedule and ordered Hassan to pay Nahid $500 per month child support and $1,000 per month for spousal support. However, the marriage was never legally dissolved and the parties reconciled in 1988.
Nahid and Hassan resided together until May 1989, when Nahid filed several claims under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, seeking restraining orders against Hassan and many of his relatives. The claims were consolidated for a hearing (case no. 590094) and considered when Nahid was several months pregnant with Hassan’s second child. In August 1989, Nahid was awarded $6,600 attorney fees and $3,600 per month for child support, made retroactive to May 1989. A different panel of this court considered and rejected Hassan’s appeal of the order. (In re Marriage of Malaklou (June 28, 1991, G008536) [nonpub. opn.].) This court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding Hassan was wealthy (having a monthly income of $20,000) and the attorney fee award was appropriate due to his conduct at trial. We noted the trial court “disbelieved Hassan on every issue and found his testimony ‘fabricated in an attempt to avoid his responsibilities.’” (Ibid.) We sanctioned Hassan $5,000 for filing a frivolous appeal. (Ibid.)
The following year, Nahid filed an application with the DCSS seeking child support enforcement services. On November 30, 1992, the DCSS acknowledged receipt of the application and gave her a file number to refer to when she contacted the office (No. 24-59-61).
On April 21, 2000, Nahid filed a petition for dissolution of marriage (00D003855), and this appeal arises from this action. In her petition for dissolution, Nahid alleged she had been married for over 14 years and the date of separation occurred in July 1999.
We note this date of separation appears to somewhat conflict with the first dissolution action, the domestic violence action, and the DCSS enforcement action. In any case, because Nahid also later stipulated July 1999 was the date of separation, she cannot now be heard to change the date in her marital dissolution action or in this appeal.
Over the next three years there were 23 court hearings, nine of which related to the issue of child support. In June 2000, Nahid filed an order to show cause (OSC) seeking child and spousal support and a visitation schedule. After completing discovery concerning Hassan’s income, the court ordered Hassan to pay $2,000 per month in child support. In February 2001, the family law court entered a final order on the OSC stating child support was $2,000 per month and it awarded $2,000 in child support arrears for missed payments on November 15, 2000 and December 1, 2000. In February, April, and November 2001, Nahid filed separate OSCs regarding contempt due to Hassan’s repeated failure to pay child support. In June 2001, the court found Hassan in contempt for failing to make child support payments on January 1, 2001, and January 15, 2001, amounting to $4,000. It concluded Hassan had made four $1,000 payments in March, April, and May 2001, which would be applied to his overall support obligation. The court ordered Hassan to pay $2,500 immediately or surrender himself to the Orange County Sherriff. None of the OSCs filed in 2000 and 2001 mentioned arrears incurred before the alleged date of separation in 1999. We also note our record does not contain any of Hassan’s responsive pleadings to the OSCs, but he does not allege on appeal there was any dispute about the validity of the 2000 support order or arrear calculations made by the trial court.
In July 2003, Nahid gave birth to her third child with Hassan, which she claims was conceived during a rare alcohol-induced reunion. The following month, in August 2003, Nahid and Hassan executed (1) a “release of claims” agreement and (2) a stipulated judgment on reserved issues. The court accepted these agreements and entered judgment accordingly. The “release of claims” agreement stated that attached as exhibit A was a copy of the stipulated judgment that “provides for the resolution of all claims in their pending marital dissolution action.... [¶] [T]he undersigned desire to enter into the agreement as a final resolution of all claims that have been raised in their marital dissolution action which could have been raised in the Action, all claims which were raised and which could have been raised in the previous marital dissolution action involving Husband and Wife further identified as... case number 59 00 94 [the domestic violence action], and all claims between Husband and Third Party Claimants which were raised or which could have been raised in this Action.”
In addition the “release of claims” agreement contained a boilerplate paragraph entitled “General and Specific Mutual Releases, ” which essentially provided the parties released all known and unknown claims. It was followed by a Civil Code section 1542 waiver.
In the stipulated judgment, the parties stated they separated on July 27, 1999, and they agreed to share joint legal custody of their three children. Nahid was awarded primary physical custody, and Hassan was awarded extensive visitation rights. Hassan’s child support obligation was reduced to $1,500 per month starting June 1, 2003. In addition, the stipulation stated, “It is the parties’ mutual desire and wish to immediately effect by this Stipulated Judgment a full, complete, and final settlement of all their respective present and future property interests, including spousal support, and to irrevocably adjust and determine forever all legal obligations of any nature which may exist with respect to each other and by reason of the parties’ marriage, and to fully and completely resolve any and all issues related to their marriage and also to release any and all previous claims arising from and related to their previous action for marital dissolution....”
