Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD437572 Donna Fields Goldstein, Judge.
Law Office of Marilyn M. Smith and Marilyn M. Smith for Appellant.
Jaffe and Clemens, William S. Ryden and Mark E. Mahler for Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
The trial court entered a judgment of dissolution that divided the community estate between appellant Nancy M. Ruff and respondent Michael A. Kalesniko, and contained determinations regarding temporary and permanent spousal support; in addition, the trial court entered an order after trial that assigned certain tax penalties and tax-related interest to Ruff. On appeal, Ruff challenges the judgment and the posttrial order. We affirm the judgment, with the exception of the trial court’s ruling regarding a car owned by Kalesniko; we otherwise dismiss Ruff’s appeal insofar as she attacks the posttrial order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ruff and Kalesniko married in 1991. Their marriage produced no children. Kalesniko worked as a screenwriter and enjoyed above-average success in this profession. During the marriage, Ruff was employed as a producer and managed Lonsdale, their loan-out corporation.
So-called “loan-out” corporations are often used in the entertainment industry. (Caso v. Nimrod Productions, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 881, 885.) Generally, “[w]hen an individual is hired by a producer to work on a production, the individual informs the producer he or she has a loan-out corporation. Then, three-way contracts are entered into in which the loan-out corporation agrees to furnish the services of its owner and sole employee to the producer; the producer agrees to pay the loan-out corporation for the owner/employee’s services; and the owner/employee agrees to the arrangement.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
In early 2005, prior to the parties’ separation, Kalesniko entered into a contract for $350,000 to re-write the script of a movie project entitled “The Seven Year Switch” (Switch). Kalesniko was to receive his payment under the contract in three installments: $115,000 shortly after entering into the agreement; $115,000 upon completing a first draft of the re-written script; and $120,000 upon submitting a polished draft. In July 2005, after receiving the first installment, Kalesniko travelled to Australia, where he worked on the first draft of the script. On October 4, 2005, he returned to Los Angeles and began living in an apartment, rather than in the home he had shared with Ruff.
On December 15, 2005, Kalesniko filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, alleging that the parties had separated on October 4, 2005. In early February 2006, he completed the first draft of the script, and later obtained the second installment of the Switch contract proceeds. On March 6, 2006, Ruff filed her response to the petition for dissolution, which asserted a separation date of February 21, 2006.
On July 21, 2006, shortly after Kalesniko received the third installment of the Switch contract proceeds, Ruff applied for an order to show cause regarding spousal support and other matters. In a responsive declaration filed in September 2006, Kalesniko stated that he had been unemployed since July 2006, when he completed the Switch contract, and had no income other than residual payments of $300 per month for past work. To provide for Ruff’s support pending trial, Kalesniko offered to pay a specified monthly amount of temporary spousal support, and to give Ruff her community property share of the proceeds from the Switch contract, based on his analysis of her share.
The hearing on the order to show cause was held on January 29, 2007. During the hearing, the trial court noted that Ruff’s community property share of the Switch contract proceeds could not be determined without establishing the date of separation, which the parties disputed. The trial court also observed that it was difficult to determine the parties’ ability to earn income, for purposes of awarding temporary spousal support. To provide for Ruff’s support pending trial, the trial court ordered that funds be advanced to her based on an equal division of the Switch contract proceeds, subject to later adjustment and repayment, if necessary; the trial court took off calendar Ruff’s application for an order to show cause.
The trial in the underlying action began on July 13, 2007. At trial, the parties presented evidence regarding the date of separation, the components of the community estate, and their postseparation use of community funds and property. On December 28, 2007, the trial court orally announced its proposed statement of decision, which contained numerous rulings regarding the community estate, but reserved the trial court’s jurisdiction regarding some matters, including the parties’ liability for certain tax payments. Prior to the filing of the judgment, Kalesniko applied for an order to show cause, seeking, inter alia, an order directing Ruff to pay penalties and interest accruing from Lonsdale’s failure to pay taxes during the 2005-2006 tax year. On April 28, 2008, at the hearing on Kalesniko’s application, the trial court amended the proposed statement of decision to reserve its jurisdiction over all taxation issues following the judgment, and directed Ruff to pay the tax penalties and interest.
On May 12, 2008, the trial court filed its judgment and final statement of decision, as well as a written order containing its rulings regarding Kalesniko’s posttrial application. In the judgment and statement of decision, the trial court found that the parties had separated on October 31, 2005. On the basis of this separation date, the trial court determined that the community estate’s share of the Switch contract proceeds were as follows: 100 percent of the net proceeds from the first installment (i.e., after reductions for necessary payouts); 63 percent of the net proceeds from the second installment; and 0 percent of the third installment. In allocating the Switch contract funds, the trial court noted the advance of funds that Ruff had received in January 2007, and awarded $30,000 in retroactive temporary spousal support to Ruff. The trial court also made determinations regarding many items of community property, including Lonsdale, but reserved jurisdiction over tax liabilities and other matters. Because neither party was employed, the trial court declined to award permanent spousal support, and reserved its jurisdiction over the issue. In the order regarding Kalesniko’s posttrial application, the court directed Ruff to pay “any interest and penalties associated with the nonpayment of Lonsdale income taxes for the period ending March 31, 2006.”
DISCUSSION
Regarding the judgment, Ruff contends (1) that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding temporary and permanent spousal support, (2) that the trial court incorrectly determined the community estate’s interests regarding certain debts and items of property, and (3) that her trial counsel exceeded her authority in entering into a stipulation at trial. Regarding the posttrial order, Ruff contends that the trial court improperly obliged her to pay the penalties and interest arising from Lonsdale’s unpaid taxes. For the reasons explained below, we reject her challenges to the judgment, with the exception of a ruling regarding Kalesniko’s car. Furthermore, to the extent she attacks the posttrial order, we conclude that her appeal must be dismissed for want of a timely notice of appeal.
A. Spousal Support
Ruff raises several challenges to the rulings regarding spousal support. She contends that the trial court improperly failed to award temporary support in January 2007, and later erred at trial in determining Kalesniko’s credit for temporary support; she also contends that the trial court incorrectly declined to issue an award of permanent support.
