We read the statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. In re Marriage of Ikeler , 161 P.3d 663, 666–67 (Colo. 2007). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we apply the statute as written.

We read the statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 666-67 (Colo. 2007). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we apply the statute as written.

Rather, he argues that the enactment of the Colorado Marital Agreement Act (CMAA) in 1986 displaced common law contract principles permitting parties to enter into marital agreements by means other than those prescribed in the CMAA. See In re Marriage of Ikeler , 161 P.3d 663, 667 (Colo. 2007) ; see also § 14-2-310(1), C.R.S. 2007. Put simply, he asserts that only written and signed marital agreements are valid and enforceable. ¶11 Our analysis requires us to interpret the CMAA, the law applicable at the time the purported agreement was made, and the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA).

The common public policy concern underlying each of those decisions was an awareness that enforcement of a provision waiving attorney fees could stifle a court's ability to address issues affecting the best interest of the child. See In re Marriage of Burke, 980 P.2d 265, 268 (Wash.Ct.App. 1999) ("The states interest in the welfare of children requires that the court have the discretion to make an award of attorney fees and costs so that a parent is not deprived of his or her day in court...."); In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 670-71 (Colo. 2007) ("If one spouse is unable to hire an attorney, . . . the lesser-earning spouses ability to effectively litigate the issues related to the children will be substantially impaired. This, in turn, may negatively impact the court's ability to assess the best interests of the children.")

Finally, we observe premarital-agreement provisions waiving a claim for attorney fees pertaining to support issues may inhibit a court’s ability to make accurate and appropriate decisions regarding alimony and that are in the best interests of the children. See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Ikeler , 161 P.3d 663, 670–71 (Colo. 2007) (en banc). In Iowa, child support is calculated using the child support guidelines.

We begin with the plain language of the statute to ascertain the General Assembly's intent. In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 666 (Colo. 2007). If the plain language is ambiguous, we may look to other factors, such as the goal of the statutory design, in determining legislative intent.

In re Marriage of Alvis , 2019 COA 97, ¶ 9, 446 P.3d 963 (citing People v. Ray , 2018 COA 158, ¶ 16, 452 P.3d 117 ). "Those tools include legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a particular construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme." Id. (citing In re Marriage of Ikeler , 161 P.3d 663, 668 (Colo. 2007) ). A statute is ambiguous if multiple reasonable interpretations are possible.

Because Hardee does not address attorney fees for child-related issues, it is not persuasive to our analysis. Best cited approvingly to In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 667 (Colo. 2007), where the state supreme court pointed out the Colorado Marital Agreement Act (CMMA) did not specifically mention attorney fees; therefore, the "only statutory basis for parties to contractually waive an award of attorney's fees" is the catch-all provision allowing contracts "not in violation of public policy." Ikeler reasoned, "[u]nder this subsection, if a waiver of attorney's fees violates public policy it cannot be enforced by the court because it is not a valid contract term."

Id. at 951, 327 Ill.Dec. 234, 901 N.E.2d 967. ¶ 15 In reaching our holding in Best, we looked beyond Illinois to In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663 (Colo.2007), for guidance on whether fee-shifting bans violate public policy. Best, 387 Ill.App.3d at 952, 327 Ill.Dec. 234, 901 N.E.2d 967. Ikeler noted that a fee-shifting ban could harm children by “substantially impair[ing]” the lesser-earning spouse's ability to effectively litigate issues involving children.

We must also consider the statute as a whole and interpret it in a way that gives “consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 667 (Colo.2007). ¶ 38 Here, we conclude that the magistrate's order for a psychosexual evaluation did not violate the boy's rights and the district court therefore erred when it set aside that part of the order.