Such a marital settlement agreement is a contract between the parties. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 4811, subd. (b); In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 678]; In re Marriage of Rabkin (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 219]; Modglin v. Modglin (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 582].) Where the agreement permits modifications, those modifications require a showing of a change in circumstances.
(4b) A change of circumstances must be shown whether the original award arises from an evidentiary hearing or by stipulation. ( In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 678].) "The court, by including the stipulation in its own decree, presumes that the parties arrived at a fair support award, after arm's-length negotiations, that took into consideration all of the circumstances as they then existed.
The court thereafter should not permit a party to change this contractual arrangement, absent changed circumstances, as it would allow a party to repudiate and change a legal contract for no reason at all." ( In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 678].) Of course, here the court found changes in circumstances since the 1982 stipulation. The court's statement of decision cited two reasons why there was a need for an increase.
The requirement of showing changed circumstances applies to stipulated agreements as well as litigated orders. ( In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901-902 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 678].) (6b) In this case, all we are presented with is the clerk's transcript consisting of the various pleadings and the court's rulings.
Thus, in this case the prior trial court, by incorporating the parties' spousal support stipulation in its own judgment, "presume[d] that the parties arrived at a fair support award, after arm's-length negotiations that took into consideration all of the circumstances as they then existed." (In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901.) "The court thereafter should not permit a party to change this contractual arrangement, absent changed circumstances, as it would allow a party to repudiate and change a legal contract for no reason at all.
When the court includes the parties' stipulation in its own decree, it "presumes that the parties arrived at a fair support award, after arm's-length negotiations, that took into consideration all of the circumstances as they then existed." (Inre Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901.) Accordingly, "[t]he support order sought to be modified is conclusive as to circumstances existing when entered."
“The court, by including the stipulation [regarding spousal support] in its own decree, presumes that the parties arrived at a fair support award, after arm's-length negotiations, that took into consideration all of the circumstances as they then existed.” (In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901, 129 Cal.Rptr. 678.) Appellant Madhu cannot now collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not establish the marital standard of living.
We further stress, in this regard, that an OSC to eliminate or reduce spousal support requires changed circumstances since the previous order. (In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901.) The one obvious change of circumstance which might have justified Satya's June 2009 OSC was his retirement, not the alleged acquisition by Lakshmi of a "separate estate" for purposes of section 4322.
Moreover, we must “presume[] that the parties arrived at a fair support award, after arm’s-length negotiations, that took into consideration all of the circumstances as they then existed.” (In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901.) This is of particular significance here given that the MSA specifically states that the parties entered into the Agreement “in mutual consideration of the acts of the other party, and each party hereby acknowledges the fairness and adequacy of such consideration.”
The rule applies equally to stipulated orders. (In re Marriage of Hentz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 899, 901-902.) Alexandra contends that the trial court could only consider her request for an increase in support and could not issue an order reducing support, which she contends it did.