Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. IND059072 Sarah Adams Christian, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Law Quinta Law Group and Timothy L. Ewanyshyn for Appellant.
Hermes & Glavin and Peter Timothy Hermes for Respondent.
McKINSTER, J.
Appellant John Ritchie Parrish (father) and respondent Joyce Rae Parrish (mother) are the parents of two minor children, H.B. (the daughter) and J.T (the son). Father appeals orders of the family law court establishing child support, arrearages, and ordering him to pay attorney fees, as well as orders precluding father from contacting mother and any of the children’s schools, doctors and therapists, and from accessing any records concerning the location of the children’s residences, schools, doctors and therapists. We affirm the child support order, but reverse the attorney fees order and the protective orders, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in 1999. The proceedings were very lengthy, protracted, and acrimonious. At one point, father was incarcerated. Mother had sole physical custody during this period. At other times, the court imposed sanctions on mother for her conduct in the proceedings.
At the end of 2005, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment. They were awarded joint legal and physical custody. Father’s residence was deemed the children’s residence for purposes of their school assignment. The time share of each parent was to be equal; because of the equal time share of custody and approximately equivalent income of each parent, no child support was ordered. Dr. Amy Miller was appointed as a special master to help the parties resolve any difficulties that arose.
In 2006, problems apparently escalated. Child protective services in San Diego County intervened, resulting in a temporary restraining order and apparent suspension of father’s visits, with physical custody granted to mother. Dr. Miller withdrew from the case. Father was ordered to attend therapy with Dr. Karoub. Dr. Karoub’s report was lodged in December 2006, and in January 2007 the court entered a statement of decision on its order modifying custody and visitation.
The court adverted to the “best interest of the child” standard, including consideration of the health, safety and welfare of a child. The court found, “[i]n this case we have had the involvement of numerous professionals in trying to determine just what would be in [the children’s] best interests. We have had mediators, psychologists, and child welfare social workers. We have had acrimonious and lengthy hearings, which followed the filing of voluminous court papers, including declarations and exhibits of every stripe, and allegations made by each of the parties against the other. Accusations of obstruction of the parental relationship, emotional abuse, and general foul play and unfair dealing have been made.”
The court took account of social workers’ reports and the report of a therapist, Dr. Karoub, as well as the wishes of the children. The court remarked, “In a case where I would wish for the wisdom of Solom[o]n, at least one situation seems strangely similar to the scenario when Solom[o]n ordered the baby cut in two and divided between the two women claiming to be his mother. When, in my frustration, I suggested that it might be better for the children to be placed in a boarding school and thus removed from both parents, [mother] was visibly appalled and shaken. [Father], on the other hand, in an e-mail to [mother]... stated, ‘I am going to formally ask... that the court seriously consider boarding school for our children as the only way of guaranteeing free and equal access to our children and their records.... It is clear to all now that we will never be able to allow this current custody dispute to continue and complying with any order made is impossible for you while [mother’s new husband] is involved. I encourage you to work with me to find an appropriate boarding school and agree on it before the court does so for us.’” Shockingly, as the court found, father “would rather have his 10 and 12 year old children living away from both parents in an institutional setting, rather than allow them to live with their mother and, most particularly, with their new stepfather. I find that akin to cutting the baby in half.”
The court also made findings, based on reports of the San Diego County welfare services that “emotional abuse had occurred, perpetrated by [father]. It was the observation of Ms. Karoub [the therapist] that [father] is an extremely angry man, who is hostile toward [mother], that his anger is affecting all the parties involved and that it needs to be eliminated in order to have a normal, healthy situation. Ms. Karoub opined that [father]’s anger is spilling over to [the daughter]. She further states that [father] creates confrontation not resolution with [the son], which elevates [the son]’s level of anger, fear and anxiety towards his father. She further states that when [the son] explained to [father] in session that he doesn’t want to live with him, [father] explained that residing in San Diego [i.e., with mother] is not an option. It is Ms. Karoub’s opinion that this statement is not appropriate for purposes of reunification and pushes [the son] further away, creating added anxiety.”
