Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Ct. No. D502365, Lorna A. Alksne, Judge. Affirmed.
HALLER, J.
Penny Hyder (Penny) appeals after the court entered a default judgment in favor of her former spouse, William Hyder (William). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Penny and William married in February 2003, and separated less than two years later. They had no children together. In March 2007, William petitioned for a dissolution of the marriage. In the petition, William requested the court to confirm that each spouse's vehicle was separate property, and that there were no community assets or debts subject to disposition by the court. The next month, William served Penny with the petition and a summons at her residence in Maryland. Penny did not file a response or appear in the action.
On October 17, 2007, William filed a request to enter a default against Penny. In support, he filed a property declaration form, stating there was no community debt and no community assets, except for William's military retirement benefits. This request was mailed to Penny at her residence. On that same date, the default was entered and a judgment of default was entered. The default judgment granted dissolution of the marriage; terminated the court's jurisdiction to award spousal support to either party; granted William the right to receive his military retirement benefits; stated that there was no community debt; and granted to Penny all the property in her possession.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Penny contends the default judgment was improper because she "did respond to [William's] request for dissolution of marriage . . . ." (Italics added.) However, she supports this argument only with documents in her appellant's appendix that were not contained in the superior court file. These documents include: (1) a responsive pleading that has no file stamp; (2) a copy of a post office card indicating a registered mail item was sent to the San Diego Superior Court on May 24, 2007; and (3) a copy of an agreement between the parties in which William agreed to pay spousal support for seven months.
These documents are not properly before this court. An appellate court may review only those documents that were submitted in the proceedings below. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1; Kohler v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1102; Thomas v. Thomas (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 818, 821-822; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g).)
Before filing her opening appellate brief, Penny acknowledged these documents were not in the superior court file, but moved to augment the appellate record to include the documents. We denied Penny's motion. To the extent Penny requests that we reconsider this ruling, we deny this request. "Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court. [Citations.] . . . Rather, normally 'when reviewing the correctness of a trial court's judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.' [Citation.]" (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3; accord In re Marriage of Forrest and Eaddy (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) Penny has not cited any exceptional circumstances that would justify a deviation from this rule in this appeal.
We have taken judicial notice of the superior court file, and have confirmed that there is no evidence in the file that Penny responded to William's dissolution petition. If Penny believes she presented responsive documents in the dissolution proceeding below, it is necessary for her to present this argument and supporting evidence first in the superior court on a motion to reopen the default. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); Fam. Code, § 2120 et seq.; see generally Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 12:100, p. 12-24.)
Penny also makes various arguments challenging the merits of the judgment. However, she relies on facts that were not before the court when it entered the judgment. For example, she discusses her medical condition and cites to various military documents and an internal memorandum from the United States Navy (William's employer). Because this evidence was not presented to the trial court, the evidence is not properly before us. Further, there is no ground for finding any portion of the default judgment was void because it exceeds the scope of relief requested in William's petition. (See In re Marriage of Andresen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 873, 886.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed. Appellant is to pay respondent's costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., McINTYRE, J.