Opinion
No. 5-273 / 04-1495
Filed June 15, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, John J. Bauercamper, Judge.
William Kehoe appeals from various economic provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Linda Kehoe. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Andrew Abbott of Dunakey Klatt, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Dave Nagle, Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
William Kehoe appeals various economic provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Linda Kehoe. We affirm as modified.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
William and Linda were married on May 25, 1974, and separated in May of 2003. They have three adult children, ranging in ages from twenty-seven to twenty years old at the time of trial. Both William and Linda are high school graduates. William is employed by the State of Iowa, earning approximately $41,000 per year and receiving reimbursements of approximately $750 per month for expenses. From 1976 to 1998 Linda stayed at home with their children and ran a daycare, where she earned between $12,000 and $14,000 per year. In 1999, she started working for company in Waterloo where she earns a gross income of approximately $16,500 per year.
On May 29, 2003, Linda filed a petition seeking to dissolve her marriage with William. Following a trial, the court entered a decree dissolving the marriage. Among other things, the court ordered William to pay Linda alimony of $750 per month for ten years; distributed the assets and liabilities of the parties, and refused to set aside to William an $18,000 inheritance he brought into the marriage. William appeals from this decree, asking this court to modify the spousal support award, allocate the assets and liabilities differently, and give him credit for inherited money he received prior to the marriage.
Scope and Standards of Review.
Dissolution of marriage decrees are reviewed in equity. In re Marriage of Fields, 508 N.W.2d 730, 731 (Iowa 1993). Our standard of review is therefore de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. In such cases, "[w]e examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented." In re Marriage of Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Iowa 1998).
Spousal Support.
The district court concluded that, due to the length of the marriage, the substantial disparity in earning capacities, and Linda's medical problems, William should pay Linda $750 per month in spousal support for a period of ten years, or until the death of either party. William maintains the award is excessive, and should cease upon either Linda's remarriage or cohabitation. Spousal support is not an absolute right; an award depends on the circumstances of each particular case. In re Marriage of Whelchel, 476 N.W.2d 104, 110 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). The discretionary award of alimony is made after considering the factors listed in Iowa Code section 598.21(3) (2003).
Upon our de novo review of this record, we agree with the district court's award of spousal support. The parties were married approximately thirty years. For twenty-two years during that marriage, Linda stayed at home with the children, and ran a daycare business. At the time of trial, Linda was experiencing the symptoms of a herniated lower lumbar disk, knee problems which had required two surgeries, and an injured rotator cuff. William was earning approximately $41,000 per year at the time of trial, and Linda's recent earnings were approximately $16,500 per year. We believe these factors justify the ten-year award of spousal support. However, we modify the decree to provide that Linda's support shall terminate upon her remarriage. We do not modify the decree to order that spousal support shall cease upon Linda's cohabitation with an unrelated member of the opposite sex, but note that such may be grounds for a modification action. See In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
Property Distribution.
William maintains the district court "disproportionately distributed the assets of the parties in comparison with th[eir] liabilities." In particular, he claims the court erred in its treatment of their son Adam's Federal Plus student loan, his retirement accounts, and the Discover Card debt. Partners to a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Hass, 538 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Equitable distribution, however, does not necessarily mean an equal division of property, nor does it mean a percentage division of the property. In re Marriage of Bonnette, 584 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude the court's overall distribution scheme does equity between the parties. Moreover, we find the court's treatment of their son's student loans, their retirement accounts, and the Discover Card debt is appropriate. Regarding the student loan debt, the decree appears only to allocate to William the $12,000 "current balance due." Regardless, according to Linda, the obligation under this loan was their son's, and would only be assumed by the parents should he fail to pay it. As for the retirement accounts, the decree on this issue equitably accounts for Linda's inability to accumulate other retirement savings during the marriage. Finally, the Discover Card debt was appropriately allocated in that the whole of this debt was assigned by the court to Linda.
Inherited Property.
Prior to the parties' marriage, William used $10,000 in inherited funds to purchase a home. On appeal, William contends he should have been credited this amount in the division of the parties' assets. As our supreme court noted in In re Marriage of Schriner, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2005):
In Iowa, two types of property, inherited property and gifts received by one party, are specifically excluded by statute from the divisible estate. Iowa Code § 598.21(1). This property is normally awarded to the individual spouse who owns the property, independent from the equitable distribution process. Yet, this exclusion is not absolute. Iowa has a unique hybrid system that permits the court to divide inherited and gifted property if equity demands in light of the circumstances of a spouse or the children. Id. § 598.21(2).
We believe the district court properly exercised its role as "architect" of the equitable distribution of the parties' assets when it refused to set aside an amount representing William's inheritance. The parties lived in this home for approximately thirty years and made substantial improvements to it over the course of that marriage. Considering this and the court's decidedly even overall property distribution, we affirm its treatment of William's inherited funds.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to William.