1. Governing Principles
Generally, temporary spousal support and permanent spousal support serve different purposes and are subject to different statutory requirements. (In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 594.) “‘Temporary spousal support is utilized to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties in as close to the status quo position as possible pending trial and the division of their assets and obligations.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, ‘[t]he purpose of permanent spousal support is not to preserve the pre[-]separation status quo but to provide financial assistance, if appropriate, as determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution and the division of their community property.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid., quoting In re Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 65, 68.)
Family Code section 3600 permits an award of temporary spousal support that is necessary for the support of a spouse. Such awards are consigned to the broad discretion of the trial court, based on the supporting spouse’s ability to pay and the other party’s needs. (In re Marriage of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 594; In re Marriage of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 159.) To determine the supporting spouse’s ability to pay, the trial court may consider income, investments, and other assets. (Id. at p. 159.)
All further statutory citations are to the Family Code, unless otherwise specified.
In contrast, permanent spousal support is controlled by section 4320 and related statutes. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 320.) To order permanent spousal support, “the trial court must consider and weigh all of the circumstances enumerated in [section 4320], to the extent they are relevant to the case before it. [Citations.] The first of the enumerated circumstances, the marital standard of living, is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed. [Citations.] The other statutory factors include: contributions to the supporting spouse’s education, training, or career; the supporting spouse’s ability to pay; the needs of each party, based on the marital standard of living; the obligations and assets of each party; the duration of the marriage; the opportunity for employment without undue interference with the children’s interests; the age and health of the parties; tax consequences; the balance of hardships to the parties; the goal that the supported party be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time; and any other factors deemed just and equitable by the court. [Citations.].” (Id. at pp. 302-304, fn. omitted.) In assessing these factors, the trial court has broad discretion to determine their weight, but it may not ignore relevant factors. (Id. at p. 304.)
Section 4320 provides: “In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances: [¶] (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following:
2. Temporary Support
Ruff challenges the trial court’s rulings regarding temporary support on several grounds. To begin, she suggests that the trial court improperly took Ruff’s request for temporary support off calendar at the hearing in January 2007. We disagree. As explained below, the trial court acted at Ruff’s request in taking the application off calendar.
During the hearing, the trial court noted the difficulty in segregating Kalesniko’s separate property share of the Switch contract proceeds due to the dispute over the separation date; in addition, the trial court observed that Kalesniko’s ability to pay support was hard to assess, as he was not employed. In the course of the discussion, Ruff’s counsel proposed that Ruff receive an advance of funds based on an equal division of the Switch proceeds, and that Ruff’s application for an order to show cause be taken off calendar. The trial court and Kalesniko’s counsel accepted the proposal, on the understanding that the equal division of funds was subject to later adjustment and repayment. Kalesniko’s counsel further suggested that if the trial court ultimately found that less than half the Switch contract proceeds were community property, the trial court “might say” there was “a support obligation” based on Kalesniko’s separate share of the funds. The trial court thus ordered a preliminary division of the funds and took the application for an order to show cause off calendar. As the trial court’s ruling was based on the proposal of Ruff’s own counsel, she has forfeited any contention of error regarding the ruling. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 395, p. 453.)
For similar reasons, we reject Kalesniko’s contention that the ruling constituted a separately appealable order from which Ruff was obliged to notice an appeal. Generally, orders regarding temporary spousal support are directly appealable when they possess “the essential elements of a final judgment” and are “dispositive of the rights of the parties.” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368.) That is not the case here. As Kalesniko’s counsel acknowledged at the January 2007 hearing, the trial court’s ruling permitted it to revisit the issue of temporary spousal support based on Kalesniko’s separate property share of the Switch contract proceeds.
Ruff also contends that the trial court, in awarding temporary support after trial, ignored the section 4320 factors and otherwise abused its discretion in determining the amount of the support. We reject these contentions. As explained above (see pt. A.1., ante), the section 4320 factors do not govern temporary support awards; such awards are proper upon a showing of the supporting spouse’s ability to pay and the other party’s needs. Moreover, the record discloses no abuse of discretion.
During closing argument, Kalesniko’s counsel noted the tentative equal division of the Switch contract proceeds in January 2007, and stated: “If [R]uff shouldn’t have gotten 50 percent [of the proceeds], she probably would have been entitled to support for that period.... I’m using... 30 percent [as] a good rule of thumb for spousal support and basically saying that there ought to be an adjustment for the 20 percent of the money that... she shouldn’t have got.”
The trial court, in determining the community estate’s shares in the Switch contract proceeds, found that the net value of the first installment (after necessary adjustments) was $87,750. As the first installment had been received prior to the separation date, the trial court ascribed the entire net sum to the community. Regarding the second installment, the trial court found that its net value was $87,750; that the community estate was entitled to $55,282 (63 percent) of these proceeds; and that Ruff’s share of the proceeds was $27,640. The trial court also found that “the entire third payment” of $120,000 belonged to Kalesniko as his separate property.
Following these determinations, the trial court addressed the question of temporary spousal support: “[Kalesniko] acknowledges that but for the... equalization of the Switch payments in January 2007, the Court would have awarded pendente lite spousal support to [Ruff] from these proceeds at approximately 30 percent. Therefore[, ] with respect to the second payment..., where [Ruff] is receiving $27,641, she is receiving 31 percent of [$87,750].... With respect to the final... payment of $120,000..., [Kalesniko] shall be credited [sic] with a payment of $30,000 as and for pendente lite spousal support.” (Italics omitted.)
Ruff argues that the award of $30,000 was arbitrary in amount. However, because Ruff raised no objections to the pertinent portion of the statement of decision, we will imply any findings necessary to support the award, notwithstanding ambiguities or omissions in the statement of decision. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1132.) Furthermore, our review is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the implied findings. (In re Marriage of Cohn (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 923, 928.)
Here, as Ruff concedes, she made no express request for temporary spousal support at trial. The only proposal before the trial court regarding spousal support was Kalesniko’s suggested “rule of thumb.” The description of the rule by Kalesniko’s counsel is ambiguous: counsel may have intended to say that if Ruff were to receive 30 percent or less of the second installment, she would be entitled to some amount of support; alternatively, he may have intended to say that Ruff’s support should amount to 30 percent of Kalesniko’s separate property share of the Switch contract proceeds. Although the statement of decision is unclear regarding the trial court’s understanding of the proposed rule of thumb, the trial court decided to award Ruff $30,000 -- 25 percent of the $120,000 final installment -- as temporary spousal support.
