Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. 06-221375 William Silveira, Jr., Judge. (Retired judge of the Tulare S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Michael Ebaugh, in propria persona, for Appellant.
Lisa Scott, in propria persona, for Respondent.
OPINION
Gomes, J.
Michael Ebaugh appeals, in propria persona, from a judgment entered in a bifurcated trial to resolve certain issues relating to the characterization and division of property, spousal and child support, and attorney fees and sanctions in the marital dissolution proceedings between himself and respondent Lisa Scott. Ebaugh raises various claims of error with respect to the court’s factual findings and decisions. Finding no merit in any of contentions, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ebaugh and Scott married in July 1987. The couple has three children, Austin born in 1991, James born in 1993 and Emma born in 1995. The couple separated on October 31, 2006, when Scott and the children moved from the family home in Porterville to Visalia, where the boys attended private school.
Ebaugh is a physician licensed to practice in the State of California. At the time of separation his medical practice in the area of obstetrics and gynecology was located in Porterville and operated through a corporation known as Porterville Women’s Medical Associates (PWMA). During the marriage, Scott worked at PWMA, but stopped working there after she separated from Ebaugh. Scott has a masters’ degree in accounting. At one time, she was licensed as a certified public accountant (CPA) in Texas, but that license had expired. She was not licensed as a CPA in California.
Scott filed for dissolution of the marriage on November 3, 2006. The community’s assets included PWMA, the Ebaugh Family Partnership (EFP) and two companion companies, Indixit, Inc. and InDxLogic, Inc. (the software companies). One company owns intellectual property software that purportedly would save significant labor in incorporating patient records and billings into an electronic format and ease sharing of that information; the other is the licensee of that software. At separation, Ebaugh was involved in developing computer software for the software companies.
Temporary Support and Approval of the Sale of PWMA
In January 2007, the trial court ordered Ebaugh to pay $7,700 in temporary child and spousal support, maintain health insurance for the children and Scott, pay one-half of the children’s education and medical costs, and pay $5,000 of Scott’s attorney fees. Ebaugh was ordered to continue to contribute $450 per month to a health savings account (HSA), with the funds to be used to pay the children’s uninsured medical costs as their medical insurance was only for catastrophic injuries. The parties were ordered to pay one-half of any uninsured health care expenses that exceeded the amount in the HSA. An attorney was appointed to represent the children. Scott was ordered to submit to a vocational rehabilitation evaluation to be paid for by Ebaugh. The parties stipulated to Michael Smith, CPA, being the Evidence Code section 730 expert to value the parties’ community property business interests.
In February 2007, the trial court ordered bifurcation of child custody and visitation determinations from the other aspects of the dissolution proceedings. After efforts at mediation failed, Scott moved to set a contested hearing on the issues of permanent child custody and visitation. Scott also asked the court to bifurcate the issue of the valuation date to be used for PWMA, as she believed Ebaugh was attempting to reduce PWMA’s value and intended to close or sell the practice so he could move to Visalia to seek employment, and for attorney fees based on the disparity of their incomes and Ebaugh’s asserted unwillingness to compromise on significant issues. In her income and expense declaration, Scott stated that she started working as an assistant controller at a company in Visalia in March 2007.
Judge Melinda Reed presided over the child custody and visitation issues, while Judge William Silveira presided over the support and property issues.
In May 2007, the court set trial on child custody and visitation for October 2007 and on the property and support issues for December 2007. That same month, Ebaugh filed a motion requesting the court make orders regarding the sale of the family residence in Porterville and allowing him to sell PWMA so he could move to Visalia to be closer to the children. Ebaugh claimed he would be obtaining employment in Visalia with the Tulare County Health Department in obstetrics and gynecology, with an annual salary of approximately $230,000.
A hearing was held in June 2007 on the two motions. As pertinent here, the court (1) declined to decide whether to modify the present child custody orders until the children’s attorney had spoken with the children and their therapists; (2) approved the sale of the family home pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, reserving jurisdiction to make further orders regarding the proposed sale; (3) granted Ebaugh’s request to proceed with negotiations regarding the sale of PWMA and ordered him to provide Scott copies of any proposed contracts, with a forensic evaluation to be completed before the execution of any sales contract and reserving jurisdiction to make further orders regarding the sale, including selling the practice without a forensic evaluation; (4) ordered valuation of PWMA and the software companies as of either the date of separation or December 31, 2006, as the parties may agree; and (5) deferred ruling on Scott’s request for attorney fees pending Ebaugh’s filing of a summary of community funds he alleged Scott removed at the time of separation.
After the parties submitted evidence on the issue of whether Scott had removed over $64,000 in community funds, the court issued a written order in September 2007, in which it found, among other things, that while Scott had removed a little over $20,000 for her own benefit from community funds when the couple separated, she used the balance of the amount Ebaugh claimed she removed to pay community debt, and she had not hidden or secreted funds from the joint checking account. Citing the substantial disparity of Scott’s and Ebaugh’s annual income, which was $65,000 and approximately $350,000 respectively, and the complexity of the litigation, the court ordered Ebaugh to pay Scott’s attorney $20,000 for her attorney fees and costs, explaining the order was based on Scott’s need and Ebaugh’s ability to pay.
The Child Custody Trial
A bench trial on child custody and visitation issues was held on November 13 and 14, 2007, before Judge Melinda Reed. In a report prepared for the hearing, the children’s attorney recommended that if Ebaugh remained living in Porterville the boys should continue the equal week to week custody arrangement that was then in place and Scott be given primary custody of Emma, but if Ebaugh relocated to Visalia, “Emma may have a more flexible schedule” between Ebaugh and Scott. Following testimony and argument, the court ordered joint legal and physical custody to both parents, with shared equal custody of the boys and a custody split for Emma of nine days with Scott and five days with Ebaugh. The court further ordered Scott and Ebaugh to participate in professional co-parenting classes and voluntary mediation. In making these orders, the court found that Ebaugh was making significant lifestyle changes to be involved with the children as much as possible by seeking to change employment and move to Visalia.
