Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Cour No. 99D003680t of Orange County, Mark S. Millard, Judge.
Thomas George Key; Michael R. Harlin for Appellant.
Buus, Kim, Kuo & Tran, William L. Buus and Alexander J. Chang; Ardent Law Group, Hubert H. Kuo, Alexander J. Chang and Stephen D. Johnson for Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.
This case has a sadly storied past. Ok Cha Kim (wife) and David Saingsoo Kim (husband) have been in litigation over their marital dissolution at least since 1993. Several lawsuits later, we arrive at the present day. In the proceedings underlying this appeal, wife filed a motion to remove a temporary judge who she alleged had not ruled on the reserved issues pending before him for more than six years. Before wife’s motion was heard, the temporary judge filed a judgment on reserved issues. The court subsequently granted wife’s motion to remove the temporary judge, and wife then filed a motion to set aside the judgment. The court denied wife’s motion to set aside the judgment. Wife appeals.
Wife raises innumerable reasons why the judgment should have been set aside. In sum, she feels the entire 16-year period the parties have been in litigation has been tainted by husband’s nondisclosures, and that more than six of those years were fouled by the temporary referee’s bias, prejudice, incompetence and inexcusable delay. She goes so far as to say that the proceedings have resulted in a sham and even a fraud. In advancing her position, wife has repeatedly mischaracterized the record or failed to support her assertions with citations to the record. She has further provided an inadequate record and cited certain invalid legal authorities.
While we cannot say that the judgment is a model of clarity and perfection, the trial took place 13 years after the parties separated and by that time it was difficult to piece together every item of information bearing upon property valuations and encumbrances. The temporary judge did acknowledge husband’s propensity for nondisclosure, and chose to award sanctions in the form of attorney fees in connection with discovery tactics. He also found that husband was lacking in credibility. At the same time, he also found that wife was lacking in credibility. All this notwithstanding, wife did not succeed in demonstrating that the judgment was a sham, that the judgment should have been set aside due to husband’s nondisclosures, or that the temporary judge had lost jurisdiction to enter judgment. Consequently, we affirm.
I
FACTS
Husband and wife were married on December 24, 1983. According to their stipulation, they separated on September 15, 1993. They have one child, born in 1985.
On September 15, 1993, husband obtained a Nevada divorce decree containing a finding that there were no community property assets for division. The decree states that husband appeared in court with counsel and that wife appeared in propria persona. However, wife represents that she never appeared in court and that the decree was taken against her fraudulently.
Uncertain whether the Nevada divorce decree was void for lack of jurisdiction, wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in California in 1994. The California dissolution proceedings were dismissed, given the preexisting Nevada divorce decree. Wife filed a second dissolution action in 1996, which was also dismissed. Wife then filed a civil suit pertaining to property division, but dismissed it before trial.
In 1998, the Nevada divorce decree was set aside. Wife represents that she appeared in the Nevada proceedings for the first time in December 1998, in connection with the set aside proceedings. The set aside order contained findings that the court lacked jurisdiction over the parties, that husband was not credible, and that, contrary to husband’s representations, the parties did have community assets including a business and a home.
Wife filed yet another petition for dissolution, in California, in 1999, and those proceedings are the subject of this appeal. In April 2001, the parties stipulated to the appointment of a temporary judge. Trial before the temporary judge took place on numerous dates beginning in January 2006, and the matter was submitted after argument in July 2006. Judgment as to status only was entered in 2006.
The temporary judge issued a preliminary statement of decision in 2006. The parties filed various motions thereafter, including an order to show cause filed by wife in January 2007, a 33-page request for clarification of the preliminary statement of decision, filed by wife in February 2007, and a court-ordered accounting filed by husband in February 2007. A hearing on these matters was held before the temporary judge on April 18, 2007.
In August 2007, no ruling having been issued, wife filed a motion to remove the temporary judge, alleging that he had not ruled on the reserved issues pending before him for more than six years. Nine days later, and before wife’s motion had been heard, the temporary judge filed a judgment on reserved issues, pertaining to property division and spousal support. He filed a statement of decision and three related rulings shortly thereafter.