We see no error in this award. As explained above (see pt. A.1., ante), the trial court had broad discretion to set the amount of the award, based on an assessment of Kalesniko’s ability to pay and Ruff’s needs. The trial court was thus not obliged to apply any “rule of thumb” regarding the amount of the award based on a percentage of Kalesniko’s separate property interest in the Switch contract proceeds. Because the trial court received considerable evidence regarding Kalesniko’s ability to pay temporary spousal support and Ruff’s expenses after separation, we discern no abuse of discretion in its determination of the appropriate amount of support.
Ruff suggests that she was entitled to 30 percent of Kalesniko’s separate property share of the second installment because the “rule of thumb” required support payments amounting to 30 percent of Kalesniko’s separate property share of the Switch proceeds. However, as Ruff acknowledges, no legal authority mandated the application of such a rule. Moreover, the trial court did not apply the purported rule, as it awarded Ruff only 25 percent of the third installment, all of which Kalesniko had been allocated as his separate property. Accordingly, we reject her contention.
3. Permanent Support
Ruff contends the trial court erred in declining to award her permanent spousal support. She argues that the trial court did not consider the section 4320 factors, and failed to make the express finding regarding the parties’ marital standard of living required under section 4332. These contentions fail on the record before us.
Section 4332 provides: “In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the court shall make specific factual findings with respect to the standard of living during the marriage, and, at the request of either party, the court shall make appropriate factual determinations with respect to other circumstances.”
Generally, under section 4320, “a key factor is the supporting party’s ‘ability to pay, ’ which encompasses assets as well as income. [Citations.] Thus, it is ‘proper for the court to look to assets controlled by husband, other than income, as a basis for the award [of spousal support].’ [Citation.] However, ... ‘it remains highly unusual for a court to use assets more than income as a basis for determining [spousal] support.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 304-305.) In assessing income, courts may examine earnings from employment during the preceding year (see In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1083), unless there are special circumstances, for example, fluctuations in a spouse’s income due to the particular circumstances of his or her employment (In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, 824-825).
In declining to award permanent spousal support to either Ruff or Kalesniko after the trial ended in December 2007, the trial court found that neither party had been employed or had earned any income since July 2006, when Kalesniko received the final installment of the Switch contract proceeds. The trial court further found that Kalesniko was not avoiding work, and that both parties were making substantial attempts to find employment. As the trial court noted, Kalesniko’s situation was not “unprecedented, ” as he had previously experienced “other work stoppages... ranging from six months to almost two years.” The trial court also stated: “There is no evidence regarding the parties’ separate estates and what the parties’ financial positions or relative income will be after distribution of the community property.” The trial court reserved its jurisdiction to make a support order in favor of either party, and ordered the parties to report new income to each other.
Ruff contends the record shows that the trial court failed to consider the section 4320 factors, as the statement of decision does not address most of them. We disagree. With the exception of a finding regarding the marital standard of living, the trial court was not obliged to make express findings regarding section 4320 factors. (§ 4332.) To the extent Ruff’s contention concerns the factors other than the marital standard of living, she has forfeited the contention, as she failed to request express findings or to object to their omission from the statement of decision. (In re Marriage of Cohn, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) Under these circumstances, we will presume that the trial court made the required findings. (Ibid.) In addition, we note that during closing argument, Ruff’s counsel discussed many of the section 4320 factors, including the marital standard of living. As the trial court’s attention was drawn to the factors, we will presume on an otherwise silent record that it discharged its official duty and considered all of them. (Evid. Code, § 664; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Burden of Proof and Presumptions, § 89, p. 223.)
Ruff also contends that the trial court failed to make an express finding regarding the marital standard of living. We discern no material error. Generally, “in bringing the marital standard of living into the spousal support equation, the Legislature intended to establish a reference point against which the other statutory factors... may be weighed and applied.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 6:838, p. 6-302.13, italics omitted.) However, as the court explained in In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 491, the Legislature, in enacting section 4332, provided no guidance regarding the proper manner of characterizing the marital standard of living. The court further stated: “It appears to us that the Legislature intended ‘marital standard of living’ to be a general description of the station in life the parties had achieved by the date of separation and this is satisfied by the everyday understanding of the term in its ordinary sense, i.e., upper, middle or lower income. Findings should be ‘specific” enough to be helpful in subsequent appellate or modification proceedings; the more specific the better.” (In re Marriage of Smith, at p. 491.)
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s statement of decision adequately specified the marital standard of living, even though it does not describe the standard as “upper, middle or lower income” (In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 491). The trial court effectively deferred ordering an award of spousal support until one of the parties established an adequate basis for support. The statement of decision contains numerous specific findings regarding the parties’ income, employment, and possessions during their marriage, including their home, which was valued at approximately $1.5 million. In view of these findings, their marital station in life is inferable for purposes of appellate review and any subsequent order regarding spousal support.
Ruff contends the trial court erred in declining to order spousal support because the evidence showed that Kalesniko had some assets that could provide funds for support, notwithstanding his lack of employment income. However, the trial court has broad discretion to determine a spouse’s ability to pay support. (In re Marriage of Simpson (1992) 4 Cal.4th 225, 232.) Here, the trial court was aware of Kalesniko’s assets, but concluded that his overall financial condition could not then be determined for purposes of ordering spousal support. As the trial court received little or no evidence at trial regarding Kalesniko’s current expenditures and debts or his tax liabilities flowing from the division of the community estate, we see no abuse of discretion.
As noted above, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to award permanent spousal support in the future.
B. Community Estate
We turn to Ruff’s contentions regarding the division of the community estate and related matters. To the extent Ruff challenges the factual basis for the trial court’s rulings, we inspect the record for substantial evidence to support them. “On review for substantial evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference. [Citation.] We accept all evidence favorable to the prevailing party as true and discard contrary evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Hokanson (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987, 994.)
