Opinion
A112978
4-24-2007
In re the Marriage of STEPHEN LOCKHART and NINA RINGGOLD. NINA RINGGOLD, Appellant, v. STEPHEN LOCKHART, Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a pretrial order issued in a marital dissolution case. Respondent Stephen Lockhart has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal contending that appellant Nina Ringgold has purported to appeal from a nonappealable order. We agree that this latest appeal must be dismissed as it clearly arises from a nonfinal, interlocutory order.
II.
DISCUSSION
Lockharts motion to dismiss this appeal comes on the heels of this courts recent nonpublished opinion filed on March 20, 2007. (Ringgold v. Lockhart (A112384, A112635; hereafter Ringgold I). We concluded in Ringgold I that most of Ringgolds arguments were nonreviewable because under the one final judgment rule, the challenged orders were nonappealable interlocutory orders.
To reiterate, the one final judgment rule in appellate law generally requires that a judgment be final, and not interlocutory, before an appeal may be considered by an appellate court. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 58, pp. 113-114.) The final judgment rule is based on the theory that "piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 113.) A judgment is final when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 304.) A judgment is not final if further action is required on the matters decided by that judgment. (Steen v. Fremont Cemetery Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1228.)
Any doubt as to the appealability of the order challenged in the instant appeal should have been removed by our discussion of these principles in Ringgold I. In this appeal, Ringgold, appearing in propria persona, purports to appeal "from the orders rendered and/or dated on or about January 6, 2006." The record in this matter contains a January 6, 2006 order entitled "Order After Hearing of December 21, 2005." The trial courts decision indicates two findings: 1) that Lockhart "has fully complied with the requirements of the courts Pre-Trial Order No. 1," and 2) that Lockhart has "met his disclosure obligations," thus, the court excused him from using the Judicial Council forms for a final declaration of disclosure.
The authorities cited above, with which Ringgold must be deemed familiar as a result of our prior opinion, show that the January 6, 2006 order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable. This order clearly contemplates further action in the trial court before a final judgment is prepared. Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed as from a nonappealable order.
III.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Ringgold is admonished that further attempts to appeal from nonappealable orders may result in the imposition of sanctions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(e); Schneider v. Friedman, Collard, Poswell & Virga (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1276, 1284.)
We concur:
Reardon, J.
Sepulveda, J. --------------- Notes: In so ruling, we decline Ringgolds request to treat this appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ as no exceptional circumstances exist in this case. As noted in Ringgold I, Ringgold may appeal the trial courts pretrial rulings regarding mandatory disclosure requirements once a final judgment has issued. We also deny Ringgolds request for judicial notice of various documents. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1089, fn. 4 [appellate court will not take judicial notice of irrelevant material].)