Approval to Sell EFP’s Rental Property and Modification of Support
Ebaugh moved to Visalia in December 2007. In January 2008, he began employment with Central California Faculty Medical Group (CCFMG) as the director of inpatient obstetrics at University of California San Francisco Fresno, at a base annual salary of $160,000, with additional compensation for on call time and bonuses. That same month, Scott filed a motion for additional spousal support, for permission to rent or lease the family residence, to reopen discovery, to issue a health insurance coverage assignment order to Ebaugh’s employer and to address issues regarding the children’s custody. The following month, Scott filed another motion requesting the court bifurcate the issue of the dissolution of the status of the marriage.
At the March 2008 hearing on the motions, the parties stipulated that a rental property next to the family residence owned by EFP (the rental property) be listed for sale, with Scott in charge of the sale, and that the rental property could be rented. The court granted a status only judgment of dissolution of the marriage. The court continued the hearing on the issue of modification of support.
At the continued hearing in May 2008, Scott argued that when determining support, the court should impute to Ebaugh the income he was earning when he worked at PWMA. The court rejected that argument, finding that (1) Scott testified she moved from Porterville to Visalia because it was in the children’s best interests and she could get a better paying job, (2) Ebaugh testified that he left PWMA in January 2008 and moved to Visalia so he could be closer to his children and continue with the joint custody arrangement, and (3) Ebaugh obtained employment with CCFMG, where he continues to work long hours (more than eight hours per day) and was earning at least $16,738 per month based on his gross earnings to date which, together with Scott’s income, was enough to maintain the children at an appropriate lifestyle. Based on the facts presented, the court declined to impute a different earning capacity to Ebaugh, noting that no evidence was presented regarding what an obstetrician/gynecologist earns in Visalia. The court further found there was an approximately 45 percent timeshare, Scott earned $5,267 gross income per month, Ebaugh had deductions of $680 per month for another child not of this marriage and $801 for health insurance.
The court ordered Ebaugh to pay Scott (1) $1,949 per month in child support commencing February 1, 2008, with each party responsible for one-half of the children’s uncovered, unreimbursed medical expenses, and (2) temporary spousal support of $1,109 per month commencing February 1, 2008. The court denied Scott’s request for attorney fees as it had made a previous order for attorney fees and the disparity of income was offset by the support award.
The September Trial on Support and Property Issues
The bench trial on the non-custody dissolution matters, including child and spousal support and the characterization, valuation and division of property, was conducted over five days in September 2008. The parties presented evidence concerning various matters. Smith, the CPA retained to appraise PWMA, testified about his appraisal and the method he used to determine the value of the business, including the use of the excess earnings method to determine the value of PWMA’s goodwill. Smith determined PWMA’s value as of December 31, 2006 to be $497,124, comprised of excess of assets over liabilities of $225,269 and goodwill of $271,855. Smith also testified that he did not appraise the software companies. Smith explained that such appraisals are very expensive, but he would appraise a start-up company in a very high risk area, like the software companies, by the dollar amount invested in the company. According to a 2006 corporate tax return Ebaugh’s attorney showed him, it appeared to Smith that approximately $149,000 had been invested in one of the companies and its value would be that number less debt of $79,159, plus the cash in the bank. Smith stated, however, that this was “open for discussion” and “just something that I’ve developed over the years, ” stating he refers the majority of these types of engagements to an intellectual property appraiser in Los Angeles.
Testimony was presented on each day of the September 2008 trial. Ebaugh, however, designated only one reporter’s transcript from the trial for inclusion in the record on appeal, namely the transcript of September 8, 2008, which contains the testimony of Dennis Coleman, the chief executive officer and president of Sierra View District Hospital, Smith, and Dr. Michael Geiling, who was employed at PWMA as an obstetrician/gynecologist and had exchanged e-mails with Ebaugh within the month before trial agreeing to purchase PWMA for $100,000. The clerk’s transcript also includes a portion of the reporter’s transcript of the proceedings on September 12, 2008, which contains Ebaugh’s testimony. While Ebaugh also testified on September 9, 2008, that testimony is not part of the appellate record. Witnesses who testified on the days for which there are no reporter’s transcript include Anna Golden, Toni Dominie, Nancy Rodriguez, Gary Morris and Scott.
In post-trial briefing, Scott argued: (1) that PWMA should be valued at the amount of Smith’s appraisal; (2) the software companies should be assigned a value equivalent to the amount invested in them, which Scott had testified was approximately $250,000, and the asset given to Ebaugh; (3) in determining child support, the court should impute earning capacity to Ebaugh based on his income when he worked at PWMA rather than his income from CCFMG; (4) she should be reimbursed for the children’s uninsured health care expenses that she paid, as Ebaugh previously was ordered to contribute $450 per month to a HSA from which such expenses were to have been paid; and (5) Ebaugh should be ordered to pay additional attorney fees and costs pursuant to Family Code section 2030.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise noted.
In Ebaugh’s post-trial brief, he asserted that because he was in the process of selling PWMA for $100,000 to Geiling through a bona fide sales transaction, the only proper value of PWMA was the actual amount of the net sales proceeds minus the liabilities plus the accounts receivable as of the date of separation. With respect to the software companies, Ebaugh agreed they should be valued by the amount invested in them and in determining that amount, the court should use the amounts to which Smith testified. With respect to child support, Ebaugh contended the court should not impute his income at a higher amount, but instead should use the income he was earning at CCFMG, which had risen to approximately $200,000 per year. Ebaugh asserted there was no evidence he did not fund the HSA, therefore the parties should each pay half of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses. Ebaugh also asserted that at least part of his attorney fees be charged to the community and requested attorney fees pursuant to section 271 on the ground that Scott’s demand for primary legal and physical custody of the children had driven up the cost of litigation.
In her reply brief, Scott stated she was willing to accept Smith’s valuation of the software companies, i.e. the gross value of $153,704 less the obligation to PWMA of $79,159, resulting in a net value of $74,545, with $45,731 added to the value of PWMA.