1. Ruff’s Postseparation Use of House
Ruff contends the trial court erred in directing her to reimburse the community estate for her exclusive postseparation use of the parties’ house. In In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 372-374 (Watts), a spouse sought reimbursement for the other spouse’s exclusive use of the marital house, a community asset, between separation and trial of a dissolution petition. The appellate court held that reimbursement may be ordered if appropriate under the circumstances. (See id. at p. 374.) In so concluding, the appellate court noted that in In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85 (Epstein), our Supreme Court approved reasonable reimbursement awards in related circumstances, namely, when spouses use separate funds after the date of separation to pay community debts. (See also In re Marriage of Smith (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 725, 746-748.) For the reasons explained below, we reject Ruff’s challenges to the so-called “Watts credit.”
Here, Kalesniko testified that when he returned from Australia, Ruff locked him out of the house. Later, she permitted him to retrieve his laptop computer, but otherwise denied him access to the house and his belongings. Ruff also testified that she locked Kalesniko out of the house in October 2005, and never invited him to return. The trial court received evidence that the reasonable monthly rental value of the house was $4,400.
In the statement of decision, the trial court found that after Ruff locked Kalesniko out of the house in October 2005, she had exclusive use of the house for 24 months, until the time of trial; that the community estate paid the mortgage on the house during this period; and that Ruff denied Kalesniko access to his belongings in the house. The trial court further found that the house’s fair monthly rental value was $4,000; that Ruff had personally made improvements to the house, which the trial court valued at $1,000 per month; and that the adjustment for Ruff ’s improvements reduced its fair monthly rental value to the community to $3,000. The trial court thus directed Ruff to reimburse the community the sum of $36,000 ($1,500 per month for 24 months) for her exclusive possession of the house.
Ruff contends the trial court erred in determining the amount of the Watts credit. Her principal argument is that she was entitled to a credit for paying some of the mortgage payments under Epstein. At trial, Ruff testified that the monthly mortgage payments were paid automatically from an account in Kalesniko’s name until August 2006, when the account was exhausted. Kalesniko then gave Ruff $5,000, which she deposited in the account for mortgage payments. After the account again became depleted in December 2006, Ruff paid the mortgage payments from the community funds she had received in January 2007, when the trial court tentatively divided the Switch contract proceeds. On appeal, Ruff argues that this evidence obliged the trial court to apply an Epstein credit in her favor against the Watts credit to Kalesniko.
Ruff has forfeited this contention, as she neither sought an Epstein credit at trial nor established the foundation for such a credit. Because the awarding of an Epstein credit is “‘not... automatic[]’” (Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 84, quoting In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at p. 747), a spouse seeking the credit must take action to obtain it. (In re Marriage of Feldner (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 617, 624 (Feldner).) The court explained in Feldner: “[J]ust because a spouse may have a right to request reimbursement does not mean the family law court has a sua sponte duty to consider the possibility. With regard to the use of postseparation earnings to, in effect, preserve a community asset [], reimbursement... involves the consideration of such a variety of factors [citation] that the onus must necessarily be on the paying spouse to specifically request reimbursement.” (Id. at pp. 624-625.) As the court further noted, section 2640 specifically governs the right of reimbursement when separate property funds are used to reduce the principal on loans for the acquisition of community property. The court concluded: “[E]ven reimbursement under section 2640... requires the paying spouse to trace contributions to a separate property source. If the paying spouse simply sits back and does nothing, there will be no reimbursement.” (Feldner, at p. 625.)
Subdivision (b) of section 2640 provides in pertinent part: “In the division of the community estate under this division, unless a party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement or has signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for the party’s contributions to the acquisition of property of the community property estate to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source.”
Although Ruff testified that she made payments from the funds she obtained in January 2007, she never attempted to show that the payments she made were from her separate property, as determined at trial. As explained above, in January 2007, the trial court tentatively divided the Switch contract proceeds, with the express reservation that it would not determine the parties’ entitlement to the funds until trial. In opposing the Watts credit, Ruff’s counsel argued that Ruff had used some of her tentative Switch contract proceeds to pay mortgage payments. However, counsel never suggested that Ruff sought reimbursement for the payments or that the trial court must attribute the payments to Ruff’s portion of the Switch contract proceeds if the trial court ordered an adjustment in the tentative division of the proceeds. Ruff has thus forfeited her contention.
Ruff also contends that the trial court, in awarding the Watts credit, failed to consider whether Ruff’s exclusive possession of the house should be regarded as a means by which Kalesniko discharged his duty to provide temporary spousal support. We see no such error. Generally, the trial court may deny a Watts credit when a spouse’s exclusive possession of a house is a form of spousal support. (In re Marriage of Garcia (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 885, 894-895 [husband was not entitled to Watts credit due to wife’s exclusive postseparation occupation of house because her possession discharged husband’s support duty]; see also In re Marriage of Stallworth (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 742, 751-753 [husband was not entitled to reimbursement for wife’s post-separation use of community funds to the extent her use of the funds discharged his support duty].) Here, the trial court expressly awarded Ruff retroactive temporary spousal support in allocating the Switch contract proceeds. As the trial court ordered spousal support in another context, it did not disregard spousal support in awarding the Watts credit.
In a related contention, Ruff argues that the trial court should have made findings regarding whether her exclusive possession of the house reasonably constituted a form of temporary spousal support, in lieu of assessing a Watts credit. She has forfeited this contention, as she concedes that she never requested temporary spousal support at trial.
Ruff also contends that the trial court erred in finding that her work on the house was worth $1,000 per month, arguing that there is no substantial evidence to support this value. Although Ruff testified that she personally oversaw work performed on the house to facilitate its sale, she provided no testimony regarding the precise value of her labor, and the record otherwise discloses none. We nonetheless decline to reverse the judgment on this basis, as Ruff has not shown that the finding is prejudicial to her: the net effect of the finding was beneficial to Ruff, as it reduced Kalesniko’s Watts credit from $48,000 ($2,000 per month for 24 months) to $36,000 ($1,500 per month for 24 months). In sum, we discern no reversible error in the Watts credit.