It appears there may have been a DCSS enforcement action pending when the parties executed the above stipulation. In her appellant’s appendix, Nahid included some documents indicating DCSS opened a case in 1992 and sent Hassan notices regarding past due arrears in October 1994, December 1994, and October 1997. The last notice stated Hassan owed $140,055 in child support arrears. Hassan was notified willful failure to support his children could result in fine, imprisonment, or other legal sanction. Hassan denied having any knowledge of these proceedings.
On December 14, 2006, Nahid filed an OSC to modify child support and requested attorney fees. In her declaration, Nahid stated that since the divorce the children spent most of their time with her and she has had to pay most of their expenses. She stated, “[Hassan] pays what he feels like every month, and although [he] may ‘make-up’ the difference in subsequent months, I am always at [his] whim, wondering whether he will pay or not. [Hassan] does not take any responsibility for our children, physically, morally or financially. I realize I can only seek the court’s assistance regarding the latter, but I need financial help as I am having to borrow to make ends meet.”
Hassan filed a responsive pleading accusing Nahid of filing the above OSC simply because she discovered Hassan had a girlfriend. He added Nahid was “engaged in a ruthless campaign to disparage [him] with [his] two sons.” Nahid responded by submitting to the family law court a copy of her DCSS affidavit demonstrating for the period of July 1, 1986, to December 31, 2002, Hassan owed $320,191 in child support arrears.
For reasons not explained by the parties, and which are not clear from our record, over one year later the court held a hearing on its own motion: The April 28, 2008 minute order stated the court decided to consider any issues regarding arrears despite the lack of a pending motion in order “to be efficient and to reduce costs.” A few days later, on May 1, 2008, the court ordered depositions be taken of both parties.
On June 17, 2008, Hassan filed an OSC to stay enforcement of the arrears. He asserted no child support accrued from 1985 to 1999 because the parties were living together as a family (as Nahid alleged in her petition and in the stipulated judgment). He asserted, “[O]f the $320,191 in alleged arrears, all but $40,698 relates to and was accrued during the period of January 1, 1985 through and including July of 1999....” He argued the arrears incurred after the date of separation was discharged by the 2003 stipulated judgment.
In response, Nahid filed a motion to determine arrears. She alleged Hassan owed $323,441 in child support plus over $1 million dollars in accrued interest, for a grand total of $1,409,071. She argued the stipulated judgment did not specifically mention settlement or waiver of the child support arrears. Nahid claimed she could not waive child support arrears in the marital dissolution settlement because the enforcement rights were assigned to the local child support agency and any agreements made without the agency’s participation was unenforceable. She alleged the DCSS action was a more cost-effective way to collect child support arrears, particularly since Hassan had a history of over-litigating issues. In December 2008, Nahid filed another OSC to further address the factual basis for her arrears request. She submitted evidence contesting Hassan’s claim the parties were living together or reunited from 1986 to 1999.
Hassan’s response alleged the release of child support arrears was quid-pro-quo for his agreement to release his interest in $300,000 Nahid sent to an account in Australia. To oppose this new claim, Nahid supplied evidence the funds sent to Australia were not community property and had nothing to do with Hassan.
At the hearing held on January 6, 2009, the court ruled: (1) the family law court had jurisdiction to enter the August 2003 stipulated judgment without notifying the DCSS or obtaining its consent; (2) the August 2003 stipulated judgment contained a valid release of arrears because there was a bona fide dispute regarding this issue, the arrears issue was fully litigated by counsel, and the stipulation was signed by both parties as well as the minors’ counsel; and consequently (3) no arrears for child support were due before entry of the judgment in 2003. It stated on the record, there was no evidence of intrinsic or extrinsic fraud, or any other equitably remedy to set aside the 2003 judgment. It acknowledged the general rule against waiver of child support arrears but found it did not apply in this case because there were allegations arrears were not owed at all and the parties likely compromised on the issue. It noted the parties still needed to have an evidentiary hearing on whether child support was owed after entry of the 2003 stipulated judgment.
