Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. FL127695
Mihara, J.
Appellant Wylmina E. Loumena appeals from the trial court’s denial of her consolidated requests for need-based attorney’s fees. She claims that the trial court was obligated to grant her requests because there was a great disparity in the financial resources of the parties. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her requests.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In January 2008, the trial court issued a ruling entitled “ORDERS AFTER PROPERTY TRIAL.” Appellant had been represented by counsel at the property trial. The court’s orders, among other things, required appellant to pay $12,382.64 in reimbursement to respondent. The order stated: “In accordance with the parties’ stipulation, their respective claims for attorney fees and costs payable as sanctions under Family Code Section 271 shall be submitted on the pleadings.” The order provided a briefing schedule for those claims.
In May 2008, appellant filed two nearly identical requests for need-based attorney’s fees under Family Code section 2030. She asserted that she required financial resources in order to litigate the issue of visitation with her children. Appellant claimed that she currently had no income since she was a full time student, and she maintained that respondent had an income “well over six figures.” However, the record reflects that respondent’s income for child support purposes had been determined by the court in November 2007 to be $4,250 per month ($51,000 per year), and both appellant and respondent were subject to “Employment Efforts” orders.
Before appellant’s requests for fees were heard, the court issued its order on the parties’ requests for sanctions and ordered appellant to pay to respondent over $100,000 in attorney’s fees and costs as sanctions under Family Code section 271.
The appellant’s appendix prepared by appellant does not include any documentation of this order, but appellant admits in her reply brief that this order was issued.
At the June 17, 2008 hearing on appellant’s fee requests under Family Code section 2030, the court denied her requests. “[I]t appears to me that much of what [appellant] brought is almost bringing litigation for litigation sake instead of focusing in on what’s best for your children.” “I know your economic circumstances, but you can’t just litigate for litigation sake.” The court issued a written order denying appellant’s fee requests “[f]or the reasons articulated in open court.” On July 10, 2008, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the court’s June 17, 2008 order.
II. Analysis
“[T]he court shall ensure [in family law proceedings] that each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a governmental entity, to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (Fam. Code, § 2030, subd. (a)(1); see also Fam. Code, § 3121, subds. (a), (b).) The court’s determination must be based on “the respective incomes and needs of the parties, and... any factors affecting the parties’ respective abilities to pay.” (Fam. Code, § 2030, subd. (a)(2).)
“In determining what is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances, the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party’s case adequately.... Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.” (Fam. Code, § 2032, subd. (b).)
A trial court exercises discretion in ruling on a request for need-based attorney’s fees and costs in a family law proceeding, and we review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 860, 866.)
The trial court considered the appropriate factors in ruling on appellant’s requests. After considering the parties’ relative economic circumstances, the court found that the litigation that appellant was pursuing against respondent was unreasonable and unnecessary. Consequently, it exercised its discretion to deny her an award of attorney’s fees and costs. We can find no abuse of discretion in this ruling. While appellant may have fewer financial resources than respondent, the trial court could have concluded that her continuous pursuit of frivolous litigation against respondent established that she did not have a reasonable need for an award of fees and costs.
III. Disposition
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J., Duffy, J.