1. Ruff’s Postseparation Credit Card Debt
Ruff contends the trial court erred in requiring her to reimburse the community estate for credit card debts she incurred after the parties separated. We disagree.
At trial, Kalesniko testified that in October 2005, when the parties separated, he stopped placing charges on three credit cards that the parties had jointly used. He never submitted a change of address to the credit card companies, and received no statements regarding the cards until late 2006, when the companies began phoning him to demand payment for charges that had accrued since October 2005. The statements disclosed charges for a trip to Rome and other expenses he had never incurred. According to Kalesniko, he never authorized Ruff to place the charges on the credit cards.
Ruff testified that after the parties separated, Kalesniko told her to use the credit cards. As she had little money, she placed living expenses, housing expenses, and certain expenditures for Lonsdale on the cards until August 2006, but never forwarded information regarding the unpaid balances to Kalesniko. She acknowledged that the statements for the cards disclosed charges for trips to New Jersey, Sundance, Atlanta, London, and Berlin.
Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court determined that Kalesniko was entitled to an Epstein credit for Ruff’s post-separation use of the credit cards to pay personal expenses. The judgment directed Ruff to pay the entire balance owing on the cards from her share of the proceeds from the sale of the house.
In the order after trial, the court found that the Epstein credit amounted to $43,057.03.
Ruff contends the trial court erred in directing her to pay the entire balance owing on the cards, arguing that some or all of her credit card expenditures were chargeable to the community as “[d]ebts incurred... for the common necessaries of life” (§ 2623, subd. (a)). However, the determination whether Ruff’s credit card expenditures were her separate debt was consigned to the trial court. (In re Marriage of Cairo (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1255, 1267.) Here, the trial court heard testimony that many of the expenditures were for trips, and it otherwise examined the credit card statements, which were admitted into evidence. On appeal, Ruff has not argued that any specific expenditures were “for the common necessaries of life” (§ 2623, subd. (a)). Under the circumstances, “[t]he resolution of the conflict in the evidence was for the trial court; we will not disturb that determination.” (In re Marriage of Cairo, at p. 1267.)
3. Creative Properties
Ruff challenges the allocation of several creative properties. Her principal contention is that the trial court erred in failing to assign her an appropriate interest in the rights regarding the properties. Generally, in dissolution proceedings, the family court must divide the community estate equally. (§ 2550.) Nonetheless, “[w]here economic circumstances warrant, the court may award an asset of the community estate to one party on such conditions as the court deems proper to effect a substantially equal division of the community estate.” (§ 2601; see In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 885-886.)
a. Underlying Proceedings
At trial, Ruff submitted an exhibit denominated “Exhibit XX, ” which identified 21 script projects and other creative ventures undertaken by Kalesniko since 1991. Kalesniko testified regarding his rights with respect to the projects listed on Exhibit XX, and described whether the pertinent movie or television program had been made. Kalesniko also provided similar testimony regarding five other projects not listed on Exhibit XX. According to Kalesniko, few of the script projects had resulted in a movie or television program, although there was a chance that some of these projects would be completed; moreover, he lacked ownership rights regarding most of the scripts, although in some instances he retained an opportunity to pursue scriptwriting credits. In addition, Kalesniko and Ruff testified that they had collaborated on another movie: he had written the script and she had produced the movie.
During closing argument, Ruff’s counsel stated: “Ruff... seek[s] an order that future income from any projects developed or written during marriage will be distributed one[-]half to her. And our [Exhibit XX] identifies the projects that [Kalesniko] claim[s to] have created during marriage.” The colloquy ensued:
“The Court: I have extensive notes as to what the parties agreed were the projects. But let me see if there [are] any disagreements. These projects are the creative works of [Kalesniko]. And do you disagree that rights [to] production[, ] to the use of the projects[, ] to register them, should remain with [Kalesniko] so long as he regularly reports to the respondent and shares the income from any community property[?]
“[Ruff]: I don’t disagree with that.
“The Court: That will be my ruling on that when I make my ruling because I think that’s appropriate since they are just creative works.
“[Ruff’s counsel]: Yes, I do to[o].”
Later, in announcing the proposed statement of decision, the trial court reaffirmed this ruling and clarified that all income arising from new work by Kalesniko on the projects that was “not contemplated” during marriage would not be community property. The trial court listed 16 projects it had tentatively identified as community property, and invited Ruff to propose any other projects that should be included.
Ruff asked the trial court to include a script project entitled “Spoiler” and a novel entitled “Pucker Up.” Ruff otherwise raised no objections to the trial court’s rulings regarding the allocation of income from the projects. The statement of decision and judgment, as filed, list 17 projects: the 16 projects the trial court had tentatively identified, plus Spoiler. Regarding these projects, the statement of decision and judgment require Kalesniko to give Ruff 50 percent of “any income and/or residuals not generated by post[]separation efforts.” The statement of decision further provides: “Any new retention by [Kalesniko] on projects during marriage, for work that was not contemplated as within the work to be performed during marriage or in which the community no longer has any interest, will not be deemed to fall under residuals or be community property. For example, if [Kalesniko] is hired to rewrite or direct something he wrote during marriage, the community will receive residuals on the work performed during the marriage, but the proceeds of the rewrite contract or... the director’s fees will be [Kalesniko’s] separate property.”
2. Ruff’s Contentions
Ruff contends that the final list of 17 projects is incomplete. However, aside from requesting the inclusion of Spoiler and Pucker Up, she raised no pertinent objection to the list. She has thus forfeited the contention, to the extent it encompasses other potential projects. (In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [spouse forfeited contentions regarding omissions and errors in child support calculation by failing to raised them before trial court].) As the trial court included Spoiler in the final list, we limit our review to Pucker Up. Because Kalesniko testified that he wrote this novel after he completed the Switch contract, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that it did not belong on the list.
As Ruff does not challenge the inclusion of any of the projects on the list, she has forfeited any such contention.
In addition, Ruff contends that the trial court improperly failed to assess the community estate’s rights and interests in the projects, beyond its entitlement to revenues from the projects arising from Kalesniko’s work, as described in the statement of decision and judgment. She argues that the trial court was obliged to assess the value of the copyright interests and development rights (if any) associated with the projects, and to allocate their value between the parties. We conclude that Ruff has also forfeited this contention. The nature and scope of the trial court’s rulings regarding the projects was founded on the express agreement of Ruff and her counsel (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 395, p. 453.); moreover, Ruff never objected to the rulings entered following the agreement (In re Marriage of Hinman, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002).
