Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 02D004788, Nancy A. Pollard, Judge.
Solomon Katz, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
OPINION
O’LEARY, ACTING P. J.
Solomon Katz appeals from an order directing him to pay his former wife, Laurel Katz, $4,000 in attorney fees under Family Code sections 2030 and 2032. He contends the award constitutes an abuse of discretion. We reject his claim and affirm the order.
We will refer to the parties by their first names to avoid confusion, and intend no disrespect. All further statutory references are to the Family Code.
FACTS
The record on appeal is limited. The clerk’s transcript contains but a few of the documents filed in the trial court—notably, none are Laurel’s moving papers requesting attorney fees. There are reporter’s transcripts from three hearings. There is only an appellant’s opening brief filed by Solomon, in propria persona, which is largely undecipherable and contains no legal analysis of any of his contentions. We begin, therefore, with a description of what we can glean from the record.
The parties separated in July 2005 after an 11-year marriage. They had two minor children. Laurel worked part time as a flight attendant. Solomon was a telecommunications sales representative and his income and expense statement filed on July 25, 2006, stated he had monthly income plus commission bonuses of about $10,000 and monthly expenses of about $9,000.
The judgment on reserved issues was entered on March 22, 2007. It stated that in January 2007, Solomon was terminated from his employment, and had formed an entertainment business that had yet to generate any income. The court reserved jurisdiction over support, but ordered Solomon and Laurel to share equally all unreimbursed medical expenses for the children. Solomon and Laurel were each awarded roughly $300,000 in community property: Laurel received the family home and was ordered to make an equalizing payment to Solomon of $200,000. They were ordered to bear their own attorney fees through the date of filing of the judgment.
The register of actions contained in the clerk’s transcript shows that on June 13, 2007, Laurel filed an order to show cause (OSC) regarding spousal support and attorney fees. That document is not part of the clerk’s transcript.
On July 9, 2007, Laurel filed a second OSC (which is in the clerk’s transcript) seeking to require Solomon to submit to a vocational evaluation to assess his ability to obtain employment and the amount of income he was capable of earning. Laurel’s declaration stated Solomon had told her when they divorced he would quit (or lose) his job before he would ever pay her any child support. Solomon then lost his job and was pursuing a new career in the entertainment industry in which he had no experience. Although Solomon’s July 2006 income and expense statement stated he had monthly income of about $10,000, Laurel claimed that during the marriage Solomon’s monthly income was about $24,000. Solomon had failed to pay any of his medical reimbursement obligations for the children, but had just purchased a new BMW valued at $60,000 to $90,000.
Laurel filed an income and expense declaration in August 2007. She earned about $1,500 a month before taxes; she had monthly expenses of about $8,300. Additionally, she now had about $600,000 in cash from an inheritance—money she was now using to support herself and the couple’s children.
The clerk’s transcript contains a handwritten stipulation and order on an OSC dated August 22, 2007. The order directs payment of $400 a month in temporary child support. The court ordered Solomon and Laurel to undergo vocational evaluations to assess their earning capacity for child support purposes, and ordered a subsequent review hearing on Laurel’s OSC regarding payment of medical expenses, directing that issues concerning child support, imputing earning capacities, and attorney fees would be heard at that time.
A hearing was held on November 15, 2007. Solomon filed a new income and expense statement claiming he lost his job in January 2007, and based on his January income had average monthly income of only $1,048, and monthly unemployment benefits of $1,150 that ended in September. He had monthly expenses of $9,077, and liquid assets of $47,000. The register of action indicates Laurel filed a declaration concerning her request for attorney fees on November 11, 2007, but it is not in the record.
At the November 15, 2007 hearing, the court stated due to lack of notice of a request for attorney fees as a sanction against Solomon under section 271, attorney fees could only be considered under section 2030 “the issue is imputation of income.” Following presentation of evidence concerning Solomon’s and Laurel’s ability to earn and Laurel’s recent inheritance, the court made the following findings: Solomon had essentially followed through on his threat to either quit or lose his job and go on disability to avoid having to pay any child support. Solomon was deliberately not seeking employment so as to enhance an age discrimination/wrongful termination lawsuit he had filed against his former employer. The court imputed to Solomon the ability to earn at least $6,000, based on his employment history and his level of education. Solomon had $47,000 in cash. Laurel was primary care taker of the children and had worked only part time to care for the children. Accordingly, the court would not impute full time income to her, but charged her with the ability to earn $2,000 a month. The court found Laurel had $600,000 in cash from her inheritance. The court indicated those were the numbers upon which it would calculate a child support order (although neither the DissoMaster printout nor the final child support order is in the record). The court stated on the record the parties would bear their own attorney fees and costs under section 2030.
