Opinion
No. 2-20-0493
03-23-2021
In re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE A. HOLMS (Tracy Batdorf as the Administrator of the Estate of Catherine A. Holms, Deceased), Petitioner-Appellant, and JAMES H. HOLMS, Respondent-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County.
No. 16-D-2071
Honorable Stephen M. DeRue, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying the petitions for a rule to show cause and for attorney fees.
¶ 2 Catherine Holms, the decedent, entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) as part of a legal separation from the respondent, her surviving husband James Holms. Upon her death, James filed a petition for probate of her estate, claiming rights as a spouse and heir. Tracy, the decedent's daughter and administrator of the decedent's estate, filed a counterpetition, arguing that, under the PSA, James waived his spousal inheritance rights. Following a hearing, the probate
court found in James's favor. Tracy appealed and this court reversed. In re Estate of Holms, 2019 IL App (2d) 190139, ¶¶ 20-22. Thereafter, as a post-decree motion in the decedent's and James's case for legal separation, Tracy filed a petition for rule to show cause and for attorney fees for having to enforce the PSA in probate court. The trial court denied both petitions. Tracy appeals from this order. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The decedent and James were married on January 17, 2014. No children were adopted or born to the decedent and James during the marriage. The decedent had two children from a prior marriage, Tracy and Scott Batdorf.
¶ 5 On January 20, 2017, a judgment for legal separation was entered. At that time, the decedent was 61 years old and suffered from a debilitating medical condition. James was 62 years of age and still employed. The judgment incorporated the parties' PSA. The judgment stated that (1) the PSA was "final and non-modifiable," (2) the parties would carry out the terms and conditions of the PSA, and (3) the parties would "establish of record the sole and separate ownership of the property of said parties in the manner therein agreed and provided."
¶ 6 The PSA stated that its purpose was to "fully and finally settle any and all rights of every kind, nature and the other, including all rights and claims in and to any property of the other, of every kind, nature and description, whether real, personal, marital, non-marital, or mixed, now owned or which may hereafter be acquired by either of them." The PSA provided that the parties were waiving maintenance as to each other and that James was to pay the decedent a lump sum of $180,000 for settlement of the decedent's interest in the marital home and her waiver of maintenance. Pursuant to the PSA, the decedent was to quitclaim to James her interest in the marital home, which would then become James's "sole and exclusive property." The PSA also
included a release of claims, stating that "[t]he parties mutually release *** each other from all actions, suits, debts, claims, and obligations, including claims against each other's property."
¶ 7 On May 28, 2018, the decedent died at the age of 63 without a will.
¶ 8 On October 9, 2018, James filed a petition for probate of the decedent's estate. Along with the petition, James filed an affidavit of heirship and a petition for letters of administration of the estate, listing himself as the decedent's spouse and heir. On October 19, 2018, Tracy filed a counterpetition for letters of administration, her own affidavit of heirship, and a petition for supervised administration. Her affidavit of heirship stated that James had waived his inheritance rights under the PSA and thus was not an heir.
¶ 9 On February 14, 2019, following a hearing on James's petition and Tracy's counterpetition, the trial court issued a written opinion, finding that James was a spouse and heir of the decedent's estate. The trial court found that there were no words in the PSA that referenced the possibility of death or that clearly indicated the intent to surrender or waive a statutory spousal award. Thus, it determined that James was a spouse and heir of the decedent and was not barred from asserting any rights he might have as a surviving spouse. Tracy filed a timely notice of appeal from this order.
¶ 10 On appeal, Tracy argued that, based on the plain language of the judgment for legal separation and the PSA, the decedent and James clearly intended to waive their statutory inheritance rights. This court agreed. We held that the language of the judgment for legal separation and the PSA was susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, that the parties intended to waive all interest in each other's property, including any spousal inheritance rights. See In re Estate of Holms, 2019 IL App (2d) 190139, ¶¶ 20-22. We held that the judgment for legal separation indicated that the PSA was final and nonmodifiable. We noted that, in the PSA,
the decedent and James specifically agreed that they were mutually releasing each other from any claims, "including claims against each other's property" and that they entered the PSA to "finally settle any and all rights of every kind." Id. As such, we reversed the trial court's determination and remanded for additional proceedings. Id. ¶ 29.
¶ 11 On remand, the trial court appointed Tracy as the administrator of the decedent's estate. On March 17, 2020, Tracy filed, as a post-decree motion in the decedent's case for legal separation, a petition for indirect civil contempt, a rule to show cause, and a petition for attorney fees and costs, referencing and attaching this court's disposition in Holms. The petition for indirect civil contempt asserted that James had violated the judgment for legal separation when he filed for letters of administration in the probate court representing that he was a surviving spouse and heir of the decedent. Tracy requested to be reimbursed for all legal fees and expenses incurred as a result of her appeal in the probate court and for having to file the contempt petition at issue here. In addition, and in the alternative, Tracy argued that she was entitled to attorney fees, under sections 508(a) and 508(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/5-508(a), (b) (West 2018)), for her expenses incurred in the appeal of the probate case and for filing the present petition for attorney fees.
¶ 12 In response, James argued that he had not violated the PSA because it was silent as to spousal inheritance rights. As such, he could not be held in contempt and Tracy was not entitled to attorney fees based on the alleged need to enforce the PSA. James also argued that Tracy was not entitled to attorney fees because the issue of whether he was an heir to the decedent's estate was not related to the case for legal separation.