II
Nahid’s appeal is based on her theory she never intended to waive child support arrears when she executed the 2003 stipulated judgment, and even if she did, Family Code section 4065 required the DCSS to approve any child support order (including orders encompassing arrears). Alternatively, she claims child support arrears cannot be waived absent a valid accord and satisfaction. We agree with the latter argument. Simply stated, we found no evidence the parties in 2003 disputed the arrears incurred after the date of separation in 1999. The general waiver and release of claims contained in the 2003 judgment cannot be deemed an accord and satisfaction of a disputed debt without any evidence it memorialized a compromise between the parties. We reverse the trial court’s 2009 order reaching a contrary conclusion.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code, unless otherwise indicated.
A. Case Authority on Child Support Arrears
“An order for child support... continues in effect until the order (1) is terminated by the court or (2) terminates by operation of law....” (§ 3601, subd. (a).) Although the trial court may modify or terminate a support order prospectively, it cannot modify or forgive accrued support payments. (In re Marriage of Sabine & Toshio M. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1213 (Sabine & Toshio).) In keeping with this state’s long standing policy that the welfare of children is of utmost importance and must be protected, parents are statutorily obligated to provide child support. (Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 947.) This child support obligation runs to the child and not the parent. (In re Marriage of Comer (1996) 14 Cal.4th 504, 517 (Comer).) Therefore, the child’s right to such support cannot be limited or abrogated by his or her parents. (Ibid.) “In essence, the parent, to whom such support is paid, is but a mere conduit for the disbursement of that support.” (Williams v. Williams (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 636, 640 (Williams).) As such, any agreement between parents purporting to modify the child’s right to support is not binding on either the court or the child. (Hoover-Reynolds v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1279.)
Child support is not an ordinary debt, but rather, it is a court-imposed obligation to provide for one’s child. (Williams, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d at p. 639.) Accordingly, general civil law defenses are generally not applicable. However, under certain limited circumstances courts have applied the defenses of accord and satisfaction and estoppel to child support arrears. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215 [accord and satisfaction]; In re Marriage of Vroenen (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1182 [no estoppel under facts of case].)
In this case, the trial court was convinced the 2003 stipulated judgment contained a valid waiver resulting from an accord and satisfaction of a disputed support obligation. Therefore, we will focus on the elements of this defense. “An accord and satisfaction is the substitution of a new agreement for and in satisfaction of a preexisting agreement between the same parties. The usual purpose is to settle a claim at a lesser amount.” (In re Marriage of Thompson (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058.)
The trial court found instructive the Sabine & Toshio case. In that case, mother and father were Japanese citizens married in the United States in 1986. Their daughter was born in 1988. Mother filed for divorce in 1993 and father moved back to Japan. In his absence, the court dissolved the marriage and ordered father to pay $1,700 per month child support and $1,000 per month of spousal support. That judgment also ordered father maintain health insurance coverage for his daughter or pay half of her unreimbursed medical expenses. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1206-1207.)
Father did not make any payments for several years, and mother asked California Child Support Services Department (CSSD) for help. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207.) CSSD declined on the basis Father lived in Japan. In 2002, mother hired a Japanese collection agency. In 2003, father sent mother a proposed agreement in which he would pay $100,000 as a full settlement for all arrears (which were then in excess of $300,000) if mother would agree to forgo any further support payments, and father would support his daughter if needed. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1207-1208.) Desperate for funds, mother signed the agreement and sent it to an “‘intermediary’” at the collection agency. The intermediary refused to give father the agreement unless father gave the money directly to him. Father refused to pay. Mother declared the agreement was “‘now null and void.’” (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209.)
In 2004, mother retained counsel in Japan to seek payment of arrears. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209.) After more negotiations, father offered to make a lump sum payment of $100,000 and to pay $1,000 per month in child support. Mother accepted the funds on the condition their purpose would be unspecified. Father paid the lump sum and between December 2004 and June 2005 wired $1,000 per month in child support.
Meanwhile, CSSD learned father worked for a subsidiary of a California company and agreed to help mother collect arrears, which totaled $246,692 in child support, $97,441 in spousal support, and $14,066 for their daughter’s medical expenses. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210.) Mother renewed the support judgment and CSSD filed a motion asking the trial court to decide if mother and father made an enforceable private support agreement and/or to determine the amount of arrears. (Id. at p. 1211.)
The trial court concluded the prior agreement was “too vague, ambiguous, and unclear to constitute a release of arrearages” and there was no enforceable prior agreement regarding arrears. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.) It ordered CSSD to audit and calculate arrears that accrued between September 1995 and April 2006. (Ibid.)
