Opinion
B320865
11-28-2023
In re Marriage of AHMED GHANDOUR and NATALIA PRYANNIK GHANDOUR. v. NATALIA PRYANNIK GHANDOUR, Appellant. AHMED GHANDOUR, Respondent,
Natalia Pryannik Ghandour, in pro. per., for Appellant. Ahmed Ghandour, in pro. per.; Morris & Morris and John S. Morris for Respondent. [Retained.]
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 18PSFL00521 Lisa R. Washington, Judge. Affirmed.
Natalia Pryannik Ghandour, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Ahmed Ghandour, in pro. per.; Morris & Morris and John S. Morris for Respondent. [Retained.]
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Appellant Natalia Pryannik Ghandour (Natalia) appeals from the judgment entered in this marital dissolution action. She contends that the trial court erred when it found, following a two-day trial, that the family residence was the separate property of respondent Ahmed Ghandour (Ahmed).
Because the parties share the same last name, we use their first names for ease of identification. No disrespect is intended.
We affirm.
The statement of facts and other factual assertions contained in the parties' appellate briefs are not supported by appropriate references to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [appellate briefs must "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears"].) Our ability to determine what transpired below is also impaired by the lack of a complete record on appeal, including a reporter's transcript from the second day of trial on October 20, 2021. Accordingly, much of this summary of the relevant factual and procedural background is gleaned from the judgment itself.
Natalia and Ahmed married in March 2007 and separated 10 years later, in March 2017. Ahmed filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in March 2018.
A bench trial took place over two days in October 2021, during which the parties tried the issue of the character of the family residence in Glendora (the Glendora home). At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that the Glendora home was Ahmed's sole and separate property.
The trial court entered a judgment of marital dissolution on February 14, 2022 (the judgment), which set forth the following findings related to the Glendora home: (1) The Glendora home "was purchased during the marriage"; (2) "there is a presumption that property purchased during marriage is community property"; (3) "that presumption is rebuttable;" (4) Ahmed "successfully rebutted the presumption by showing that the acquisition of the [Glendora home] is traced to his separate funds"; (5) Ahmed "had separate property funds, from prior to the date of marriage, in two accounts"; (6) Ahmed "showed that these separate property funds were used to acquire the [Glendora home] by way of wire transfer"; and (7) Ahmed "further showed that the loan incurred on the [Glendora home] was likewise paid down with funds solely traceable to [Ahmed]'s separate property funds."
According to the judgment, the trial court "further found that [Natalia] signed a [q]uitclaim [d]eed with regard to the [Glendora home]. The court acknowledged that English is not [Natalia]'s first language. Nevertheless, with regard to that [q]uitclaim deed, the court found: [¶] . . . [I]t was not the product of a breach of fiduciary duty; [¶] . . . it was not the product of undue influence; and [¶] . . . it was not unconscionable or unreasonable given the circumstances existent at the time of purchase of the family residence."
Based on the foregoing, the trial court "found that the purchase of the [Glendora home] was solely traceable to [Ahmed]'s separate property and confirmed the family residence as being solely [Ahmed]'s separate property."
Natalia timely appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. General Legal Principles
"In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court's characterization of the parties' property-as community property or separate property-determines the division of the property between the spouses. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1399-1400 (Valli).)
Property acquired by a spouse during marriage is generally presumed to be community property. (Fam. Code, § 760; Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1400; In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 91.) This presumption is rebuttable. (Ciprari, supra, at p. 91.) "Property that a spouse purchases with separate property funds continues to be separate property. [Citation.] Separate property does not change character simply because the owner is married, or the property is used in the marital relationship, or the property changes form or identity. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1423 (Bonvino); see also Valli, supra, at p. 1400 ["Property that a spouse acquired during the marriage is community property [citation] unless it is . . . traceable to a separate property source"].)
"A spouse's claim that property acquired during a marriage is separate property must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.]" (Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1400.) "Virtually any credible evidence may be used to overcome the general community property presumption, including tracing to a separate property source. [Citation.]" (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423.)
II. Standard of Review
A trial court's characterization of property as either community or separate is a factual finding that we review for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Campi (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1572.) Under the substantial evidence standard of review, "[o]ur sole inquiry is 'whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' supporting the court's finding. [Citation.] 'We must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's findings . . ., resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.' [Citation.]" (Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822-823.)
III. Natalia Has Not Met Her Burden of Demonstrating Reversible Error
Natalia's appeal boils down to a challenge to the evidentiary basis for the trial court's finding that the Glendora home is Ahmed's sole and separate property. Natalia contends, in conclusory fashion, that Ahmed failed to rebut the presumption that the Glendora home, which was acquired during the marriage, belongs to the community. She also disputes the validity of the quitclaim deed she signed.
"'[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.]' [Citation.] 'This means that an appellant must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test [her] claim. The appellant must present an adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the record. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619-620 (L.O.).) "An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence must [also] set forth all the relevant evidence, not just the evidence favorable to the appellant, and show how the evidence does not support the judgment[.]" (Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1251; see also L.O., supra, at pp. 620-621.) These requirements apply with equal force to appellants acting in propria persona. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 ["Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation"]; L.O., supra, at p. 620.)
Natalia has forfeited her contentions on appeal by failing to adequately cite the record, support her legal and factual assertions, and discuss the conflicting evidence presented by Ahmed. (See L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 620-621; Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1406 ["The court is not required to make an independent search of the record and may disregard any claims when no reference is furnished"]; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 ["an attack on the evidence without a fair statement of the evidence is entitled to no consideration when it is apparent that a substantial amount of evidence was received on behalf of the respondent"].)
There are also critical omissions in the appellate record. Ahmed's admitted trial exhibits-including bank statements, an escrow document, wire transfer documents, and the quitclaim deed-have not been transmitted to us. The reporter's transcript from the second day of the two-day trial was not designated by Natalia as part of the record on appeal and is therefore not before us. Natalia asserts that "[t]here is no evidence to support a finding" that the Glendora home is Ahmed's separate property, but she has failed to provide a complete picture of the evidence that was presented to the trial court.
"[A] record is inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the record [s]he provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court could be affirmed." (Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. American Vanguard Corp. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 285, 302.) In other words, we must presume that the content of Ahmed's trial exhibits and the omitted reporter's transcript contain substantial evidence supporting the trial court's challenged findings. (See Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 576 ["In the absence of a proper record, . . . we must presume the trial court acted properly"]; Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412 ["We cannot presume error from an incomplete record"].)
IV. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Property Characterization
In any event, even the incomplete record before us provides substantial evidence to affirm the trial court's characterization of the Glendora home. On the first day of the trial, Ahmed testified that at the time of his marriage to Natalia in March 2007, he had approximately 1.7 million dollars in savings. He used that money, which had all been acquired prior to the marriage, to purchase the Glendora home in February 2008. Ahmed took title to the property as "a married man, his sole and separate property."
Ahmed's testimony constitutes substantial evidence that the Glendora home was purchased with Ahmed's separate property funds and was, therefore, his separate property. (See Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 ["Property that a spouse purchases with separate property funds continues to be separate property"]; Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 969 ["The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to constitute substantial evidence"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur:, LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J.