We note that the parties dispute whether the judgment assigned the projects to Kalesniko as his separate property, aside from his entitlement to the potential revenue described above. Ruff asserts that the judgment made this assignment; Kalesniko maintains that the judgment assigned the projects to neither party. For the reasons explained above, we need not resolve this dispute.
4. Lonsdale
Ruff contends the trial court erred in allocating Lonsdale, the loan-out corporation. She argues that the trial court improperly failed to place a value on Lonsdale’s stock. This contention fails on the record before us.
At trial, Kalesniko testified that Lonsdale had been incorporated in the mid-90’s. Ruff testified that she and Kalesniko held equal shares in Lonsdale and both used Lonsdale as their “d.b.a;” in addition, she managed Lonsdale’s checking account and other corporate matters. According to Ruff, Lonsdale was her “identity, ” and she marketed herself as Lonsdale.
Regarding the proper allocation of Lonsdale, Ruff initially testified that she wanted the “Lonsdale corporate shell” awarded to her. However, when Ruff was later examined by her counsel, she testified as follows:
“Q. What have you decided with respect to the stock in Lonsdale?
“A. I don’t know the value of it at this point, but I no longer want the Lonsdale name. I’m not going to operate under the Lonsdale name any longer. So we either keep 50/50 or I don’t know how that works. I have to talk to my accountant, but I’m not interested. [¶]... [¶]
“The Court: You’re not seeking to have the Lonsdale name?
“A. No.”
In closing argument, Ruff’s counsel stated: “With respect to Lonsdale. [Ruff] did agree to give up the name and the corporate shell. She would like to have a distribution from the sale proceeds of the residence of $5,000 to start a new corporation.” The following colloquy ensued:
“The Court: You’re saying that Lonsdale has a goodwill or some value?
“[Counsel]: No, I’m simply saying that she needs a loan[-]out corporation of her own to work with....
“The Court: It needs value to do so....
“[Counsel]: It’s the cost of forming it, that’s all it is.”
In the statement of decision, the trial court rejected Ruff’s contention that she, rather than Kalesniko, was identified with Lonsdale. The trial court awarded Lonsdale’s corporate shell and name to Kalesniko, valued Londale’s goodwill at $7,500, and directed Kalesniko to pay Ruff $3,750 for her share of the corporate goodwill. In somewhat different terms, the judgment ordered Kalesniko to pay Ruff this sum as her share of the Lonsdale “corporate shell and stock.”
We conclude that the trial court did not err in declining to place a specific value on Lonsdale’s stock, as Ruff never asked the court to do so, and the parties presented no evidence directly bearing on this value. Ruff’s remaining challenges to the trial court’s rulings fail for want of a showing of prejudice. She argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s valuation of Lonsdale’s goodwill; in addition, she points to the discrepancies between the statement of decision and judgment. As Ruff has not shown how these aspects of the rulings are injurious to her, we decline to reverse the judgment on their basis.
The unsworn statements and arguments of Ruff’s counsel are not evidence. (Estate of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1090-1091.)
C. Stipulations
Ruff contends that her trial counsel twice exceeded her authority in the course of the underlying proceedings. She argues that counsel entered into an unauthorized stipulation during trial, and later improperly agreed to the deletion of a provision in the judgment that safeguarded her rights regarding Kalesniko’s car. For the reasons explained below, we reject her contention regarding the trial stipulation, but conclude that the removal of the judgment provision regarding the car requires a reversal for further proceedings.
1. Governing Principles
Generally, “the attorney-client relationship, insofar as it concerns the authority of the attorney to bind his client by agreement or stipulation, is governed by the principles of agency. [Citation.] Hence, ‘the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client.’” (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 403, quoting 1 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 107, p. 117.) The attorney-client relationship authorizes an attorney to bind his or her client regarding procedural or tactical matters without the client’s express consent, but does not permit the attorney to enter into agreements or stipulations that settle a claim, eliminate an essential defense, or otherwise “‘impair the client’s substantial rights.’” (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., at pp. 403-404, quoting Linsk v. Linsk (1969) 70 Cal.2d 272, 276.)
In In re Marriage of Helsel (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 332, 339-340 (Helsel), the court explained the application of these principles to family court actions: “When a lawyer agrees to settle the typical civil case, the case ends as far as the client is concerned. In the typical family law case, however, quite the opposite is true. Frequently at least some issues... are resolved by way of a stipulation between the parties.... In the family law context, a stipulation in a given case may be tantamount to settling the entire dispute or may represent merely the flea on the back of the elephant.... [¶] Thus in family law cases where the court is confronted with a motion to set aside a stipulation..., it must determine whether issues disposed of... were central to the controversy. If the dispute is substantially resolved by virtue of the stipulation, it is tantamount to the settlement and dismissal of the typical civil case which... cannot stand if the client can demonstrate a lack of authorization. On the other hand, if the substantial portion of the case remains to be litigated, the stipulation represents largely a winnowing of the issues so that the dispute is focused for trial. Under such circumstances, we do not believe the system is best served -- especially in the often emotionally charged family law environs -- if clients may routinely set aside stipulations entered into by their lawyers as to matters which are insubstantial and collateral to the heart of the dispute.”
2. Trial Stipulation
We begin with Ruff’s contention regarding the stipulation at trial. The crux of the contention is that Ruff’s trial counsel improperly compromised her claim to community funds held in three checking accounts.
a. Underlying Proceedings
After the parties separated, they withdrew community funds from a Lonsdale checking account, a checking account in Ruff’s name, and a checking account in Kalesniko’s name. On July 13, 2007, the first day of trial, in the presence of Ruff and Kalesniko, the parties’ counsel announced that they intended to hire a single accountant to examine the accounts and provide a report regarding the withdrawal of funds. According to counsel, they would accept the accountant’s report in lieu of further “proof of the numbers, ” although they planned to present evidence at trial regarding the “characterization” of the parties’ use of the funds.