Accordingly, the court made orders granting sole physical custody to mother, and giving mother decision-making authority over issues such as education, religion, medical care and mental health treatment. Father’s visitation was terminated. Father was ordered to complete parenting classes and anger management classes, and to file proof of completion within six months. The parties were ordered to request leave of court before filing any further modification of the orders, and no modification would be made unless father had completed the required classes.
In April 2008, mother filed an order to show cause (OSC) to modify support, custody and visitation. Inasmuch as father’s visitation had been terminated, and mother had full-time custody, the parties no longer had equal custody time. In addition, mother had no income, while father had testified to income of $1,200 per month. Mother therefore requested a guideline support order. Father’s conduct since the previous order suspending his visitation had been angry and abusive, and he had not filed proof of completion of a parenting class or anger management class within six months, as ordered by the court. Mother averred that the children had been terrorized by father’s angry and manipulative behavior. Dr. Karoub diagnosed the daughter as having an anxiety disorder, a paranoid personality disorder, and suffered from anxiety and panic attacks. The son had an anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The children started treating with a new therapist, Dr. Robinson. Dr. Robinson confirmed the diagnoses, except that she found both children had PTSD. The staff at the daughter’s school reported that father had harassed them with demands for information relating to the daughter.
Mother averred that father had a history of harassing behavior toward any of the children’s schools, therapists and medical providers. The daughter was upset and crying, fearful that father would show up at her school and try to take her. Father had attempted to do so once in 2006. Mother took the daughter to a doctor for treatment of her anxiety and distress. Father later disrupted the doctor’s practice, accompanied by police, and threatened the doctor with a lawsuit if she continued treating the daughter. Father had similarly threatened Dr. Karoub.
Mother attached to her moving papers a series of e-mails between father and mother’s attorney, concerning father’s demands for paperwork and information about the children’s schools and medical treatment. Father’s writings were hostile, angry, abusive and threatening.
Dr. Robinson wrote a letter concerning the children’s diagnoses and proposed length of treatment, to which father responded by demanding further information from Dr. Robinson. Dr. Robinson’s letter stated that the daughter, in particular, “repeatedly asks if there is any way her father can find her. Thus, [she] has an intense fear of attending school. She is worried that her father will show up and try to take her. She discusses at length what she would do if he tried to kidnap her.... Previously, [father] had showed up at... school, and as a result the teacher had to lock the students and [the daughter] in the classroom to keep [the daughter] safe. This was very traumatic for [her]. She is also in constant fear for her mother. She believes her father will stop at nothing to hurt her and her mother.... According to [the daughter], when she was in contact with her father he had threatened to have his ‘prison buddies, take care of mom.’...” The daughter had nightmares and panic attacks. The son also had nightmares and feared his father would kidnap him. Dr. Robinson recommended that father have no access to the children’s whereabouts, school addresses or home addresses.
Mother therefore sought permanent protective orders preventing father from access to the children’s school, doctor and therapist information.
Father filed responsive declarations. First, he disputed mother’s claim of zero income. Second, he opposed the request for protective orders, providing certificates that, in October 2007, he had completed a four-hour class on the impact of divorce on children, and a four-hour class in anger management. He complained that he had been unable to obtain the children’s school grades, medical records, religious records or other paperwork despite numerous requests. He accused the new stepfather of an incident of abandoning the son by the side of the road for having spilled a drink in the car. Father complained that mother had already made the educational, religious and medical decision for the children anyway, and granting the OSC would effectively deny father his fundamental due process parental rights.
At the initial part of the hearing, mother’s counsel argued that the children were traumatized and could not progress in therapy unless they could be assured that father would not know where they were. He contended that father “wants to know where these kids are so he can start then harassing the therapists. [¶] Just like Dr. Goni. He went there with police and disrupted her office and threatened to sue her. That’s what he does.” Father had shown no particular interest in the children themselves: “He hasn’t seen these children in a couple of years. He doesn’t write to them. He doesn’t do anything; no presents at Christmas, birthday, not even a card. He is not even a part of their life except to traumatize them.”
