Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. ED033162. Robert Applegate, Judge.
Ronald Grzywinski, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Michael J. Movius for Respondent.
ZELON, J.
Ronald Grzywinski appeals the property allocation, support order, and attorney fee award in his divorce from Christina Fahad-Grzywinski. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married in 1982 and separated on March 11, 2004. The marriage was dissolved on March 2, 2005, with numerous issues reserved for further proceedings. A trial was held on reserved issues in April and May 2006, and the court entered judgment concerning spousal support, separate property, and the division of community property. Additional issues were reserved for future proceedings. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
I. Property Evaluation and Division
Most of Grzywinski’s arguments on appeal concern the evidence presented in the trial court and its sufficiency to support specific awards made by the trial court. “Under [Family Code] section 2550, the court must divide the community estate of the parties equally. In this regard, the court has broad discretion to determine the manner in which community property is divided and the responsibility to fix the value of assets and liabilities in order to accomplish an equal division. [Citations.] The trial court’s determination of the value of a particular asset is a factual one and as long as that determination is within the range of the evidence presented, we will uphold it on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 631-632; see also In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 197 (Ackerman) [valuation of practice and support orders reviewed for an abuse of discretion; when exercise of discretion is based on facts of the case, determination is upheld as long as it is “‘within the range of the evidence presented’”].)
A. Valuation of Grzywinski’s Law Practice
The trial court found that Grzywinski’s law practice was a community asset, that the parties agreed to value the asset at the date of separation, and that the value of the practice was $156,312. On appeal, Grzywinski argues that his expert’s opinion, valuing the practice at approximately $32,000, was legitimate and that it “must be accepted” under Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 191. Grzywinski claims that his expert’s opinion must be accepted over the opposing expert’s estimate because that expert had not evaluated a law firm before, was unable to fully evaluate the law practice, and used an evaluating technique that Grzywinski labels as “conjecture” and an unacceptable method of accounting.
The evidence supports the determination by the trial court. Grzywinski’s expert employed an excess earnings approach to valuation of the law practice. Fahad-Grzywinski’s expert testified that the documentation provided was insufficient to permit analysis of the practice’s value under an earnings approach or a cost approach. There was evidence that the documentation made available concerning Grzywinski’s law practice contained numerous discrepancies that Grzywinski never made available a general ledger, and that without any way to substantiate the actual income and expenses of the law practice certain forms of economic valuation of the practice could not be performed. Accordingly, Fahad-Grzywinski’s expert testified that without any way to verify the numbers provided to him and no way to determine the actual income of the law practice, only a market approach to valuation could be performed. Fahad-Grzywinski’s expert testified to how he performed that analysis, what evidence he relied on, and how he arrived at his valuation. The evidence was entirely sufficient to permit the trial court to accept this valuation over the amount asserted by Grzywinski’s expert witness.
Contrary to Grzywinski’s assertion, nothing about Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 191, compels us to disregard the factual determination that the family court made. Ackerman does acknowledge that excess earnings valuation is a recognized valuation technique. (Id. at p. 200.) Ackerman does not compel a family court to accept any calculation made using the excess earnings valuation method regardless of whether the underlying numbers may be verified. This case is not similar to In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, as Grzywinski has not demonstrated that the analysis put forth by Fahad-Grzywinski’s expert and accepted by the family court failed to legitimately establish value under the method used. (Id. at p. 821.)
B. Equalizing Payment
Grzywinski argues that the court attributed a bank account balance of $7,765 to him and incorporated that amount into the equalizing payment but that “there is no credible evidence to substantiate its reasoning for doing so.” With a reference to the portion of Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 191, in which the family court deducted outstanding liabilities from the outstanding cash in a medical practice, Grzywinski states that “no such deductions were made” here so that the entire amount of $7,765 in his bank account should therefore be “stricken”—from where it should be stricken he does not explain, but because he demands to be reimbursed half that amount it is evident that he means that the account balance should not have been included in the community funds used to calculate the equalizing payment.
