This factual scenario is not present in this case. As such, these cases have no application here. ¶ 53 Respondent also cites to Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d 640, and In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d 450 (1991), in support of his position that the trial court erred. However, respondent merely sets forth the facts of those cases with no explanation as to how they apply here.
¶ 91 We turn to the several other cases Russell cites. The first group consists of five cases, In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill.App.3d 640, 324 Ill.Dec. 310, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (2008), In re Marriage of Werries, 247 Ill.App.3d 639, 186 Ill.Dec. 747, 616 N.E.2d 1379 (1993), In re Marriage of Jelinek, 244 Ill.App.3d 496, 184 Ill.Dec. 692, 613 N.E.2d 1284 (1993), In re Marriage of Perlmutter, 225 Ill.App.3d 362, 167 Ill.Dec. 340, 587 N.E.2d 609 (1992), and In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill.App.3d 450, 155 Ill.Dec. 174, 569 N.E.2d 174 (1991). He describes their common facts and analyses as follows:
Moreover, we disagree with Donna that the fact that the money generated from the property was used to pay for the property necessarily renders the property a marital asset. Indeed, in In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d 450 (1991), we found that property that was paid for by the revenue it generated was actually nonmarital property. In Eddy, the husband and his brother inherited ranch and farm property from their father during the husband's marriage.
In order to classify such newly acquired property as nonmarital property, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the new property was acquired in exchange for nonmarital property. In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App.3d 450, 456 (1991). Any doubts are resolved in favor of finding that the new property is marital.
Real property and business interests acquired after marriage are presumed to be marital property unless they were purchased with nonmarital funds. In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d 450, 456-57 (1991). The trial court found that Bricks was nonmarital property because it was "formed with funds from [Kim's] non-marital interest in Colonial."
Any doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital. In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App.3d 450, 456-57 (1991); see In re Marriage of Parr, 103 Ill. App.3d 199, 205 (1981) (Act has "express preference for the classification of property as marital property"). In this case, Marilyn concedes that the Petunia property was acquired during the marriage.
¶ 73 In contradiction to his argument that we should rely upon the plain language of the stipulation, Michael nevertheless argues that his unrefuted testimony established that his partnership interest has no present value and that any future value is a mere expectancy. Thus, Michael contends, his partnership interest was not property subject to allocation. ¶ 74 In support, Michael cites In re Marriage of Centioli, 335 Ill. App. 3d 650 (2002), and In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d 450 (1991). These cases are inapposite.
To obtain reimbursement for the marital estate on that basis, Rhoda bore the burden of proving that the value of Staker's Acres had "substantially appreciated" as a result of Michael's significant personal efforts. In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d 450, 458 (1991); 735 ILCS 5/503(c) (West 2014). Only the appreciation resulting from Michael's significant personal efforts would entitle the marital estate to reimbursement, "not the appreciation which results from inflation or other factors external to the marriage."
When marital and nonmarital funds are commingled and lose their identities in acquiring a newly created asset during the marriage, the asset is considered a marital asset. In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d 450, 457 (1991). In such circumstances, the commingled property is transmuted to marital property.
Thus, even if petitioner is correct in asserting that the “in contemplation of marriage” doctrine may not be applied where the property at issue has been purchased entirely with one spouse's premarital funds, this is not such a case. ¶ 25 In reaching that determination, we have considered In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill.App.3d 450, 155 Ill.Dec. 174, 569 N.E.2d 174 (1991), cited by petitioner, and find it distinguishable from this case. In Eddy, 210 Ill.App.3d at 457–58, 155 Ill.Dec. 174, 569 N.E.2d 174, this court held that the respondent's businesses were formed from nonmarital funds where the loans that provided those funds were made to the respondent and his brother, were secured by property they owned, and were repaid with revenues from those businesses.