The Reopened Trial
On October 17, 2008, Scott filed a motion to reopen the trial so evidence could be received regarding Ebaugh’s opening of his private practice in Visalia. Scott asserted this evidence was relevant to (1) the value of PWMA, (2) Ebaugh’s ability to pay support and attorney fees, (3) Ebaugh’s credibility and (4) whether sanctions should be imposed. Scott also asked the court to order Ebaugh to execute all documents necessary to complete the sale of the rental property. Scott asserted that since the close of testimony, she learned Ebaugh had leased property in Visalia so he could carry on his private medical practice, a fact that Ebaugh had not listed on his final disclosure or mentioned during his trial testimony, which directly contradicted Ebaugh’s prior statements that he no longer wanted to work in the private practice of medicine. Scott further asserted that potential buyers of the rental property had accepted her counteroffer of $195,000 — the appraised value of the property — but Ebaugh had refused to execute the documents necessary for the sale to proceed, and she was concerned the offer would be lost.
In support of her motion, Scott filed a declaration from Toni Dominie, a real estate agent Scott retained to sell the rental property. Dominie stated she had located promising buyers, who accepted Scott’s counter-proposal on September 24, 2008, and had agreed to purchase the property at the appraised value without any extraordinary improvements. Dominie discussed the proposed sale with Ebaugh and, per his request, forwarded copies of the listing agreement, the offer and the counter-offer to him. While Ebaugh said he would contact her by October 9 to confirm his signing of the listing agreement and acceptance of the offer, as of October 23 he had not contacted her.
Ebaugh asked the court to deny Scott’s request to reopen the trial. Ebaugh asserted the sale of PWMA to Geiling, including its assets and goodwill, was in progress and would be final as of December 31, 2009. Ebaugh admitted he intended to start a gynecological health service in Visalia and had leased space to do so, but he did not yet have hospital privileges. Ebaugh denied that his plans constituted moving his Porterville practice, as Visalia is outside the service area for Sierra View District Hospital and his agreement with Geiling included a provision that he not solicit PWMA patients or provide medical services to any current patient within a 29 mile radius for two years. Ebaugh claimed he took the position at CCFMG in Fresno because he could not find work in Visalia, and while he loved his job, he wanted to open a practice in Visalia so he could supervise his sons, who had gotten into “more difficulties” over the past year. Ebaugh claimed he had not signed the documents relating to the sale of the rental property because the proper documents were never provided to him, as the documents given him were not in EFP’s name as the property owner. Ebaugh stated he told Dominie on October 7 to send him corrected documents, and he followed-up with e-mails on November 2 and 10, 2008, but he had not received them.
In reply, Scott pointed out that while the non-competition clause in the PWMA sales contract precluded Ebaugh from treating an existing client in any office within a 29 mile radius of Sierra View District Hospital, Ebaugh’s Visalia office is located 30.45 miles from Sierra View and therefore any existing patient could follow Ebaugh to Visalia. Scott also claimed there was a position available in Visalia for which Ebaugh was qualified and which paid, at least potentially, more than CCFMG. With respect to the sale of the rental property, Scott stated that the agent had prepared an addendum to the listing agreement, but Ebaugh refused to sign it and instead had insisted the original listing agreement be modified.
In November 2008, after hearing argument, the court granted the motion to reopen the trial limited to the valuation of PWMA, and all other issues presented by Scott’s motion to reopen testimony, including the imposition of sanctions. The court stated it would consider the declarations already on file at the time of trial and granted permission to subpoena witnesses.
Testimony in the reopened trial was received on January 16 and February 3, 2009. The witnesses were Ebaugh, Geiling, Errol Fowlkes, Martin Zeeb, Scott, Monica Ebaugh and Irvin Ebaugh. At the February 3 hearing, the court agreed to accept written arguments, summarizing the issues to be addressed, as pertinent here, as follows: (1) whether Ebaugh should be charged with Smith’s valuation of PWMA, as the court tentatively found he did not go to work for CCFMG in Fresno in good faith, but instead intended to maintain his private practice, and he had a duty to maintain that practice in Porterville for the community’s benefit; (2) attorney fees and sanctions; (3) the court’s tentative ruling that the software companies be assigned to Ebaugh for the value of the community’s contributions to it; and (4) what should be done with the rental property. Moreover, the court made specific orders regarding tasks that Gary Morris, CPA, was to accomplish regarding the valuation of the software companies and EFP.
Ebaugh did not designate either date of the reopened trial for preparation of a reporter’s transcript. Accordingly, none of the testimony received on January 16 or February 3, 2009 is part of the appellate record.
Further Custody Hearings
Meanwhile, a custody hearing was held before Judge Reed on January 23, 2009. In a declaration Scott submitted for the hearing, she asserted that Austin had been living primarily with Ebaugh and since moving in with him, he had dropped out of school, was unemployed, and had substantially increased his use of marijuana and introduced his brother to marijuana use. Scott claimed Austin had no adult supervision while Ebaugh was at work. Because of Austin’s increased drug usage, Scott was researching inpatient facilities to address his needs. With respect to James, Scott asserted that James’s grade point average was falling, he missed school about half of the time, and he was smoking marijuana on an almost daily basis during his custodial time with Ebaugh. Accordingly to Scott, while Emma continued to do well in school, Ebaugh left her unsupervised while she was in his custody. Judge Reed ordered both boys receive inpatient program treatment if a facility was available and that the custodial parent either supervise the children at all times or make appropriate arrangements for supervision.
By March 2009, Scott and Ebaugh had agreed to place the boys in an inpatient treatment facility in Utah, with the treatment to be paid from the boys’ trust fund. At an April 2009 hearing, Judge Reed ordered no change in custody to allow the children to complete the rehabilitation program.
Post-Trial Motions on the Rental Property, Support and Instructions to Morris
On February 19, 2009, Scott filed an order to show cause requesting the court to order the sale of the rental property for $160,000 or more, and to give her exclusive authorization to execute all documents necessary to complete the sale. Scott asserted that the offer to buy the property for $195,000 was lost due to Ebaugh’s delay, as he refused to sign the sales contract until ordered to do so in open court on November 20, 2008, and the buyers withdrew their offer when the sale still had not closed by late January. Scott further asserted that the realtor had received an offer of $125,000 on February 9, 2009, which she wanted to counter-offer, but Ebaugh objected. Scott noted, however, that she was willing to accept an offer Ebaugh had made to purchase the property himself for $150,000. In his opposition, Ebaugh claimed the loss of the prior sale was not due to his actions, as the buyers pulled out after the property inspection. Ebaugh offered to purchase the property, or have it awarded to him, for $150,000.