To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 672-673, fn. 3.) Grzywinski has not identified any evidence in the record of any outstanding liabilities or monthly expenses that he claims should have been subtracted from his bank account before determining it to be a community asset, awarding it to Grzywinski as separate property with a community value of $7,765, and including it in the equalizing payment calculation. Moreover, Grzywinski has also failed to explain why any failure to deduct unspecified liabilities from his bank account before including it in the community property would result in the entire balance becoming his separate property with no community value. Grzywinski has failed to demonstrate any error here.
C. Reimbursement Connected to Residential Refinancing
By an earlier stipulation and judgment in the case, Grzywinski was ordered “responsible for all costs, fees, expenses and deductions of said refinance of [the family home] paid through escrow except the November and December mortgage payments and property taxes.” Grzywinski complains that he, rather than the community, was designated as responsible for a pre-payment penalty occasioned by the refinance of the home. Grzywinski argues that classifying the prepayment penalty on the original loan as a cost of the refinance was erroneous because it allows Fahad-Grzywinski “to escape responsibility for an obligation that was clearly community in nature and puts the burden solely” on him. Grzywinski argues that the pre-payment penalty would have been incurred when the house was sold, so the penalty should be considered a cost related to the home and not an expense related to the refinancing. Grzywinski has not offered any evidence of the terms of the original mortgage loan for the residence to support his claim that the sale of the home to a third party would have incurred the pre-payment penalty. Absent any support in the record for this claim, Grzywinski has not established any error in considering this penalty to be among the expenses and fees that became Grzywinski’s responsibility as a result of the earlier judgment in this case. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [obligation to provide evidence and citations to support claim of error].)
D. Reimbursement for Tax Liability
Grzywinski next challenges the order that Grzywinski shall reimburse Fahad- Grzywinski $16,228 in connection with the parties’ income tax liability. He argues that this was a community responsibility erroneously converted by the trial court to a separate obligation of Grzywinski’s. At trial, Fahad-Grzywinski testified that her wages had been garnished for taxes and that the IRS informed her it was for unpaid taxes from the years 2001 and 2003. Fahad-Grzywinski testified that she had known about some outstanding taxes, but not all. She estimated the amount at approximately $17,000 and explained that Grzywinski had completed their tax returns and faxed her the signature page, and she signed it. Fahad-Grzywinski then testified that Grzywinski agreed to pay those taxes himself “out of his own money, his own share, in consideration that I would not bring an innocent [spouse] action because I talked to the IRS; and he said I would have grounds for an innocent spouse action, and I dropped it because he said he would pay them himself.” This evidence was sufficient to support an assessment of $17,000 against Grzywinski, and although why the court decided to impose slightly less than $17,000 is unclear, Grzywinski is not damaged by the trial court’s determination to allocate approximately $800 less in tax liability to him than the evidence would allow.
E. Classification of Earnings and Expenses
Grzywinski claims that four bank accounts awarded to Fahad-Grzywinski as separate property should have been considered community property. The family court found that one of the four accounts “reflects post-separation earnings and expenses, and has no community value,” and therefore declared it to be Fahad-Grzywinski’s separate property without any community value. Grzywinski has not demonstrated any error here. He mentions evidence that soon after the separation, a deposit of $9,000 was made into that account that Fahad-Grzywinski acknowledged came from her retirement account. Grzywinski does not acknowledge the evidence that that money was used to hire counsel for the divorce and to pay expenses for Fahad-Grzywinski to complete her teaching credential; he instead insists, without authority, that because she maintained this account while she was married the sums therein are community property. Grzywinski has not demonstrated any error in the family court’s determination that the funds were not community property.
This account is awarded to Fahad-Grzywinski in the judgment as separate property; it appears that the court erred by listing this award under “Community Property Awarded to Respondent” rather than as her outright separate property. It is clear, however, from the statement of decision, that the court understood this account to be a post-separation account, as it declared the account to be separate property and did not include it in the equalization calculations.
With respect to the remaining three bank accounts (Citigroup/Smith Barney Nos. 09-12, 33-10, and 19-15), Grzywinski appears not to understand how these accounts were disposed of by the family court. The court determined that the three accounts had a community property value of $816, $1728, and $1728 respectively. The accounts were awarded as separate property to Fahad-Grzywinski but were included in the equalization payments because they were community assets to which Grzywinski was entitled to one-half. Grzywinski appears unaware that he ultimately received half of the funds from these accounts despite the accounts’ allocation to Fahad-Grzywinski, as the community funds were equally distributed between the parties by means of the equalizing payment.
