Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. RFLRS24757. Kathleen Bryan, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Haslam & Perri, Donald G. Haslam and Shannon R. Thomas for Appellant.
Law Offices of P. Timothy Pittullo and P. Timothy Pittullo for Respondent.
OPINION
King J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Eugenia Yu was married to respondent Kaming Li. In their divorce proceeding, they entered into a stipulated judgment that required Li to pay family support payments to Yu. Approximately two years later, Li sought to modify the judgment to reduce the support obligation. The trial court granted the request. Yu appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reject her arguments and affirm the court’s order.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Yu and Li were married for 12 years 6 months when Li filed for dissolution of their marriage in December 1999. Li is a 45-year-old plastic surgeon; Yu is a 52-year-old part-time nurse. They have one minor child, Erica, born in February 1997.
On September 28, 2006, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment. It provides that Li will pay Yu $12,500 per month for family support “until the death of either party, marriage of [Yu], further order of the court, or through April 5, 2016, whichever happens first.... This level of support is based upon [Li]’s gross monthly income of $109,000 and [Yu]’s gross monthly income of $4,016 and the fact that Erica lives one-half of the time with each parent. [Yu] may not seek modification of family support.”
In July 2008, Li filed an application for, and the court issued, an order to show cause (OSC) why the family support payments should not be terminated. Li based his request primarily on arguments that his income had decreased substantially and that Yu “could be fully self[-]supporting if she so desired.” Yu opposed the request. She asserted that Li continues to be able to pay the present level of family support and that Li has not presented any substantial change of circumstances.
Following a hearing on the OSC and the subsequent denial of Yu’s motion for new trial, the court issued an amended ruling on the OSC. The court determined that Li’s reduced income and Yu’s failure to secure full-time employment established a prima facie case of changed circumstances. The court then addressed the statutory factors for determining spousal support (Fam. Code, § 4320) as follows.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
“4320a(1): [Yu] is a registered nurse with a master’s degree in nursing. She has worked as a hospital nurse for many years and chooses to work only 24 hours per week, although she testified that she could work full time if she chose to do so. Although the parties dispute whether full time is 36 or 40 hours a week, this Court is inclined to find that she has the ability to work 36 hours per week at $51 per hour.
“4320a(2): Given the length of time since separation, this Court finds that issues of unemployment due to domestic duties are no longer relevant.
“4320b: While it may be assumed that [Yu] assisted [Li], probably financially and emotionally, in his career, this factor has not been given significant weight by the Court. First of all, it has been 10 years since separation. In addition, [Li] already had his medical degree at the time of marriage, although he did complete his residency during the marriage. [Yu] had the benefit of the fruits of his career by not having to work at all during the last three years of marriage, and working part-time since then because of substantial financial assistance by [Li]. Additionally, she has had the benefit of a former spouse who not only pays support, but also pays for most, if not all, of their daughter’s educational and extracurricular expenses.
“It is noteworthy that [Li]’s income significantly increased after 2004 (some 5 years after separation) because of his election to go into private practice. Attributing this factor to [Yu]’s support during the marriage is tenuous at best.
“[Yu] has a Master’s Degree, 20 years in the nursing field, and has had 10 years to retrain, reeducate, or otherwise advance her career to optimize her ability to support herself. She is not entitled to an unlimited annuity from a 12.5 year marriage.
“4320(c): [Li], even with a decrease in income, does have an ability to pay spousal support given his income, assets and lifestyle.
“4320(d): Although this Court agrees that some 10 years after separation, the standard of living during the marriage becomes less important, it is instructive to note that the average monthly income of Dr. Li during the entire marriage was $9,576 per month and $22,917 during the last three years. Based upon the Regain evaluation, it would not appear that [Yu] was working during the last three years of marriage. Assuming a 35% tax bracket, the family of three was living on roughly $15,000 per month.
“[Yu] now claims monthly expenses of $19,000 for she and her daughter on a half-time basis that would seem to be far in excess of the standard of living during the marriage, even taking into account inflation. It is noteworthy that she estimates $2,000 per month for clothing, $2,000 per month for entertainment, gifts and vacation, $2,000 per month for savings and $6,748 per month for miscellaneous debt, $5,000 of which is for estimated taxes to pay the taxes on her family support. Given this Court’s order of $5,264 in non taxable child support, her net loss as a result of this order is about $2,300 per month. Her $10,000 loan to Charles Schwab Bank should be nearly paid at this point, giving her an additional $1,000 per month. Increased hours (including 40 hours a week if she chooses) and paying a little less for clothing and entertainment will leave her in no financial distress.