In April 2009, Ebaugh filed a motion to suspend child support for the two boys, as they were both in a residential program and not residing with either parent. That same month, Scott filed a request for an ex parte hearing on an order to show cause seeking, as pertinent here, orders requiring Ebaugh to (1) pay past due child and spousal support, (2) sign an instruction letter to Morris pursuant to the court’s previous order, and (3) file proof of obtaining medical insurance for the children. She also requested the court sanction Ebaugh $10,000 and order him to pay $2,500 in attorney fees. Scott asserted that she had been garnishing Ebaugh’s wages at CCFMG for support payments, but he was quitting his employment there to begin his Visalia practice and Ebaugh had not yet paid the support due on April 1.
At an April 23, 2009 hearing, the court ordered that Morris be instructed to perform services as an Evidence Code section 730 expert, and be given written instructions. The court further ordered the parties to promptly respond to a pending offer to purchase the rental property with a counteroffer of $160,000, with instructions on how to proceed if the sale was not completed. The court further ordered Ebaugh to continue to pay spousal support of $1,109 per month, pay $1,031 per month for Emma’s support, and suspended child support for the two boys. The court further ordered Ebaugh to pay $1,000 to Scott’s attorney for his fees and $500 as sanctions under section 271.
In May 2009, the parties sent Morris a letter requesting him to perform services as a neutral expert. As pertinent here, Morris was requested to determine the amount of the community’s contributions to the development of InDxLogic software from the inception of the marriage to December 31, 2006. In June 2009, the court granted Morris permission to interview certain individuals to assist him in determining how much the community contributed to the software companies and stated that the parties were entitled to contest the findings in Morris’s report and present evidence on issues investigated by Morris in a contested hearing.
The Parties’ Closing Briefs
In her closing brief on the reopened trial, Scott argued (1) the court should accept Smith’s valuation of PWMA, as it was the only competent evidence of its value presented at trial, and award PWMA to Ebaugh, (2) support should be calculated based on Ebaugh’s ability to earn rather than his income from employment at CCFMG, (3) the software companies should be valued based on the amount the community invested in the software development, and the court should reserve its decision on the matter until Morris’s report was received, (4) the court should retain jurisdiction regarding the sale of the rental property, and (5) she should be awarded sanctions based on Ebaugh’s conduct that necessitated the reopening of the trial and his refusal to cooperate.
In his closing brief, Ebaugh argued (1) the court should reject Smith’s valuation of PWMA’s goodwill, as he did not use the value the open market would place on professional goodwill, and the actual sales price of PWMA be used instead, (2) the value of the software companies is $75,254, which is the amount Smith testified to at the September trial and what Scott agreed to accept in her prior reply brief, (3) support should be set not on Ebaugh’s ability to earn, but on his income with CCFMG of $17,098 per month, which he acknowledged was an appropriate amount to use, and (4) he be awarded attorney fees pursuant to section 271. In reply, Scott argued, among other things, the rental property should be awarded to Ebaugh at its appraised value.
Additional Post-Trial Motions
In June 2009, Scott filed a motion to modify child and spousal support based on a change of circumstances, namely that she was laid off from her job in May 2009 due to the elimination of her position after the company downsized, leaving unemployment and child and spousal support as her only sources of income. Scott asked that support be set based on Ebaugh’s ability to earn $417,000 annually, and for attorney fees and sanctions. In response, Ebaugh asserted spousal support should be reduced to zero, as Scott was residing with her significant other, Jerry Jacobson M.D., at his Visalia residence, and Scott’s residence was vacant and listed for sale. Ebaugh argued the court should not impute his income at the amount Scott requested and although his income had decreased since he no longer was working at CCFMG and he was not earning the amount he earned there from his practice or earning any money from the software companies, he was not claiming that child support should be reduced. Ebaugh conceded it would be fair and appropriate to use the income he earned from CCFMG to determine support, which for 2008 was $210,695.06.
In reply, Scott asserted that her home was not for sale; instead, she was renting it out so she could pay the mortgage on it. Scott admitted that Jacobson was her boyfriend and she had moved into his house, but claimed that did not occur until June 28, 2009, and in exchange for room and board, she became a nanny for Dr. Jacobson’s sons. Scott stated she had been applying for jobs since February 2009, but had yet to find one, and her only income until July 1, 2009 was the $450 per month she was receiving from unemployment. On July 1, 2009, she began receiving $1,500 per month rent.
Scott also filed a motion in June 2009 to reopen evidence related to the value of InDxLogic, as her attorneys recently had discovered a video presentation Ebaugh gave on June 9, 2009, in which he acknowledged monthly revenues exceeded $50,000 per month, and had grown from December 2008 to May 2009. Scott asserted this called into question Ebaugh’s assertions throughout the litigation that the software was highly speculative and therefore of limited value, and his failure to include income from the software companies on his income and expense declarations.
On July 16, 2009, the court filed its statement of intended decision on the issues of the valuation of PWMA, the distribution of the assets of EFP, the valuation of the software companies, the distribution of other assets and attorney fees. The court stated it was not making a decision regarding support issues, as a hearing was scheduled on that subject. Ebaugh filed proposals regarding the statement of decision, to which Scott filed a response.
On August 5, 2009, a substitution of attorney was filed which stated that Ebaugh was now representing himself. On August 13, 2009, Ebaugh filed a reply to Scott’s motion to reopen evidence related to the value of the software companies, arguing that the motion should be denied.