Grzywinski attributes a different balance to account No. 33-10, but as he does not offer any citation to evidence to support this alleged amount, nor does he make any argument that the court inaccurately valued that account, we do not consider this a cognizable argument on appeal. “We need not address points in appellate briefs that are unsupported by adequate factual or legal analysis.” (Placer County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Nevada County Local Agency Formation Com. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 793, 814.)
Grzywinski also argues that an additional bank account was “not addressed” by the family court but should also have been considered community property. This account was directly addressed by the court in its statement of decision, in which it made the factual finding that the Citigroup/Smith Barney account in Fahad-Grzywinski’s name, account No. 11-18, was a trust account for the parties’ son. As such, it was not community or separate property to be awarded in the judgment. Grzywinski does not acknowledge this finding by the court, much less cite evidence to demonstrate error in the family court’s decision that this account was held in trust for his son. Grzywinski has not established any error here.
II. Retroactivity of Spousal Support
Grzywinski asserts that the family court erred in awarding retroactive spousal support. It is not entirely clear what about this order aggrieves Grzywinski, as his assertion of error reads, “In light of the amount of spousal support ordered in its Judgment, the amounts Petitioner was paying from January 1, 2005, until the time of Judgment herein, clearly exceeding the amount ordered, is simply not justified.” We are not certain whether Grzywinski means to assert that he could not be ordered by a court to pay support in light of his previous agreement to pay certain sums pending the completion of the bifurcated proceedings, or whether he attempts to argue that the retroactivity of the order in the judgment on appeal resulted in him having to pay double support for months preceding the judgment. If he contends the former, Grzywinski has not provided any authority, nor are we aware of any, that would make this order invalid simply because Grzywinski had previously agreed to pay specified amounts. If he contends the latter, Grzywinski has not provided any evidence that the trial court’s order resulted in Grzywinski actually paying support twice for any time period. In either event, Grzywinski simply has not provided legal or factual support for his assertion that he should not have been assessed $6,000 in support for 2005. “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs” or in the record. (United States v. Dunkel (7th Cir. 1991) 927 F.2d 955, 956.) Grzywinski has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion here. (Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 197.)
III. Attorney Fees
The trial court found that Grzywinski had the ability to pay attorney fees, that the fees requested by Fahad-Grzywinski were reasonable and necessary for her proper legal representation, that Fahad-Grzywinski needed assistance in paying for attorney fees, that Grzywinski caused Fahad-Grzywinski to incur some extraordinary fees, and that Grzywinski’s contribution toward Fahad-Grzywinski’s attorney fees was just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Grzywinski does not claim that the trial court erred in determining that the fees requested by Fahad-Grzywinski were reasonable and necessary for her proper legal representation, that she needed assistance in paying for attorney fees, or that he caused her to incur some extraordinary fees. Instead, adhering to his insistence that his law practice was of minimal value, Grzywinski claims that there was no evidence that he could pay $25,000 in attorney fees and that the award therefore exceeds the bounds of reason. We review the attorney fee award for an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762, 768-769.)
Grzywinski asserts that the findings of the court do not support the award because “[t]he evidence was that Petitioner’s law practice had no good will, no excess earnings, no assets, and at the time of trial had grossed a little over $19,000.00 for the first quarter of 2006.” Grzywinski neither acknowledges nor contests the trial court’s factual finding that his annual income was at least $78,000. We have already addressed the fact that the evidence supports the valuation of Grzywinski’s law practice, and the family court could reasonably have concluded from the evidence presented at trial that Grzywinski was trying to create the appearance of having fewer financial resources and lower income than he actually possessed. In light of the determination that Grzywinski’s half of the community funds totaled $86,427.50, his annual income of $78,000, and the other evidence presented at trial, we discern no abuse of discretion, and Grzywinski has identified none, in the assessment of $25,000 toward Fahad-Grzywinski’s attorney fees.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., WOODS, J.