Father appealed, claiming the 2003 agreement was enforceable. (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.) The appellate court affirmed the order. It reasoned that under section 3651, subdivision (c)(1), neither the trial court nor the parties can modify or revoke child support arrears that accrued prior to filing the motion to modify. (Id. at pp. 1212-1213.) In addition, it noted retroactive modification of child support arrears is statutorily barred. (Ibid.)
The Sabine and Toshio court also concluded the prior agreement did not qualify as accord and satisfaction because there was no dispute regarding the existence or amount of arrears owed. It stated, “That is not to say a trial court lacks authority to determine whether any arrearages exist and, if so, the amount due. (See In re Marriage of Robinson (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 93, 98.) Nor are the parties precluded from settling all disputes that might affect the calculation of arrearages. ‘When a dispute, having the ring of truthfulness on each side, arises, concerning an amount due under an obligation, as in a case where... an agreement is... made to accept a lesser sum in full satisfaction of the amount [in controversy], the obligation is cancelled by a tender and acceptance of the lesser sum in full payment.’ (Robertson v. Robertson (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 113, 117.) Thus, where a husband asserted that he owed $250 a month in spousal support, and the wife contended that $300 was the correct amount, they could resolve their differences in a manner that was binding on the court. (Id. at pp. 117-118.) [¶] But an accord and satisfaction requires the existence of a bona fide dispute concerning the debt. [Citation.] Here, there was none. [Father] did not deny the existence of the arrearages, question the meaning of the Judgment, or raise any issue concerning the amount he owed. Nor did he contend that the Judgment was invalid or void as a result of extrinsic fraud, lack of service of process, or any other reason. Quite simply, [father] offered [mother] less than one-third of the arrearages in exchange for a release as to the rest. We fail to see how this resolved a bona fide dispute. ‘[A]n agreement for payment of a part of the amount due is without consideration.’ [Citations.] Put another way, a ‘legal obligation to perform an act may not constitute consideration for a contract.’ [Citations.] ‘Performance of a legal duty to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration....’ (Rest.2d Contracts, § 73, p. 179; see Civ. Code, § 1605 [no contract is formed where promisor receives that to which she is lawfully entitled or where promisee consents to provide what he is lawfully bound to provide].)” (Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1214-1215.)
B. Analysis
Before reviewing the trial court’s conclusion there was an accord and satisfaction of child support arrears contained in the 2003 judgment, we must clarify and settle several preliminary matters. First is the issue of whether the child support arrears at issue began to accumulate on the alleged date of separation in the underlying marital dissolution action, or if we should also consider arrears purportedly arising from periods of separation relating to prior actions between the parties. We recognize there are several different support orders generated from the various actions and Nahid asserted below (and on appeal) Hassan owes arrears dating back to the mid-1980’s.
We conclude this appeal arises from the marital dissolution action filed in 2000 and it is undisputed a child support obligation was triggered on the alleged (and stipulated) date of separation (July 27, 1999). In this marital dissolution action, the court entered a child support order obligating Hassan to pay $2,000 per month in child support. This is the only support order relevant to this action. Accordingly, the family law court could consider Nahid’s claim to collect support arrears accruing anytime after July 1999. In this action it would be improper to consider any claim for child support owed before the stipulated date of separation. Child support is not available for the time Nahid stipulated she and Hassan were married and not separated. Thus, our review on appeal concerns only arrears that accumulated after July 1999. This brings us to the second point we wish to clarify.
We cannot determine from our limited record whether Nahid’s claim for arrears incurred before 1999 during purported periods of separation relate to her domestic violence action, the DCSS’s action, or the earlier marital dissolution action. We have no evidence regarding how or if these actions were resolved. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as a ruling on whether Nahid’s claims for arrears arising before June 1999 have any merit.
It is undisputed some amount of child support arrears actually accumulated after July 1999. After all, the primary issue raised on appeal is whether there was a compromise or wavier, and this necessarily implies there was some amount owing. In addition, Hassan in the trial court claimed the amount he owed for arrears after the date of separation was waived by the stipulated judgment, which suggests some amount of child support accrued between 1999 and 2003 and had not been paid. We appreciate the parties currently disagree over the amount of arrears incurred after 1999, but this fact is not relevant to resolving this appeal. For an accord and satisfaction to have occurred there must be evidence the parties in 2003 had a dispute over the amount owed and reached a compromise on that issue in the stipulated judgment. As we will explain, we find there is simply no evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion the parties disputed the amount of arrears owed in 2003 and they reached a compromise by agreeing to completely forgive all the owed arrears.