The hearing on the motion to modify support and reopen the trial was set for August 14, 2009. According to the minutes of the hearing, corrections to the statement of intended decision were made regarding health and schooling fees, while other correction or revisions were discussed on the record. The court ordered Scott to sign a deed of trust over to Ebaugh as to the rental property, which would become Ebaugh’s sole and separate property, with the bills, mortgages and taxes on it to be prorated and charged to the community, and the property valued at $195,000. The request to reopen the trial was withdrawn and denied, with the previous orders on the software companies to remain in effect. The court addressed the issue of spousal support. After reviewing the parties’ income and expense declarations, the court determined it would impute to Ebaugh the ability to earn income at the rate he was making at his last employment. Ebaugh and Scott both testified. The court granted Scott’s request to withdraw $100,000 from the community.
The reporter’s transcript of the August 14, 2009 hearing is not part of the appellate record as Ebaugh did not designate it for transcription.
On September 1, 2009, the court filed a statement of intended decision on the issues of child and spousal support. Ebaugh filed proposals to the content of the intended statement of decision, as well as a motion to reopen the August 14 hearing on the issue of support, asserting he had discovered new evidence he believed Scott concealed at the hearing, namely that she had been interviewing with a prospective employer since the spring of 2009. In opposition, Scott asserted that while she had submitted a resume to a company in May 2009, she did not receive a response from the company until August 10 and did not interview for a position until the end of August 2009, and she was offered a position as a senior financial analyst on September 18, 2009.
By the September 28, 2009 hearing, Morris had not yet completed his report. The court set a hearing for December 3 and ordered Morris to have his report finalized and delivered to the parties by November 1. With respect to reopening the hearing, the court denied the request finding (1) the request was unnecessary, as Scott was under a continuing obligation to disclose offers and acceptances of employment to Ebaugh, and (2) if Scott is given a good faith offer that she does not accept, Ebaugh could move to modify support. With respect to Ebaugh’s objections to the intended statement of decision, the court found merit in his assertion that the court did not consider Scott’s ability to work as a staff accountant. Accordingly, the court modified its decision to state that if Scott could not find work as a controller within four to five months, she would be required to apply for work as a staff accountant to a CPA.
On November 5, 2009, Ebaugh filed a motion to modify child and spousal support. Ebaugh asserted Scott failed to notify him that she had accepted the position at a Visalia company and was to start work on November 9 at an annual salary of $62,000, and asked that spousal support be reduced to zero. Ebaugh asserted he did not have the ability to pay spousal and child support in the amounts ordered by the court due to his debts and limited income. Scott stated her attorney had informed Ebaugh of her acceptance of employment and that she started employment as a senior financial analyst on November 9, 2009 at an annual salary of $60,000.
At a December 3, 2009 hearing, the court denied Ebaugh’s motion to modify spousal support to the extent he sought to have the court modify its statement of intended decision. The court further explained that to the extent Ebaugh claimed the court erred in not attributing income to Scott at a level higher than $38,000 per year, it found credible trial testimony that Scott’s recent employment history and background in employment is in a narrower field than accounting generally. The court, however, agreed with Ebaugh’s assertion that Scott could at least be employed as a staff accountant. Accordingly, the court decided to give Scott an opportunity to obtain employment as a controller and if she could not, the court would attribute income to her at a level in which employment was readily available. The court denied Ebaugh’s request to attribute income to Scott from her employment as a nanny, as it had already found Scott’s testimony credible regarding the benefits she was receiving by living in the home of her significant other, it did not think she was living any better there than when she lived with Ebaugh, and it would not attribute any cash value to her services because the services were in-kind. The court set the issue of modification of spousal support for a hearing in January 2010, as well as a hearing on Morris’s report, which valued the software companies at $500,000.
The court signed the statement of decision and judgment at the hearing, both of which were filed that day. Before the hearing concluded, Ebaugh pointed out there had been no discussion about his ability to pay. The court replied that the issue was taken up in the statement of decision and findings and it determined Ebaugh had the ability to pay based on what he was being paid at CCFMG, rather than what he was earning at PWMA.
The Statement of Decision
The court made numerous factual findings in its statement of decision. As pertinent here, the court determined PWMA’s value as of December 31, 2006 to be $495,734, with $271,855 of that representing goodwill, and awarded PWMA to Ebaugh along with the right to retain the sales proceeds as well as the accounts receivable. The court further found that any tax obligations inherent in the sale to Geiling were a community liability. In making this determination, the court agreed some adjustments needed to be made to Smith’s valuation of PWMA, but rejected Ebaugh’s claims that it should not adopt Smith’s goodwill valuation and that PWMA should be valued for the amount for which it actually could be sold because he had a good faith motive to leave PWMA and take employment in Fresno, finding Ebaugh’s arguments legally and factually meritless.
The court concluded, based on the totality of the evidence, Ebaugh “engaged in an elaborate and self-defeating ruse” to deprive Scott of PWMA’s goodwill as determined by Smith. While Ebaugh contended at the September trial he needed to move to Visalia and take employment 50 miles away in Fresno because the long hours of on-call hospital duty prevented him from effectively co-parenting his children, the evidence at the reopened trial showed that at the time of the September trial Ebaugh was preparing to open another private practice in Visalia, an alternative he had previously rejected as fraught with too many financial and professional obstacles. The court was “completely unconvinced” that Ebaugh was in fact away from his home less hours while employed in Fresno than during his operation of PWMA. The court further found that relevant case law established that calculation of goodwill is a component of value in professional practices whether or not there is a market for the practice.
With respect to the rental property, the court found its fair market value to be its appraised value of $195,000. The court awarded the rental property and underlying mortgage obligation entirely to Ebaugh, with the net share of the children’s interest paid to them from the proceeds of the sale of other EFP property that was being held in trust. The court disposed of the property this way because Ebaugh thwarted efforts to market and sell the property, did not respond timely to good faith offers to purchase the property and raised objections and questions regarding the offers presented which had no real bearing on the fair return to the community.
The court found that EFP had a liability in the form of a $100,000 unsecured note owed to Ebaugh’s mother, Monica Ebaugh, which had a balance owing of $96,581. The court assigned the note to Ebaugh for repayment, with credit to be given him upon division of the community property and Ebaugh holding Scott harmless from any liability should the note be sued upon. The court ordered the children’s share of the note paid from their share of the proceeds of the sale of other EFP property and assigned the balance of $68,257.60 to Ebaugh as a community property obligation.
