Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo, Super. Ct. No. FL 03-0421. E. Jeffrey Burke, Judge
Michael T. LeSage, in pro per and Dale Gustin; Eschwig & Gustin, for Appellant.
John F. Hodges, Susan E. Boatman; Clarkson & Boatman, for Respondent.
YEGAN, J.
Michael T. LeSage appeals from post-trial orders awarding his ex-wife Joanne LeSage $45,000 sanctions (Fam. Code, § 271), $30,000 appellate attorney fees (Fam. Code, § 2030), and $5,070 supplemental attorney fee sanctions (Fam Code, § 271). We affirm.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Family Code. We refer to the parties by their first names to ease the reader's task.
Procedural History
Michael, an attorney for more than 40 years, represented himself in a consolidated marital dissolution and partition action in what the trial court described as "a very simple dissolution action" with no support or custody issues. The only dissolution issues requiring litigation were the community division of the family residence, a Bass Lake cabin, a Paso Robles office building, and some retirement accounts.
The family residence was on a 65 acre parcel near Paso Robles (the Vineyard property). Joanne's parents owned an undivided half interest in the property and transferred their interest to a family trust in which Joanne was a beneficiary. Joanne joined the trust and trust beneficiaries in the dissolution action to determine the respective ownership interests.
Michael responded with a civil complaint alleging that Joanne's parents (now deceased) agreed to sell their interest in the Vineyard property to Michael in 1996. The complaint was based on an unsigned, undated, and unrecorded copy of a writing that Michael purportedly found in his office.
After the trial court found that the complaint was barred by the statute of frauds, the statute of limitations and subject to a laches bar, Michael stipulated to a partition sale of the Vineyard property. The only issues to be decided were credits for improvements and offsets for occupancy and use of the property.
Following a lengthy trial, the trial court found the Vineyard property improvements were in disrepair and did not enhance the property's market value. A referee listed the property for $1.5 million and sold it to the highest bidder for $1.975 million.
Michael demanded that the Vineyard property be sold to him at a fraction of its value, filing a flurry of motions that expanded the superior court file to eight volumes.
The trial court found the motions were "designed to obstruct the proceedings" and to secure "an unfair advantage over his former spouse and his co-tenants in common." Michael "and his co-counsel needlessly delayed and obstructed the distribution of these three discrete, easy-to-sell properties with numerous frivolous objections and motions. . . . He filed meritless motions for a new trial arguing, for example, that he was entitled to a retrial because he was surprised by the receipt of photographs of the house . . . and surprised by the testimony of experts he neglected to depose. He objected to the form and substance of [the] judgments and orders simply to reiterate arguments rejected many times before. After being disappointed by the statements of decision, Mr. Le Sage and his co-counsel thrice attempted to remove the undersigned as judge based upon the argument that the adverse decision evidenced bias."
Sanctions
Section 271 advances the policy of the law to promote settlement and to encourage cooperation in order to reduce the cost of litigation. (In re Marriage of Petropoulos (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 161, 177.) Family law litigants who flout that policy may be ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs as sanctions. ( Ibid.) An award for sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion and reversals are rare. (Id., at p. 178; In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 630; Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1448-1449.)
The evidence supports the imposition of sanctions for frivolous litigation. The trial court, in a 10-page statement of decision, found that Michael "delayed and obstructed the proceedings before, during and after the trials" and refused to comply with the trial court's orders. Joanne incurred $24,088 attorney fees in the partition action, $33,556 attorney fees in the dissolution action, $6,500 attorney fees responding to post-trial motions, and paid a mediator $1,235 which was "wasted" money after Michael reneged on the mediation agreement.
Joanne requested $64,377 attorney's fees and was awarded $45,000, an amount that is reasonable and supported by the record. Michael's assertion that the motion for fees was not timely filed is without merit.
Fees on Appeal
Family Code section 2030, subdivision (c) provides that the trial "court shall augment or modify the original award for attorney's fees as may be reasonably necessary for the prosecution or defense of the proceeding, or any proceeding related thereto, including after any appeal has been concluded." (Emphasis added.) Based on the respective incomes and needs of the parties, a trial court may award appellate attorney fees so each party has access to legal representation. (In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-867.) Section 2030 fees and costs may also be awarded in a related civil action as was done here. (See e.g., Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 964; In re Marriage of Green (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 584, 590-591.)
Michael has filed three writ petitions and two appeals, requiring Joanne to incur more fees and costs defending the judgment. Joanne is a retired nurse, lives on a fixed income, and has moved out of state. Lacking disposable income, she was forced to use her retirement savings to pay fees and costs. Joanne's attorney estimated the fees and costs on appeal would be $30,000. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Joanne $30,000 fees to respond to Michael's appeals and writ petitions. (§ 2030.)
Supplemental Order for $5,070 Fees
The trial court invited Joanne to file a motion for sanctions (§ 271) after denying Michael's post-trial motions. It found that the motions were groundless and repeated earlier arguments. The trial court noted that "this must be the fifth or sixth attempt by Mr. Le Sage to disqualify this court from proceedings even though that has been rejected by the court two or three times, by the court of appeal once, and review was denied by the California Supreme Court. . . . [¶] . . . [A]nd I think it is simply additional evidence of Mr. Le Sage and his attorney's effort to simply obstruct and delay justice in these proceedings. . . ."
Substantial evidence supported the award for $5,070 supplemental attorney fees. The trial court found that Michael's "motions, petitions, and other pleadings were intended to delay and obstruct the delivery of a just outcome to all the parties. Mr. Le Sage must do so on his own dime by reimbursing Ms. Le Sage for some of the fees and costs he created by obstructive, uncooperative, and selfish conduct."
Considering that Michael is an attorney with 40 years experience, these findings are remarkable. " '[S]omewhere along the line, litigation must cease.' [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Mason (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1028.)
The orders awarding attorney fees and sanctions are affirmed. Joanne is awarded fees and costs on appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial court. (§ 2030.)
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., COFFEE, J.