On February 28, 2008, Laurel’s attorney filed a declaration regarding Laurel’s request for attorney fees. She stated Laurel had paid $27,356 in fees to date, detailed Solomon’s obstreperous conduct concerning payment of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses, and asked that pursuant to section 271, Solomon be required to pay Laurel’s attorney fees related to obtaining reimbursement of medical expenses of $5,562.
At the hearing on February 28, 2008, the court stated it was considering Laurel’s request for attorney fees. Solomon represented to the court he had paid over $90,000 in his own attorney fees; Laurel had only paid $25,000 in attorney fees, so he could not understand why he should be paying any part of her fees. The court chastised Solomon for his unjustified delay in paying Laurel his share of the children’s medical expenses, and based on “the finding that this case had an inordinate amount of delay for payment of bills,” it ordered Solomon to pay $4,000 in Laurel’s attorney fees under sections 2032 and 270.
The register of actions indicates Solomon filed an OSC for modification on March 6, 2008, and a motion for reconsideration on March 14, 2008. It also indicates several responsive declarations were filed by Laurel. None of these documents are in the record on appeal.
Findings and an order from the February 28, 2008 hearing on the June 13, 2007 OSC were entered on June 19, 2008. The court ordered Solomon to pay Laurel $4,000 in attorney fees pursuant to sections 2032 and 270. At a hearing on June 20, 2008, Laurel’s attorney explained Solomon was now employed, but he refused to produce any information regarding his current income. The court denied Solomon’s motion for reconsideration. It left the $4,000 attorney fees order in tact, but stated it was “vacat[ing] the [sections] 270 and 271 grounds and issu[ing] the orders on... section[s] 2030 and 2032.” Solomon filed a notice of appeal from the attorney fees order.
DISCUSSION
Solomon contends the award of $4,000 in attorney fees to Laurel constitutes an abuse of discretion. The legal discussion in his opening brief is comprised of four paragraphs containing three assertions: (1) there is no evidence supporting an award of attorney fees under sections 2030 and 2032 because Solomon is unemployed and living on his dwindling savings, whereas Laurel is employed and has money from her inheritance with which to pay her own attorney fees; (2) Solomon was not given proper notice attorney fees were being sought under sections 2030 and 2032; and (3) the court erroneously precluded Solomon from introducing “certain evidence” (he does not indicate what that might be) that would have substantiated his defense as to his failure to pay his share of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses. We find no ground for disturbing the court’s order.
“A motion for attorney fees and costs in a dissolution action is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations.] The discretion invoked is that of the trial court, not the reviewing court, and the trial court’s order will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 296.)
As the appellant, Solomon had the burden of providing this court with a record sufficient to allow us to determine whether reversal is appropriate. “It is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record. [Citations.]” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575.) The absence of such a record precludes reversal. “‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The register of actions indicates there are many documents associated with Laurel’s attorney fees request that were not included in the record on appeal—most notably her moving papers, responsive papers to Solomon’s motion for reconsideration, and several declarations in support of attorney fees. We cannot say on this record there is no evidence to support the court’s order.
Furthermore, Solomon’s claim of error is devoid of any legal analysis or citation to any supporting legal authority. When an appellant raises an issue, “but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citations.]” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784 785; see also Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [appellate court not required to consider points not supported by citation to authorities or record].) An appellant may not simply make the assertion that the ruling is erroneous and leave it to the appellate court to figure out why. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6.)
The fact Solomon is representing himself on appeal does not change his burden. We hold him to the same standards as we do an attorney. (City of Los Angeles v. Glair (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 813, 819; Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284-1285.) Given the inadequate record and the complete lack of legal arguments, Solomon has failed in his appellate burden and we must affirm the order.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J., IKOLA, J.