The court, in its October 11, 2007 minute order, construed wife’s motion as a motion to withdraw the stipulation to have the matter heard by a temporary judge. It granted her motion as so construed. However, the minute order also stated: “2. This court is not hereby adjudicating the effect of this disqualification upon the rulings rendered by the temporary judge after this motion was filed since that issue has not been properly noticed. That would require a separate motion. [¶] 3. The effective date of this ruling is October 10, 2007. With rare exceptions, law and motion rulings are effective the date of the ruling and are not given retroactivity.”
In December 2007, wife filed a motion to set aside the judgment. The court denied the motion. At the hearing on her motion, the court stated that wife’s removal motion had been granted because of delay and that delay does not make a judgment void. Also, the court interpreted the removal order to be prospective only, that is-the temporary judge was precluded from taking any action thereafter. On another point, the court noted that a judgment may not be set aside unless the court finds that the set aside would materially affect the judgment. However, there was nothing in the record to support such a finding. Wife filed a notice of appeal from the order denying her set aside motion.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Introduction:
(1) Judgment
As noted in the judgment, an August 28, 2000 order provided: “‘For the purpose of determining the nature and value of any community property the date of evaluation shall be the date of separation of September 15, 1993.’” Consequently, at the 2006 trial, the court took evidence on the nature and value of the property in 1993.
In addition to resolving the property characterization and valuation issues, the court needed to determine whether, as husband argued, the parties had entered into an oral property division agreement, which they had effectuated, and whether that division amounted to a substantially equal division of the property as of 1993. Although the court questioned the credibility both husband and wife, it was impressed with the credibility of independent witnesses. Relying on the testimony of those witnesses, and on documentary evidence of the transactions of husband and wife, the court concluded that husband and wife had entered into and carried out a property division agreement. It also concluded that the property division was unequal, necessitating an equalization payment to wife.
Consistent with the parties’ property division agreement, the judgment awarded to wife, as her separate property, real property on Camden Place in Fullerton valued at $63,000 (fair market value of $240,000 minus $177,670 encumbrance), real property on West Alvarez Street in Orange valued at $70,000 (fair market value of $414,000 minus $305,000 encumbrance), a beauty shop valued at zero value and a Volvo automobile also valued at zero. The judgment awarded to husband, as his separate property, real property on Younger Drive in Buena Park valued at zero (negative value), real property on Orangethorpe in Fullerton valued at $140,000 (fair market value of $540,000 minus $400,000 SBA note), real property on Holland Road in Sun City valued at zero (negative value), and Kim’s Iron Works, valued at $40,000. It also awarded a $23,500 equalization payment to wife, payable by husband.
In addition, the judgment ordered husband to provide an accounting with respect to three other assets and the court reserved jurisdiction to make such further orders as necessary in connection with those matters. The judgment also resolved certain other issues. Finally, it awarded wife spousal support in the amount of $743 per month commencing November 1, 2006 and ending April 30, 2008. The judgment was supported by an eight-page, single-spaced statement of decision.
(2) Arguments
Wife argues: (1) the judgment should have been set aside as a sham adjudication; (2) the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction, having been filed by the temporary judge after wife had filed her motion to remove him; and (3) the judgment should have been set aside because of noncompliance with fiduciary disclosure requirements. We look at these arguments in turn.
(3) Standard of review
The parties agree that the appellate court, in reviewing an order denying a motion to set aside a family law judgment, applies an abuse of discretion standard. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 118; In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 682.) However, wife cites In re Marriage of Deffner (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 662 in support of this proposition. That case was ordered depublished by the Supreme Court on January 24, 2007, almost two years before wife’s opening brief was filed. Wife violated California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) in citing that opinion. She is cautioned against citing depublished opinions in the future.
B. Analysis:
(1) Sham adjudication
At the outset, wife argues “it is painfully clear from the face of the Judgment that it is simply a continuation of the process of one-sided disenfranchisement which had been established in the 13-year ‘record’....” We reject this argument. To the contrary, no such thing is clear from the face of the judgment.
