Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michele D. Levine and Jeffrey Prevost, Judges. Super.Ct.No. RID200003
Law Office of Julian Fox and Julian Fox for Appellant.
No appearance by Respondent.
OPINION
King, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Huseyin Aydemir appeals a bifurcated judgment determining his and respondent Heidi Lee’s date of marital separation and ordering Aydemir to pay spousal support and attorney fees. Aydemir claims the superior court was without jurisdiction to award spousal support or attorney fees, because it erroneously refused to recognize the parties’ 2002 Turkish divorce decree as ending their 1996 California marriage and resolving their marital obligations arising from their California marriage. Specifically, Aydemir maintains that, because both he and Lee consented to the jurisdiction of the Turkish court, the superior court was required to recognize the Turkish divorce decree pursuant to principles of international comity.
We affirm. We conclude that, even if the superior court was required to recognize the Turkish divorce decree pursuant to principles of international comity, that decree neither ended the parties’ California marriage nor resolved any of their obligations arising from their California marriage. Instead, the Turkish divorce decree, by its express terms, merely ended the parties’ redundant 1998 Turkish marriage, and resolved any additional obligations the parties had as a result of their 1998 Turkish marriage.
Lee has not filed a respondent’s brief and is not represented by counsel on this appeal. On May 7, 2008, we granted a request by Lee’s attorney, Kirby F. Combs, to be relieved as Lee’s counsel of record. According to Attorney Combs, Lee went to Turkey several months earlier without leaving Attorney Combs with any means to contact her. During his last communication with Lee in February 2008, Lee stated she did not have the money to pay for an appellate lawyer or for transcripts of the superior court record.
II. BACKGROUND
Aydemir and Lee were married in California on November 24, 1996. They married again in Turkey in 1998 and were divorced in Turkey in 2002. They appeared at a hearing in the Turkish court, declared their request for a divorce, and declared they did not have any claims against each other “from then on.” In a written divorce decree which was translated from Turkish to English, the Turkish court dissolved the parties’ 1998 Turkish marriage and further ordered that “[t]here is no need for a decision on material and spiritual belongings since there is an agreement between the parties.” The decree also stated that Aydemir paid the filing fee for the divorce and that neither party requested attorney fees. Aydemir was remarried to another woman in Turkey in September 2003.
In March 2003, Lee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Riverside County Superior Court, seeking dissolution of the parties’ California marriage, spousal support, and attorney fees. Aydemir filed a motion to dismiss Lee’s petition based on the parties’ Turkish divorce, pursuant to the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act. (Fam. Code, § 2090 et seq.) In December 2003, the superior court denied the motion on the ground both parties were domiciled in California at the time of their Turkish divorce. (§§ 2091, 2092.)
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
The court further found that, although both parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Turkish court, the Turkish divorce dissolved only the parties’ 1998 Turkish marriage, not their 1996 California marriage. The court reasoned, “it is axiomatic that there can be only one marriage. Neither party disputes that they were validly married in California in 1996. Thus . . . the parties, at the time of their Turkish divorce, intended at most to resolve whatever additional obligations arose [between them] as a result of their attempted marriage in Turkey.” The court also concluded that the Turkish divorce did not resolve the parties’ “marital obligations to each other arising out of their actual marriage in California.”
The court expressly declined to find that the parties had a “divisible divorce,” but stated that “[i]f in fact the parties entered into a valid, enforceable, and partially-or fully-executed agreement in consideration of their Turkish divorce, it may be that such agreements should be enforced to the extent that they are consistent with California law and public policy.”
In addition, the court expressly ruled that “principles of comity” did not require the court to recognize the parties’ Turkish divorce because (1) neither party was domiciled in Turkey at the time of their Turkish divorce; (2) it did not appear that the Turkish divorce dissolved the “actual marriage” of the parties; and (3) the Turkish divorce did not resolve the “rights, duties, or liabilities which attach to all California marriages.”
Over two years later, a bifurcated court trial was held on the issues of the parties’ date of separation, spousal support, and attorney fee obligations. The trial was held over several sessions, beginning on September 13, 2005. The matter was finally submitted to the court for a decision on March 23, 2007. In a ruling dated May 31, 2007, the court found that the parties’ date of separation was February 11, 2003, and ordered Aydemir to pay Lee spousal support and attorney fees.
In determining the date of separation, the court reasoned that the parties’ actions in seeking and obtaining their 2002 Turkish divorce did not constitute “sufficient evidence of the parties’ subjective intent to end their California marriage.” Instead, the court found the parties’ actions during the several months following their 2002 Turkish divorce, “at best demonstrate[d] a certain ambivalence and uncertainty regarding the continuation of their [California] marriage,” and “ongoing economic and emotional ties.”
The evidence presented during the trial supports the court’s conclusions regarding the effect of the parties’ Turkish divorce on their date of separation. Lee testified she was surprised by Aydemir’s request for the Turkish divorce, but agreed to it because she believed it would dissolve the parties’ Turkish marriage. In addition, the Turkish divorce decree expressly indicated that it dissolved the parties’ 1998 Turkish marriage; but does not mention the parties’ 1996 California marriage. The decree also stated it did not divide the parties’ “material or spiritual belongings” because the parties had entered into an agreement concerning these matters. Neither party presented any evidence of such an agreement, either in connection with Aydemir’s 2003 motion to dismiss Lee’s petition for dissolution, or during the trial on the date of separation, spousal support, and attorney fee issues.