“4320(e): [Li]’s assets are substantial, including real property valued at $1.4 million as of the time of the hearing, and a business whose value is unknown but generates considerable income. [Yu] received assets in the course of the dissolution, but has provided the Court with little information about bank accounts or real estate, although she has a home for which she pays a mortgage.
“4320(f): Although this is by definition a long-term marriage, it is a marriage of 12.5 years and has been nearly 10 years since separation.
“4320(g): The Court finds this section not particularly applicable inasmuch as the parties share the child on an equal basis and both parties are employed. To the extent that [Yu] wishes to work part-time to spend more time with her daughter, this would seem to be a preference rather than a need for a child who is 12 and one-half years of age.
“4320(h): [Li] is 45 years of age and in good health. [Yu] is 52 years of age and also in good health.
“4320(i): Not applicable.
“4320(j): See Xspouse calculation attached.
The referenced “Xspouse calculation” consists of three spreadsheets that appear to incorporate consideration of tax consequences in calculating child support and spousal support amounts.
“4320(k): Neither party appears to suffer from any hardship at this time, nor does the Court believe that either will suffer any particular hardship with the implementation of this order.
“4320(l): [Yu] has the ability to be self-supporting if she chose to work full-time. She has the skills, training and experience to work in a field that is in demand and pays her well. She has no plans at this time to further her education or training and should be considered stationary in her career.
“4320(m): Not applicable.
“4320(n): None.”
Based on these factors, the court made the following order: “After nearly 10 years since separation, and a marriage of only 12.5 years, this Court finds that it is appropriate to terminate the payment of support for [Yu] at this time. [Yu] has the skills and ability to support herself. Because of the fact that she is only working part-time, the Court is inclined to give her until January 31, 2010 to make whatever arrangements are necessary to put her financial affairs in order. The current family support order will continue until that date, at which time child support will commence as set forth below.” Child support payments were set at $5,264 per month.
Additional facts will be discussed below where pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Legal Principles
Generally, an agreement for spousal support is “subject to subsequent modification or termination by court order.” (§ 3591, subd. (a).) “Modification of spousal support, even if the prior amount is established by agreement, requires a material change of circumstances since the last order. [Citations.] Change of circumstances means a reduction or increase in the supporting spouse’s ability to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the supported spouse’s needs. [Citations.] It includes all factors affecting need and the ability to pay.” (In re Marriage of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978, 982.)
In evaluating a request to modify a support order, the trial court must consider the criteria set forth in section 4320. (In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240, 247; In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 396.) Section 4320 provides:
“In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances:
“(a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following:
“(1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
“(2) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.
“(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.
“(c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living.
“(d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage.
“(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party.
“(f) The duration of the marriage.
“(g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the party.
“(h) The age and health of the parties.
“(i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence....
“(j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
“(k) The balance of the hardships to each party.
“(l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time....
“(m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4325.
“(n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable.”
We review an order modifying spousal support “‘for abuse of discretion. In exercising its discretion the trial court must follow established legal principles and base its findings on substantial evidence. If the trial court conforms to these requirements its order will be upheld whether or not the appellate court agrees with it or would make the same order if it were a trial court.’” (In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1235 (Shaughnessy).)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Material Change of Circumstances
The trial court determined that Li had established a change of circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of support based upon a reduction of Li’s income and Yu’s failure to obtain full-time work. Yu contends the evidence was insufficient to support this conclusion. We disagree.
According to the 2006 stipulated judgment, the amount paid to Yu for family support was based on Li’s income of $109,000 per month. In support of his modification request, Yu submitted evidence that his income had been reduced to $71,624 per month in September 2008 and to $29,065 per month in January 2009. He also testified that his medical practice had seen a drop in patient volume and a corresponding drop in revenue. He attributed these reductions to “the economic downturn” and to an increase in expenses following the dissolution of his medical partnership in 2008. In its written ruling, the court did not comment on Li’s evidence. Instead, it stated: “Under [Yu]’s best-case scenario, she argues that [Li]’s available cash flow to pay support at present is between $90,000 and $100,000 per month.” It thus appears that the court impliedly found that, even if Yu’s calculations are accepted, Li’s income had decreased by $9,000 to $19,000 per month. Yu does not challenge this finding on appeal.
