Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD 278911. Michael P. Linfield, Judge.
Victory E. Kinnard, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Mazur & Mazur, Janice R. Mazur and William E. Mazur, Jr., for Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Defendant Victory E. Kinnard (Victory) appeals, in propria persona, from an order in his marital dissolution action from respondent Patricia Kinnard (Patricia) made on August 1, 2006, and memorialized in a written order issued on August 25, 2006, that he vacate the marital home so that it could be sold without his interference. He also, apparently, attempts to appeal from the judgment entered in December 1998 and from the court’s denials of his three later motions to set aside the judgment. We affirm.
For the sake of clarity, not out of disrespect, we will refer to the parties by their first names. (See In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240, 242, fn. 1.)
BACKGROUND
Victory purchased a home in Inglewood in August 1975, when he was single. In September 1979, Victory and Patricia were married. In 1981, the parties separated, and Patricia moved out of the home. In April 1998, Patricia filed for dissolution of the marriage. Victory claims that in a later amended petition for divorce filed in July 1998, “item #7g. was not checked for the Court to determine property rights”; he also claims that he never was served with the amended petition and had no knowledge of Patricia’s “designs” on his real property purchased before their marriage. He apparently failed to file a timely response, and a default judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered on December 11, 1998. The judgment classified the home as community property and ordered it sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. In February 1999, Victory filed a “Response” and a “request for dismissal,” followed by three separate motions to set aside the judgment, all of which the court denied. The court denied the first such motion in early 1999 and the latter two on January 25, 2006 and April 19, 2006, respectively.
The facts in this section are based primarily on the pleadings in Victory’s brief, because the record contains no support for most of the facts he alleges.
On August 1, 2006, the court heard Patricia’s motion to require Victory to vacate the home because he was interfering with its sale. Victory, representing himself, argued that because Patricia stayed in the home no more than a year and a half, she could not have any claim to it, and that Patricia was never really his wife but only the mother of his children to whom he gave a marriage license solely for the children’s protection. The court granted Patricia’s motion and ordered Victory to vacate the premises.
On August 23, 2006, Victory filed a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal is unclear as to the subject of the appeal. His opening brief, however, challenges the judgment, the orders denying his motion to set aside the judgment, and the order requiring him to vacate the house. Any challenges to the judgment and orders denying his motions to set aside the judgment are untimely. (See City of Los Angeles v. Glair (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 813, 818-819.) We therefore do not consider them. With regard to his challenge to the order requiring him to vacate the residence, he has not provided any citation to the record or authority to support his position, as he must. (See McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522-523; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) Accordingly, we affirm the order.
The transcript of the April 19, 2006 hearing is the earliest court record Victory provides. Patricia provided additional documents pursuant to a request for judicial notice, including the original one-page judgment of dissolution of marriage form from December 11, 1998, the trial court’s order after hearing filed on January 25, 2006, and Victory’s notice of appeal to this court. We have taken judicial notice of these documents. We cannot grant Victory’s request to take judicial notice of various loan approval documents, because these documents are not appropriate for mandatory or permissive judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code sections 450-452 and 459.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall have her costs on appeal.
We concur: VOGEL, Acting P. J. JACKSON, J.
(Judge of the L. A. S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)