On August 9, 2007, at the beginning of the proceedings, the parties’ counsel stated that they had received the accountant’s report, and had agreed to a stipulation. Counsel explained that although the stipulation relied on the report, it went beyond the report in allocating the use of the community funds to the parties. According to counsel, Ruff’s withdrawals had exceeded Kalesniko’s withdrawals by $116,000, which would have required her to pay him an “equalization payment” of $58,000, absent other considerations. However, because Kalesniko received interest from some of the accounts, the parties agreed that Ruff’s equalization payment should be set at $55,000. Although the record does not affirmatively state that Ruff was present during this discussion, she was called to testify immediately after the stipulation was announced.
On October 18, 2007, while Ruff was testifying, Ruff’s counsel paused in her examination of Ruff to make an offer of proof based on the stipulation, which had been -- to use counsel’s phrase -- “happily announced” on August 9. After explaining the content of the stipulation, including the fact that it obliged Ruff to make a $55,000 equalization payment, Ruff’s counsel stated that Ruff intended to testify that after the period covered by the accountant’s report, she made payments totaling approximately $11,000 from one of the accounts for the benefit of the community. The trial court permitted Ruff to so testify.
In the proposed statement of decision, the trial court relied on the stipulation to determine the payment needed to equalize the parties’ use of community funds after their separation; in addition, the trial court adjusted the equalization payment in light of Ruff ’s testimony, as described above. Although the record discloses that Ruff received a copy of the proposed statement of decision, she never objected to the stipulation prior to this appeal.
b. Analysis
We conclude that Ruff’s trial counsel did not exceed her authority in entering into the stipulation, as the stipulation did not “substantially resolve[]” the disputes between the parties. (Helsel, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 340.) Nothing before us suggests that prior to trial, Ruff asserted a claim or defense regarding the parties’ use of the checking account funds; she never asserted that her equalization payment regarding the checking account funds should be less than $55,000, or that Kalesniko owed her an equalization payment regarding the funds. Rather, the parties appear to have hired the accountant to examine the accounts because they did not know how the funds in the accounts had been used. The record thus shows only that the stipulation expedited the litigation without resolving any of Ruff’s asserted claims or defenses. Because the stipulation left the substance of Ruff’s claims and defenses untouched, the stipulation was within the authority of her trial counsel, and the court did not err in accepting it. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the stipulation impaired Ruff’s substantial rights in some manner, the record establishes that she ratified the stipulation through her conduct at trial. As explained in City of Fresno v. Baboian (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 753, 755-760, a party may ratify a disadvantageous stipulation by conducting litigation on its basis without challenging it in the trial court. There, a city began a condemnation action to obtain property for a community center. (Id. at p. 755.) The property owners hired an attorney to stop the condemnation action or, alternatively, obtain a higher price for the property than the city had offered. (Ibid.) The attorney entered into an unauthorized stipulation that gave the city possession of the property in exchange for $15,000, and then misappropriated the funds. (Id. at pp. 755-756.) The owners fired the attorney, but continued the litigation without challenging the settlement; they contended only that the city was not entitled to a credit of $15,000 against the compensation paid for the property. (Id. at pp. 756-757.) After the trial court rejected this contention, the owners argued on appeal that the stipulation exceeded the attorney’s authority. (Id. at pp. 757-758.) The appellate court agreed, but concluded that the owners had ratified the stipulation by their conduct at trial. (Id. at pp. 759-760.)
Here, Ruff was aware of the stipulation and understood its consequences for the equalization payment. Instead of challenging the stipulation, she provided testimony that she knew the trial court would rely upon in applying the stipulation. Not only did she raise no objection to the stipulation before the trial court, she ratified it by her conduct. In sum, Ruff’s contentions regarding the stipulation fail on the record before us.
For the reasons described above, we reject Ruff’s contention that the trial court was obliged to obtain her express consent to the stipulation. She suggests that Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, which establishes an enforcement procedure for judgments entered upon the basis of settlement agreements, required the trial court to obtain Ruff’s personal consent to the stipulation. However, the stipulation did not constitute a settlement of her claims; furthermore, Ruff never raised any objection to the stipulation before the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 or on any other basis.
3. Kalesniko’s Car
We turn to Ruff’s contention regarding the deletion of the judgment provision concerning Kalesniko’s car. Ruff argues that her trial counsel, in agreeing to the deletion, improperly settled her claim regarding the car.
The facts pertinent to the contention are as follows: Prior to trial, Ruff claimed that Kalesniko’s car was community property. Kalesniko testified at trial that he bought a used car valued at $27,000 in October 2005. To purchase it, he traded in a truck owned by the community for $7,000, and paid the balance of $20,000 with funds from a personal checking account. The proposed statement of decision awarded the car to Kalesniko, directed him to pay $3,500 to Ruff for the trade-in value of the truck, and reserved the trial court’s discretion to determine the value of the car “for purposes of equalization, if necessary.” The proposed judgment contained essentially identical provisions.
On April 28, 2008, the parties’ counsel told the trial court that they were in the process of resolving minor disputes regarding the statement of decision and judgment. Later, on May 12, 2008, counsel appeared before the trial court and submitted the statement of decision and judgment they had approved to the court for its signature. Neither Ruff nor Kalesniko was present. Although the statement of decision, as filed, contains the provisions described above, the judgment, as entered, displays a modification: the provision that reserved the trial court’s jurisdiction to determine the car’s value has been deleted by handwritten lineation. Accompanying the lineation are the initials of the parties’ counsel.
On the record before us, we cannot resolve whether Ruff’s counsel acted beyond her authority in removing the provision from the judgment, which effectively settled Ruff’s claim regarding Kalesniko’s car. Here, unlike the trial stipulation discussed above (see pt. C.2.b., ante), Ruff claimed before trial that Kalesniko’s car belonged to the community estate. Although the trial court awarded Ruff a share of the value of the community-owned truck that Kalesniko used to buy the car, it reserved its jurisdiction to determine whether Ruff was entitled to further reimbursement for the community funds (if any) Kalesniko used to complete the purchase. On the face of the record, the settlement of Ruff’s potential claim for further reimbursement cannot be determined to be a mere “winnowing of the issues, ” (Helsel, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 339), as her recovery could amount to as much as $10,000; moreover, nothing before us indicates that Ruff agreed to the removal of the judgment provision or that she ratified it.