When father’s counsel suggested that the allegations of trauma to the children referred to old events, the court pointed out that the exchange of e-mails with mother’s counsel had not taken place “years ago,” but was much more recent. In addition, father had insisted upon and been given contact information for Dr. Robinson; father then began an e-mail exchange with Dr. Robinson insisting not only on detailed information of the children’s therapy, but on a face-to-face confrontation with the doctor. Mother’s counsel reminded the court that father had also harassed the staff at the daughter’s current school. “All he does once he finds out where the children are, he harasses and he gets in their face with this very hostile attitude, and this Court has seen it in court as well. [¶] And this is what happens, once he finds out the child is going to a different therapist or a different doctor or if they change schools, he becomes just a... terrible person to the staff, and it is very difficult for the children to stay with therapists. Some of the therapists in the past... back off from their professional relationships because they don’t
“THE COURT: As did Miss Karoub.
“[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Yeah. They don’t want to be harassed by this man.” The balance of the hearing was continued for several weeks. The court then took up the issue of child support. It imputed an income to father of $1,200 per month, finding that father had been “less than forthcoming” with his financial information. Mother’s counsel argued that father was voluntarily under-employed, but in 2006 had done work for some of his family members at $1,200 per month. Father’s attorney objected to mother’s income and expense declaration as not being current. The court declined to impute any income to mother, but ordered father to pay the guideline amount of support of $421 per month. The court noted that father had never provided any support for the children, even when he had court-ordered visitation. He never provided medical coverage for them, and never paid for any of their counseling or medical expenses.
After the court ruled on child support, it turned its attention to the other OSC matter, the prior temporary orders precluding father from having access to the children’s information. As father’s counsel began to argue, the court interrupted: “before you go on. I’m not going to allow you to argue that point.... I just looked at your client’s declaration again. He makes not one statement with regard to that. It’s all about the money. And I’m not going to allow you to argue for him if he didn’t choose to address it. All he says is he doesn’t agree, and he makes not one statement about it.” The court then proceeded to make the temporary orders permanent: “[Father] shall have no access to knowledge of the children’s location, doctors, therapists, schools. He is no longer entitled to any records from the schools, therapists or doctors.” The court further ordered that father was restrained “from making any contact with schools, doctors, therapists, or [mother] by text, phone, e-mail, snail mail or any other mail, except... [¶] [o]bviously, any contact between his attorney and [mother’s] attorney is not restrained....”
Father filed a notice of appeal from the child support and attorney fees award, as well as the orders denying him access to the children’s location information.
ANALYSIS
I. The Lack of a “Current” Income and Expense Declaration Was Harmless With Respect to the Child Support Order
As to the child support order, father’s claims of error relate solely to mother’s income and expense declaration. Father contends that the trial court erred in considering mother’s income and expense declaration because it was not current.
We review modification of child support orders under the abuse of discretion standard: The trial court is vested with discretion in determining the amount of a child support order. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282; In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 546, 555 [the deferential standard concerning child support orders is tempered significantly by this state’s uniform child support guideline].) “[T]he appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.” (In re Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590, 598.)
Father urges that the moving party must file a current income and expense declaration whenever it is relevant to the relief sought, as it would be with respect to a modification of support orders. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.118(b), 5.128(a), 5.128(b).) An income and expense declaration is considered “current” if it was completed within three months before the hearing. (Rule 5.128(a).) Father relies on In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572, at pages 575-576 (Tydlaska), for the proposition that the failure to provide current information justifies a denial of a motion for modification of a support order.
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise indicated.
Here, mother’s income and expense declaration was filed with her OSC moving papers and dated as of February 2008. The hearing was actually held in August and September 2008. Thus, father argues, mother’s income and expense declaration was not current, and the trial court erred in considering it.
As noted, rule 5.118(b), provides that a “completed Income and Expense declaration... must be attached to an application... when relevant to the relief requested.” Thus, mother was required to and did attach an income and expense declaration to her OSC papers at the time they were filed. Rule 5.128(a) provides that a “current” income and expense declaration is one that has been “completed within the past three months providing no facts have changed.” (Italics added.) Mother argues that, because no facts had changed since she filed her income and expense declaration, it was still “current.” Mother has misread the provision. Rule 5.128 unequivocally states that “‘[c]urrent’ is defined as being completed within the past three months.” The language, “providing no facts have changed,” modifies the definition of “current” as being “within three months.” In other words, if any facts have changed after the “current” (within three months) declaration was filed, the information naturally can no longer be considered “current,” notwithstanding that the declaration was made within three months. If facts change within the three-month period, then a more current income and expense declaration must be filed.