Next, wife says, without citation to the record, although with apparent reference to the October 11, 2007 minute order granting her removal motion, that the court “found ‘clear and convincing proof’ of a compromised adjudication process.” She also indicates the court found bias and incompetence on the part of the temporary judge. She is wrong on each point. The court granted wife’s motion “on the grounds of the temporary judge’s failure to promptly execute his duties.” A finding of delay is not the same as a finding of a compromised adjudication process or a finding of bias or incompetence.
In support of wife’s related assertion that “[t]he Temporary Judge was masquerading as an adjudicator[,]” she cited a span of 309 pages of the record as “proof of the charade[.]” Counsel is admonished to provide pinpoint page references; this court is not required to wade through hundreds of pages of the record to find support for a party’s argument. (Evans v. Centerstone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 151, 166-167.)
Wife indicates that the temporary judge had issued a preliminary statement of decision in 2006 and that she had filed a 33-page request for clarification on February 1, 2007. She now complains that the statement of decision filed in this matter on August 20, 2007 is almost unchanged from the prior version and fails to respond to her requests for clarification. Wife has failed to support her factual assertions concerning the 2006 version of the statement of decision with citation to the record, which, as far as we can tell, does not to contain a copy of the document. It is her burden, as appellant, to support her argument with citations to the record. Her arguments with respect to the failure to makes changes in the statement of decision are deemed waived. (Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 109.)
Continuing on, wife claims certain pretrial events “almost guaranteed an unfair trial for lack of evidence....” In support of this assertion, she cites a November 20, 2001 order in which the temporary judge found that she had violated Code of Civil Procedure section 2030 in certain respects, and had propounded 587 separate interrogatories that were “photocopied pattern interrogatories” with subinterrogatories. The order stated that “service of 587 form book interrogatories further exacerbates and causes needless increases in the costs of this litigation both because of their service and further by the filing of a Motion to Compel with regard to interrogatories which should not have been served, in this form, in the first place.” The court ordered that husband was not required to respond to the interrogatories and that wife was sanctioned $500. The order in question does not support wife’s argument that she was denied a fair trial. Just because husband was not required to respond to 587 form book interrogatories does not mean that wife was precluded from obtaining the evidence she needed by the propounding of proper interrogatories.
Wife further alleges she was denied a fair trial because the temporary judge, acting on husband’s behalf, relieved husband of all disclosure obligations. In support of this argument, wife cites her own pleadings, rather than any orders of the temporary judge. Wife has failed to substantiate her assertion.
On another point, wife contends the judgment itself shows that there was no equal division of the property. We disagree. The judgment on its face identifies properties, specifies their values, allocates them between the parties, and orders husband to make an equalization payment to wife so that the total value of the assets awarded to each party is equal.
Wife complains that the temporary judge based the property division on a finding that, as husband asserted, the parties had entered into an agreement on the matter. She compares the evidence supporting the finding of an agreement to a “‘shadow of pigeon’s breath’.” While the statement of decision shows that the temporary judge found husband to be lacking in credibility on numerous points, it also shows that he found wife to be lacking in credibility as well. In determining whether a property agreement existed, the temporary judge was persuaded by the testimony of witnesses other than either husband or wife, and the existence of certain recorded deeds. This court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. (Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622.)
Furthermore, wife has not provided us with either transcripts of witness testimony or the exhibits admitted into evidence. Therefore, we have an inadequate record to determine whether there was evidentiary support for the determination in question. “As the party challenging [the order], [wife] has an affirmative obligation to provide an adequate record so that we may assess whether the trial court abused its discretion. [Citations.] We cannot presume the trial court has erred. The Court of Appeal has held: ‘“A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent....” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) “The absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the trial precludes a determination that the trial court abused its discretion.” (Id. at p. 448.)