As explained, parents cannot waive child support, but they can settle a dispute that might affect the calculation of arrears. For a valid accord and satisfaction there must be evidence there was a dispute concerning the amount due under the child support obligation and the parties agreed to accept a lesser sum in full satisfaction of the amount in controversy. As discussed in the Sabine & Toshio case, a bona fide dispute concerning owed child support can arise when a party denies the existence of the arrears, questions the meaning of the judgment, raises any issue concerning the amount owed, or disputes the validity of the judgment due to extrinsic fraud, lack of service of process, or any other reason. Simply offering less than what is owed in exchange for a release is not the resolution of a bona fide dispute but rather a partial payment.
Hassan alleges that in 2003 there were three legitimate disputes between the parties that related to support arrears: (1) the parties stipulated to the fact the marriage lasted 14 years, settling any prior dispute about the length of the marriage; (2) Hassan waived his right to community funds Nahid transferred to Australia; and (3) Hassan claimed Nahid failed to properly account for payments between 2000 and 2003. Only resolution of the first alleged dispute is reflected in the 2003 stipulated judgment. The parties executed a factual stipulation the date of separation was July 27, 1999. The other two arguments were raised several years after the judgment, when Hassan filed an OSC in 2008 to stay enforcement of arrears and Nahid filed an OSC to determine arrears. There is nothing in the stipulated judgment suggesting community funds were unevenly divided to account for owed arrears. To the contrary, the judgment states Hassan and Nahid were to receive “an equal division of community property.” Similarly, there are no stipulated facts indicating the parties reached a compromise regarding payments made between 2000 and 2003. A generally worded wavier of all support does not reflect anything was exchanged for the release.
Our record shows that prior to executing the 2003 stipulated judgment the parties litigated support and arrears multiple times before the trial court. Several contempt orders were entered against Hassan for failing to pay support. Thus, unlike the father who moved to Japan in the Sabine & Toshio case, when Hassan fell behind on his payments he had ample opportunity to challenge Nahid’s calculation of arrears. The trial court’s orders finding Hassan in contempt contain specific factual finding regarding what payments were made or missed. There are no similar factual statements made by the parties in the 2003 stipulation regarding Hassan’s payments or a transfer of assets to satisfy owed child support. Similarly, there is simply no evidence indicating Hassan, before executing the 2003 stipulated judgment, believed the support order was modified or superseded or was invalid or void for any reason (cf. Sabine & Toshio, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215). If there had been a dispute regarding the calculation of arrears owed by Hassan, or a dispute over the validity of the support order, and the dispute had been compromised by a complete waiver of all the money owed, there would be some mention of the settled amount being extinguished. Hassan fails to point to anything in the stipulated judgment indicating what the parties agreed would be exchanged to satisfy the disputed debt.
In addition, we found nothing in the record evidencing a support dispute pending between the parties before the court immediately prior to entry of the 2003 stipulated judgment. Our record shows there was no unresolved OSC or other request pending. Hassan adamantly disputes any suggestion he was even aware of the DCSS’s enforcement action. The judgment itself does not contain a single reference to any dispute or compromise with regard to arrears.
Based on our disposition and our limited record we will not address the current status of DCSS’s enforcement action or whether DCSS was an indispensible party to the proceedings or should be joined for any future proceedings concerning child support. (See § 4065, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a)(2)(i).) We note the 2003 stipulated judgment contained a downward modification of the child support obligation from $2,000 to $1,500 apparently without DCSS’s consent. We appreciate, “‘Failure to join an “indispensable” party is not “a jurisdictional defect” in the fundamental sense; even in the absence of an “indispensable” party, the court still has the power to render a decision as to the parties before it which will stand. It is for reasons of equity and convenience, and not because it is without power to proceed, that the court should not proceed with a case where it determines that an ‘indispensable’ party is absent and cannot be joined. [Citations.]” (Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc. v. Office of Administrative Hearings (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 700, 706.
In conclusion, we hold there is no evidence suggesting the general waiver and release of claims in the 2003 stipulated judgment was also an accord and satisfaction of a bona fide dispute regarding the calculation of child support arrears. The parties could not have waived child support arrears. It must be decided what amount, if any, is owed from the date of separation (July 1999).
III
We conclude the family court incorrectly held the 2003 stipulated judgment contained a compromised waiver of child support arrears. The court’s 2009 order is reversed. On remand, the family court shall consider (1) Nahid’s claim for child support accruing from July 1999 to the present, and (2) the status of DCSS’s support enforcement action. Appellant shall recover her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J., IKOLA, J.