While father is correct that Tydlaska holds that reliance on outdated information (i.e., not a “current” income and expense declaration) can justify denying a motion to modify a support order (Tydlaska, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576), it does not necessarily preclude an order granting a modification. The salient point is whether the court has properly current information about the conditions and circumstances at the time an order is made. Here, mother filed an income and expense declaration with her moving papers. She claimed zero income from any sources, and had to borrow money to pay her attorney. It was evident that she was being supported entirely by her new spouse. At the hearing, father’s counsel objected to mother’s income and expense declaration specifically on the ground that it was not current, but the court in essence overruled the objection. Mother also was sworn as a witness at the hearing and could have been questioned as to any current circumstances. Her attorney’s arguments and representations were consistent with the income and expense declaration that had been filed; thus, even if the income and expense declaration in itself was not strictly “current,” there was no showing that the circumstances described were not still applicable. If mother had been required to file an updated income and expense declaration, it would still have said the same things. In other words, mother’s information was “current,” even if the declaration was not.
We are also mindful of the constitutional requirement that “[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of... the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Father has failed to demonstrate that the lack of a “current” income and expense declaration from mother has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Mother had full-time custody of the children, and had no income. Although father claimed no income, the court imputed a reasonable income level upon him, consistent with his prior testimony that he had quit his former job and had taken a job working for his family members, earning $1,200 per month. The new circumstances (full-time custody to mother, changes in mother’s and father’s incomes) were significantly altered from the circumstances of the 2005 stipulated judgment. The facts justified a finding of changed circumstances to support a modification of the child support order.
The order setting child support at $421 per month is affirmed.
II. The Lack of a “Complete” Income and Expense Declaration Requires Reversal and Remand of the Attorney Fees Award
Father also complains that mother’s income and expense declaration was incomplete with respect to the attorney fees award. He argues that, because mother’s income and expense declaration was incomplete, the attorney fee award in connection with the child support order was not supported by the evidence.
As with orders setting child support, an award of attorney fees is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial court’s sound discretion; trial judges are entrusted with this discretionary determination because they are in the best position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in their courts]; In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762, 768-769 [need-based order for attorney fees is reviewed under abuse of discretion standard].)
Rule 5.128(b) provides for information above and beyond that required to support a modification motion under rule 5.128(a): “When a party is represented by counsel and attorney’s fees are requested by either party, the section on the Income and Expense Declaration pertaining to the amount in savings, credit union, certificates of deposit, and money market accounts must be fully completed, as well as the section pertaining to the amount of attorney’s fees incurred, currently owed, and the source of money used to pay such fees.” The requirements of rule 5.128(b) make sense; while an order for spousal or child support is dependent upon ongoing income (and mother here demonstrated that she had no earnings, as she cared full-time for the children), the ability to pay attorney fees may be based on other assets. Presumably, upon dissolution of marriage, the parties are awarded an equal share of community property assets, as well as any separate property assets, resort to which might be had to pay attorney fees.
Here, mother’s income and expense declaration failed to fully complete information concerning her savings, credit union accounts, certificates of deposit and money market accounts. The “assets” portion of her income and expense declaration stated that her “[c]ash and checking accounts, savings, credit union, money market, and other deposit accounts” were “[n]ominal.” As to “[s]tocks, bonds, and other assets I could easily sell,” she reported “[n]one.” Mother claimed that all her other property, real and personal, was “[u]ndetermined.” She reported her new husband’s gross income was “[u]nknown.”
Mother did fully report the amount of attorney fees she owed and the source she had used (borrowing) to pay a portion of those fees. However, the report of mother’s assets (“nominal,” or “undetermined”) was essentially nonexistent. There was no good faith effort at even substantial compliance with the duty under rule 5.128(b) to “fully complete[]” a list of her assets. In the absence of such compliance, the court had insufficient evidence to ascertain a need-based request for fees. A court abuses its discretion when an attorney fee award is not supported by the evidence. (Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 545.)