We observe that in her May 30, 2008 designation of record, wife recited that she had requested that the temporary judge transmit the record of the proceedings before him to the clerk of the Superior Court. The requested record was to contain transcripts of 8 days of testimony plus all exhibits admitted into evidence or lodged in the proceedings. However, the record on appeal does not contain any such evidence. In her briefs, wife does not mention the record or any difficulty in obtaining it. Her briefs are greatly deficient inasmuch as they do not cite to either the trial transcripts or the exhibits in evidence. Apparently, wife contemplated the possibility of citing such evidence when she designated the record, but later considered it unnecessary, since she did not follow through to ensure that the record was complete. It is wife’s burden to provide an adequate record on appeal. (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447.)
In addition to the foregoing, wife complains about the lack of appraisals and valuations to support the property division. She casts aspersions against husband because he did not, she says, provide a single appraisal. However, she emphasizes the fact that husband stipulated to the appraisals that she offered. Wife provides no citation to authority either for the proposition that husband failed in his obligations before the court because he stipulated to her appraisals rather than providing separate ones or that the court erred in accepting her appraisals once the parties stipulated to them. She claims that her appraisals showed $1,232,600 in equity but that the judgment fails to divide or award anywhere near that amount, dividing only $313,000 in equity instead. Once again, however, wife has failed to support her argument with record references. She does not cite any portion of the record containing copies of the appraisals to which the parties stipulated, so that we can compare appraised values minus encumbrances to the amounts stated in the judgment. Having failed to support her argument with citations to necessary portions of the record, her argument is waived. (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
Also pertaining to property division, wife urges this court to take note of the fact that the temporary judge found there was inadequate evidence with respect to several assets-a $160,000 deed of trust assigned to husband after separation, the proceeds of a $250,000 promissory note, and certain property located on Avenida Soledad in Fullerton. She uses this information to bolster her argument that the judgment was simply a sham. However, after nine days of trial, the temporary judge concluded there was sufficient evidence to render a decision as to the majority of the assets, but that he still had not received sufficient evidence to render a decision as to three remaining assets. What he did was order husband to provide an accounting as to the three assets in question and ordered that the court would retain jurisdiction to make such further orders as necessary with respect to such assets. Wife cites no authority to show that the temporary judge exceeded his authority in making these orders and she does not demonstrate how she is disadvantaged by them.
Wife also contends the support orders contained in the judgment are further evidence that the judgment was a sham. The judgment reflects that there were prior child and spousal support orders in place before the temporary judge was appointed. With respect to child support, the judgment states that “there was a valid determination of child support and child support arrears and the court declines to make a retroactive order for child support for a time prior to November 1, 1999....” Wife complains that the court failed to make Family Code section 4005 findings as she requested. That statute provides: “At the request of either party, the court shall make appropriate findings with respect to the circumstances on which the order for support of a child is based.” Here, the court made no new or additional award that it failed to explain. As for its order declining to make an award a number of years in arrears, the court explained that there had been a valid determination of child support that it declined to modify. No further explanation was necessary. Wife’s additional argument, that the child support award is inadequate, fails for lack of citation to the record.
As for spousal support, the prior spousal support order provided for payments from November 4, 1999 through June 30, 2001, with support then reduced to zero. Wife cites no portion of the record to show us what the prior spousal support order was, or whether a Gavron warning was issued. The judgment contained a finding that the marriage was one of short duration. Despite that, and the fact that the parties had separated in 1993, the judgment also contained an order for additional spousal support in the amount of $743 per month from November 1, 2006 to April 30, 2008, at which time spousal support would terminate. The additional spousal support was awarded due to the continued minimal employment of wife and the differing positions of the parties.
See In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705.
Wife attacks the spousal support award because of its purported inadequacy, because the judgment noted that husband had provided an incomplete income and expense declaration, and because the statement of decision did not contain an analysis of all of the factors enumerated in Family Code section 4320. However, this is not an appeal from the spousal support award itself. Where that is concerned, wife did file an appeal from the judgment, but this court dismissed that appeal for failure to designate the record. (In re Marriage of Kim (G039364, app. dism. Jan. 9, 2008).)