In determining the amount of child support payment, the court stated that it “used the figure of $58,979 as [Li]’s net income per month.” Li uses this figure to argue that the court found that his income is now “slightly more than half of his income at the time of the Stipulated Judgment several years prior.” The court’s figure, however, is of Li’s “net income.” The $109,000 figure upon which the 2006 stipulated judgment was based was Li’s “gross monthly income.” Comparing his former gross income with the court’s finding of his net income is an apples and oranges comparison.
In addition, the court found that Yu’s failure to secure full-time employment “may constitute a change of circumstances.” That is, even if there was no change in Yu’s employment situation since the 2006 stipulated judgment, the failure to change—i.e., the failure to obtain full-time employment when she was capable of doing so—can itself be a change of circumstances for purposes of modifying spousal support. There is support for this logic. The Legislature has expressly declared it a “goal” in determining spousal support “that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time.” (§ 4320, subd. (l).) By enacting this policy, our state Supreme Court explained: “The law has thus progressed from a rule that entitled some women to lifelong alimony as a condition of the marital contract of support to one that entitles either spouse to postdissolution support for only so long as necessary to become self-supporting.” (In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman (2000) 24 Cal.4th 39, 53.) Thus, “[i]n the absence of circumstances demonstrating that a spouse is incapable of becoming self-supporting, [the supported spouse] cannot reasonably expect to receive spousal support indefinitely. Rather, the spouse should expect to be required to become self-supporting within a reasonable period of time.” (Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249.)
As the Shaughnessy court further explained: “[A] material change of circumstances warranting a modification of spousal support may stem from unrealized expectations embodied in the previous order. [Citation.] Specifically, changed expectations pertaining to the ability of a supported spouse to become self-supporting may constitute a change of circumstances warranting a modification of spousal support. [Citation.] Thus, if a court’s initial spousal support award contemplates that a supported spouse will take some action to decrease the need for spousal support following the issuance of the order and the supported spouse fails to take that action, the court may modify the award on the ground of changed circumstances.” (Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.)
The expectation that the supported spouse will become self-supporting within a reasonable time is not necessarily embodied or implied in every order for spousal support. In In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705 (Gavron), the trial court granted the former husband’s request to terminate spousal support, stating that the former wife’s “‘failure to become employable or to seek training after so many years shift[s] the burden to her to demonstrate her continued need for support in light of her continued inaction in this regard.’” (Id. at pp. 709-710.) The Court of Appeal recognized that “‘the Legislature intended that all supported spouses who were able to do so should seek employment.... [and] that courts would issue orders encouraging these spouses to seek employment and to work toward becoming self-supporting.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 711.) Nevertheless, the Gavron court reversed the trial court’s ruling because the former wife had not been informed of the expectation that she become self-sufficient. The court explained: “Inherent in the concept that the supported spouse’s failure to at least make good-faith efforts to become self-sufficient can constitute a change in circumstances which could warrant a modification in spousal support is the premise that the supported spouse be made aware of the obligation to become self-supporting.” (Id. at p. 712.) This awareness, the court stated, could be provided by “an explicit statement by the court at the time of its original support order regarding employment expectations of the supported spouse....” (Ibid.; see § 4330, subd. (b).) Such a statement has become known as a “Gavron warning.” (See In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 55.)
On appeal, the parties initially disputed whether Yu had been given a Gavron warning in connection with the 2006 stipulated judgment. The basis for the dispute appears to be that the page of the judgment that included the Gavron warning was omitted from the copy of the judgment used at trial. In light of this omission, the trial court noted: “Although [Li] argued that [Yu] had been given a Gavron warning in 2000 and/or 2006, no evidence was submitted on that issue.” Nevertheless, the court found that a vocational examination concerning Yu completed in September 2005 provided Yu with notice of the expectation that she become self-supporting.