With respect to the software companies, based on Smith’s recommendation, the court decided to assign a value based on the amounts the community invested in their development. The parties’ accountant, Morris, had been charged with determining this amount. The court rejected Ebaugh’s argument that the goodwill portion of Smith’s valuation of PWMA included the amounts PWMA contributed to the development of the companies, as Smith testified he made adjustments to normalized earnings and did no analysis of how those net earnings were spent. The court reserved jurisdiction to make all appropriate orders related to the companies.
The court set child support for Emma, who lived with Scott 235 days per year and with Ebaugh 130 days, at $1,478 per month effective June 5, 2009. The court made no award of support as to the boys since they were in residential treatment facilities and schools covered by their own funds and Austin would be turning 18 in September 2009. The court ordered Ebaugh to continue to pay into the HSA, from which the children’s health expenses were to be paid. The court ordered Ebaugh to pay Scott $2,000 per month in spousal support effective June 5, 2009 and retained jurisdiction over the issue, with support being reduced to zero five years from August 31, 2009.
In making the support orders, the court attributed $210,695 of annual income to Ebaugh, which is the annual income he would have earned at CCFMG had he not quit his employment there in March 2009. The court rejected Scott’s contention that he be attributed the income he earned during his last year of work at PWMA. In deciding to attribute income to Ebaugh, the court noted that while he was currently without income, he tacitly admitted in his income and expense declaration that support should be calculated based on his earnings at CCFMG. Moreover, the court found Ebaugh had not shown any believable reason why he would leave his CCFMG employment to open a medical practice in Visalia in which he had no assurance of obtaining hospital privileges, especially in light of his testimony at the May 2008 hearing on his motion to modify support that he chose employment in Fresno because of the difficulties inherent in opening a medical practice in Visalia, including securing coverage in order to have hospital privileges. The court believed the evidence clearly showed Ebaugh could still be earning his salary at CCFMG had he not voluntarily left his employment there. While Ebaugh had stated in court that he left CCFMG to give him more time to supervise the children due to Scott’s unwillingness to co-parent with him, the evidence showed the boys were already beyond their parents’ control and Ebaugh did not provide any evidence that further attention from him likely would have remedied the situation.
With respect to Scott’s income, the court found she had the ability, but not the opportunity, to work as a controller. The court advised Scott she was obligated to become employed in a reasonable period of time and if she remained unemployed as of May 4, 2010, the court would impute to her the ability to earn $38,000 annually and modify support accordingly. Based on findings that Scott was living with and being partially supported by a person of the opposite sex, it applied the presumptions of section 4323 and elected to determine Scott’s request for modification of spousal support under section 4320, including its findings regarding Ebaugh’s income.
The court ordered Ebaugh to pay Scott $100,000 in attorney fees under sections 271 and 2107, as his failure to disclose and actions taken in bad faith caused Scott to incur substantial attorney fees. In making this order, the court noted that both parties had spent large sums in attorney fees and costs, with Ebaugh incurring $192,577.33 and Scott $143,587.75 as of January 2009. The court explained that when awarding fees under section 2030, it must consider the parties’ earnings and earning capacities, and found that Ebaugh’s ability to earn far exceeded Scott’s ability, even if only his salary and extra duty pay from CCFMG were used.
The court found that Ebaugh had engaged in conduct that necessitated the reopening of evidence and unduly prolonged the September trial. The court further found that Ebaugh engaged in a deliberate fiction that he withdrew from PWMA and went to work for CCFMG in Fresno to allow him to co-parent the children, when those actions were taken in an effort to have no goodwill attributed to PWMA, resulting in the taking of evidence and making of argument over several days of trial time. Moreover, Ebaugh’s rationale for leaving PWMA was being argued before the court while Ebaugh was making plans to open a Visalia practice — a possibility he argued at the September trial to be fraught with too many difficulties and an unrealistic alternative to employment.
Ebaugh filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 3, 2009 judgment.
DISCUSSION
Ebaugh is not represented by an attorney in this appeal. Pro per litigants, however, are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985; Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) On appeal, we begin with the presumption that the trial court’s judgment is correct and supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Consistent with this presumption, we draw all inferences in favor of the judgment unless the record expressly contradicts them. (Ibid.) An appellant must affirmatively demonstrate grounds for reversal because trial court error will not be assumed. (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549 (Sullivan).) “To demonstrate error, [the] appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
The presumption of correctness carries particular weight in this case, given the deferential abuse of discretion standard that governs our review here. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282-283 [support orders]; In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 670 [determination of value of community assets, including goodwill]; In re Marriage of Petropoulos (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 161, 177-178 [attorney fee awards].) Speaking generally, “the appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.” (In re Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590, 598.) To the extent that a trial court’s exercise of discretion is based on the facts of the case, it will be upheld “as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence presented.” (In re Marriage of Nichols, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 670.) Conversely, a court abuses its discretion if its findings are wholly unsupported, since a consideration of the evidence “is essential to a proper exercise of judicial discretion.” (Johns v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 983, 998; see also, e.g., In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351; In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)
In addition to shouldering the burden of demonstrating error, an appellant “further bears the burden to provide a record on appeal which affirmatively shows that there was an error below, and any uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the [appellant].” (Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 549; accord People v. $17,522.08 United States Currency (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084.) An incomplete reporter’s transcript precludes review of a trial court exercising its discretion because the missing portions will be presumed to support the judgment. (In re Silva (1931) 213 Cal. 446, 448; see also Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154.) Even if the extant portion of an incomplete reporter’s transcript indicates error, we nonetheless would be compelled to affirm since a reversal of the judgment may not be made except after a review of the entire record. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) “Appellate inquiry into prejudice is not a process of subtracting the invalid elements to ascertain whether the remaining record is adequate to sustain [the judgment]. Rather, the process entails scrutiny of the entire record to determine the error’s influence.” (People v. Hopper (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 774, 778, italics added.) Appeals made on inadequate records preclude review.