¶ 13 On August 20, 2020, the trial court denied Tracy's petition. The trial court's written order indicated that it denied Tracy's request for a contempt finding on the basis that James was not
currently in violation of any court order. The trial court also found that Tracy was not entitled to attorney fees under section 508 of the Dissolution Act. Tracy filed a timely notice of appeal from this order.
¶ 14 The parties filed a bystander's report in lieu of a transcript of proceedings. The report indicated the parties appeared before the trial court on Tracy's petition via Zoom. The trial court did not allow any argument from the parties and relied on the submitted written arguments. As to Tracy's request for a finding of contempt, the trial court stated that the purpose of indirect civil contempt was to coerce and not to punish, and thus the appropriate relief for indirect civil contempt was an injunction. The trial court reasoned that, as of the time of the filing of Tracy's petition, James was not doing anything in violation of the PSA, and as such, James was not taking any action that could be enjoined. The trial court thus denied the request for a finding of contempt. As to the claim for attorney fees under 508(b), the trial court found that there was no malfeasance when James filed the petition for probate because there was a colorable claim as to his spousal inheritance rights. The trial court further found that these facts did not fit under the purview of 508(b), which concerned the enforcement of orders in family court, not the interpretation of family court documents by other courts. On this basis, the trial court denied the request for attorney fees under section 508(b). The trial court also denied the request for attorney fees under section 508(a), again finding that there was a colorable probate issue that necessitated the interpretation of the PSA to resolve.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, Tracy first argues that the trial court erred in denying her petition for a contempt finding against James. Civil contempt is designed to compel future compliance with a court order. Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 391 (2007). A person held in civil contempt must have the ability
to purge the contempt by complying with the court order. Pryweller v. Pryweller, 218 Ill. App. 3d 619, 633 (1991). Contempt based on past actions which cannot be undone means that the contemnor lacks the ability to purge the contempt. Luttrell v. Panozzo, 252 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602 (1993)). Therefore, whenever a court order cannot be complied with, there cannot be a finding of civil contempt. In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 46 (1990).
¶ 17 Whether a party is guilty of indirect civil contempt is a question for the trial court. If the trial court's factual findings are in dispute, we only reverse those findings that are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Shamrock Chicago Corp. v. Wroblewski, 2019 IL App (1st) 182354, ¶ 29. If there are no factual findings in dispute, we review the contempt order for an abuse of discretion. Id. Here, as there are no factual findings in dispute, we review the trial court's denial of Tracy's petition for a contempt finding against James for an abuse of discretion. Id.
¶ 18 In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tracy's petition for contempt. The petition was based on James's filing of a petition for probate of the decedent's estate, which Tracy contends was in violation of the PSA. This is a past action which cannot be undone, and which James has no ability to purge. As such, there was no basis for the trial court to find James in indirect civil contempt. Luttrell, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 602; Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 46.
¶ 19 Tracy's next contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying her request for attorney fees under sections 508(a) and 508(b) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/508(a), (b) (West 2018)). "Section 508 allows the recovery of attorney fees for expenses incurred in any proceeding to enforce an order or judgment entered in a dissolution proceeding, even if that proceeding occurs in collateral litigation." Crouch v. Smick, 2016 IL App (5th) 150222, ¶ 41; In re Marriage of Davis, 292 Ill. App. 3d 802, 810 (1997) ("an award of attorney fees under section
508 of the [Dissolution] Act may be made for expenses incurred in connection with a proceeding to enforce the provisions of a dissolution order, even if that proceeding occurs in a different court."). An estate may enforce the terms of a property settlement agreement. In re Marriage of Dowty, 146 Ill. App. 3d 675, 680 (1986). Accordingly, Tracy is not precluded from asserting a claim for statutory attorney fees in family court for enforcing a PSA in probate court.
¶ 20 "Section 508 governs attorney fees generally, including petitions for contribution of attorney fees and costs incurred in post-decree proceedings and initial dissolution proceedings." Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 46 (2009). Section 508(a) of the Dissolution Act provides, in relevant part, that the trial court may order a party to pay a reasonable amount of the other party's attorney fees in connection with the enforcement or modification of an order or judgment under the Act, or the prosecution of any claim on appeal. 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(2), (3.1) (West 2018). Section 508(b) provides that the court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party "in every proceeding for the enforcement of an order or judgment when the court finds that the failure to comply with the order or judgment was without compelling cause or justification." 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court's decision to award or deny attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Davis, 2019 IL App (3d) 170389, ¶ 22.
¶ 21 Under the circumstances in the present case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Tracy's request for attorney fees under section 508 of the Dissolution Act. In the probate case, we held that the plain language of the PSA had terminated James's spousal inheritance rights. See Estate of Holms, 2019 IL App (2d) 190139, ¶¶ 20-22. However, we did not hold that James violated the PSA. The PSA was silent as to spousal inheritance rights, and we agree with the trial court that there was therefore a colorable claim as to that issue. Accordingly, as we cannot say that James's petition violated the PSA, we decline to find that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying fees under section 508(a). Further, the trial court did not err in denying Tracy's request for fees under section 508(b) because James's petition in probate court was not without cause or justification.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.