Opinion
No. 04-1642
Filed September 14, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. Staskal, Judge.
Appellant is appealing the district court's order that he must pay his ex-wife $6,360 as reimbursement of uncovered medical expenses for the parties' daughter. AFFIRMED.
Scott M. Wood of Wood Law Office, Ankeny, for appellant.
Carol Henderson, Des Moines, pro se.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
The question in this case, which comes to us in a strange posture, is the amount appellant, Charles Henderson, should be required to pay to his former wife appellee, Carol Henderson, to reimburse her for uncovered medical expenses of their daughter Nicole. Charles contends the district court order directing he pay Carol $6,360 is in error. We affirm.
Carol has not filed an appellee's brief which makes our review considerably more difficult.
This matter comes to us as an outgrowth of a dissolution action; consequently, we review de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We give weight to the findings of the district court but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14 (6)( g).
Carol and Charles were divorced on August 30, 1990. The parties had one child, Nicole, who was placed in Carol's custody. Charles was ordered to pay child support and maintain health insurance on Nicole. The decree provided Carol and Charles were each responsible for one-half of any uncovered medical expenses. If Charles failed to maintain health insurance on Nicole then he was responsible for all of her medical expenses. Additionally, as a part of the decree Charles was required to pay a bill to Charter Hospital of $150.
On September 10, 1992 Charles filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy court. Listed as debts were obligations to Carol Henderson of $9,782.10 under their decree of dissolution as well as the debt to Charter Hospital.
Carol apparently filed a petition earlier.
Charles failed to maintain health insurance on Nicole. Carol sought to have him found in contempt and the district court made the requested finding. On September 30, 1993, the parties entered into a stipulation that provided Charles could purge himself of contempt by executing a wage assignment in favor of Carol for $35.00 a week. On October 1, 1993, the district court entered an order approving the stipulation and incorporating it in the order by reference. While there was testimony that the $35.00 was to compensate Carol for the expense of carrying medical insurance on Nicole, there is no language in either the stipulation or the order that suggests this.
On November 10, 1993 the bankruptcy court addressed Carol's complaint to determine dischargeability of the debt. On March 18, 1994 the bankruptcy court granted Charles' motion for summary judgment as to the dischargeability of the debt and the debt was found to be dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(5)(A) (1994).
On October 27, 1999 Charles was held in contempt of court for failing to pay one-half of the cost of uncovered medical expenses for Nicole.
On December 10, 1999 Charles asked for a new trial on the district court's finding of contempt. He contended he overpaid child support and he was not aware of this at the time of the contempt hearing. The district court determined the most appropriate resolution of the matter was to consider the overpayment in determining what sentence to pronounce for contempt. In doing so the district court said, "The record was clear the Respondent [Charles] was requested to pay medical bills, that he ignored these requests and he made no effort to inform the Petitioner [Carol] as to why he has not paid the medical bills." Carol was awarded $800 in attorney fees.
Then on December 10, 1999, the district court found that Charles's assignment of wages in the amount of $35.00 a month satisfied his obligation to provide health insurance for Nicole, as the amount was based on reimbursing Carol for insurance she carried on Nicole. The order further provided Carol should give Charles copies of Nicole's bills and a showing of what part of the bill that insurance had covered within sixty days of the carrier determining the portion of bill it would pay. Charles was then given sixty days to reimburse Carol one-half of the uncovered amount. The order further provided that the time limits set forth there did not apply to medical bills incurred between May 27, 1999 and December 10, 1999.
On February 11, 2000 the district court determined Charles overpaid child support in the amount of $4,729.16 but allowed Carol to retain the overpayment as a possible offset against medical reimbursement Charles owed her but had not paid. The order provided both parties could apply for a hearing on the issue and Carol did. Apparently, between the time of Carol's application and the hearing, the overpayment was applied to satisfy Charles' future support obligation. The issue before the district court then was whether Charles should reimburse Carol for unreimbursed expenses, and if so, in what amount.
Carol presented an exhibit which Charles objected to as hearsay. It outlined her claim for expenses for the years 1990 through 1999. For the period prior to the October 1, 1993 order approving the stipulation that Charles executed for a wage assignment of $35.00 a week, Carol asked for reimbursement of one hundred percent of the bills she alleged were not reimbursed. She requested one-half reimbursement for the balance of the bills.
The district court denied Charles's hearsay objection finding even if the exhibits were technically hearsay the court considered them reliable, for even without the exhibits Carol would be competent to testify to the amount of medical expenses incurred for Nicole.
Charles contended obligations incurred prior to 1992 were discharged in bankruptcy. The district court denied this argument finding the reimbursement was in the nature of child support and as such could not be discharged in bankruptcy.
Charles also contended he was not obligated to reimburse Carol for expenses because she did not provide copies of the bill to him within the time required by the December 10, 1999 order. The district court found that order was prospective only and did not apply to bills incurred before its date.