We need not decide whether the vocational examination was sufficient to satisfy the Gavron notice requirement because the missing page of the judgment with the Gavron warning has been located, supplied to this court by amendment to the joint appendix, and stipulated to by the parties. The Gavron warning consists of preprinted type on Judicial Council form FL-180. It states: “NOTICE: It is the goal of this state that each party will make reasonable good faith efforts to become self-supporting as provided for in Family Code section 4320. The failure to make reasonable efforts may be one of the factors considered by the court as a basis for modifying or terminating spousal or partner support.”
Following the amendment to the joint appendix with the missing page of the judgment, Yu acknowledged the existence of the Gavron warning in her reply brief to this court. However, she argues that it is ineffective because “it was not established at trial whether [she] ever saw or received a copy of page two of Judicial Counsel form FL-180....” A similar argument was made and rejected in In re Marriage of Mosley (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1375. The court in that case stated: Former wife “tries to downplay the significance of [the Gavron warning], claiming it was merely informational and not a warning. She further says that it was just a box checked on a Judicial Council form judgment and that she first became aware of it when it was pointed out in [former husband’s] order to show cause. She would seem to argue that a party need not be concerned about the portions of a judgment he or she has not taken the time to read. Surely we cannot countenance that argument.” (Id. at p. 1388.) We agree, and therefore reject Yu’s argument.
Yu also argues that the Gavron warning in the judgment does not apply because it refers to modifying or terminating “spousal or partner support.” Yu argues that because the stipulated judgment provides for “family support, ” not “spousal support, ” the Gavron warning should not affect her right to family support. We reject this argument. The phrase, “family support, ” is used in marriage dissolution proceedings to designate “an unallocated total sum for support of the spouse and any children....” (§ 4066.) The amount designated as “family support” thus includes a spousal support component. We thus construe the Gavron warning in the judgment to encompass the spousal support component of the provision for family support.
According to Li, the parties stipulated to designating an unallocated sum for both child support and spousal support as “family support” to obtain beneficial tax consequences. (See Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2010) ¶ 10:136, p. 10-34.2; Kean v. C.I.R. (3d Cir. 2005) 407 F.3d 186, 192-193.)
Because the judgment included a Gavron warning, Yu’s failure to make reasonable efforts to become self-supporting can constitute changed conditions supporting a modification of spousal support. (Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.)
Here, the court found that Yu is a registered nurse with a master’s degree in nursing who “chooses to work only 24 hours per week, although... she could work full time if she chose to do so.” The court further found that Yu “has the ability to be self-supporting if she chose to work full time. She has the skills, training and experience to work in a field that is in demand and pays her well.” The findings are amply supported by the record. Yu testified that she is a registered nurse at UCLA Medical Center; she has a master’s degree in nursing; she works 24 hours (two 12-hour days) per week; the only reason she does not work full time is to care for her 12-year-old daughter, Erica; she has made no effort to find work during the time Erica is in school; she is paid approximately $51 per hour; and has not looked for a job closer to home since 2001. A vocational evaluation of Yu indicated that there is a strong demand for nurses and “that most hospitals are constantly seeking qualified Registered Nurses.” The report concluded that Yu possesses “the requisite skills to obtain full[-]time employment.”
Because the Gavron warning embodied in the judgment expresses an expectation that Yu will make reasonable efforts to become self-supporting, her failure to make such efforts, combined with the reduction in Li’s income, satisfies the change in circumstances requirement for the modification of the family support order.
C. Consideration of the Parties’ Intent
Yu argues the court failed to consider the parties’ intent and reasonable expectations surrounding the stipulated judgment. According to Yu, her expectation was that she would continue to receive family support until April 5, 2016. She cites to her own declaration for this statement. Yu simply ignores the Gavron warning in the judgment, which makes clear that the parties are to “make reasonable good faith efforts to become self-supporting” and that the failure to do so may be “considered by the court as a basis for modifying or terminating spousal or partner support.” As explained above, the evidence is sufficient to establish that Yu failed to make the requisite good faith effort. Such failure was clearly considered by the court.