With these principles in mind, we turn to Ebaugh’s contentions.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ebaugh raises numerous contentions that the court’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Ebaugh contends: (1) the court erred when it imputed income to him based on his employment at CCFMG because it was not in the children’s best interests for him to work in Fresno, as he needed to live and work in Visalia so he could attend to the “extreme needs” of the boys and supervise the children as Judge Reed ordered, and there was no evidence he had the opportunity to earn $210,695 in Visalia, that his decision to quit CCFMG was motivated by anything other than wanting to be available to co-parent his children, or that further attention from him would not remedy the boys’ situation; (2) the court failed to consider the factors listed in section 4320 when awarding Scott spousal support of $2,000 per month by failing to consider evidence of Scott’s standard of living and his inability to earn the imputed income in Visalia; (3) the court overvalued PWMA’s goodwill, as the sales price showed the goodwill had no value and there was no evidence to support the court’s finding he engaged in a ruse to deprive Scott of PWMA’s goodwill; (4) the court erred in finding the fair market value of the rental property to be $195,000, as he did not thwart efforts to market and sell the property; and (5) the evidence did not support the court’s findings on the attorney fees award that he engaged in a deliberate fiction by claiming he withdrew from PWMA and took employment in Fresno so he could co-parent his children when he actually was trying to have no goodwill attributed to PWMA.
Ebaugh, however, has failed to provide this court with the material evidence upon which the lower court’s judgment was based. Although the clerk’s transcript comprises 19 volumes of documents, including the pleadings, motions, various reports and other filings, court orders, trial exhibits and portions of the trial transcript, missing are key portions of the testimony from the September 2009 trial and the reopened trial in 2010, as well as testimony received at the August 2010 hearing on support issues. Without the trial testimony, we cannot evaluate Ebaugh’s claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings he challenges.
In addition to Ebaugh’s failure to carry his burden to provide an appropriate record of the trial proceedings to support his claim the court lacked sufficient evidence to support the judgment, he also failed to set forth in his brief a fair and accurate summary of the evidence presented at trial. “‘A party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular finding must summarize the evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is insufficient.’” (Hong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409, italics added.) “[I]t is [appellant’s] duty to set forth a fair and adequate statement of the evidence which is claimed to be insufficient. He cannot shift this burden onto respondent, nor is a reviewing court required to undertake an independent examination of the record when appellant has shirked his responsibility.... ’” (Ibid.) Ebaugh’s recitation of the evidence focuses almost exclusively on the facts that support only his position. He has not provided an accurate or full description of the evidence presented below.
Ebaugh raises other claims of error with respect to the court’s findings, which we address in turn.
Sanctions
Under a heading entitled “Sanctions, ” Ebaugh asserts the court sanctioned him by valuing PWMA’s goodwill at $227,980, ordering payment of $120,000 of Scott’s attorney fees, valuing the rental property at its appraised value of $195,000, and assigning him the debt EFP owed his mother. He asserts the court sanctioned him without good cause and without evidence to support the sanctions, and it abused its discretion by failing to analyze whether he had the ability to pay the sanctions.
To the extent his contentions are based on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s factual findings, they fail because of the inadequacy of the record and Ebaugh’s failure to fully describe the evidence presented below. Moreover, he does not cite any authority in this section to support his other contentions. Accordingly, we treat the argument as waived. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) While Ebaugh does cite Education Code sections 11500, subdivision (b), and 51120, subdivision (a), regarding the importance of parental involvement in the education of children, these statutes have no bearing on the court’s finding that Ebaugh’s explanation for leaving CCFMG was not believable. All issues of credibility are for the trier of fact. (In re Marriage of Nichols, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 670.) Obviously the court here found Ebaugh was not credible and accordingly rejected his testimony. We have no basis here to overturn that decision.
Valuation of PWMA
Ebaugh contends the trial court should not have accepted Smith’s valuation of goodwill because the court had previously agreed PWMA could be sold and the sales price was much less than Smith’s valuation. While the court allowed Ebaugh to sell PWMA, it stated at that hearing a forensic evaluation should be completed before any sale because the accountant might put a value on PWMA higher than the sales price. Ebaugh cites no authority to support his contention that merely because the trial court authorized him to proceed with negotiations to sell PWMA it was required to use the price for which PWMA was actually sold to determine its value. Accordingly, we treat the argument as waived. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
Ebaugh repeats nearly verbatim his substantive arguments before the trial court that PWMA should not be valued as of December 31, 2006, and even if that date is used, any post-separation decline in value must be apportioned downward to the sales price. In repeating these arguments, Ebaugh has not demonstrated the trial court’s decisions to value PWMA as of December 31, 2006 and to accept Smith’s valuation are without substantial evidentiary support, nor has he established the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, and therefore we reject his contention. (See Iliff v. Dustrud (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.)
Valuation of the Rental Property and Assignment of EFP Liability
Although the parties had stipulated that the appraised value of the rental property was $195,000, Ebaugh contends the court should have valued the property at $160,000 because Scott was willing to sell the property for that amount. Ebaugh further asserts that by valuing the property at $195,000, the court sanctioned him $35,000. While Scott did ask the court in February 2009 to order the sale of the rental property for $160,000 or more, she did so only after the sale at the appraised value fell through due to Ebaugh’s delay. Ebaugh does not cite any authority to support his contention that the court was bound by Scott’s request when determining the value of the rental property, therefore the point is waived. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
With respect to the debt EFP owed his mother, Ebaugh contends the trial court abused its discretion in assigning the debt to him and claims it was a sanction. According to the trial court’s order, however, he was to be given credit for the debt upon division of the community property. Ebaugh has not provided a sufficient record to review the claim, as the testimony from the reopened trial at which this issue presumably was addressed is not part of the appellate record. Moreover, Ebaugh fails to present any reasoned argument or citation to authority to support his claim or to show the trial court abused its discretion by assigning the debt to him in this way. Accordingly, the claim fails. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
The Software Companies
Ebaugh contends the trial court erred when it decided to allow Morris to determine the amounts the community invested in the software companies because it had sufficient evidence before it to value the software companies as of the date of separation. He asserts the trial court “inexplicably is allowing the introduction of new evidence and the designation of a new 730 expert” when it had already designated an expert and Scott had agreed to the value of the companies. Ebaugh asks us to exclude from evidence Morris’s report as to the value of the software companies on the ground that the value reflects his post-separation efforts and investment, and asks us to determine the value of the companies based on the evidence in the record.