The district court concluded Charles was responsible to reimburse Carol for the medical expenses with the exception of the Charter Hospital bill, which was already a judgment against Charles and in favor of Carol in the original decree. The court also found the $35.00 a week was to pay Carol for Nicole's health insurance and Carol did not carry it for four months. Consequently, $560.00 was deducted from the reimbursement. The court then found Charles owed Nicole $6,360.04 for unreimbursed medical expenses. The court ordered Charles to pay $750.00 towards Carol's attorney fees.
The district court denied Carol's request to have a judgment entered for the unpaid $800 in attorney fees, ruling that Carol already had a judgment for that amount.
Charles first contends the district court erred in finding that the December 10, 1999 order should only be applied prospectively. He contends that in making the determination the district court ignored that part of the order which said the time limits set forth there shall not apply to medical bills incurred between May 27, 1999 and December 10, 1999. Charles argues this stipulation operates to deny Carol's claim for medical expenses prior to May 27, 1999. He argues the order applied the time limits retrospectively by inclusion in carving out a time period not subject to the notice period and by omission in not extending the notice period exception back to the time of the initial decree.
We agree with Charles that the stipulation the parties entered is "tantamount to a consent decree." In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 1996); In re Property Seized Nov. 14-15, 501 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Iowa 1993). The issue, however, is whether the December 10, 1999 order modified provisions for medical support in the initial dissolution decree and prior orders.
The resolution of this dispute requires us to construe the terms of the written stipulation. To do so we look to the rules applicable to the construction of written contracts. In the construction of written contracts the intent of the parties must control, and except in the cases of ambiguity this is determined by what the contract itself says. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( n); American Soil Processing, Inc. v. Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd., 586 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Iowa 1998); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Knop, 524 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). Interpretation is the search for meaning of contractual words, and construction is ascertaining their legal effect. Pathology Consultants v. Gratton, 343 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Iowa 1984). Words are assigned their ordinary meaning in the interpretation of a contract. See Conoco, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Mason City, N.A., 767 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1985). Words are interpreted within the context in which they are used. Gildea v. Kapenis, 402 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987). Nothing in the stipulation makes any reference to the manner or time frame for presenting medical bills before May 27, 1999. Nor is there any language there indicating that reimbursement owed for earlier medical bills is forgiven. We are not persuaded that absence of any reference to presentation of earlier bills in the December 10, 1999 order required them to be presented in the manner provided in that order. See Northern Natural Gas Co., 524 N.W.2d at 671. We affirm on this issue.
Charles next contends the district court should have increased the number of months of credit he be given for medical insurance payments made to Carol that she did not use for insurance for a period of five years.
The district court specifically found that while the September 1999 order did not make it clear Charles was paying the $35.00 a week to reimburse Carol for medical coverage, the parties' testimony and the December 1999 order made it clear that was the purpose of the payment. The district court then gave Charles credit for the $35.00 a week payments he made during a four-month period when it was determined Carol did not have health insurance for Nicole. This finding has not been challenged. Charles contends only that he should have had more credit.
During the initial hearing there was testimony from an employee of the Child Support Recovery Unit concerning the periods Carol received medical assistance from the government. After the initial hearing a "Notice of Correction to Testimony" was filed by an assistant attorney general for the Child Support Recovery Unit where it was stated that an employee of the Child Support Recovery Unit had given incorrect testimony based on records available to her at the time of the hearing, but after the hearing she investigated and learned the testimony given was incorrect. The correct testimony was attached in a verified affidavit. The notice indicated that either attorney could make a motion for additional findings or hearings as needed. The affidavit filed June 8, 2004 showed Carol received medical assistance for Nicole from August 1999 through April 2000; from May 2001 through September 2001, November 2001, from November 2002 through October 2003, from December 2003 to January 2004, and from March 2004 to June 8, 2004.
A hearing on the issue of the corrected affidavit was held. During the hearing the district court accepted without objection the affidavit as the State's evidence in the hearing.
Carol testified at the hearing that during 1999 she was employed by Ramsey Pontiac, they took out insurance all year for Nicole, and she paid that insurance through January 20th of the next year. She further testified that to the best of her knowledge she did not apply for State aid for insurance and she was not aware of the State paying anything for her daughter during that time. There was also testimony from a Department of Human Services worker that one could have insurance through an employer and still qualify for medical aid.
Charles filed a motion to amend and enlarge findings and conclusions in which he advanced that Carol did not dispute receiving medical assistance during the periods of January 2000 through April 2000; May 2001 through September 2001, November 2001; November 2002 through October 2003; December 2003 through January 2004, and March 2004 to the hearing date. Charles asked that the sum of $4,549.65 be deducted from his responsibility to reimburse medical expenses, this amount representing the thirty months he claimed Carol failed to use the money to procure medical insurance.
The district court denied the motion saying that the factual findings and conclusions of law in his original ruling address the issues raised in Charles's motion and that its factual findings were based on the testimony of the parties and their exhibits and are supported by the evidence.
We affirm on this issue. The child support amount paid by Charles was modest. Undoubtedly, the cost of raising Nicole far exceeded what Charles paid in total. The order did not direct how the $35.00 a week should be used. There is no equity in adopting Charles' position. The case is affirmed in all respects.