What we have before us now is an appeal from the order denying the motion to set aside the judgment. The question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the motion. Wife cites no portion of the record to show that she raised the spousal support issues in connection with her motion to set aside the judgment, so that the trial court could have taken them into consideration in making its ruling. Therefore, arguments based on these particular issues are waived. (Hogan v. Country Villa Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 259, 269.) Moreover, wife cites these purported inadequacies in the statement of decision and judgment as evidence that the entire judgment was a sham. Whatever imperfections there may be in the judgment, they are insufficient to show that the entire judgment was a sham.
(2) Void judgment
Wife asserts that once she filed her removal motion, the temporary judge was disqualified from filing the judgment, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 170, subdivision 5, and 170.1, subdivision (a)(6). Husband, on the other hand, contends that the statutes do not control with respect to temporary judges. That is an issue we need not decide, for even under the statutes wife cites, the temporary judge was not disqualified at the time judgment was entered.
Wife contends that “Civil Procedure, § 170, subdivision 5, requires disqualification ‘when it is made to appear probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice of such justice or judge a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before him.’” (Underscoring and boldface lettering omitted.) She is in error. Current Code of Civil Procedure section 170 provides in full: “A judge has a duty to decide any proceeding in which he or she is not disqualified.” It would appear that wife is citing former Code of Civil Procedure section 170, subdivision (5), repealed in 1984. (Stats. 1984, ch. 1555, § 1; see Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 541-542.) We do not pass upon her arguments concerning a statute that has been repealed.
Next, wife claims the temporary judge was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii), (B). That statute provides: “(a) A judge shall be disqualified if... [¶]... [¶] (6)(A) For any reason: [¶]... [¶] (iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. [¶] (B) Bias or prejudice toward a lawyer in the proceeding may be grounds for disqualification.”
Disqualification is required under this statute, wife urges, because the entry of judgment appeared to be retaliatory, inasmuch as it was entered immediately after she filed her removal motion. The judge ruling on her set aside motion disagreed, as do we.
As previously mentioned, wife has not included a copy of the 2006 preliminary statement of decision in the record. However, wife represents, and husband agrees, that the temporary judge issued a preliminary statement of decision in 2006, and further, that the statement of decision and judgment rendered in August 2007 were not materially different from the preliminary statement of decision issued in 2006. The 2007 statement of decision required an accounting from husband as to three unresolved assets, and husband represents that the temporary judge had requested that information of him as of August 2006. Consistent with that representation, and with the 2007 statement of decision, husband filed an accounting with respect to those three assets in February 2007. Just the preceding month, wife filed an order to show cause, and she also filed a request for clarification in February 2007. A hearing was held on these matters in April 2007.
As the foregoing shows, the temporary judge made a decision in 2006. Husband thereafter filed an accounting and wife filed certain motions of her own. The accounting, the motions, and the hearing thereon reasonably accounted for some of the delay in rendering judgment. In any event, wife admits, in fact complains, that the preliminary statement of decision rendered in 2006 was substantially the same as the statement of decision and judgment rendered in 2007. The statement of decision did not change because of wife’s removal motion, and the judgment is consistent with the statement of decision. Given this, it does not appear that “[a] person aware of [these] facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).) Once the removal motion was filed, the temporary judge was prompted to enter judgment, in accordance with his preliminary statement of decision. This does not demonstrate a lack of impartiality towards wife or bias or prejudice towards her lawyer. The temporary judge had made his decision after trial and long before wife filed her motion.
In applying Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6), wife says that when she filed her removal motion, the temporary judge lost jurisdiction to rule on any pending matters and that any rulings made while her motion was pending were void. She cites Brown v. Swickard (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 820 in support of this proposition. Brown v. Swickard, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d 820 is inapposite. It interpreted Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, concerning peremptory challenges, not Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6).
(3) Non-compliance with fiduciary disclosure requirements
Several Family Code provisions bear upon the disclosure obligations of parties to a marital dissolution proceeding. As Family Code section 2100, subdivision (c) provides: “[A] full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, regardless of the characterization as community or separate, together with a disclosure of all income and expenses of the parties. Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent there have been any material changes so that... at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the relevant underlying facts.”