Yu relies heavily on In re Marriage of Dietz, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 387. In that case, the trial court reduced the former husband’s monthly spousal support obligation on the ground that the former wife had reached an age that allowed her penalty-free access to retirement accounts and the value of her securities had appreciated. (Id. at p. 390.) In reversing the trial court’s order, the Court of Appeal emphasized the need to give effect to the intent and reasonable expectations of the parties as expressed in their stipulated judgment. (Id. at pp. 398-399.) That judgment expressly acknowledged the parties’ expectations that the value of the retirement accounts might increase and contemplated that they would reach the age at which they could access the retirement accounts without a penalty. (Id. at p. 399.) Because these events were contemplated by the parties, the court reasoned, the trial court erred in concluding that a material change of circumstances had occurred. (Id. at p. 400.)
To the extent that Dietz is offered by Yu for the proposition that the trial court must give effect to the intent and reasonable expectations of the parties as expressed in the agreement, it supports our conclusion. The intent and expectations of the parties, as expressed in the Gavron warning, is that the parties are to make reasonable good faith efforts to become self-supporting. The trial court did consider this expectation (albeit without the evidence of the Gavron warning itself). We also note that the stipulated judgment specifically precludes Yu from seeking modification of family support, but does not prohibit Li from doing so. This suggests that the parties contemplated the possibility that Li’s support obligation could be reduced upon a change of circumstances. Beyond this, Dietz is inapposite. It was concerned with the increased value of securities and the ability to access retirement accounts and the parties’ expectations regarding the same. It did not involve a Gavron warning or any expectation that the supported spouse become self-supporting through employment.
D. Imputation of Full-time Work for Yu
Yu next contends the court abused its discretion by imputing a full-time work schedule to her. She is apparently challenging the court’s discussion of her earning capacity under section 4320, subdivision (a). On this issue, the court stated: “[Yu] is a registered nurse with a master’s degree in nursing. She has worked as a hospital nurse for many years and chooses to work only 24 hours per week, although she testified that she could work full time if she chose to do so. Although the parties dispute whether full time is 36 or 40 hours a week, this Court is inclined to find that she has the ability to work 36 hours per week at $51 per hour.”
Under section 4320, subdivision (a), the court must consider: “(a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following: [¶] (1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment. [¶] (2) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.”
Yu argues that although she had the ability to work full time (36 hours per week), there was no evidence that she had the opportunity to work full time. (See In re Marriage of Bardzik (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1294 [party seeking to have income imputed to other party has burden of showing the other party has the ability and opportunity to earn the imputed income].) We disagree. The court expressly considered the vocational examination concerning Yu. This report states: “Labor market research showed that there were several full[-]time positions which Ms. Yu qualified for in her immediate geographical area, outside of her current part[-]time position at UCLA.... [Yu] indicated that full[-]time nursing positions are usually open at UCLA.” The evaluator reported that she had spoken to nurse recruiters, who “explained that most hospitals are constantly seeking qualified Registered Nurses” and “[m]any employers expressed that they are constantly looking for qualified nurses.” Although this evaluation was completed in 2005, Yu testified at the hearing that she “could” work full time, and the “only reason” she does not work full time is because she cares for their daughter, Erica. This implies that she has both the ability and opportunity to work full time, but has chosen not to do so for the sole reason that she has elected to care for Erica instead. Such evidence is sufficient to support the court’s findings regarding Yu’s earning capacity.
E. Application of the Marital Standard of Living
Under section 4320, one factor for the court’s consideration is the “needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage.” (§ 4320, subd. (d).) In considering this factor, the Legislature intended the court to consider “the general station in life enjoyed by the parties during their marriage.” (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 475.) It is not intended “to be a precise mathematical calculation, but rather a general reference point for the trial court in deciding this issue.” (Ibid.) Yu contends the court erroneously “applied a mathematical formula to establish standard of living.”