Smith testified in September 2008 that although he had not appraised the software companies, he would value them by determining the amount the community invested in them. When Ebaugh’s attorney showed him tax returns from the companies, he testified about the value as shown by the tax returns. Scott initially was willing to accept Smith’s valuation before the reopened trial took place. The issue, however, was apparently addressed at the reopened trial, when the trial court decided to appoint Morris to determine the community’s investment in the companies. We cannot tell from the record why the trial court appointed Morris to make this determination. Apparently, testimony was received at the reopened trial on this issue, but the reporter’s transcripts are not part of the record. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing Morris to determine the community contributions. While Ebaugh asks us to determine the value of the companies, when reviewing a trial court’s discretionary power “[w]e do not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court, but determine only if any judge reasonably could have made such an order.” (In re Marriage of Schlafly (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 747, 753.) Ebaugh also asks us to exclude Morris’s report from evidence. The report, however, is not part of the appellate record and the trial court did not rely on it when it issued its statement of decision and judgment. As an appellate court, our review is confined to the evidence that was before the trial court and is contained in the appellate record. (Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 625.)
In sum, Ebaugh has not shown the trial court abused its discretion with respect to the disposition of the software companies.
Attorney Fees
Ebaugh contends that in ordering him to pay $20,000 of Scott’s legal fees in September 2007, and $100,000 of her fees on December 3, 2009, the trial court failed to find that he had the ability to pay these amounts. Ebaugh further contends the record does not show that the court exercised any discretion or followed legal principles in awarding fees and sanctions.
While Ebaugh challenges in his appellate brief the September 2007 attorney fees order, he did not specify that order in his notice of appeal as one from which he was appealing, as the notice states only that he is appealing from the December 3, 2009 judgment after court trial. Where several judgments or orders are separately appealable, each appealable judgment or order must be expressly specified, in a single notice of appeal or multiple notices of appeal, to be reviewable on appeal. (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 239.) As an order awarding pendente lite attorney fees under section 2030 is an appealable order (In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119 [“a direct appeal lies from a pendent lite attorney fees order.... ”]), Ebaugh was required to specify the September 2007 attorney fees order in his notice of appeal. Since his notice of appeal does not state that he is appealing from that order, it is not reviewable on appeal.
With respect to the December 2009 order to pay $100,000 of Scott’s attorney fees, the court awarded those fees pursuant to sections 271 and 2107, as well as section 2032. Ebaugh bases his argument for an “ability to pay” standard by citing the attorney fee provision set forth in section 2032 and cases decided under that provision, including In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797, 827, and In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, 828-830, as well as a decision discussing attorney fees under former Civil Code sections 4370 and 4700, In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514. He makes no argument that the court erred in awarding the sanctions under sections 271 and 2107. Ebaugh’s failure to demonstrate error with respect to an independent ground upon which the court’s order may legitimately rest means he has failed to demonstrate prejudice even if we assume the merit of the argument he does make — that the court failed to consider his ability to pay. Put differently, even if the court failed to consider Ebaugh’s ability to pay, Ebaugh has not affirmatively shown that an identical order would not have been entered based on the findings required under sections 271 and 2107. (See Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 263; Davey v. Southern Pacific. Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329; see also Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 853-854.)
Section 2107, subdivision (c) requires the trial court to impose monetary sanctions and award reasonable attorney fees if a party fails to comply with any portion of the chapter of the Family Code that deals with a spouse’s fiduciary duty of disclosure during dissolution proceedings, i.e. sections 2100 to 2113. The statute provides, “If a party fails to comply with any provision of this chapter, the court shall, in addition to any other remedy provided by law, impose money sanctions against the noncomplying party. Sanctions shall be in an amount sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct, and shall include reasonable attorney’s fees, costs incurred, or both, unless the court finds that the noncomplying party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§ 2107, subd. (c).)
The situation is substantially the same as that where a particular finding is for some reason erroneous or defective but other findings are sufficient to support the judgment; in such circumstances the presence of the infirm finding is harmless. (American National Bank v. Donnellan (1915) 170 Cal. 9, 15; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008), Appeal, § 434, pp. 488-489.) The same result is also required where the trial court gives an erroneous instruction on a particular issue or cause of action but the judgment is supported by the evidence or by findings on a different cause of action or issue. (See Brandes v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co. (1929) 102 Cal.App. 221, 228; 9 Witkin, supra, § 433, p. 488.)
Judicial Bias
Ebaugh contends Judge Silveira was unfairly biased against him. In support, Ebaugh focuses on his disagreements with the trial court’s rulings. For example, he objects to the trial court minimizing Scott’s imputed income while imputing income to him when he was unemployed and had been denied hospital privileges in Visalia, and contends the trial court ignored evidence of Scott’s unwillingness to co-parent the children and of her earning ability.
These arguments are not a proper basis for disqualification. “An opinion formed by a judge as the result of a judicial hearing, even though it is adverse to a party, does not amount to bias.” (Guardianship of L.V. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 481, 500; see Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 312.) “[R]ulings against a litigant, even when numerous and continuous, do not [support] a charge of bias and prejudice.” (Dietrich v. Litton Industries, Inc. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 704, 719.) The record shows the court understood the legal standards, considered the relevant evidence, and reached a reasonable conclusion. There is nothing in the record showing the court was biased against Ebaugh based on irrelevant or improper factors.
DISPOSITION
The judgment entered December 3, 2009 is affirmed. Costs of appeal are awarded to respondent.
WE CONCUR: Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J.
Similarly, section 271, subdivision (a) provides the trial court with authority to order the opposing party to pay attorney fees and costs in the nature of a sanction when “the conduct of each party or attorney... frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation.” Specifically the statute provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.” (§ 271, subd. (a).) Section 271 “advances the policy of the law ‘to promote settlement and to encourage cooperation which will reduce the cost of litigation.’” (In re Marriage of Petropoulos, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 177.)