The award of attorney fees must be reversed. The reversal is without prejudice to mother’s providing an updated, and “fully completed” income and expense declaration to support her request for a need-based award of attorney fees.
III. The Trial Court Improperly Failed to Consider Father’s Evidence, and Precluded Argument, on the Issues Relating to the Protective Orders
Father contends that the orders restricting him from access to the children’s location information, and from contacting mother, or the children’s schools, doctors or therapists were legally improper as an injunction for harassment without following the proper procedures for imposing an civil harassment restraining order. He further complains that the orders are impermissibly vague and overbroad, and that he was deprived of due process when the trial court precluded his counsel from making any argument.
In principle, we find that protective orders like those entered here may be proper, but conclude that father’s last point—deprivation of due process—is meritorious. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The standard of review of orders of the family law court concerning matters such as custody and visitation is whether the trial court abused its discretion, and an abuse of discretion is found only where the court exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Marriage of David and Martha M. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 96, 100.)
At the hearing, the trial court precluded father’s counsel from presenting any argument, on the ground that father’s declaration in opposition to the OSC had concerned solely financial information. The trial court believed, erroneously, that father had provided no declaration addressing the substance of the proposed orders. In fact, father had presented one declaration addressing solely financial issues, and another in opposition to the protective orders. Father’s declaration in opposition to the protective orders stated, “I have been informed that the basis of this request [i.e., to prohibit father’s access to the children’s information] is that I have not enrolled in and completed a parenting class and an anger management class as ordered by the court in its Statement of Decision dated January 12, 2007.” Father attached certificates showing that he had attended a half-day class on the impact of divorce on children, and a half-day class in anger management in October 2007.
Father’s declaration included his complaints that mother had always made decisions about the children’s educational, medical or religious issues without consulting him anyway, and that the orders merely let her get away with continuing to do so. He further complained that mother had continuously refused to provide him with information, despite numerous requests. He argued that the proposed protective orders effectively denied him his fundamental right to parent his children without making a direct order removing his legal custody. He also accused mother’s new husband of mistreating the son, and threatening father that he could use the courts to prevent father from seeing his children again.
The trial court evidently overlooked father’s declaration and erroneously believed there had been no opposition to the proposed protective orders. The court thus imposed the temporary orders on a permanent basis, without considering either father’s proffered evidence, or any argument by father’s counsel. This was unreasonable and constituted an abuse of discretion. The protective orders must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings, giving appropriate weight and consideration to father’s declaration in opposition.
The trial court’s reconsideration of the matter will necessarily invoke father’s additional claims of error—i.e., improper procedure for obtaining a harassment injunction, and overbroad and vague scope—so we address those matters for the guidance of the trial court.
Father urges that the orders precluding his access to information about the children were improper because mother’s OSC proceedings did not conform to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, the civil harassment statute, or Family Code sections 6300-6409, the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.
Father argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (m), provides that the “Judicial Council shall promulgate forms and instructions” for use in civil harassment injunction proceedings, and that “their use by parties in actions brought pursuant to this section shall be mandatory.” Because father is restrained from contacting or obtaining information about his children from mother, the children’s schools, the children’s doctors, or the children’s therapists, he contends, it functions as a civil harassment restraining order without using the mandatory procedures and forms.
Father’s contention is without merit. Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 requires mandatory use of the promulgated forms “in actions brought pursuant to this section.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (m), italics added.) This was not an action brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Rather, the OSC proceedings were pursuant to the Family Law Code, concerning the best interests of the minor children of the marriage. The family law court has broad jurisdiction to protect the best interests of the children respecting matters of custody, visitation, and support. (See In re Marriage of Brown and Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 961.) Here, the purpose of the orders was not to prevent harassment of mother, school staff, or health care providers. It was to protect the children, who were unable to progress in their treatment or to feel safe at home, at school, or in treatment because of father’s harassing and threatening behavior toward others. Notably, the protective orders did not prohibit father from contacting the children. He had invested no efforts in doing so, however, as he had not sent the children any birthday or Christmas gifts, or even a card, for quite some time. Father had time to devote to voluminous demands for paperwork, and to tenaciously litigate (to the extent 11 volumes of files) the family law proceedings, but evidently spent little in time or resources directly with the children. As mother’s counsel remarked, “[father] is not even part of their life except to traumatize them.”