As the court explained in Helsel, when, as here, the appellate record is inadequate to show whether an attorney exceeded his or her authority, the appropriate remedy is to reverse the judgment with respect to the challenged stipulation, and to remand the matter so that the trial court may determine whether the stipulation should be set aside. (Helsel, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 340-341.) We therefore will do so.
D. Posttrial Order
Ruff challenges the posttrial order insofar as it obliges her to pay the penalties and interest arising from Lonsdale’s unpaid taxes. Kalesniko contends that Ruff’s appeal must be dismissed to the extent she challenges the posttrial order because she never filed a notice of appeal regarding it. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Ruff’s contentions regarding the posttrial order.
We begin by observing that the posttrial order (insofar as Ruff challenges it) was appealable separately from the judgment. As our Supreme Court has explained: “When a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken. [Citations.] This constitutes a necessary exception to the one final judgment rule. Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 368.)
The posttrial order satisfies this test for separate appealability. On April 28, 2008, at the hearing on Kalesniko’s application for the posttrial order, the trial court expressly amended the preliminary statement of decision to reserve its jurisdiction over all taxation issues. After hearing testimony from Ruff regarding her failure to pay Lonsdale’s taxes, the trial court ordered her to pay “any interest and penalties associated with the non[]payment of Lonsdale income taxes for [the] period ending March 31, 2006.” As Ruff had not then filed the pertinent tax return, the trial court stated that the amount of the interest and tax penalties would be “up to [Ruff], ” and advised her to file the tax return as soon as possible.
The posttrial order thus directed Ruff to pay money and was collateral to the judgment, as the trial court expressly placed the issue of tax liabilities outside the scope of the judgment. Moreover, although the trial court did not determine the amount of money at issue, the order was sufficiently “dispositive of the rights of the parties” to constitute a final order (In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 368). (See San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1402-1403, fn. 1 [order directing party to share pre-trial case management costs for certain tests was final and separately appealable, though party’s ultimate share of the costs not fixed at the time of the order]; Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-299 [order directing party to pay a fixed hourly fee for deposing expert witness was final and separately appealable, though order did not direct payment of determinate amount of money]). Here, the parties do not dispute that the amount of the tax penalties and interest will be determined by the tax authorities, rather than the trial court, once the tax return is completed.
As the posttrial order was separately appealable, Ruff was obliged to notice an appeal from it (see In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119). She did not do so. Generally, “‘“[w]here several judgments and/or orders occurring close in time are separately appealable..., each appealable judgment and order must be expressly specified -- in either a single notice of appeal or multiple notices of appeal -- in order to be reviewable on appeal.”’” (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 239 (Sole Energy), quoting DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43.) Thus, in Sole Energy, the appellate court held that a notice of appeal that referred only to the judgment did not encompass a separately appealable order filed shortly before the judgment was entered. (Id. at pp. 239-240.) Here, the notice of appeal refers exclusively to the May 12, 2008 judgment, and does not mention the posttrial order, which was filed on the same date. As Ruff failed to notice a timely appeal from the posttrial order, we have no jurisdiction to review the order. (Id. at p. 240.)
Ruff’s reliance on Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15 (Walker), Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54 (Luz), and Adams v. Talbott (1942) 20 Cal.2d 415 (Adams) is misplaced. In Walker, the plaintiff noticed an appeal solely from the denial of her motion for a new trial, which is not an appealable order. (Walker, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 19-20.) Pointing to the policy encouraging the liberal interpretation of notice of appeal, our Supreme Court held that the notice should be interpreted to include the underlying judgment. (Id. at pp. 20-22.) However, as explained in Sole Energy, this policy does not operate to preserve an appeal from a separately appealable order when, as here, the notice of appeal designates only the judgment. (Sole Energy, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 239-240; see also Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 47 [“The rule favoring appealability in cases of ambiguity cannot apply where there is a clear intention to appeal from only part of the judgment or one of two separate appeable judgments or orders.”].)
In Luz and Adams, the pertinent notices of appeal failed to mention the specific judgment or order from which the party sought to appeal, but contained general language which, reasonably viewed, referred to the judgment or order. (Luz, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 59-60 [notice asserted appeal from “‘all orders and rulings... adverse to [appellants]’”]; Adams, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 417 [reference to unspecified “‘judgment’” in notice designated appealable order].) Here, the notice of appeal specifically designates the “[j]udgment after court trial” entered May 12, 2008, and contains no reference to other rulings. Although the notice contained several boxes and blanks that permitted Ruff to specify other rulings from which she intended to appeal, Ruff placed no notations in them. In sum, Ruff’s appeal must be dismissed insofar as she challenges the posttrial order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed solely with respect to the determinations concerning Kalesniko’s car, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings regarding the potentially unauthorized deletion of the judgment provision concerning Kalesniko’s car, in accordance with this opinion (see pt. C.3., ante). The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Ruff’s appeal is dismissed to the extent she challenges the posttrial order. Kalesniko is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., SUZUKAWA, J.
(1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
(2) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.
(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.
(c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living.
(d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage.
(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party.
(f) The duration of the marriage.
(g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the party.
(h) The age and health of the parties.
(i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence... between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party, and consideration of any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party.
(j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
(k) The balance of the hardships to each party.
(l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. Except in the case of a marriage of long duration as described in Section 4336, a ‘reasonable period of time’ for purposes of this section generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage....
(m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4325. (n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable.”
Ruff’s reply brief also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award of temporary spousal support after trial. We disagree. Generally, the trial court may issue a retroactive award of temporary spousal support. (In re Marriage of Dick, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 165-166.) Here, the parties apparently agreed at the January 2007 hearing that the trial court could order temporary support after adjusting the tentative division of the Switch contract funds; at trial, Kalesniko resurrected this possibility without objection from Ruff. Under these circumstances, we see no error in the making of the award; moreover, we note that Ruff has not suggested how she may have been prejudiced by an award of temporary spousal support she did not request.