As wife points out, Family Code sections 2105 and 2107 also contain disclosure provisions of note in this matter. Section 2105, subdivision (a) provides: “Except by court order for good cause,... if the case goes to trial, no later than 45 days before the first assigned trial date, each party, or the attorney for the party in this matter, shall serve on the other party a final declaration of disclosure and a current income and expense declaration, executed under penalty of perjury....” Section 2107, subdivision (d) provides in pertinent part: “Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, if a court enters a judgment when the parties have failed to comply with all disclosure requirements of this chapter, the court shall set aside the judgment. The failure to comply with the disclosure requirements does not constitute harmless error....”
Wife contends that husband did not file the final disclosures required under Family Code section 2105, subdivision (a), so the judgment should be set aside. Husband addresses wife’s allegation without specifically representing whether he did or did not provide the required disclosures. However, he states that any failure to provide the required disclosures does not require reversal per se. He argues that, Family Code section 2107, subdivision (d) notwithstanding, a judgment will not be set aside without a showing of prejudice. (In re Marriage of Steiner and Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 519 (Steiner); see also Fam. Code, § 2121, subd. (b).)
He is correct. “[A]rticle VI, section 13 of our state Constitution [mandates] that no judgment may be set aside or new trial granted unless there has been a miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]” (Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 526.) “To the degree, then, that [Family Code] section 2107, subdivision (d) is read for the proposition that a judgment must be set aside or a new trial granted solely because of a failure to exchange final declarations of disclosure, it is not consistent with our state’s Constitution.” (Id. at p. 527.) And, “[t]he California Constitution trumps any conflicting provision of the Family Code. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Consequently, the failure to provide the final disclosure required by Family Code section 2105 “does not constitute a ‘get-a-new-trial-free’ card, giving [a spouse] the automatic right to a new trial or reversal on appeal when there is no showing of a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)” (Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)
Wife contends Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 519 is distinguishable because in that case, neither party filed a final declaration of disclosure (id. at p. 525), whereas in the case before us only husband failed to file. Although it is true that neither party filed the final declaration in Steiner, the constitutional provision at issue applies and is controlling irrespective of that particular factual point.
Wife nonetheless argues she need not show any actual injury arising from the alleged nondisclosure, citing In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470 (Feldman). This citation is unavailing. Feldman addressed Family Code section 2107, subdivision (c), permitting a court to levy sanctions against a party for failure to comply with various disclosure requirements. As the court in that case stated, “Section 2107, subdivision (c) indicates that sanctions are to be imposed to effectuate compliance with the laws that require spouses to make disclosure to each other. [Citation.] The statute is not aimed at redressing an actual injury.” (Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1479.) Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th 1470 is inapposite. The case before us has to do with set aside requirements, not the requirements for imposition of monetary sanctions.
Although she disagrees that she needs to demonstrate any prejudice arising from husband’s alleged nondisclosure, wife nonetheless says that she was indeed prejudiced and that the refusal to set aside the judgment resulted in a miscarriage of justice. For one thing, wife insists that it was impossible to make a fair property division because husband provided no disclosures of the value of, and no appraisals of, the properties in question. She says that he acknowledges engaging in a litigation strategy of nondisclosure, to her detriment. In support of this assertion, wife cites husband’s acknowledgment that he decided to stipulate to wife’s appraisals instead of going out and procuring another set of his own.
However, we observe husband’s willingness to stipulate to wife’s appraisals is a litigation strategy that could obviously give rise to savings in terms of time and money, but is not evidence of a pattern of nondisclosure. Furthermore, once wife provided appraisals, there was presumably evidence upon which a fair division of property could be made. The record does not contain copies of the appraisals, however, so we cannot determine whether they provide substantial evidence of the court’s finding that the property division, together with an equalization payment, constituted an equal division of the assets at issue. We must presume that they did. (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.)