To answer another of the insinuations in father’s declaration in opposition to the OSC, an award of sole legal and sole physical custody of a child to one parent does not serve to “terminate” the other’s parental rights or due process interest in parenting. (In re Marriage of Brown and Yana, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 958; In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 227.)
We also observe that, in opposition to the OSC on the protective orders, father claimed that the basis for the request was that father had failed to comply with earlier orders to complete parenting and anger management courses within six months of January 2007. Father responded that he had completed courses, and attached certificates of completion. Father did not complete the classes within six months, as ordered in January. He did not complete his classes until October 2007. In addition, his certificates indicate that he attended a total of only eight hours of instruction, approximately one day, for both topics. Finally, father still failed to address the substance of the matters for which he was ordered to attend the classes. He continued his campaign of demands and threats, unabated. Attending classes for a bare minimum of hours and merely collecting certificates is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with the court’s orders. The concerns of the court for the welfare of the children are not simply “quantitative (that is, showing up for counseling or therapy or parenting classes, or what have you) but qualitative (that is, whether the counseling, therapy or parenting classes are doing any good).” (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 706.)
The protective purpose as to the children also answers father’s contention that the orders were invalid under the Domestic Violence Protection Act, as the persons he is restrained from contacting (aside from mother) do not fall within the category of persons to whom domestic violence restraining orders are addressed. (See Fam. Code, § 6211.) The orders never purported to be domestic violence restraining orders; rather, they are orders made in the best interests of the children to enable the children’s mental and physical well-being, and to facilitate the progress of their medical and mental health treatment. Such purposes are within the power of a family law court, charged with the jurisdiction and the duty to protect the best interests of the children. There is nothing inherently improper about the kind of orders entered; the court’s error was in failing to consider or permit father’s showing in opposition.
Father’s argument that the orders were impermissibly vague and overbroad is also unmeritorious. He complains that he is effectively barred from all communication with his children. This is untrue. Although he is prevented from knowing the children’s location or the locations of their schools, doctors and therapists, communication is still open between the attorneys. Father could communicate with the children through counsel.
Father posits that he could unknowingly violate the orders by, e.g., being in a public place with someone who happened to be a teacher or employee at one of the children’s schools. As with similar probation conditions, the protective orders could be modified to prohibit contact with persons known to father to be school officials, the children’s medical providers, etc. (See, e.g., In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 891-892.)
Father contends that the term “contact” is vague and overbroad, as reasonable people might differ as to its meaning. He cites Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157 as an example of a similar order which was held violative of First Amendment rights, when a spouse was prohibited from “contacting” the sheriff’s department (where the other spouse worked) except to report an emergency. Father’s reliance on Evans is misplaced. There, the court held that it was an overbroad prior restraint to prohibit publishing “false and defamatory statements,” on the internet, or from publishing “confidential personal information” on the internet. The prohibition against communicating with the sheriff’s department about the spouse ran afoul of the First Amendment right to petition a governmental agency (id. at pp.1172-1173), a matter which is not implicated here. In any case, the court here specified what is meant by “contact,” as including “text, phone, e-mail, snail mail or any other mail,” except that communication through the attorneys was not prohibited.
DISPOSITION
The order setting child support is affirmed. The order for attorney fees is reversed, without prejudice to a new request based upon a complete income and expense declaration. The protective orders prohibiting father from contacting mother and the children’s schools, doctors or therapists is reversed. The error requiring reversal was the trial court’s failure to take account of father’s opposition and preclusion of argument on the issue, but the reversal is also without prejudice to making a proper order upon an appropriate showing, as there is nothing in principle inherently wrong with making such a protective order. The matter is remanded for further proceedings with respect to the attorney fees request and the protective orders.
In the interests of justice, each party is to bear its own costs on appeal.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., KING J.