Lee also testified that, following the sale of their Corona house in August 2002, she and Aydemir lived together in an apartment in Riverside while they searched for another home to purchase. They moved out of that apartment in February 2003. During the same “post Turkish decree time period,” they shared a common bank account, and Aydemir did not seek to have his “work checks” deposited into a different account until February or March 2003. Through February 2003, Aydemir continued to support Lee’s adult children from another relationship.
As noted, Aydemir appeals the judgment on the birfurcated issues. It is unclear from the present record whether the superior court has ever dissolved the parties’ 1996 California marriage.
III. DISCUSSION
Aydemir claims that because it was undisputed that both he and Lee consented to the jurisdiction of the Turkish court, the superior court was required to recognize the Turkish divorce decree, pursuant to the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act (§ 2090 et seq.) and principles of international comity. He further argues that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to award any relief pursuant to Lee’s petition for dissolution, including spousal support or attorney fees, because the Turkish divorce decree rendered these issues res judicata and was not subject to collateral attack in a California court. Thus, he argues, the judgment awarding Lee spousal support and attorney fees must be reversed.
We begin with section 2091, which provides: “A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce commenced.” As noted, the parties did not dispute that they were both domiciled in California in 2002 when their Turkish divorce proceeding commenced, and on this basis the superior court refused to recognize the parties’ Turkish divorce. Aydemir claims, however, that notwithstanding section 2091 and the parties’ California domicile, the superior court was required to recognize the parties’ Turkish divorce decree pursuant to principles of international comity.
Section 2093 provides: “The application of this chapter [which includes section 2091] is limited by the requirement of the Constitution of the United States that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.” Although the full faith and credit clause applies only to sister-state judgments, not foreign country judgments, a California court may, in its discretion, recognize and enforce a foreign country judgment based on principles of international comity. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 313-314.)
International comity, or voluntary recognition, is generally extended to a foreign country judgment, provided (1) the foreign court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action, and provided further (2) recognition of the foreign judgment will not violate California law or public policy. (Burt v. Burt (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 36, 43; Harlan v. Harlan (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 657, 660-661.) The same personal and subject matter jurisdiction requirements, though not local public policy considerations, apply to the recognition of sister-state court judgments pursuant to the full faith and credit clause. (Sherrer v. Sherrer (1948) 334 U.S. 343, 352-354 [68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed.2d 1429] (Sherrer); see also Heuer v. Heuer (1949) 33 Cal.2d 268, 270-271 & Solley v. Solley (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 522, 529.)
Here, however, it is unnecessary for this court to decide whether the superior court should have recognized the parties’ 2002 Turkish divorce decree based on principles of international comity. As the superior court observed, the Turkish decree, by its express terms, did not dissolve the parties’ 1996 California marriage; it only dissolved the parties’ 1998 Turkish marriage, if any, and any additional obligations the parties may have had as a result of that marriage. The Turkish decree expressly stated that the parties had been “married for four years,” apparently in reference to the parties’ 1998 Turkish marriage, and did not in any way refer to the parties’ 1996 California marriage. Nor did the Turkish decree purport to resolve any of the rights or obligations the parties had as a result of their 1996 California marriage, including their obligations to pay spousal support or attorney fees. Finally, there was no evidence that the parties’ agreement, which was briefly mentioned in the Turkish decree, had anything to do with the parties’ California marriage or resulting marital obligations. Thus, even if the court should have “formally” recognized the parties’ Turkish divorce decree, that decree had no effect on the superior court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Lee’s petition to dissolve the parties’ California marriage or the issues of spousal support and attorney fees that were adjudicated in the bifurcated trial.
Aydemir relies on Sherrer, supra, 334 U.S. at page 352, where the United States Supreme Court held that a Florida divorce decree could not be collaterally attacked in a Massachusetts court on the grounds the Florida court did not have jurisdiction over the parties, where the party attacking the Florida decree appeared in the Florida proceeding and had a full opportunity to contest the Florida court’s jurisdiction. Instead, the high court held that the Massachusetts court was required to recognize the Florida judgment under the full faith and credit clause. (Ibid.) By analogy, Aydemir argues that the superior court was required to recognize the Turkish divorce decree, because the parties consented to the Turkish court’s jurisdiction, the decree effectively dissolved the parties’ California marriage and resolved all rights and obligations arising from that marriage, and therefore the decree cannot be collaterally attacked in a California court.
Aydemir’s analysis misses the point that the Turkish divorce decree did not affect the parties’ California marriage or resulting rights and obligations. As discussed, the Turkish divorce decree neither dissolved the parties’ California marriage nor resolved any rights or obligations arising from that marriage. Sherrer, and the other cases upon which Aydemir relies, including Heuer v. Heuer, supra, 33 Cal.2d at pages 270 and 271, Solley v. Solley, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at page 529, and Green v. Green (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 37, 42 and 43, are distinguishable because each involved a sister-state judgment that did in fact dissolve the parties’ one and only domestic marriage and that either actually or effectively determined the parties’ rights and obligations arising from their one and only domestic marriage. That is simply not the case here, however.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
We concur: Hollenhorst, Acting P.J., Gaut, J.