Wife addresses the various properties allocated to the parties in the judgment and decries the inequality of the overall division. She complains that the court’s findings regarding property values and equities were inconsistent with her appraisals or were otherwise unsupported by the evidence and that husband did not provide disclosures as to encumbrances. However, our record is grossly inadequate to assess wife’s claims. We do not have copies of the appraisals or other documentary evidence upon which the court relied. We also do not have transcripts of witness testimony.
The court acknowledged the shortcomings in the evidence available in 2006 to reconstruct the valuations and the balances of encumbrances as they existed in 1993. The statement of decision states: “The testimony and documentary evidence did not identify specific encumbrances against the properties on September 15, 1993 (Date of Separation)[.]” It continued on to provide findings concerning the fair market values of the real properties, and the amounts of the encumbrances to which they were subject, “determined by a review of the documentary evidence and the testimony of the parties [as] the best evidence available during the general time frame as close to the date of separation as could be determined by the evidence....” We cannot say the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s findings when we have no record to review.
Wife has drawn our attention to only one inconsistency of note within the statement of decision itself. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the court awarded the Alvarez property to wife. However, the statement of decision also indicates that wife transferred the property to husband in 1994. Wife complains that she never received the property and this, therefore, is evidence of prejudice resulting from husband’s nondisclosures.
It is unclear as to how this state of affairs arises from husband’s nondisclosures. At any rate, it does seem odd, at first blush, that a judgment could award to wife a property that was already in the hands of husband, without an order that husband reconvey the property to wife. However, we must remember that the judgment was made in furtherance of a property division agreement that had already been effectuated as between the parties after their separation in 1993. The court explained, in the statement of decision, that after the parties had exchanged properties pursuant to their property division agreement, wife sold properties “for an amount less than the equity contained therein. This subsequent loss was due to her own actions....” While that portion of the statement of decision does not identify the Alvarez property by name, there were only two real properties allocated to wife-the Alvarez property and the Camden property, so the court must have been referring to both of them.
Husband offers this explanation: “At [wife’s] instruction, the Alvarez Property was sold at below market value to generate instant cash with all proceeds of the sale going to [wife] to pay off [her] separately incurred debts. Likewise, [wife] sold her interest in the Camden Property, netting approximately $40,000, to pay off her separately incurred debts.” Whether that explanation is correct or not, the point of the matter is that neither party cites trial exhibits or testimony in support of his or her position. It is wife’s burden to provide an adequate record for review and her burden to show error. (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 447 [appellant’s burden to provide adequate record]; Virtanen v. O’Connell (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 688, 710 [appellant’s burden to show error].) She has failed on both counts.
As further evidence of husband’s failure to disclose, wife again emphasizes that the temporary judge found there was inadequate evidence with respect to three assets, and that the judgment required husband to provide a posttrial accounting with respect to each one. Husband did provide the posttrial accountings. So, the court required further information from husband and husband provided it. What would wife gain by a set aside at this point?
Similarly, wife points to the portion of the judgment wherein the court reserved jurisdiction to award fees and costs “after the exchange and submission of current, complete, and accurate Income and Expense Declarations....” She does not explain how this reservation of jurisdiction harms her or how setting aside the judgment would be a better solution.
Wife also notes that the court mentioned husband’s incomplete income and expense declaration when it addressed spousal support. As we have already observed, even though the marriage was one of short duration and the prior spousal support order had terminated six years earlier, the court awarded additional spousal support in part because of husband’s incomplete declaration. Wife was not disadvantaged by the award of additional support.
Along the same lines, the court found husband had breached his fiduciary duty to provide information to wife and ordered him to pay her the reasonable costs of her “attorney fees directly related to the discovery regarding the ongoing business in this matter as to the characterization and valuation of the business as of the date of separation.” One may infer that husband was evasive during the course of the dissolution proceedings, particularly with regard to the valuation of the business, resulting in extra discovery efforts by wife’s counsel prior to trial. Consequently, the court chose to sanction husband for his conduct. This does not mean that the judgment should also be set aside.
The court ultimately made its findings as to valuations through trial evidence, as supplemented by husband’s posttrial accountings. Wife has not demonstrated that the judgment as entered resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
III
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.O’LEARY, J.