Regarding the standard of living factor, the court stated: “Although this Court agrees that some 10 years after separation, the standard of living during the marriage becomes less important, it is instructive to note that the average monthly income of Dr. Li during the entire marriage was $9,576 per month and $22,917 during the last three years. Based upon the [vocational] evaluation, it would not appear that [Yu] was working during the last three years of marriage. Assuming a 35% tax bracket, the family of three was living on roughly $15,000 per month. [¶] [Yu] now claims monthly expenses of $19,000 for she and her daughter on a half-time basis that would seem to be far in excess of the standard of living during the marriage, even taking into account inflation. It is noteworthy that she estimates $2,000 per month for clothing, $2,000 per month for entertainment, gifts and vacation, $2,000 per month for savings and $6,748 per month for miscellaneous debt, $5,000 of which is for estimated taxes to pay the taxes on her family support. Given this Court’s order of $5,264 in non taxable child support, her net loss as a result of this order is about $2,300 per month. Her $10,000 loan to Charles Schwab Bank should be nearly paid at this point, giving her an additional $1,000 per month. Increased hours (including 40 hours a week if she chooses) and paying a little less for clothing and entertainment will leave her in no financial distress.”
It seems clear that the point of this discussion is that Yu is now spending thousands of dollars more per month to support herself and her daughter (of whom she has 50 percent custody) than both parties were spending to support all three of them just a few years earlier. Although the court used mathematics to arrive at its rough calculations to make this point, it does not appear to us that the court was applying an impermissible “rigid formula” or a “dollar for dollar” analysis, as Yu asserts. Nothing in the cases Yu cites (In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 469; In re Marriage of Watt (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 340) suggests the court may not consider the parties’ income and expenses in determining the marital standard of living (see, e.g., In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 307, fn. 23).
Moreover, by introducing its discussion on this point with the comment, “that some 10 years after separation, the standard of living during the marriage becomes less important, ” the court indicated that the determination of the marital standard of living—one among the many section 4320 factors—did not play a significant role in the court’s determination. “In balancing the applicable statutory factors, the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord to each.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 304.) The primary rationales for the court’s order were Li’s reduced income and Yu’s failure to make any effort to obtain full-time employment. Thus, even if the court’s analysis regarding the marital standard of living factor placed undue emphasis on the comparison between the parties’ expenses during marriage and Yu’s postdissolution lifestyle, Yu has failed to establish prejudice.
Yu also argues the court failed to contemplate that the standard of living had not reached its full potential in light of the community’s contribution to Li’s career. She is referring to subdivision (b) of section 4320, which requires consideration of: “The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.” Regarding this factor, the court stated: “While it may be assumed that [Yu] assisted [Li], probably financially and emotionally, in his career, this factor has not been given significant weight by the Court. First of all, it has been 10 years since separation. In addition, [Li] already had his medical degree at the time of marriage, although he did complete his residency during the marriage. [Yu] had the benefit of the fruits of his career by not having to work at all during the last three years of marriage, and working part-time since then because of substantial financial assistance by [Li]. Additionally, she has had the benefit of a former spouse who not only pays support, but also pays for most, if not all, of their daughter’s educational and extracurricular expenses. [¶] It is noteworthy that [Li]’s income significantly increased after 2004 (some 5 years after separation) because of his election to go into private practice. Attributing this factor to [Yu]’s support during the marriage is tenuous at best.” Although Yu may disagree with the court’s conclusions, it is apparent from the court’s discussion of this factor that it gave the matter sufficient consideration.
F. Court’s Finding Regarding Hardship
The court is required to consider the “balance of the hardships to each party.” (§ 4320, subd. (k).) Regarding this point, the court found: “Neither party appears to suffer from any hardship at this time, nor does the Court believe that either will suffer any particular hardship with the implementation of this order.” Yu contends this is error because she will be unable to meet her monthly expenses on the reduced support.
Yu’s argument assumes that she will have roughly $19,000 per month of living expenses. However, as the court pointed out, that number includes $5,000 for taxes on her family support payments, which she will no longer have to pay. (The $5,264 in new child support payments are nontaxable.) The stated expenses also apparently include $1,000 for loan repayment, which the court stated “should be nearly paid at this point.” Her expenses should now be approximately $13,000 per month. If Yu receives the income imputed to her ($7,956 per month based upon 36 hours of work per week) and $5,264 in child support payments, the total ($13,220) will exceed her expenses, even without reducing her estimated $2,000 per month for clothing and $2,000 per month for entertainment, gifts, and vacation expenses. If, as the court suggested, Yu pays “a little less for clothing and entertainment, ” she will suffer “no financial distress.” We therefore reject Yu’s argument.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: Richli Acting P.J., Codrington J.